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
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THE
BRITISH AND FOREIGN
EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY THE
REV. H. SINCLAIR PATERSON, M.D.

VOL. XXXI.




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
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PRINTED BY THOMAS AND ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY,
AT THE EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1882.

ART. I.—*Evangelical Theology living and progressive.*¹

IN our time a bugbear lies at the door of Systematic Theology. It is the impression that he must “abandon hope who enters here,”—the hope of any interesting, living, and progressive study; the idea that he must move mainly among the shadows of the past, or, so far as he deals with present and powerful factors of human thought, must simply accept and bow down before them as reigning dogmas within the circle of Church life in which his lot has fallen. I shall not inquire how this bugbear has been created,—how far any shade of reality it has is traceable to the professional bias of theologians to the *vis inertiae* of human nature, to periodic stagnations in the Church’s spiritual life, above all to the prejudices of those who dislike Christian truth itself, but find it easiest and safest to express that dislike by disparaging its systematic form. Of these things let us not now speak; it will be better to grapple directly with the impression itself, to rouse ourselves manfully to overpass this “lion in the way.” And as some contribution to this, let us endeavour to show that when confronted with the principles of living Protestant Christianity, it is a

¹ Delivered at the opening of the class of Systematic Theology, New College, Edinburgh, 3d Nov. 1881.

phantom, and must vanish ; that, on the contrary, there is no science in which the provision for life, movement, progress is so ample and the result so sure as the science of Evangelical Theology. For what do we evangelical Protestants mean by dogmatic or systematic divinity? We mean "the exact and orderly declaration of our understanding of God's revelation," "the sorting out and collecting by the believing man or Church of what is judged by them to be the truth as Scripture teaches it."¹ A Christian doctrine "is a truth of faith derived from the authority of the word and revelation of God." "Dogmatic is the science which presents and proves the Christian doctrines regarded as forming a connected system."² The point in these definitions on which we are to fix attention at present is, that our theology is one mode—the scientific mode—of expressing what the *believing mind* finds in *Holy Scripture*. I wish to show how secure and ample is the provision made for a living and progressive theology, when regard is had to both these factors—these great postulates of Protestantism, its formal and its material principles, viz., to the Scriptures—the rule of faith on the one hand, and on the other to faith itself (in the sense of believing grace) as that which receives and holds what Scripture teaches.

A word or two in explanation of this definition of theology. Some may demur to its being called the system of our understanding of Divine truth, rather than the systematising of Divine truth itself. We are ready to admit with Principal Rainy³ that this distinction between a doctrine as delivered to us in Scripture and the same doctrine as sought out and expressed in our theology, is often merely formal, and for practical purposes frequently disappears. We are ready to remind you, with Dr. Chalmers, that a system though designated by the name of its human founder may be directly Divine. The Newtonian system of the heavenly bodies is the system of God though it is the discovery of Newton, "and so a theological system may be the work of God though the discovery of man." Yet Protestants cannot overlook the distinction, for their allegiance is due to Scripture alone, and not to any system

¹ Principal Rainy, *Delivery and Development of Doctrine*, p. 107.

² Martensen's *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 1. Clark, 1866.

³ Dr. Rainy, *ut supra*, p. 118.

of truth that may be drawn from it. The Protestant theologian is bound by his own principle to view his system as something which must, after all his endeavours, fall short of the entire truth contained in the Scriptures themselves. Again, men are sometimes chary of assigning any prominence to faith in the construction of Christian theology. There is so much dread of what is loosely called "the Christian consciousness" that men would fain speak as if they thought Scripture would yield a theological system of itself; that such system might be little more than the logical arrangement of what the Scripture already contains; that we are somehow honouring Scripture more to speak of it, as if it must suggest to the human mind, under any condition of that mind, the true system of theology. But when we say what we think and know, we cannot so speak. We know that the assumption just alluded to was the immediate precursor of Rationalism—that Rationalism of the eighteenth century, which was the spawn of a defunct orthodoxy at the close of the seventeenth. We know that it is only the believing mind which will draw out of Scripture a theology at once true and living:—

"In contemplating the power of human activity which concerns itself about doctrine, we are ever to remember that the grace of the Spirit is a real condition of success; that the kind of success which we are encouraged to expect is promised to the spiritual man, and to no other."¹

Now, let us consider how these conditions of Evangelical Theology, viz., that it is the product of faith drawing truth from Scripture as its supreme and only authoritative standard, become conditions of freedom, freshness, and progress. Let us look first at the duty towards Christian theology which faith imposes, and then look at the nature of the source from which that theology is drawn.

I.

It is well known that the very essence of Protestant Christianity is to lay upon every believing soul the duty and responsibility of grounding and maintaining its spiritual life by direct dependence upon Christ and upon the knowledge of His mind as communicated in the Scriptures.

While making full allowance for the function of the Church

¹ Dr. Rainy, *ut supra*, p. 106.

—the whole Church past and present—in educating and guiding such faith, this great principle demands that faith draw direct from the Church's Head, and that it ground its beliefs on the sole and immediate testimony of His Word. This means far more than the mere right or liberty of what is called "private judgment." It expresses the irresistible demand of the enlightened soul that it shall have its creed at first hand from Divine Revelation, and shall be free to obey that heavenly voice. It declares the imperative duty of believing theologians in every age to ground their theology on nothing short of a direct appeal to the Word of God.

Now this is evidently fitted to secure such continual recourse to Scripture, such concurrence of the believing mind with Scripture, as to be a constant safeguard against stagnation, a constant guarantee of freshness. It is so fitted, I say; not that this has been the invariable result. That it has not been so is the fault of human nature, not of Protestant Christianity. It is when Protestants forget their own most essential principles that they become traditionalists. And traditionalism is but one form of an evil which affects not doctrine only but every other department of Christian life and work. We cannot at present turn aside to adjust the true relation of the individual believer's faith to that of the collective Church, or the relation of every age and cycle of the believing Church to the theological attainments of the past, most important as these relations are. I do not think we are in much danger of overlooking or undervaluing them; and as for the influences that flow from them, they pour in upon us whether we will or no. The one point I am interested in emphasising at present is, that the function of faith, as we Protestants recognise it, contains in itself the rejection of traditionalism and the postulate of progress. For as we understand the duty of Christians and of Christian Churches towards doctrine, there is no believing man, no school of divinity, no circle, age, or generation of believing divines, but must feel bound to be original in theology in the sense of seeking to draw it by direct spiritual application from its Divine source.

It may be said, however, that this method is not likely to be productive of much freshness in theology. For these inquirers, going to the Scriptures, age after age, with much

the same needs, will find much the same things, so that a consent rather than a growth of doctrine may be expected to be the result. So, judging *a priori*, we might have supposed. But, as we all know, such has not been the case. Evangelical theology is not a mere tame and jejune round of common truths in Christianity on which successive generations of Christians have agreed,—enlarging only at its outer edges by adjustment in details, or by addition of logical inferences. Very different indeed has been its course. Ruled as it has been too seldom purely by believing apprehension of the revelation, swaying as it has done from one extreme tendency to another, running out too long into developments that have been false and mischievous, it has nevertheless moved forward from point to point, mastering one position after another, but only as by hard-won fight. The Church, impelled by the necessities of her warfare with error and evil, led graciously on by her indwelling Head to apply a living faith to the enduring and recorded standard, has so evolved her evangelical theology in the past as to prove that the principle is fitted to bear further fruit and lead to further progress. The result already gathered is not a collection of cut and dry dogmas compassing the circle of belief. It is more like a chain of outposts successively conquered, but pointing hope and expectation onward to further gains. Each theological achievement of the past has been the result of a great outburst of spiritual life and controversial agitation, enabling and compelling the Church to evolve into distinct and permanent doctrine what was furnished for her in Scripture in its element and essence. The relation between the constant and the variable factor in these movements is most suggestive, and illustrates well the mutual help of the two great principles—a living faith and an abiding standard. Every real advance in the region of theology has been at first opposed by some as being novel and therefore false, for “had this doctrine,” say its opponents, “been of faith, it could not have been new, it could not have been unknown to those who before us have believed the Scriptures.” Those again who know that they are drawing the so-called novel doctrine from the permanent source make overstrained defences of its catholicity, and try to show that it always has been held by the great believers of former times. The fact is usually found to lie between the two extreme con-

tentions of enemies and friends. This fresh doctrine which, amid stress and tumult, faith has evolved from the Scripture, has been always in a sense there, always, therefore, implicit in the Church's faith, and thus is old with the eternity of truth; on the other hand, it has never been drawn out in this express form, until the necessary moment came, and is therefore new with the freshness of the everlasting gospel.

Not without significance is the successive order in which these achievements have been won. In the earliest centuries, the Church, in face of errors bred of Oriental and Greek philosophy, had to elaborate from the Scripture, under the guidance of the Greek Fathers, a doctrine of God and of the God-Man which has ever since formed the foundation of her theology in the strictest sense of that word. Next had the Latin Church, through its deeper apprehension of the evils of the world and of the human heart, its greater feeling of the necessity of conversion and the need of holiness, to work out, amid the usual concomitants of heresy and controversy, the doctrine of Scripture concerning Sin and Grace. Then followed at a vast interval—and we wonder oft at the slowness of the process—the great doctrinal advance of the Reformation. This was not only on the whole a new apprehension of God's saving grace and thus as it were a new commencement, but distinguished amid its many doctrinal trophies, especially that one,—demanded by the conscience of awakened Europe, so long oppressed by the legal system of the mediæval Church,—the grand declaration of the evangelical mode of pardon and acceptance, that doctrine of justification by faith which now appears to us to shine so plainly in Paul's Epistles. Following close on this great discovery, came a multitude of additions to the doctrinal deposit, among which we may specify the doctrine concerning the Church, so evident to us now as the teaching of the New Testament, but evoked then for the first time in anything like dogmatic completeness by the need felt for the reconstruction of primitive Church principles, when the shackles of the hierarchy had fallen away. In specifying these familiar and capital instances of dogmatic achievement, we do not forget that on every one of the topics indicated there has been living movement since the Reformation. By fixing our attention, however, on the more distant past, we can more easily estimate

the gains that have been made. We estimate the progressive principle in theology by contemplating the positive doctrinal achievements of the past. If we could not regard the instances above alluded to as permanent gains, the movements of theology would too much resemble those of philosophy, where we so often have gyration, but no progress. Here, as we believe, it is otherwise, and past gain is the pledge of future advance. Whence it may arise and whither tend are other questions. But we see whole regions of Scripture teaching, *e.g.* that which we commonly call Eschatology, where the doctrinal positions of the Church are as yet mainly inferential and implicative only,—never having been called out into full and definite articulation by any sustained and continuous process. In what direction, however, the future departures of theology may lie we cannot tell; and we cannot wonder at our own ignorance. For we find ourselves utterly unable to conceive why theological questions, such as to us seem inevitable, were not debated and resolved in earlier periods of the Church's history. As little will the theologian of the future be able to conceive why the questions which will then be new should have remained by us unstirred. But these "times and seasons" the Head of the Church has reserved in His own power. What we are bound to maintain is the great principle of actual advance from point to point in the dogmatic region, that faith shall ever have full and free recourse to Holy Scripture.

These illustrations of progress have been given upon the largest historical scale. But they are no less pertinent to stimulate the individual believer, to encourage to progress in the faith each particular Church and each school of Divinity. For even individual apprehensions of truth, as Dr. Dorner has pointed out, possess an intrinsic right to self-preservation and continuance. Nay, our collective Protestantism "is compelled upon its own principles to confess that what it realises of Christianity it represents in an individual manner, and that other forms of the Christian spirit may yet show themselves upon the same stage, should the Churches in which they lie hid attain, by God's blessing, to an era of evangelical life."¹

¹ *Dorner's History of Protestant Theology*; Introduction.

II.

Let us now examine for a little the relation of theology to its supreme source and authoritative standard, that we may see what pledge of its progress is implied in that relation, and in the nature of the standard itself.

The relation is commonly misrepresented by the foes of evangelical theology. It is their cue to imply that orthodox Protestants put the Bible, the *ipsissima verba* of Scripture, in the same relative position as that in which Romanists place the authority of the Pope and of the Church—the representation being meant to prepare for the inference that their beliefs must be equally hidebound and lifeless. It is notorious that evangelical teaching takes quite a different course. It does not first require faith in the inspiration of the Book, that upon its special authority Jesus may be received as a Saviour. Its method is the reverse. It directs the soul first to a living Redeemer, to whom the Word, the Spirit, and all history bear witness. It seeks to bring the soul into a living relation to that Redeemer. Then to that believing soul and to every company of such believers the Scripture—the word of Christ—becomes the rule of doctrine and of life, and dwells richly in them in all wisdom. The Evangelical Church owns no Head and no supreme authority but that of the Lord Himself. As to doctrine, that authority has expressed itself thus: “I have given them thy word.” His Church knows where to find that word, viz., in those Old Testament Scriptures, of which He said, “They testify of me;” in those New Testament deposits, of whose first keepers He said, “I have given unto them the words Thou gavest me.” Let any believer in the Lord Jesus Christ submit his mind to the undiluted force of these repeated and majestic expressions of His about this body of truth received by Him from His Father, committed by Him to His disciples, to be illumined and interpreted by His promised Spirit; then, I venture to say, he will find himself substantially at one with the Evangelical Church in her declared relation to Scripture, namely, that the Word of God is the supreme source and the ultimate standard of all her deductions and declarations of truth.

Now let us notice what that is in the nature of the standard

itself which keeps advance ever open to all believing inquirers,—progress in the understanding and exhibition of its contents. It is the inexhaustible character of the Revelation, the adorable fulness of its inspired communication, a fulness of Divine truth to the comprehension of which we constantly reach forward, but can never fully attain. Progress in believing theology is not only possible or probable, but certain, from the analogy of the past; for what has its past course been but a gradual advance in the understanding and elaboration of Scripture doctrine? The perplexing slowness as well as the probable method of that advance may be illustrated by another analogy, which our great English master in that form of reasoning shall state for us:—

“In this respect,” says Bishop Butler, “there is a great resemblance between the light of nature and of revelation. . . . As it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so if it ever comes to be, . . . it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at; by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons attending to, comparing and pursuing intimations scattered up and down in it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made, by thoughtful men’s tracing, on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same phenomena and the same faculties of investigation from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years before. And possibly it might be intended that events as they come to pass should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.”¹

But without dwelling longer on the general character of Revelation as promising advance to a believing theology, let us direct our attention to some particular characteristics of it which bear very closely on our topic. And here one must first attempt, with due diffidence, a correction upon a mode of statement which is very common, a correction which glances back on the quotation just made from Bishop Butler. The relation between doctrine as contained in the Bible and doctrine as arranged and exhibited in our systems, has usually been put as if it were simply that between riches in a treasury of undigested stores, and the same wealth minted, told, and ledgered.

¹ *Analogy*, Pt. II. chap. iii.

The parallel commonly employed has been that of the relation between nature and natural science. The Bible is represented as containing all the materials of doctrine, as nature contains the facts which science collects and classifies. Theology is to bring general principles and mutual relations of truth to light from Scripture texts, as science discovers laws and connects orders of being in the world around us. The parallel, in this form at least, is a very misleading one. Most of us, I imagine, feel that in the current expression of it something is misstated, or has been left out. For example, the need for systematic theology is not uncommonly put thus :—

“The Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, and exhibit in their relation to each other. . . . In no department of knowledge have men been satisfied with the possession of a mass of undigested facts, and the students of the Bible can as little be expected to be thus satisfied. There is a necessity, therefore, for the construction of systems of theology. God does not teach us systematic theology, but He gives us in the Bible the truth which, properly understood and arranged, constitutes the science of theology.”

The thing which jars upon one in these statements is the implication that Scripture, from the point of view of the theologian, is little more than a collection of texts, a mass of undigested facts ; that it is without doctrinal coherence, or at least that its coherence is not relevant to the labours of the systematic divine ; finally, that the main function of dogmatic, so far as Scripture is concerned, is to draw out into logical order and philosophic sequence the truths which are given in God's Word without any such advantages. The definition is at once too narrow and too presumptuous. It is too narrow, for a believing theology has larger functions towards the statements of Scripture than merely to formulate them into dogma ; it has wider ranges of development than those of logical synthesis or inferential construction. On the other hand, the definition is too presumptuous, and undertakes too much if it ignores the order and connection in which revealed truths and facts are delivered to us in the Bible itself if it assumes that they only become “profitable for doctrine” when they have been ranged into a dogmatic system. A very important view of Scripture in its relation to doctrine has in truth been overlooked in these definitions, and is too much forgotten in our theological studies. For, in the first place, the Canon is

made up of parts which have each a certain unity of their own, i.e. of the inspired utterances of God's chosen ones given to them "at sundry times and in divers manners." These utterances are not so fragmentary in almost any case but that we can see the writer of them to have had a system of Divine things in his mind by which his statements cohere and become explicable; while in not a few instances, especially among the New Testament writers,—notably, we might say, in the case of the apostle Paul,—these "ruling ideas" take the form of a clearly pronounced and vigorously enforced doctrinal system. Plainly it is the duty of one branch at least of theological science to examine and elucidate with the utmost care the doctrinal ideas underlying each of the books, or groups of books, of which Scripture is composed, to mark the connection, the progressive import, the growing fulness of these thoughts, and thus to prepare the way for the construction of a system which is to work into itself the various phases of Biblical truth, with completeness, with impartiality, but, at the same time, with a due regard to the manner and order in which they arise in the course of revelation. For again, besides the doctrinal unity, more or less distinct, which pervades the work of *each* inspired writer—thus affording instances of system within the record itself, which must be invaluable to the systematic theologian, there is a larger unity (other than merely logical), of the *entire* Revelation as a historical unfolding of God's grace to mankind. This fruitful view of Revelation, to which attention has been so wholesomely recalled in our day, we owe mainly to the Reformers of the sixteenth century. We know how much it did in their hands for the life of theology as well as for spiritual life in general. When, for instance, the Gospel came to be considered not merely as a new law, something to be believed and obeyed over and above the moral code of the Old Testament, but as the culminating discovery of God's grace reconciling men to Himself in Jesus Christ, evangelical theology, the theology of the Reformation, at once sprang to life, taking the place of the dry and arid expositions of the school-divinity. Now let this idea have full scope; let this more "vivid, organic view of Holy Scripture and sacred history" prevail, this perception that the thoughts of God concerning man's salvation, as communicated to us in the Bible,

“form a whole which is composed of members organically related, and which has been the subject of an historical progress.” Can it fail to have a transforming and quickening influence on our theology? For one thing, the notion of Scripture as, in relation to doctrine, merely the *rudis indigestaque moles* from which the systematic theologian is to evoke order, must thenceforth appear to us repugnant. The too common habit of regarding all texts taken from any period, and wrenched out of their connection, as equally available for doctrinal proof must be discarded; while on the other hand the theology which is truly and properly *Biblical* will take its due place as the fuller model after which systematic divinity is to interpret the teaching of its supreme standard. The word which I have just employed will remind you that the thing desiderated is, strictly speaking, the task, not of Dogmatic but of that which is technically called Biblical theology. But what I am interested to point out is, that our Dogmatic can no longer dispense with the thing itself. The task ought to be accomplished in some adequate fashion. And it must be confessed that Biblical theology in the sense now indicated has, among us at least, had scarcely any existence.

How the two departments might assist each other, a fact in the history of the natural sciences may help to illustrate. We state the fact as given in one of the charming chapters of the late Hugh Miller.¹ Students of plant and animal life had long pursued with varying success their vocation of arranging and classifying the individuals and groups belonging to their respective domains, when, late in the history of human knowledge, there came, from another department, a brilliant corroboration of the correct, or the natural, system. It was the youngest of the sciences interpreting the oldest of the records. The researches of geology brought to light in the earth's strata the record of a succession in plant and animal—a record not graven by art or man's device—but Nature's own report of the order in which these had taken their place in the ranks of existence. This succession was found to proceed, speaking roughly and generally, from lower to higher; nay, in most of its details was found to run parallel with the orders into which the best of our naturalists were learning to arrange the living products of the

¹ *Testimony of the Rocks*, pp. 4-6.

globe. In short, the classifying principle in the human mind, exercised upon the natural objects presently submitted to it, has been found to coincide, in its results, with the historic succession of the various orders and classes as these arose in the creation of animated being. The analogy is imperfect, as most analogies are, but not without its use and suggestiveness. The record of Revelation is not palæontological—it is not a record of fossil beliefs, or of an earlier doctrinal creation,—rather of those living principles of God's truth and grace which form the substance of our Gospel and the subject-matter of our theology. But the parallel lies here : that branch of theological science which traces the order and manner of the delivery of these principles to men in the course of Revelation must have a great deal to say to that other branch of it, which deals with the system of these revealed doctrines in their mutual relation and connection. Indeed, the lesson is double-sided. It is not only that our systematic theology, if it is to be progressive, must lean more on that which is properly Biblical,—and this, probably, is the lesson we need most in this country ;—but also, that Biblical theology, where it has been studied, has been too exclusively historical, and has not ministered, as it might have done, to the quickening and transforming of Dogmatic. In any case, if it be acknowledged (as it will be) that this closer alliance of the Biblical with the Dogmatic is *the* desideratum of our present evangelical theology, the fact is a most relevant and significant comment upon our thesis of to-day : that life and progress can only be secured on the great Protestant line of a reinvigorated believing application of our theological forces to the Bible itself.

There are cheering signs that our Church and country are to share, yet more largely than they have done, in that revival of Theology which has marked the present as compared with the preceding century. We have shared in it already. The great stride which all the Scottish Churches made in spiritual life forty years ago has garnered some of its fruits more recently in such theological productions as those of Chalmers and Cunningham, of Bannerman and Buchanan, of Candlish and Crawford, of Brown and Eadie, not to mention names among the living. But there are tokens that this regeneration is to

spread more widely. Preparations for it have long been evident in the greatly increased enthusiasm manifest in our schools of divinity for the study of the sacred tongues, in the rise of a careful yet freer exegesis even in our pulpits, in such results of modern textual criticism as are now made accessible to all, *e.g.* in the Revised Version of the English New Testament, and even in the direction recently given to our thoughts in the more debatable and delicate region of historical criticism. Let that criticism continue to own thorough allegiance to faith; let it remain true to its chosen watchword, the "measuring of Scripture by Scripture;" let its constructions of the genesis and order of Revelation be ruled supremely by the record itself and never by tradition, either orthodox or rationalistic; then it cannot fail to elucidate those "mutual relations of the various elements of the Canon" which are likely, when better understood, to prove so valuable an incitement and aid to our theology.

Not to prolong this rapid summary of the prospects of these sacred studies, let me remind you that they will converge on that which we are to pursue together. Systematic theology has her seat in the centre of the sacred and of all the sciences. A thousand preparatory lines of thought have been beating a path for your feet hither; myriads of saintly names rise in memory to beckon you on; many of the best books ever written are ready to light your studies in the sacred and highest of them all. And then there is that promise of "the anointing that teacheth." Thus served and ministered, let our study be pursued as it ought, with an independence arising (as I have tried to show) at once from the rights of Faith and from the claims of Scripture. Served by criticism, yet resting upon that which criticism cannot shake, theology can afford calmly to contemplate its apparent fluctuations. Defended by apologetic,—an apologetic in our day at once broadened and simplified,—she yet learns not to rush to her walls at every panic, rather to expend energy on the cultivation of her own positive attainments.

"The truth within aye first take care to cherish,
Truths long besieged are apt of want to perish."

Once more, remember that our study is also supreme and central as regards your future work. The truths which it undertakes to ground and harmonise are the substance of

preaching, for they are the great central topics of the evangelical faith. Study them, then, with your eye on the work of Christ and on the souls of men. There is no ground to fear that the thorough study of them will dissipate their spiritual aroma, if you study with the believing heart, as with the investigating mind. The greatest theologians of the Church—Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Edwards, and many bright names of more recent memory, have been also the most spiritual and the most spiritually influential of her sons; and the reason is obvious: when a soul can both most intelligently comprehend and most cordially apprehend Divine truth, then does that soul, apprehended itself and carried sweetly captive by the truth it knows and loves, stamp itself more deeply on men and life. But we must preach these things to ourselves as we study them. We must handle sin, atonement, acceptance as solemnly and vitally in the class-room, as if we were speaking of them to one on the verge of the world to come. Let me welcome you to this employment, and let me pass on to you as the motto of your class-work, and of your life-work, the well-known words, "*Utilis actio, utilis eruditio, sed magis unctio necessaria, quippe quae docet de omnibus.*"

J. LAIDLAW.

ART. II.—*Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century.*¹

THE subject with which, in the following article, we mean to deal is strictly indicated by the heading; the works named below indicate rather the quarters whence the student of this period of our history may find much suggestive help, than the scope of our inquiry. Professor Cairns, in his able and scholarly lectures, ranges over a wider field than the one covered by our title. While making the eighteenth century the main

¹ *The Cunningham Lecture for 1880*, by Professor CAIRNS, D.D. A. and C. Black, Edinburgh.

English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, by LESLIE STEPHEN. Smith, Elder, and Co.

History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Vols. I. II., by W. E. H. LECKY. Longmans and Co.

Religion in England under Queen Anne, etc., by Dr. STOUGHTON. Hodder and Stoughton.

object of his study, he deals with both earlier and later phases of the history of unbelief; he takes eighteenth-century unbelief, as related to the opposition of earlier ages on the one hand, and the infidelity of our own time on the other. The Cunningham Lectures have added considerably to our knowledge and understanding of this important question. They are a solid piece of workmanship, worthy alike of their accomplished author, the Church under whose auspices they were delivered, and the subject discussed. To his opponents Dr. Cairns is fair, even to the point of generosity, and no one can rise from the perusal of his work without a feeling of gratitude, and a sense of obligation to the learned, candid, and thoughtful lecturer.

In the first lecture, the unbelief of the first four centuries is discussed and its character well defined; in the second, the lecturer glances at several aspects of the opposition to Christianity manifested in the seventeenth century; the third lecture deals with Deism proper, as it appeared in England—giving a comprehensive outline of its origin, causes, character, decline, and death; in the fourth and fifth lectures the course of Deism is traced in France and Germany,—in both of which countries it was considerably metamorphosed, appearing under new forms, but with the same old spirit; the closing lecture discusses modern unbelief chiefly as associated with three great and representative names—Strauss, Renan, and Mill. It will be seen from this brief summary that Dr. Cairns gives a comprehensive view of his subject, and that he wanders over a large extent of territory. His lectures will well repay careful study, and, if we mistake not, he has added a most suggestive and instructive chapter to the modern science of apologetics.

In order the better to point the moral often suggested by Professor Cairns, we shall confine our remarks to the unbelief of the eighteenth century, and mainly to this opposition to the claims and authority of Christianity as it appeared in our own country.

It may be said that unbelief is the same in any or every country; this is partly true, by no means all the truth: properly speaking there are two factors in unbelief to which attention may be directed,—the one, that “evil heart” which, whether in Pagan, Humanist, Deist, Agnostic, or Apologist, will

ever manifest itself, and which, for our purposes, may be regarded as almost a constant quantity; the other is that factor which comes from the conditions of the age, the spirit of opposition to God's claims and Revelation, which varies with the changing aspects of human life and thought; "all that floating mass of thoughts, opinions, maxims, speculations, hopes, impulses, aims,"—the "spirit of the age—which it is impossible to seize and accurately define"¹—this gives to unbelief its special character in any one period, and this we must ever try to understand if we are to deal wisely with any period of history. Dr. Cairns points out in his lectures,² and by so doing he has contributed not a little to our understanding of this matter, how the scepticism of early days differs from the unbelief alike of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The early assailants of Gospel truth themselves believed in the supernatural; the opposers of our day object to this at the very threshold of their inquiry. These unbelievers actually appealed to the supernatural, and they found no fault with either the documents to which Christians appealed, or the historical facts on which they based their doctrines. So in the seventeenth century; whilst there were attacks made that went to the root of all belief, yet the main stream of hostile tendency stopped far short of this. True, there was that alike in attack and defence which may be called universal; Spinoza certainly went to the root of the matter, and Pascal has a message for every age,—but both Spinoza and Pascal are better understood in our day than they were in their own age. The common stream of unbelief flowed in channels less deep and broad. Even in the early days of the eighteenth century, there were articles in the creed of an ordinary Deist that would appear, to the unbelievers of our time, scarcely more palatable than the creed of the most advanced Christian. All this only shows how different the unbelief of one period may be from that of another, and how necessary it is carefully to discriminate between things that are very unlike, even if covered by the same general name.

There are many reasons why, in these times, we should study with great interest the unbelieving tendencies of the last century. First of all, if we neglect this study we cannot expect

¹ Archbishop Trench, *New Testament Synonyms*, p. 207.

² Cairns, *Lecture i.*

to understand or appreciate the Apologetic works in common use, and that have been honoured by all churches and all believers. How often are Butler and Paley misunderstood by both friends and foes on this very ground! On the one hand, these writers are held up as having answered all actual and possible objections; on the other, they are condemned as worthless. The late Mr. Maurice speaks of "groaning" as he reads the arguments of the good Bishop Butler; he thinks, in seeking to defend some of the outworks of Christianity, Butler has given up its very citadel. In reply to this, the clear-sighted Canon Mozley says the groaning might have been spared if Mr. Maurice had taken the trouble to understand the origin and scope of the *Analogy*.¹ In like manner, men sneer at Paley's twelve men with their arguments in favour of the Resurrection of Christ, forgetting, as Professor Fairbairn clearly shows, that there have been theories of the Resurrection against which Paley's argument of the "twelve honest men is perfectly conclusive."² If then we are to understand the very books with which we are supposed to be familiar, above all, if we are to do justice to the work of the Apologists of the last century, we must try to find out the kind of opposition against which they so earnestly contended.

In the second place: the unbelief of the eighteenth century, however weak it may appear to some in these days, was wide-reaching in its results. Hume, its boldest and latest product, is hardly now to be considered a voice and nothing more; nor can we forget his relation to Kant and the critical philosophy of Germany—which has so largely influenced the religious thought of our age. After Deism had done its work in England, it crossed the Channel, to do a work far more thorough-going, and in its ultimate issues more lasting. Dr. Fairbairn speaks of Lessing's edition of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* as the "last words of the dying Deism,"³ but before these last words were spoken, it had changed the very conception of religion in Germany, and wrought havoc in fair France. What we term Rationalism, or Naturalism, as Cairns has it, was simply the German edition of English Deism. During the Seven Years' War officers of high rank in

¹ Mozley's *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 264.

² See Dr. Fairbairn's *Studies in the Life of Christ*, p. 337.

³ "David Friedrich Strauss;" *Contemporary Review*, vol. xxvii. p. 953.

Frederick's army discussed Collins and Tindal over their cups, and, in the intervals of more serious business, fought over again the conflicts of the Deists.

In France too, perhaps even more gravely, Deism had its effect upon life and thought. In no sense can we regard it as a "spent force," simply because able English Apologists had the best of the argument. The brilliant literary efforts of Voltaire and Rousseau, as well as the grosser, but not less powerful, forces working in connection with the great Revolution, must all be associated with Deism.

Thirdly, and in our opinion most of all : the Deistic form of unbelief demands and deserves study on account of the clear conception thus gained of the intimate connection between life and thought, the creed and the character ; between a low standard of moral life and an unworthy conception of spiritual truth. Still more deserving of study is this period, when we remember that the most telling reply to the unbelief of the Deists came not from the Philosophy of Berkeley, the Ethics of Butler, or the Evidences of Paley, valuable as were each and all of these, but from that great spiritual revival ever associated with the great and honoured name of Wesley.

Dr. Cairns beautifully says :¹ " It was not a faith nursed on works of evidence, but on communion with a living Christ, that carried the Reformation through the Diet of Worms, the siege of Leyden, and the Marian persecutions ;" so may we say that by far the best works of evidence, in the eighteenth century, were the triumphs of Wesley and Whitefield. The best answer, after all, to the cold criticisms of Hume and the " causes " of Gibbon, although other answers then and now are ever to be honoured and welcomed, were the " tears shaping white gutters down the black faces of the colliers, black as they came out of the coal-pits,"² shed under the simple but spiritually powerful preaching of Whitefield, or the new life and quickening that came to every nook and corner of England, yea and the world, under the divinely guided work of the Wesleys.

English unbelief in the eighteenth century is mainly Deistic. This form of opposition to the claims of Christianity

¹ Cairns, *Lecture II.* p. 32.

² Stephen's *Essays in Eccles. Biography*—"The 'Evangelical' Succession."

is not indeed peculiar to this period; it existed in the seventeenth, it exists still (under certain conditions it is the natural and appropriate form of belief or unbelief), but it reached its culmination in the movement associated with the early portion of the last century. Its limits, as Mr. Pattison remarks, are "pretty well defined." His limits are from the death of Stillingfleet to the death of Bolingbroke, the "last of the Deists."¹ Dr. Cairns has a "threefold rubric"—which he applies to unbelief, and under which he classifies all the leading writers—viz., the Deistic, Pantheistic, and Sceptical. These categories are helpful for purposes of greater accuracy, but usually the whole of the writers are called Deists, and the product of their activity Deism. Hume hardly belongs to Deism proper. He is more a critical sceptic in philosophy, and although his speculations have a direct bearing on all questions about Divine Revelation, he himself wished to be considered as holding more with the "vulgar" than his philosophy might lead us to expect.

The creed of Deism proper is not so "advanced" as the agnosticism of the nineteenth century; hence the strength in argument of the Apologists of that day. It would hardly be fair to make all Deists accept the "*notitiae communes*" of Herbert, or the Deists' Bible, as these have been termed, for Herbert belonged to an earlier age. At the same time we cannot but acknowledge that Herbert's Deism would have been more congenial to the leading unbelievers of the eighteenth century than would the rationalism of our day.

Herbert's articles were chiefly the following: that there is a Supreme Being, and that He is to be worshipped; that worship consists chiefly of piety and virtue; that we must repent of our sins and cease from them; and that there are rewards and punishments here and hereafter.² Starting from Herbert, and for a long time not openly opposing his view of religion, the Deists nevertheless wandered further and further from his "five points." The Supreme Being, if He existed, had little to do with human affairs; He *had* created the world. Piety consisted more and more, according to the new teachers, in acting according to the dictates of reason, and the Bible was

¹ "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England." See *Essays and Reviews*.

² See Cairns, Lecture II. p. 43.

ever more freely dealt with as Deism advanced along its course, and as these freethinkers developed their system. So with rewards and punishments *hereafter*. *Here* these might have a place; as to the *hereafter*, unbelief, whether in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, is ever less certain. In point of fact all *distinctive* Bible-truth is ignored in the creed or teaching of Deism, and the only religion it will support is a vague kind of natural religion. To all deeper aspects and relations either of truth, of man, or of God, Deism is ever indifferent.

And this is the character of eighteenth-century unbelief. Varying much in different writers, and at different periods of its history, it was in one and all a spirit of *indifference* to all that is spiritual or distinctively scriptural. The Deists had nothing to draw with, and the well of Gospel truth was too deep for them; they had no clear conception, because no direct consciousness of the true nature and spiritual wants of men; they knew nothing of the nature of sin,—unbelief ever stumbles here,—and consequently they stumbled at, ignored, or rejected the essential truths of Christ's Gospel.

How came it that Deism, a system so spiritually impotent, took such strong hold of the mind and life of England? This is a practical question, and it has considerable bearing on the more general inquiry as to the conditions under which unbelief in any age may be expected to flourish.

To trace fully the causes of eighteenth-century unbelief, even if we could do so, would demand more space than is now at our command. We must give due weight to the causes mentioned by Mr. Patrick in his suggestive article on Deism in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; such, for example, as the new conceptions about astronomy, overthrowing, as these did, the more traditional view of the universe. We know that similar causes have produced similar effects in our own century, and it is but fair to assume that they operated then, and to some extent changed the religious conceptions of men. The feeling expressed so well by Mr. Browning's Moor in *Luria* has its place in the human mind, and it may lead to serious changes in a man's view of life. Contrasting with Western conceptions of God the views prevailing in the East, the Moor says:—

"My own East !

How nearer God we were ! He glows above
With scarce an intervention, presses close
And palpitatingly, His soul o'er ours !
We feel Him not by painful reason know

.

All changes at his instantaneous will,
Not by the operation of a law
Whose Maker is elsewhere at other work.
His hand is still engaged upon His world—
Man's praise can forward it, man's prayer suspend,
For is not God all-mighty ?"

In this England of ours, men accustomed to the conception of God being near to them—as near to them as He was to Moses, Joshua, and the great leaders of the past when they were engaged in His work—accustomed to feel His presence and invoke His aid in all that concerned their life, received a kind of shock when they were told of the new theories. These theories seemed to remove God further from them, and to put in His place laws and forces self-acting ; and hence, perhaps, their perplexity. These influences, acting on men who had ceased to feel within their own hearts that "*testimonium spiritus sancti*," the glory alike of Reformation and Puritan life, might predispose to wavering, uncertainty, and unbelief. So too, the philosophy of Locke might prepare the way for Deism, as it certainly supplied to both attack and defence the theory of the "reasonableness" of Christianity.

The great cause of Deism, however, was unquestionably, as Cairns remarks, "the decay of the Christian religion itself. The fervent interest in spiritual things which had marked the middle period of the seventeenth century, and made it, with all its faults, the greatest hitherto in English history, had, through manifold failure and defeat, been followed by the reaction of the Restoration ; and the visible and notorious denial of Christianity in life and practice prepared the way for its denial in opinion and theory."¹

This is, we believe, a true and sufficient account of the origin and progress of unbelief in the early portion of last century ; may we not say of unbelief in any and every century ? Hence its lessons for us in these days of doubt, unrest, and

¹ *Cunningham Lectures*, p. 63.

open atheism. It may be, no doubt often is, possible to separate intellectual unbelief from laxity of moral life. No longer is it always the "fool," using that word in its Old Testament sense, that says "No God." Many feel the pressure of intellectual doubt as to the Divine character of Christianity, who have no wish to shake themselves free from moral obligations. Nevertheless, there will generally be found, if not in the individual certainly in the age, a close connection between unbelief and low moral standards. "Wherever," says Christlieb, "there is a real alienation from the Gospel, ethical causes have much to do with it. . . . In Divine and spiritual things, no one errs entirely without his own fault."¹ This, true of the individual, has a wider bearing, and may be applied to the community. It is only when there is great freshness and fervour of spiritual life in the Church, when Christians are uniting together in earnest spiritual work, and when they are manifesting the power of Christianity in their lives, that the world finds it easy to accept the New Testament faith. Science does appear to banish God from us, and to put in His place laws and forces as if self-acting; nor can Berkeley's philosophy of a constant creation, however true, supply the place of the banished Power. Only when God's living presence is felt in the Church, and through the Church is manifested to the world, is there supplied the necessary counteracting influence,—necessary alike to the Church and the world.

Much difference of opinion exists among thinkers as to the true character of the last century. Dr. Cairns, referring more especially to Carlyle's estimate, very properly says that an age so fruitful in scientific discovery, so great in works of art and literature, so full of great moral, philanthropic, and spiritual movements cannot, with any propriety, be called barren.² This is true, and yet after saying all we can for the eighteenth century we must admit that, morally and spiritually at least, few periods have been less fruitful than its earlier decades. Mr. Pattison's estimate can hardly be set aside. The "thirty years succeeding the peace of Utrecht" (1714) may have been materially the most prosperous season England ever experi-

¹ *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 27.

² See Appendix to *Cunningham Lectures*, Note A.

enced; morally and spiritually they were barrenness itself. Worse still, and this is part of the explanation of Deism, they were productive of much evil. Not too strong are Mr. Pattison's words: "A period of decay of religion, licentiousness of morals, public corruption, profaneness of language, a day 'of rebuke and blasphemy' . . . an age whose poetry was without romance, whose philosophy was without insight, and whose public men were without character; an age of 'light without love,' whose 'very merits were of the earth earthy.'" Mr. Pattison supports his estimate by giving Hartley's "six things threatening ruin to states;" among others the growth of infidelity and even atheism, the open lewdness of both sexes, the licentiousness and carelessness of the people, and the gross and unblushing worldliness of the clergy. Readers of Tyerman's *Life of Wesley* are familiar enough with all these features of English life. One town, not far from John Wesley's home, has the bad pre-eminence of having possessed a vicar and chief magistrate shameless enough to lead an open attack on one of his preachers. These leaders in Church and State used the *public-house influence* in their crusade against Methodism in a way that might do credit even to unscrupulous politicians in our time. Even if we make allowance for a certain one-sidedness in accounts given by men who themselves suffered many things at the hands of the lawless, we must still admit the substantial truthfulness of their saddest pictures. Mr. Leslie Stephen, while trying to do justice to another and better side of things, and not unwilling, perhaps, to correct, if possible, the accounts given by more zealous writers, is compelled to admit the deadness and immorality of the early part of the eighteenth century. Nor does Mr. Lecky in his very able and thorough-going History—a very model of painstaking research and judicial calmness—at all differ from Mr. Pattison.

We would not be understood as condemning everything in the eighteenth century. Thank God! no age is left without its saints, its scholars, and its men with the heroic spirit. In spite of the worldliness, the time-serving, and the compromise, so fashionable in the early days of the century, there were in it men, surpassed in purity, devotion, and moral worth by none, equalled by but few, in any age. We speak of the great

mass of the people, and of the prevailing tendencies alike in Church and State. As to the character of these, history leaves little room for dispute. Whether we read it in the charming pages of Green, the more massive work of Lecky, or the sharp and sarcastic descriptions of Leslie Stephen; whether we go to the more highly-coloured, because more deeply felt and realised, descriptions given by the spiritual men then living, or to the histories of spiritual men of to-day, who tell the story of that age, we meet with one and the same account. Brilliant genius allied with dissolute manners; great political influence gained by most unworthy means and supported by flagrant abuse alike of office and authority. Along with this, intellectual ability in the pulpit, sometimes of a high order, but often using a style of argument too much like vituperation ever to have produced any deep moral impression; sermons too, of great intellectual worth, but frigid as the pole; argument upon argument to prove what no one doubted, and to confute what few cared to believe. Mr. Leslie Stephen speaks of sermons the only classification of which is "dull, duller, dullest," and of people whom he more graphically than politely terms "ponderous, well-fed, animated masses of beefsteak"!! Such a state of things would be little likely either to disturb or retard the progress of Unbelief; under such conditions the Deist's creed would really be the form of belief most attractive to the human mind. We have no space for confirmation of such an estimate by more detailed and realistic descriptions; few familiar with this portion of English history require much further illustration.¹ The age of Marlborough was not wanting in a certain kind of greatness. Englishmen may be proud of the military genius of the great soldier; they cannot look upon the moral effect of his ascendancy as anything but corrupt and corrupting. Walpole may have been a great minister; he was anything but a great man. We must regard him as a foe to public morals and a corrupter of public men. What must have been the spiritual tone of the nation when

¹ See Lecky's two volumes for abundant confirmation of all the statements made in the text; also Leslie Stephen's *History*, or Green's *History of the English People*.

There are some good remarks in Dr. Rigg's *Discourses*, recently published, on the same theme. Any Life of Wesley or Whitefield will furnish materials in proof.

its Prime Minister could unblushingly use the patronage of the Crown for mere party purposes, when all public support had its price, and when political parties were kept together by wholesale bribery ! Worse still : what but unbelief could be expected in a community where a Prime Minister was not ashamed to "appear at the play with his mistress ;" when bishops boasted that they had never seen their Sees ; or when Lord Chesterfield was the fashionable guide and teacher of young men !

Speaking of Walpole, Lecky says : "That he lived for many years in open adultery, and indulged to excess in the pleasures of the table, were facts which, in the early part of the eighteenth century, were in themselves not likely to excite much attention"!! Surely this is proof sufficient that unbelief had in those days a most congenial soil, and very favourable atmospheric conditions. Speaking of a later period, Mr. Stephen says that "men had lost their interest in the deepest problems." Hence the little stir caused by the sceptical writings of Hume. How could a deep interest in either philosophy or theology exist along with the corrupt lives of State ministers, the intellectual coldness and worldliness of bishops, and the coarse manners of large numbers even of the upper classes of society ? The Church, and by this term we do not mean the Church of England alone, was largely responsible for the prevailing indifference. Its teachers and pastors forgot their function as ambassadors of Christ, and laboured chiefly to commend a kind of prudential morality to the dull reason of the people. In seeking for the moral causes of Deism these conditions must not be overlooked. Intellectual causes there doubtless were as well. The great literary revival might act partly to the injury of spiritual fervour. The discoveries of science, and the new world opened up by Newton and others, might disturb the equilibrium of many who had little real spiritual stability in themselves, just as the stories of rich lands brought by the sailors of an earlier age excited the cupidity of traders, and led to disastrous commercial results. As Dr. Cairns well says,¹ *ideally* considered, there is no opposition between

¹ *Lectures*, p. 35. See some profound remarks on a cognate subject in Mozley's Essay on Blanco White, *Essays*, vol. ii.

culture and spiritual religion, but it is, nevertheless, historically true that the world has never seen great alliances between these two forces without some detriment to religion. The Reformation doctrine did not long commend itself to the so-called Humanists; nor did the Humanist help when given to reformers always add to the spiritual progress of the Reformation. So, in the eighteenth century, while there might thus be causes of unbelief connected with the relation of the intellectual to the spiritual domains of life, the chief causes will be found in the moral and spiritual life of that age. To no small extent is it true that the very preaching tended to unbelief. The great preachers harped so constantly on one string, and that not the one whose vibrations touch most deeply the heart of humanity, that they rather fostered than counteracted the Deistic tendency. Both attack and defence agreed in one thing: Christianity must be shown to be reasonable. The "reasonableness of Christianity," Locke's theory, it has been well said, was really the text from which all preached. "The clergy," says the clear-sighted and profoundly evangelical Dorner, "no longer regarded themselves as the ambassadors of Christ commissioned in His name to offer salvation to the world; but as orators, whose office it was eloquently to recommend to their flocks Christian, or for the most part merely moral, truths, as the surest means of happiness both in this world and the next. . . . Orthodoxy contented itself, for the most part, with a defence of the outworks, while, so far as the contents of Christianity were concerned, it was itself only too nearly assimilated to a moderate kind of Deism; morality and not religion having become the centre on which it turned."¹ Unquestionably, Dorner here puts his finger on the weak point alike in the preaching and apologetics of the eighteenth century. It is said, with what truth we are unable to judge, that at one time in Boston (U.S.), Unitarianism was so strong that it gave the tone to the preaching of Trinitarians; that men thought more of commending their teachings to Unitarians, or of defending themselves from the attacks of Unitarians, than of commending the gospel of Christ to the consciences of their hearers. If such was the case, we venture to say that

¹ Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology*, vol. ii. p. 77, etc.

not Trinitarian, but Unitarian, doctrine, would be the gainer by such a policy. So in connection with the "moral" and "reasonable" preaching of the eighteenth century. It would promote neither morality nor religion. The moment the preacher substitutes for the authority of Christ's Gospel—the message of his Master, delivered for the obedience of himself and his hearers—his own reasonings, however logical, or his own speculations, however interesting, that moment he takes a lower place, weakening both his own influence and the authority of his Master. The first preachers had to deal with a reason-seeking age—the "Greeks seek after wisdom:" we do not read that they made the chief feature of their teaching the essential reasonableness of the Gospel of Christ. They no doubt believed profoundly in the rational character of Christianity—men do not die for what they think irrational; but this is not the ground on which they appeal to men. They appear as ambassadors, regard themselves as men intrusted with a message whose meaning and urgency they themselves felt most intensely; they delivered their message simply, earnestly, and boldly. Hence the results.

If any modern preacher thinks he can convince the world by reasoning out, *a-priori*-wise, the Gospel of Christ—if he thinks he can bring the world back to righteousness by constantly insisting on the importance of a good moral life,—let him study the philosophy, theology, and morality of the early part of the eighteenth century. There he will find convincing proof that deeper work is needed, and that only as the preacher honours Christ by delivering His message of mercy to sinful man, in His name and by His authority, can he hope to convince the gainsayers, reform the social, and quicken the spiritual, life of men.¹

We would not for one moment be understood as saying a word against the honest attempt to meet argument by argument, or to show that Christianity is a rational system. "Wherever we can, by fair and legitimate interpretation, harmonise Scripture with history, with philosophy, with science,

¹ We have confined our attention exclusively to English thought and life. The same lesson is taught by a study of Scottish "Moderatism," as it has been termed. Sermons after Blair's model, while they might have a certain finish about them, converted no souls, and the Moderate, while constantly teaching morality, did not promote righteousness.

we are not only warranted but bound to do so, since all truth is one, and God requires us to display it unbroken."¹ But we shall never really commend Christianity to the reason until we have asserted or vindicated its authority over the conscience and spiritual nature of man; nor shall we manifest the reasonableness of the Gospel, unless we go deeper than the deistic reasoning, and unfold to man his own sinfulness, thus preparing him to welcome God's great mercy, of which the Gospel is the expression.²

Hence, while we do not "groan" with Mr. Maurice over the low standard of Butler, we must in fairness remember that man's deepest life requires another guide than mere "probability." The *Analogy* was more than an answer to the shallow reasoning of Deism; it is less than an answer to some of the deeper questions of our time.³ We may admire much the clearness of Paley, and also admit the validity of his arguments *as against the objectors of his time*; we may also see how little real satisfaction there was for the heart of men in his philosophy of life. "Virtue" might indeed be "the doing of good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness;" but, as Professor Blackie well remarks, "the definition characterises the man, the book, the age, the country, and the profession to which he belonged."⁴

While we do honour to the apologists of the eighteenth century, especially to the noble and thought-inspiring Butler, while we fully appreciate their intellectual force and moral earnestness, we must confess that their work did not deliver England from Deism. "From its own point of view," their "argument" might be conclusive, as Mr. Mill confessed; it might triumphantly vanquish Deism, regarded as an intellectual system; it could not deliver men from the chilling influence of indifference and negation. Other men must do this work. Perhaps this is one of the permanent lessons taught by the history of Deism in the eighteenth century.

Much has been said about the causes that led to the failure of Deism. As we have before remarked, Deism *did not die*

¹ Cairns, *Lectures*, p. 281.

² Even Tennyson reminds us that, before we can show men God's mercy, we must teach them "all the sin."

³ Dr. Matheson, in his *Baird Lecture* for 1881, has some suggestive remarks on Butler's place and work, p. 10.

⁴ Blackie's *Four Phases of Morals*; "Utilitarianism."

when it ceased to be a great force in English life and thought. In France and Germany it found fresh soil, and conditions more favourable to its growth. In England it failed, as Dr. Cairns reminds us, because it lacked "faith in a Divine mission." For the same reason its opponents, while fully meeting Deistical arguments and establishing their own thesis, failed to awaken the real spiritual life of the nation. And so the real vanquisher of Deism, as also the destroyer of the conditions out of which it sprang, was neither the idealism of Berkeley, the ethical philosophy of Butler, nor the shrewd common sense of Paley, but apologetic work of a very different type. "In the rise of Methodism and other great impulses," says Cairns, "it was found that one of the most decided evangelical miracles—the descent of the angel to heal stagnation by commotion and trouble—had been repeated, though not always owned by those who waited for it; and in the brightening energy and hopefulness ere long sent forth by the living Spirit of God, from a country which had thus preserved the continuity of its religious history, over every branch of the Anglo-Saxon race and into all the world, it was felt that the weakness of Christianity had departed, and that a more heroic age had begun."¹ This estimate is confirmed by Lecky, Green, and other historians of this period, not excepting the sceptical Leslie Stephen.

Lack of space forbids our entering at any length on this most fertile theme. To trace the rise and progress of that spiritual movement, which shook England from its centre to its remotest circumference, which filled the English-speaking world with new life and energy, which, reacting on all other Churches, quickened the whole spiritual life of that age, and filled the world with new forms of Christian energy and enterprise, is not possible to us at present. Nor is such a work necessary for the readers of this paper; they are familiar with this noble story—a story to which not only historians of Methodism, but all true historians, are now beginning to do justice. Lecky in his *History* does honour to Wesley and the movement of which he was the originator; says that the "career of the elder Pitt, and the splendid victories by land and sea won during his ministry, . . . must yield in real

¹ *Lectures*, p. 118.

importance to that religious revolution begun by the preaching of the Wesleys and of Whitefield. The creation of a large, powerful, and active sect, extending over both hemispheres, and numbering many millions of souls, was but one of its consequences. It also exercised a profound and lasting influence upon the spirit of the Established Church, upon the amount and distribution of the moral forces of the nation, and even upon the course of its political history."¹ While this is now acknowledged by all, there is sometimes freshness of impression in simply seeing a familiar picture from a slightly different point of view; thus in relation to the unbelief of the eighteenth century the origin and progress of Methodism is peculiarly suggestive. As there were "reformers before the Reformation," so there were spiritual influences at work before the appearing of Wesley; indeed, Wesley himself has to be accounted for, and is the outcome in one way of these influences. We must not forget to do justice to Law and the Moravian Brethren, and to other faithful and more or less enlightened men, struggling against the dominant unbelief and spiritual indifference of their time. All these points of interest we must leave untouched. What is specially important to be considered is the *character* of the new forces at work against deism after the appearing of Wesley. Not even Leslie Stephen, ready as he is to sneer at aspects of Methodism, and to look down with agnostic disdain on the new life of that period, can call the sermons of either Wesley or Whitefield "dull," whatever charges may be made against them on other grounds.

Mr. Leslie Stephen, speaking of much of the ordinary preaching of the age, calls it "good commonplace morality, defended by ordinary common sense. Don't get drunk, or you will ruin your health; nor commit murder, for you will come to the gallows; every man should seek to be happy, and the way to be happy is to be thoroughly respectable."² Wesley and Whitefield had other ideas about preaching, and other aims and objects in addressing their fellow-men. Once more the preacher stood before his hearers, not as an elegant essayist, or a philosopher reasoning about natural religion, or the elements of probability, but as one of the old prophets, his lips touched

¹ *History*, vol. ii. chap. ix. "The Religious Revival."

² *English Thought*, vol. ii. "The Religious Reaction."

with fire from God's altar, his soul full of compassion for perishing men. Once more the preacher regarded himself as an ambassador of Christ, and with all the earnestness and energy of his being delivered his Master's message. His themes were not the reasonableness of Christianity or the chances of a future life based upon mathematical calculations and theories of human probability,¹ but sin and death, the wrath of God, the judgment-seat of Christ, the world to come, with its joys and terrors, or the infinite love and mercy of God revealed in the Cross of Christ. God and Christ, heaven and hell, sin and atonement, judgment and salvation, were no longer mere theological terms devoid of all true significance—they were great and awful realities. And as these new preachers discussed such themes with all the earnestness of their strong natures, with all the enthusiasm of God-quickenened men, they thrilled the hearts of their fellows, making them realise the terrible meaning of life and the need of salvation. Hence the tears that streamed down the grimy cheeks of colliers and miners; hence the awful sense of eternity and the importance of salvation *there and then* that took possession of human hearts. These preachers did not care to argue much about the existence of God, the probabilities connected with a future life, or the reasonableness of Christianity. To them Christ was a real Being, and His Gospel a real salvation; to them this salvation was not merely a future prospect, but a present and conscious possession; to them the Bible did not merely contain things of high value, was not simply a confirmation of the eternal Gospel, "old as the creation," and written on the natural heart of man,—it was the word of the living God, the full and final word on all matters connected with man's highest life here and hereafter. Believing all this with intensity of faith, they spoke out of full hearts, and their word was with power; their gospel became the "power of God unto salvation" to many thousands. Hence the new life and quickening experienced far and wide; hence the crowds that gathered round these new

¹ Sherlock puts it: "It is ten to one against you (Deists), that if you follow the world you will get nothing or little by it; and, therefore, there are the same odds on the other side, that if you follow religion you lose nothing by it; so that supposing religion to be uncertain, yet a man does not venture much for it," etc.—*English Thought*, vol. ii. p. 342. Such prudential calculations do not much influence the souls of men.

preachers wherever they stood up to speak. Men who could see nothing in the logic of Berkeley or the ethics of Butler, for whom Paley's twelve men had no message, saw before them, felt within them, new manifestations of Divine power. God not only lived and reigned somewhere and somehow; *He was actually present among them.* The triumphs of Christianity and the living power of Christ were not merely found in the records of early history, in the thousands at Pentecost, or the heroes and martyrs of a later age; they were to be seen and felt in every city, town, and village of old England. Thus without any reasoning, with but little argument, the Deistic position was completely undermined, and the walls of the proud Jericho of eighteenth-century unbelief fell flat before the blasts of the new evangel. As if by magic the whole scene was changed. The closing decades of one of the "dreariest" of centuries are among the most fertile in Christian enterprise that the world has seen. The impulse of the Wesleys and others was felt by all the Churches, and many who criticised much of their methods caught the inspiration of their spirit. The Church that could find no room within its pale for the work of a Wesley, received new life and power from its rejected sons, and all over England new life began to make its appearance. Hence the splendid efforts of philanthropists, the movements in favour of compassion for the suffering, and liberty for the slave; hence the new kindling of the fire of evangelistic zeal and the missions at home and abroad that were its first result;¹ hence the formation of the great Societies that have for their object the sending forth of labourers into God's vineyard, and the giving of the word of life to every weary son and daughter of humanity.

As when, after the frosts, snows, and dreary days of winter, the fresh breath of spring life touches the apparently lifeless trees and plants, and, lo! they are covered with rich buds and blossoms, the promise of richer life to come, so the fresh inspiration of Christ's own life, through the Wesleys and their fellow-workers, touching the dormant life of Churches, the cold indifference and all but paralysed energies of Christian men filled not only England, but the whole English-speaking world

¹ See Dr. Christlieb's little book, *The Foreign Missions of Protestantism*. Nisbet and Co.

with the buds, blossoms, flowers, and fruits of a new and a richer spiritual life.

This quickening power, at once Heaven-sent and Heaven-fostered, was the truest apology for Christianity, and the most effective reply to the arguments of Deism in old England. It was felt by all, says Cairns, "that the weakness of Christianity had departed, and that a more heroic age had begun."

J. FORDYCE.

ART. III.—*A Bible Reviser of the Fourth Century.*

THERE are few events of greater interest and significance, in this age of religious forces so various and opposite, than the appearance, with the consent and co-operation of all sections of the Church, of a revised version of the English Bible. When we think of the length of time during which the version of 1611 has retained its hold on all English-speaking peoples, and the warmth and sincerity of the praise still bestowed on it, even by those most earnest in advocating its revision, it might well have seemed that, in spite of its minor defects, the proposal to revise it would have received but little support. Especially might the strong conservative instinct of the great body of Christians have been expected, in view of the powerful critical and agnostic movements of the day, to have resisted strenuously a step which might appear fitted to undermine the general confidence regarding the teaching of the inspired Word. It is therefore a ground of profound thankfulness to God—may it not be taken as another added to the many indications, in all the ages, of a Divine guidance of the Church?—that the conservative instinct, in its own place most valuable, has not in this instance been permitted to go to an extreme; but that the various sections of the Church, by taking the movement for revision into their own hands, and dedicating to its accomplishment the gifts of their ablest men, have shown their wise confidence in the ability of the truth they believe in to protect itself.

Resides the conservative instinct of the Church, the strong sceptical tendencies of the day might have been thought fatal

to the inception and successful completion of such a work as the revision of the Bible. Is this old book worth the trouble? might have been expected to be the cry, or at least the secret thought, of many. In these circumstances the universal interest taken in the work, and universal examination and testing of the portion of it published, is a testimony of the most practical and valuable kind to the profound, though sometimes unsuspected, hold, God's revelation has upon society at large.

In view of the interest and importance of an undertaking which is one of the characteristic features of Church life in our day, and to make the past live again in the interest of the present, we purpose to give in brief outline the life and labours of one of the earliest revisers and translators of the Christian Bible, JEROME, "the great representative of Western learning, its true head and glory, and the rich source from whom almost all critical knowledge of Holy Scripture in the Latin Churches was drawn for ten centuries."

He was born at Strigonium in Dalmatia, or, as some think, Stridova in Hungary; the date of his birth being variously put between 329 and 345 A.D. He was of Christian descent, and his father Eusebius was of good family and estate. Home-taught in his earlier years, he was, at a still early age, sent to Rome, where he received his further education from Aelius Donatus, a celebrated teacher of the day. He perfected him in Latin and Greek. Under his guidance the lad stored his retentive memory with the choice passages of many authors in both these languages; and cultivated his rhetorical powers by public speaking, and studying the examples of forensic eloquence Rome afforded. At twenty-five he had completed the ordinary courses of study, and was able to devote himself to such pursuits as his bent of mind inclined him to. The progress of his religious training is shown by the fact that, at this period, he was baptized, and took the robe of Christianity, the mark of a public profession of that faith.

The strength and susceptibility of his religious feelings reveal themselves in his life. He was of warm, even ardent piety; but, as frequently happens, the eager, passionate temperament with which that is usually allied was, in his case, not sufficiently brought under the control of the enthusiastic religiousness to which it too often contributed irregular and inferior fire.

In criticising men who have left their mark on the world, we have often to discriminate between the different senses of the epithet "great," and in Jerome's case it must be used with a certain limitation. His work was, in the full sense, great: but his personality, his moods, his revelation of himself, betray at times an irritability, a vanity, a weakness, and want of dignity, which show the absence of that calmness and strength of soul which belong to true greatness. He was too much under the influence of his feelings. When these were not unduly engaged, he could take well-balanced, practical, judicious views of things. Under a sense of sacred responsibility, we see him also keeping them well under control, as in his Commentaries. At most other times they are indulged to the full. His controversial, and a good deal of his epistolary, writings, leave on us this impression, that he habitually yielded himself to the full influence of the view that presented itself at the moment. He saw nothing else, and tried to see nothing else. Frequently, therefore, he is one-sided, exaggerated, and even self-contradictory. Upon the grounds such a habit always abundantly furnishes, Rufinus subsequently founded his charges of falsehood and hypocrisy against his former friend. In marked and fortunate contrast, however, to this frequently indulged tendency, and showing that he was not without control over it, are the moderation and impartiality of his Biblical translations and commentaries.

The passionate and as yet undisciplined fervour of religious impulse which about this time filled him, made the next ten years, till he was thirty-five, the most unsettled period of his life. He had not found his true work, and did not know what it was to be. Days and years passed in ascetic rigours, and religious meditation, seemed to him the highest type of life. His student, literary bent increased its attractiveness. Returning from Gaul, he sought to lead this retired, contemplative existence in Rome, but without success, notwithstanding the helps he had in a good library he had begun to collect. The great metropolis of the world was too noisy. His native place, to which he might have turned, was disturbed by a turbulent bishop. The East, the birthplace and home of asceticism, drew him to herself. Her atmosphere alone seemed to breathe the calm of religious contemplation. Visiting Jerusalem, then

moving from place to place in Asia Minor, he at length buried himself for four years in the Syrian deserts, with three companions whom he had persuaded to join him in religious seclusion. To his great disappointment, however, one of them, Heliodorus, soon withdrew. In an extant letter we see Jerome remonstrating with him in the strongest manner, and with many rhetorical expressions and arguments pleading, in vain, with him to return. The wisdom of the step Heliodorus took is shown by the fact that by and by the others, Innocent and Hylas, died; and, to save his own life, Jerome, wasted by sickness, was obliged to return to Antioch.

Here he was ordained as priest, making however the stipulation that he should not be under obligation to abandon his monastic or literary life, or perform priestly functions. Having thus reserved his liberty, he did not enter his name in the register of the clergy in Antioch.

In the desert he had yielded to a temporary impulse of self-condemnation; and laying all secular literature aside, he had devoted himself to exclusively Biblical studies. He there acquired the rudiments of Hebrew, and began the writing of commentaries. Notwithstanding its undue but temporary narrowness, this earnest devotion to Biblical study had its part to play in preparing him for his providential post. And not long after, another element in his training came into operation. He received an invitation to Constantinople from Gregory Nazianzen, with whose ascetic, contemplative spirit he was in sympathy. Gregory gave his mental and spiritual development a further and important direction, by leading him to study the works of Origen, to whom, as a Biblical authority, he became so eminent a successor. The influence of Origen was in the direction of thorough exegetical study of the Scriptures, with all the aids learning could give. Coming to Jerome through the Antiochian school, this exegetical method was separated from the allegorising tendency Origen combined with it; and its scientific truthfulness at once commended itself to him. Under its guidance he reached a freer, truer theory of inspiration than was common with many of his day; and gained a breadth and insight of critical judgment which, in the then condition of the Church, he could not have acquired elsewhere. He never really abandoned the views of the moderate Origen-

istic school, nor forgot to whom he owed the introduction to so important a part of his training. He habitually spoke with reverence, gratitude, affection, of Gregory as his master.

After a year in Constantinople he returned to Antioch, and soon went to Bethlehem, where he thought to settle. But on a summons from Damasus, Bishop of Rome, he went thither with Paulinus to take part in a synod in connection with the Meletian disputes in Antioch. Here, however, he at last found his life-task, and in another department. For Damasus, observing his scholarly attainments, obtained from him, first, corrections of passages of Scripture, and thereafter commissioned him to complete a revision of the old Latin, or current Latin, version of the New Testament.

At this point we may suitably diverge to consider the need for this, the condition of the text of the Latin Bible in Jerome's day, and the causes which had produced it.

Accustomed to a Bible which, wherever we go, whatever church we worship in, and however many copies we examine, presents us with one uniform text, it requires a strong effort of imagination to realise the state of things in the fourth century, when "there were almost as many texts as copies" of the Scriptures; when, in church, individual worshippers found, each in his own manuscript, a different version of the passages of Scripture read in the services; and irreconcilable differences in the various copies perplexed the thoughts and increased the controversies of the age.

The Hebrew, the Greek, and the vernacular texts generally, of the Scriptures were liable to the errors due to the impossibility of finding mechanically perfect copyists, a fertile source of error which the art of printing has eliminated. The last, in addition, showed the imperfections of translations, especially of translations hastily made, and completed by different hands. The Latin Bible suffered from a further cause. The Christian Scriptures were early rendered from Greek and Aramaic into the vernacular of the countries into which their tidings penetrated. The Church at Rome formed an exception to this. As Westcott points out, till nearly the end of the second century it remained essentially Grecian, the Scriptures and the liturgy used in its services being in Greek. A translation of the Bible in the polished language of Rome was thus unnecessary.

Where Greek was unknown, as in North Africa, the case was different. Very early a translation of books of the New Testament had been made into the barbarous Latin spoken throughout that province. A version of the Septuagint, including therefore the Apocrypha, was already extant in the same dialect; and by the middle of the second century probably, the Bible in African Latin was complete. This gradually came into use in Rome, and in the Italian provinces; and as its barbarisms and harsh literalisms were offensive, attempts were made to improve it. Reference to the abundant Greek texts secured a version commended by Augustine for its close accuracy, and its plainness. But many revisions, privately executed, were also current. And thus through errors of transcribers, prepossessions of private translators, and unrestricted combinations of free or erroneous versions, the common copies of the Latin Scriptures, especially of the New Testament, had become so corrupt as to call for immediate and authoritative revision. A deepening conviction of this led Damasus to turn to the scholarly ability at his command in Jerome: "Put the original Greek into good Latin for us." And the eager student addressed himself to his task.

That task had many difficulties. The vast number of corrections required was itself a serious obstacle. Contradictions, arising from the combination of differing and blundering MSS., or additions to one Gospel of details from another; incorporation in the text of originally marginal notes; errors arising from ignorance of the original, or mistakes as to what it was, all called aloud for rectification at the hand of a faithful reviser.

Jerome was not unaware of the ordeal through which his work and himself would have to pass, though the reality surpassed even his forebodings, and drew from him the passionate reproaches and invectives we find in his later letters on this subject. He gives a vivid picture of the surprise, consternation, and rage of a reader, learned or unlearned, accustomed to the old interpolated, confused text, on taking up a copy of the revised version, and, when he begins to read, missing the old and familiar words and errors. "He breaks forth with exclamations, and calls me falsifier, sacrilegious, for daring to add to, change, correct anything in the books of the ancients." The favourite charge against him was that of "introducing changes

into the Gospels," the insinuation of course being that the changes were of his own devising. He finds it necessary to utter a vigorous protest against the notion, grateful to the intellectually indolent, and not confined to those times, of a necessary connection between piety and the simplicity of ignorance. He ridicules those "who ostentatiously declare themselves disciples of fishermen, as if to be ignorant was necessarily to be holy."

Besides those who in their ignorance thought every alteration of the familiar text a falsification, our scholar had other objectors to think of. There were, *e.g.* that class of the religious who, though better instructed themselves, feared the effect on the unlearned of seeing alterations made in the Bible they trusted. Those also would be found who, for the sake of the arguments furnished, or for some graver reason, would hold by erroneous readings which told in their favour.

Jerome therefore proceeded in his work with the greatest caution, and in so conservative a spirit as to obtain the thanks of men like Augustine, who welcomed a revision, though they subsequently remonstrated with him on hearing of his proposal to translate the Old Testament directly from the Hebrew. Unlike the single-minded student, who sought only how he might most faithfully present God's revelation to the Western world, they were unwilling to shake, too rudely as they thought, popular error. Nay, some of themselves, though men of wide culture in many fields, were not wholly emancipated from the bondage of the errors of the day, and regarded Jerome's later labours with the utmost alarm.

Taking in hand first the Gospels, and then probably the Epistles, he contented himself with correcting only the more glaring blunders in them, by the help of the best Greek texts he could then obtain. Nor was the Old Testament wholly overlooked. Circulating in the Roman provinces in its privately revised and re-revised North-African Latin dress, it as greatly needed the hand of the corrector as did the Latin New Testament. The same tentative, conservative spirit characterised Jerome's work upon it. He began with the Book of Psalms, revising it by comparison with the Septuagint, not the Hebrew. This revision did not, however, generally commend itself, possibly not being thorough enough. "The old error," Jerome complains, "prevailed over the new correc-

tion," and was only supplanted by a new and more thorough version, still drawn directly from the Greek. From this version the Psalter in the English Prayer-Book is translated—hence the differences between it and the Authorised Version.

At this point our attention is drawn from the Biblical labours of our eager scholar to the course of his personal history. At this stage of his work his good friend and protector, Bishop Damasus, died; and as his successor Siricius was either unable, or unwilling, to extend similar effective patronage to Jerome, the latter found himself exposed to the full consequences of the hostility which, in these few years of his residence in Rome, he had roused against himself. This was not all due to his labours in Biblical revision. These had, indeed, roused against him the prejudice, distrust, dislike of multitudes of conservative and ignorant Christians, both clergy and laity. But the keenness of the hostility with which he was assailed was due, it must be confessed, to the unmeasured vehemence and bitterness of the invective he permitted himself to pour forth, publicly as well as privately, against those who differed from him. Many men, able, honest, good, make their path more difficult, and create many additional obstacles to their work, by an unrestrained passionateness of thought and language toward their opponents, which is due to exaggerated self-esteem. Jerome was never done exposing and satirising the ignorance of the Latin clergy, high and low; with the natural consequence that, instead of accepting the guidance and aid of his undoubtedly great gifts and achievements, they regarded his most necessary and valuable labours as an intentional insult to themselves. Other causes contributed to make him intensely unpopular with a powerful section of the Roman religious community. His rigid personal asceticism condemned the self-indulgence, not to say immorality, of many of the laity, and even clergy. The monastic views he held and preached found enthusiastic disciples. Ladies of rank placed themselves under his spiritual direction. And when it was seen that under his influence they severed themselves from the ties and duties of domestic as well as social life, to devote themselves to religious seclusion, it is not surprising that some in power thought themselves bound to proceed to the utmost lengths, to put an end

to this introduction into the West of the unwholesome monastic practices of the East. Jerome found it necessary to leave Rome for more sympathetic and safer regions.

The scene now changes again to Palestine, to the old town of Bethlehem on its long grey hill, "its wild bleak hill among hills equally bleak," according to Stanley's description. At their foot lie corn-fields, while vineyards are seen upon their terraced sides. A reaction from the previous utter neglect had long ere this taken place. And the sacred spots of Palestine, so long deserted and profaned, had become the goal of eager pilgrimages, and the haunt of many a hermit. The fashion had been set by Helena; and at Bethlehem her son Constantine had cleared away the Pagan temple and grove of Adonis, which, expressly erected for the purpose, had, from 135 to 315 A.D., desecrated the birthplace of our Lord, and had erected a basilica after the example of his mother at Jerusalem.

The attractions of the place were just such as appeal with greatest force to one with Jerome's views and feelings; and beside the birthplace of his Lord he spent, with but brief intervals, the remaining thirty years of his eager, agitated, passionate life. With all the ardour of an ascetic, yet full of the human interest and passion of a man created to stir and widely influence his fellow-men, Jerome struggled to live not only for the universal diffusion of the truth, but for its all-consecrating influence within himself. Here surely, he thought, at a spot so fitted to awaken the liveliest of sacred emotions, and to calm and purify the heart, he should find strength to guide and curb, and fuel to feed, a life's devotion. The "enormous pile of buildings," comprising the Convent of the Nativity, "extending along the ridge of the hill from west to east," contains, next to the grotto, the supposed scene of our Lord's birth, no spot of so deep interest as "the rough chamber hewn out of the rock at the end of a long, winding, subterranean gallery," the scene of Jerome's later, greatest labours. Down the terraced slopes, along winding paths among the corn-fields, we can in fancy see him, in his monk's garb, wandering forth, to rest after hours of exhausting study, to ponder afresh a difficult passage, a new rendering, a conflicting reading; or bending his steps to one or other of the

convents his friends have established around him, or to Jerusalem to hold converse with his friends Rufinus and Bishop John before the unhappy and irreconcilable differences which broke out between him and them.

His life in Bethlehem is photographed for us in his letters, which glow with all the fire, sometimes so strangely mingled, which kindled and consumed him.

"Here," says Stanley, "he gathered round him his devoted followers in the small communities which formed the beginnings of conventual life in Palestine; here the fiery spirit which he had brought with him from his Dalmatian birthplace, and which had been first roused to fervour on the banks of the Moselle, vented itself in the flood of treatises, letters, commentaries which he poured forth from his retirement, to terrify, exasperate, and enlighten the Western world; here also was composed the famous translation of the Scriptures which is still the '*Biblia Vulgata*' of the Latin Church; and here took place that pathetic scene, his last communion and death, at which all the world has been permitted to be present in the wonderful picture of Domenichino, which has represented, in colours never to be surpassed, the attenuated frame of the weak and sinking flesh, the resignation and devotion of the spirit ready for its immediate departure."

Jerome's treatment in the metropolis of that Western Church he laboured so earnestly for, did not lessen his ardour in her service. The first-fruits of his retirement to Bethlehem were that second and better Latin version of the Book of Psalms we have already mentioned. Translated, like the first, from the Septuagint, he had on this occasion greater facilities for securing accuracy; his nearness to Cæsarea enabling him to obtain the use of Origen's *Hexapla* from the library there, with its more accurate Greek and Hebrew texts. This work of *revision*, as distinct from a new translation, he extended to all, or nearly all, the canonical books of the Old Testament.

But he was too accomplished a scholar, and too full of the true scientific spirit, to rest satisfied with these labours. The current Latin version of the Old Testament, even with his revision, was not so accurate as it might be, nor so accurate as he could make it. His increased acquaintance with the Hebrew showed him that more was needed than a faithful rendering of the Septuagint, to present to the Christian Church the Hebrew Bible. The only other direct translation from the Hebrew, and, besides the Septuagint, the only one before his

time, was the Syriac version, the Peshito. The use of this was, of course, confined to the Syrian churches. The possibility of the Septuagint being a translation of an earlier, and therefore at least equally authoritative, text with the one allowed by the Rabbis to remain for sole use, seems not to have occurred to Jerome. And feeling that a translation of a translation must always be less faithful to the first text, unless there be such constant reference to that first text as practically makes the original the basis of the translation, there grew up in his mind the resolution to go to the original itself, and give to the Church that truly great work, a new version, a new translation, of the Hebrew Bible.

This, the crowning achievement of Jerome's life, was given to the world in portions at varying intervals. The Pentateuch, instead of being the first, was among the last published. The books he published first were those of Samuel and Kings; and the quaint title of the preface to them, *Prologus Galeata*, seems to indicate the need he felt he had to be prepared at all points for the storm he was certain to provoke. Three years later the Prophetical books were completed and in the hands of the public, and first copies of others given to various friends for their suggestions. Jerome was justly solicitous that the success of his undertaking should not be marred by the premature publication of any part which had not received final correction. The portion next translated, Ezra and Nehemiah, was determined by the persistent request of private friends. Perhaps he needed this external impulse, for about this period the controversy broke out respecting the orthodoxy of Origen's writings, which affected Jerome deeply, and cost him the friendship of his old companion and ally Rufinus. Origen's influence on Jerome has been already mentioned. Its limits have been pointed out. Times such as he lived in, however, are not apt to discriminate nicely between orthodoxy and heresy. In the popular view at such times, to agree with a heretic in some points is to agree with him in all. Even in the East there was great divergence of opinion respecting Origen's views, and in the Western Church he was generally regarded as heretical, though upon hearsay, only one or two of his books having been translated into Latin, and these by Jerome himself. At this period, then, in Jerome's labours,

the attention of the Western, and especially of the Roman Church, was, through accidental circumstances, directed to the hold Origen's views had on the Church in Palestine, and in no long time our translator found himself involved in the bitterest and, it must be added, the least fruitful or pardonable, of the many bitter controversies of his life. The course he took was peculiarly fitted to enrage those with whom he had hitherto acted, and who felt that he was now deserting them. It was a course not unnatural in one engaged in such an undertaking as occupied him; yet it was not a course so courageous and straightforward as to escape the appearance of temporising. In abandoning the party of John of Jerusalem and Rufinus, with whom he had been so intimately associated, and joining those who fiercely denounced the Origenists, Jerome undoubtedly incurs the charge of deserting his natural allies, with whose views he had most, if not everything, in common. His reason is not difficult to see. A translator must, beyond everything, be recognised as orthodox. And though the faithfulness and honesty of Jerome's translation, its freedom from the influence of peculiarities of individual opinion, is one of its distinguishing merits, yet in ignorant, intolerant times, a reputation for orthodoxy, once shaken, can hardly be recovered. And, perhaps, few things form a more generally accepted certificate of orthodoxy than to belong to an orthodox party. The general reputation clothes the individual. His general fidelity thus guaranteed, he may with perfect safety, as Jerome was able subsequently to do, express his discrimination between truth and error in the heretic.

Rufinus did what most, in similar circumstances, do. Feeling keenly what he considered the faithlessness of his old friend in this particular, he gradually viewed the whole of Jerome's past life, to whose inner scenes he had always been admitted, through the same distorted medium, and persuaded himself of its general falsity. Having formed this conviction, he laboured to expose, in the most public manner, what he considered Jerome's general untrustworthiness and inconsistencies; committing the unpardonable offence of taking advantage of the unrestrained confidence of this old intimacy, the better in appearance to make out his case. Jerome was not backward to reply, and in his most bitter manner; till the

personalities of the controversy provoked general pain and disgust, and were the subject of an earnest remonstrance from Augustine, addressed to Jerome.

During this unhappy controversy, protracted over several years, the work of translation seems to have gone on but slowly : and a long and severe illness he suffered just then further delayed it. Fretting at the delay, he hastened to put into the hands of friends a further portion, the three books of Solomon, on whose translation he spent only three days. The later portion, however, received again more time and care, and at length, in 404 A.D., the Old Testament was complete.

Even at this distance of time and in the midst of our vastly superior advantages, it is impossible to think of this great work without wonder and admiration. The very helps and advantages now abundant, and in the modern view indispensable, lead, by contrast with the scanty resources of those early periods, to a fuller admiration of the indefatigable zeal, the unwearying perseverance, the undaunted efforts, the clear intellect and well-balanced judgment, which entitle Jerome, in view of all circumstances, to be ranked among the greatest of Biblical scholars. The pains he took to be accurate, the honesty with which he put aside erroneous readings, however popular, the fidelity with which he stated and defended the true amid the ignorant prejudice of the day, make him honourably singular in his age. Good texts were rare, and not to be obtained without great labour and expense. Even the Fathers of the Church were ignorant of Hebrew, and thought its knowledge unnecessary. A striking proof of the low state of Biblical scholarship then, and of Jerome's scholarly earnestness, is furnished by the trouble and expense he was put to, to obtain instruction in Hebrew, and by the ridicule poured on him by even pious and able men, for what they considered his absurd, and even traitorous, zeal in that direction. He was actually accused of falsifying the Scriptures to suit the Jews.

In spite of all alarm, however, and opposition and denunciation, his great translation made its way, without official patronage, purely by its merit. It has its imperfections, errors, defects. But to say this is simply to say that it is human ; and in further moderation of judgment is the fact that

it is the work of one man. For its later form Jerome is not responsible. In spite of his utmost efforts, erroneous copies of parts of his work got into circulation. By and by the truly marvellous ignorance, and stupidity, of his own and later ages, led transcribers to incorporate with his text portions, usually erroneous, of the previous Latin text he wished to supplant. Corrections, improvements, which, as his Commentaries show, he wished subsequently to make in his own renderings, did not find their way into the copies. Into detailed criticism we do not here enter. We may say generally, that to him the Latin Church owed, for many centuries, a good Biblical text; that to him belong the merit of making a clear distinction between the canonical and apocryphal Scriptures, and the introduction into the West of a scientific method of Biblical criticism and interpretation.

We have left ourselves no space to speak of his controversial efforts. In the successive controversies of the day he took a vehement part. But this portion of his labours had less value, owing to the partial and exaggerated statements into which his vehemence led him, and it had subsequently to be corrected and supplemented by himself or others.

We give, in conclusion, a striking passage from one of his letters to Damasus, showing the spirit in which he addressed himself to the main labours of his life. "He that treateth of Holy Scripture should not borrow Aristotle's subtle reasonings, nor use Tully's eloquence or the flowers of Quintilian, to refresh his readers with his declamations. His discourse should be plain and common. It is not necessary that it should be composed with care: it is sufficient that it expounds the things, and discovers the sense, of the Scripture, and clears its obscurities. Let others be eloquent, and by that get commendation and applause. Let them thunder out great words in a plausible harangue. For my part I am satisfied to speak so as I may be understood: and discoursing of the Holy Scripture, I strive to imitate its simplicity."

Jerome died at Bethlehem on the 30th September A.D. 420.

ROBERT HENDERSON.

ART. IV.—*How is Sin to end? By a Purgatory?*¹

THE first question of our title was the title of a former paper, and we must still press it. For it is *not* the punishment of sin—in respect either of the manner in which it shall please God to effect it, or of its duration, or of the number on whom it shall fall—that is the real problem: it is the existence of moral evil at all, and for so long a period as has elapsed since the fall of angels, under the government of a holy and good God. In nearly all the writings, now become legion, in which men have struggled to get free from the terrors of the orthodox belief regarding the penalty of sin, this question is either blinked altogether or made quite subordinate. There is a way to light and hope, if that question be honestly faced and kept always prominent before the mind,—How is sin to end? but only disastrous stumbling is the result of attempting to consider this awful theme with hearts more concerned about our own impending sufferings than about our guilt and corruption, of which these are the penalty.

The pressure of the question is ultimately felt by all who are sincere and right-hearted, and among these Canon Farrar must, of course, be reckoned. Some, like Mr. Edward White, cut the Gordian knot by asserting the annihilation of the impenitent at an undefined point beyond the judgment: others try to find ground for believing that, somehow in the intermediate state between death and judgment, sin will be brought to an end in the will of the sinner: in other words, that those who have left this world guilty and depraved shall be justified and made holy before the final judgment, the present life not being finally decisive of their eternal state. The mere statement of such a hypothesis is enough to show how far it is at variance with the belief commonly received as Scriptural, to wit, that the final judgment is to proceed upon the character of men before death, and, in particular, that

¹ *Mercy and Judgment: a few last words on Christian Eschatology, with reference to Dr. Pusey's "What is of Faith?"* By F. W. FARRAR, D.D., F.R.S., Canon of Westminster, etc. London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

men who have the Gospel of Christ offered to them are decisively saved or lost, here and now, according as they accept or neglect so great salvation.

In proceeding to vindicate the orthodox belief against the notion of a Purgatory, for which Canon Farrar pleads, we must ask the reader to refer to what has been said in this Review three years and a half ago¹ under the same title. We are not to repeat what has been said about the great facts which condition all thinking on the future of sin,—the universality and persistence of moral evil, the severity of God as displayed in terrible acts of judgment, and the present retribution with which sin is visited in the consciences and lives of us all. Neither are we to argue again in favour of the sole authority of the Word of God in this matter. But we must strenuously reassert that principle, for Dr. Farrar's work has 360 pages, out of 485, devoted to wearisome and altogether nugatory statements of the history of opinion, mingled with declamatory appeals to the moral sense. The show of patristic learning and general reading is immense, and its effect on some readers may be overpowering; but for us, determined not to forget that it is with God we have to do, and that each of us is an interested party, there is little importance in anything not directly associated with Scripture, and we agree with Professor Gracey in regarding these endless quotations as "a turbid inundation of disintegrated theologies." Some suggestions were given, at the close of the former paper, of grounds on which we think a hope may fairly be rested that the number of the saved shall largely exceed the number of the lost: so that that portion of the subject also may be left without further remark.

The only point to which we feel inclined to return is one only hinted at before, the character of the Scriptural revelation concerning sin,—its origin in an older race than ours, its introduction from that race, the maintaining and diffusion of it still by that race, and the representation consistently given, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, of a warfare carried on from the first by the Son of God against Satan. We are not aware that the problem has been fully studied and discussed in this particular light; and it would be highly interesting to

¹ July 1878.

consider what bearings it may have on the final ending of sin. Such discussion, however, would demand a careful and exhaustive exegesis, needing a long paper for itself. We limit ourselves now to the single point raised by Canon Farrar in his first book, and strenuously pleaded for in this one,—the probability of sin taking end, in the large majority of cases at least, by means of a Purgatory after death.

The name has an evil sound in Protestant ears, and the 22d Article of the Church of England pronounces the "Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory, pardons, worshipping and adoration, as well of images as of reliques, and also invocation of saints," to be "a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God." It will be best, therefore, to represent Canon Farrar's position in his own words :—

"Cardinal Wiseman is reported to have said 'that the belief that there would be suffering in the day of judgment would satisfy the doctrine of Purgatory.' If so, many English Churchmen would find little difficulty respecting it. They might prefer, for the avoidance of mistakes, to call the intermediate state, with any purifications or retributive sufferings which it may involve, by some other name than Purgatory, just as many theologians of the Greek Church do ; but, as a Greek theologian says, while they shun the name as though it were something frightful, they believe in different conditions of the dead in Paradise or in Gehenna ; and in very varied degrees of punishment and of blessedness ; and even that some may be in anguish who yet hope for the resurrection of life ; and this practically amounts to something but little distinguished from a purgatorial fire. And this view is freely admitted, and has long been admitted, by Lutheran and other Protestant divines. And in views like these I see a strong confirmation of all that I said in *Eternal Hope*, and a very sensible mitigation of the horrors which are preached by popular theology."—P. 71.

Again, at the close of this book, we find the following propositions, stated after the fashion of a creed :—

"I think that even if some portion of the 'pain of loss' may continue for ever, there is nothing to sanction the assertions that such hopes as sinners may *here* embrace, may not also be open to them, *at least until the great judgment*, in the intermediate state beyond the grave.

"I believe that man's destiny stops not at the grave, and that many who knew not Christ here will know Him there.

"I believe that hereafter—whether by means of 'the almost-sacrament of death,' or in other ways unknown to us—God's mercy may reach many who, to all earthly appearance, might seem to us to die in a lost and unregenerate state.

"I believe that Christ went and preached to the spirits in prison, and I see reason to hope that since the Gospel was thus once preached 'to them that were dead,' the offers of God's mercy may in some form be extended to the soul, even after death."

We place this statement in italics, as being almost the solitary proof from Scripture on which the writer relies. The only other is the following :—

"I believe, as Christ has said, that 'all manner of sin shall be forgiven unto men, and their blasphemies however greatly they shall blaspheme,' and that as there is but one sin of which he said that it should be forgiven neither in this æon nor in the next, there must be some sins which will be forgiven in the next as well as in this."

These statements are sufficiently plain. Dr. Farrar does not shrink from the responsibility of teaching men that there is hope for them, even although they may go on neglecting the Gospel quite to the end of this life.

In order to give a fair representation of Dr. Farrar's views, it is necessary to explain that his theory of purgatory differs in one remarkable feature from the "fond thing, vainly invented by the Romish Church." The Church of Rome allows the *hopes* of purgatory only to such as die "in a state of grace"—meaning by that phrase anything but what evangelical Christians mean by it. Cardinal Newman, in his correspondence with Canon Farrar's master, Professor Plumtre,¹ held him tightly to the cruel consequences of the opposite belief; and Dr. Pusey has done the same by Canon Farrar. Now, the Canon (so far to his credit) does not hold the same doctrine of sacramental grace as Newman and Pusey, and quotes with surprise a saying of Pusey's about "a man dying in a state of grace whose soul *here had no longings for God.*" "No popular teaching which I have ever heard," says Dr. Farrar, "would (apart from some visible repentance) have admitted that such a soul would still die in a state of grace." (We cannot pass this without saying that the Churchman in Westminster has been more fortunate than a Presbyterian in Birkenhead, in not having met with such disastrous "popular teaching" from some of his brethren in the Church of England. But to the point.) Being unable to believe, with Newman and Pusey, that men, whatever their moral character, may

¹ See *Contemporary Review* for May 1878.

be secured in "a state of grace" before death by the virtue of sacraments, Canon Farrar explains himself thus:—

"What I did mean was, the doctrine that men do not pass direct from life to hell or to heaven, but to a place in which God's merciful dealings with them are not yet necessarily finished; where His mercy may still reach them in the form, if not of probation (for on that I have never dogmatised), yet of preparation. . . . And here comes in the truth that, as even saints are not perfect, but are still sinners, so even sinners are very rarely—perhaps never—fixed, finished, and incurable in sin, when seized by their mortal sickness. . . . Ere the great Day of Judgment has come, and in Hades, there must have been many a change before it is easy to distinguish between the best of the evil and the lowest of the good."—Pp. 157-159.

We have now Dr. Farrar's position distinctly before us in his own words.

I. It occurs to us to say at once that it is open to objection as a gratuitous and ineffective attempt to penetrate into the secrets of Hades. The state between death and the judgment is *αἴδιος*, the unseen and unseeable state; and it appears to be an essential feature of God's present dealing toward us to withhold light as to what takes place there; the veil, thin but strong, has many solemn uses which are obvious. Is there warrant for any attempt, specially for an attempt so persistent and elaborate as this one is, to discover what God seems to have so entirely concealed? We think there is the reverse of warrant. The revelation given to us in the present state is declared to be sufficient for our practical guidance, although it may not satisfy our intellectual curiosity; and it is part of the discipline to which God meanwhile subjects us that we are required to accept truths and obey precepts on the mere ground that He announces and enjoins these, even while full intellectual satisfaction is denied us. "It is the glory of God to conceal a thing." "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law."¹ And if it be objected that these texts belong to the darker dispensation, there are those sayings of the Master: "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter;" and the demand which He makes so tenderly that we shall trust Him in respect of whatever He conceals, "In my

¹ Prov. xxv. 2; Deut. xxix. 29.

Father's house are many mansions : *if it were not so, I would have told you* : I go to prepare a place for you."¹ The Saviour tells us that some knowledge is in the meantime withheld, and bids us trust Him, that what is so withheld is not necessary for our present guidance. Is it not our duty and our safety to receive the lesson as little children ?

Dr. Farrar lets us see that the reason which urges him into those speculations regarding the unseen world is the state of imperfect sanctification in which the greater number of Christians leave this world ; and we can all more readily sympathise with his longing to know how the gap between that condition and one of sinless perfection is to be covered than we can excuse the means by which he tries to satisfy himself and others. Might he not have reflected on the innumerable cases of infants and persons of unsound mind whose place in the kingdom of heaven is secure, although we cannot in the least understand the processes by which they are fitted for it ? May we not, without at all allowing ourselves to guess at the details of what takes place in Hades, get some guidance by thinking on the vast possibilities of the disembodied state ? That is a state of which as yet we have no experience, but we do know that temptations from the flesh and from the world will at least be finally removed, and the change thus produced must be immense. Dr. Farrar appeals to his observation of deathbeds. He has surely seen many, as we have, in which nothing more seemed required in order to perfection in holy obedience than that the dying saint, already trusting and loving the Lord Christ, should be thus released from the world and the flesh. And that is not all ; our knowledge is not merely negative ; we are assured that to be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord ; and who will be so bold as to determine what the rate of progress made by the separate spirit shall be when it is " seeing him as he is " ?² We only hint at these things, however, in order to indicate that there are lines in which thinking—but not speculation—is lawful and soothing. Our main contention is that He who says, " Fear not, I am the First and the Last, and the Living One ; and I became dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore ; and I have the keys of death and Hades," is fully to be trusted ;

¹ John xiii. 7 ; xiv. 2.

² 1 John iii. 2.

and that any speculations which would render our trust less simple and childlike are as dangerous as they are vain.

“Lord, I will follow *Thee* with fearless tread
All through the dim recesses of the dead,
And each shall seem a star-lit vestibule
To widening mansions of the Father's rule;
Hearts may untroubled beat with Thee that go,—
Thou wouldst have told me if it were not so.”

II. Looking at the hypothesis of a Purgatory in the light of Scripture, we find a strong argument against it in its tendency to unsettle many of our fundamental Christian beliefs. We are not yet examining the slight Scriptural basis on which the Protestant Purgatory is rested, nor are we as yet bringing forward direct Scripture testimony against it, but we wish the reader to consider whether it can be entertained consistently with the common belief concerning pardon and regeneration, concerning the call of the Gospel, and concerning the union of the believer to Christ.

1. We have been accustomed to believe that full forgiveness and a new heart are the free gift of Christ to every believer, instant, sure, and never to be revoked. “Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life.” “O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” “If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature: the old things are passed away; behold, they are become new.” “O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? The sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law: but thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.”¹ It will not, we trust, be so much as suggested that these and many like words apply only to a small class of more favoured believers: they belong to all who are through faith in a state of grace, however brief the time that may have passed since they believed, however far they may be from perfect sanctification. It is obvious (1) that for such the present state *has* been thoroughly decisive of their eternal

¹ John v. 24; Rom. vii. 24, 25; 2 Cor. v. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 55-57.

state; and (2) that it is not to purgatorial sufferings in Hades they are to look for their spirits being made perfect. Their transaction with Christ here and now has been a conclusive one, in respect of their full deliverance from God's wrath, and of their hearts being turned from the love and dominion of sin to the love of holiness and the dominion of grace. Through faith they *have got* to an end of sin, so far as its curse and reign are concerned: what remains is their deliverance from its influence altogether by the Spirit of Christ, and that is eagerly longed for. In what way that complete deliverance is to be effected (in so far as it may still remain to be effected) at death, is precisely the point on which we are not informed; but it is impossible to suppose that souls already in living union with Christ, already absolutely forgiven, and whose wills are already wholly on God's side, shall be subjected to long undefined periods of purgatorial suffering.

Here all turns on a just and Scriptural conception of what is meant by a state of grace. Had the Roman, the sacramentarian conception of a state of grace, contained as much as ours, neither Newman nor Pusey would have pleaded for any purgatory; but, of course, if a state of grace means no more than that a man, unforgiven and unchanged in heart, is in fellowship with the Church through means of external rites, then there is room and need for much purgation. Canon Farrar, as we have shown, recoils from the grossly superstitious view of a state of grace; but he does not adopt that just stated as the common view of Evangelical Christians. Whatever he may say as to not dogmatising about a *probation* after death, that is what his reasonings necessarily involve; and as for any view of what a state of grace is, he escapes from the demand for precision of statement as the cuttle-fish eludes pursuit, by plentiful emission of ink. This is what we desire to make clear: the adoption of the proposed purgatory involves the letting go all the precious things involved in the orthodox belief regarding vital union to Christ by faith, that is, in being in a state of grace. "But let us, since we are of the day, be sober, putting on the breastplate of faith and love; and for a helmet, the hope of salvation. For God appointed us not unto wrath, but unto the obtaining of salvation

through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us, that, whether we wake or sleep, we should live together with him."¹

It follows that this theory would alter the meaning of the call of the Gospel, and would deprive it of the chief element which gives it urgency. "To-day!" "Now!" cease to have much force if I tell men, in the same breath, that, even should death surprise them the next hour, they may still hope to find mercy in Christ in the world beyond. It will then matter very little what other inducements I set before men to repent and believe in Christ: men will cling to their sinful pleasures, and will abuse the perhaps kindly-meant suggestion of a second probation to defer the more convenient season to a point beyond the grave.

"Your argument," says Cardinal Newman to Professor Plumptre, "may avail, in my opinion, with men of subtle intellects, or of heroic natures . . . but will not serve for the run of men, or support them in their struggle here with evil. What's the good of my striving so hard to keep from sin and temptation if I am not safe when I die, and my neighbour who gives himself to the world, the flesh, and the devil, and so dies, may, for aught I know, after this life get to heaven, and I fail of it? Is it not best to go my own way here and chance the life to come? . . . There are many truths which may be startling and even dangerous in places where they have been long forgotten; but, if apostolic, we must return to them and preach them at whatever cost. *Is this one of them?* Must it be *preached?* Certainly it has a heavy *onus probandi* on it, both as cruel and as novel, and requires good evidence in order to be allowed."²

If a Romanist can reason thus even from his view of what is meant by dying in a state of grace, how much more may we! The cruelty of so frustrating for men the urgent appeal which the Gospel makes to them to turn *now* and live is something incredible. The explanation, so far as Canon Farrar is personally concerned, lies in his altering the nature of the Gospel call, at the same time that he modifies its pressure. He does not teach that acceptance of Christ gives the believer instant and certain escape; but rather that "it may be doubted whether there be such a thing as a perfectly and irredeemably bad man," and that therefore it may be hoped processes tending to ultimate purification will be carried on hereafter toward those who have here neglected Christ's offer. This is a serious charge, but

¹ 1 Thess. v. 8-10.

² *Contemporary Review* for May 1878, pp. 341, 342.

almost every page of the book before us contains the vindication of it. In his fear of encouraging antinomian delusion, Dr. Farrar has gone to an extreme if possible more deadly. How inconsistent it is with the whole tone of both the Old and New Testaments most readers will already feel ; but our present point is merely that the hypothesis of a Purgatory would, if adopted, require us to alter our whole belief about the nature and urgency of Christ's call in the Gospel.

III. We wish to reserve our remaining space for direct reasoning from the Word of God, and therefore hasten now to consider the texts on which the notion of a Purgatory is rested.

1. It is inferred from the supposed descent of Christ into Hades. "The doctrine is mainly built," says Canon Farrar, "on Eph. iv. 9 ; 1 Pet. iii. 19 ; Acts ii. 26."¹

As for the first of these passages, "Now this, He ascended, what is it but that he also descended into the lower parts of the earth?" We have been accustomed to understand it as a swift and telling side-stroke, after Paul's manner, thrown in to point attention to the language of the sixty-eighth Psalm as containing an implied proof of Christ's *humiliation*. Its main and obvious lesson relates to His exaltation ; but the very manner in which that is spoken of contains evidence that His presence on earth and His suffering of death were altogether singular, and the result of a wonderful condescension. Had the passage stood alone no meaning besides this would have been suggested by any one. That the soul of Christ was in Hades between His dying and rising again, is, of course, obviously the matter of fact ; and if nothing else be understood by "the lower parts of the earth," there is nothing to contend about : the whole question is what His being in the unseen world means.

This remark applies still more to the last of the three passages, Peter's quotation and exposition of the sixteenth Psalm in the second chapter of Acts,—*"Because thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption."* The text is most luminously interpreted for us by the last saying of our Lord on the Cross, *"Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit,"* and by the words addressed to the penitent thief shortly before, *"To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise."*² We have to thank the

¹ P. 81, note.

² Luke xxiii. 46, 43.

learned Revisers for delivering our English New Testament from the shockingly unfit word "hell" in this place; and if any one can think that a place which Jesus described as Paradise, and as being consciously in His Father's hands was also one in which impenitent souls were suffering, we must be excused for supposing they are hard pushed for arguments.

The passage in 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, is the principal Scripture proof relied on by Dr. Farrar: his words regarding it have been already quoted.

The interpretation put on the words is that the separate spirit of Christ went to the prison, in which were the spirits of the unbelievers who had rejected the preaching of Noah, and preached to them. Supposing for a moment this to be the meaning of the words,

a. How is the presence of Christ in the prison of unbelieving spirits to be reconciled with His own words, just quoted, as to Paradise and the Father's hands?

β. This extraordinary grace was limited to *one class* of the unbelieving dead, those destroyed in the Flood. Why so?

γ. No hint is given that the effect was their repentance. Hitherto the preaching of Christ on earth had been with little result; it was by the mission of the Comforter that thousands were brought in: and during the forty days, our Lord never once preached to the impenitent.

We have long been persuaded, however, that the true interpretation of the passage is not that on which Dr. Farrar relies, but that which will be found given by Archbishop Leighton in his exposition of First Peter, and by Bishop Pearson in his work on the Creed. This interpretation turns upon the sense attached to "quickened in the spirit" at the close of verse 18. The Revisers have unfortunately committed themselves, by the use of a small instead of a capital letter, to the opinion that it was the Lord's own spirit and not the Holy Spirit by which His quickening or resurrection was effected; whereas the teaching of Scripture seems to us to be plain that it was by the Holy Spirit this consummation of the redeeming work was effected. "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you," etc. (Rom. viii. 11), and the same thing is taught in the appeal quoted from the sixteenth Psalm; the Lord's righteous Servant had trust in *Him* that *He* would

not leave His soul in Hades. This being so, the passage has a meaning awfully different from that put on it by Canon Farrar and others. *All* the preaching of Divine mercy is represented as being the preaching of Christ by His Holy Spirit, even that which the antediluvians enjoyed through Noah; and the spirits of those who were then disobedient to the call of grace are represented as now, after the lapse of so long a time, "in prison." This seems to us the true interpretation; and if so, the whole doctrine of our Lord's descent into Hades, in so far as that means going among lost spirits, disappears.

2. The only other passage on which the notion of an offer of pardon beyond the grave is rested is Matt. xii. 32: "Whosoever shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in that which is to come" (R. V. marg.). On which it is to be observed—

(1.) That the general opinion, that our Lord is here making a strong asseveration, accords well with the sin He is speaking of, the sin against the remedy, the sin which excludes the possibility of pardon by rejecting offered grace. It accords well also with the parallel place (Mark iii. 29): "Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an *eternal sin*,"—where the R. V. admirably brings out the meaning of the sacred Word. This is the view taken by the Bishop of Winchester, as well as by very many others.¹

(2.) The following remark of Dean Alford (*in loco*) is worth quoting: "The expressions *αἰὼν οὗτος* and *αἰὼν μέλλον* were common among the Jews, and generally signified respectively the time before and after the coming of the Messiah." In that case we obtain a very plausible explanation of our Lord's using the words He did: when the Comforter had come, the sins which His hearers were now committing against Himself *would* be forgiven, but the sin of those who positively rejected the Spirit would not be forgiven.

We may close this part of our subject with another sentence from Dean Alford: "In the entire silence of Scripture on any such doctrine" as forgiveness after death, "every principle of sound interpretation requires that we should resist the introduction of it on the strength of two difficult passages, in

¹ Harold Browne on the Articles, p. 523.

neither of which does the plain construction of the words require it."

IV. It remains now to present Scripture proof against this theory of a Purgatory, passages which exclude the hope men would willingly cherish of the Intermediate State furnishing opportunity for a change of their eternal destiny.

1. The language of our Lord uniformly, and very solemnly, represents our state hereafter as being determined by the reception given to His offer here. "He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my sayings, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day" (John xii. 48). We do not, of course, stretch the application of this or of other texts beyond those who have had the offer of the Gospel in this life: but we must press it in regard to all such.

"If thy right eye causeth thee to stumble, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell" (Matt. v. 29). The disembodied state certainly furnishes no opportunity for the acts of self-denial by which escape is to be secured from the casting of the whole body into hell.

"Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels." "These shall go away into eternal punishment" (Matt. xxv. 41, 46). We quote these words not with reference to the duration of punishment, but to show how conclusively our Lord links the doom with sins which *can be* committed only in the present life. In Hades there are no hungry ones to be fed, or naked ones to be clothed. The attempts made to escape from the plain teaching of this whole passage are such as make one blush. It is said that our Lord is not speaking of the *final* judgment, but of some division of men preceding that,—in the teeth of the concluding words, "These shall go away," etc.; and it is suggested that the final decision cannot be made to turn on particular acts of mercy,—missing the very manifest lesson that Christ is telling us that He himself is represented by the members of His body, and that men's dealing towards these will reveal the relation of their hearts toward Him.

"And besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, that they who would pass from hence to you may

not be able, and that none may cross over from thence to us" (Luke xvi. 26). It is matter only for honest indignation that men should try to discharge from these words their obvious and awful meaning by saying, That is a mere parable. No one is ignorant of that: the question is, Did the Son of God so speak? and, Did He not intend us to understand that the hope to which men cling of something more being done than is already done in the Word to produce repentance, is a ruinous delusion? and yet more, that the bourne of Death once passed, change cannot be?

The same truth is taught, without any parable, in a passage which has always seemed to us the most plain and decisive, one to which we think Canon Farrar has not referred: "He said therefore again unto them, I go away, and ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sin: whither I go, ye cannot come. The Jews therefore said, Will he kill himself, that he saith, Whither I go, ye cannot come? And he said unto them, Ye are from beneath; I am from above: ye are of this world; I am not of this world. I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: for except ye believe that I am, ye shall die in your sins" (John viii. 21-24). Dying *in* their own sins, *i.e.* carrying them with them into the future world in their guilt and power, and passing then into a state where Christ can no longer be reached, however strong their desire, are set forth as the doom of such as neglect or reject the present offer of Christ. "Take away the probationary character of this life on earth, and that sentence of the Lord is emptied of its meaning. The whole teaching of our Lord is consistent with this central thought."¹

2. The language of the later Scriptures is the same. "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" "As the Holy Spirit saith, To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts!" "Exhort one another day by day, so long as it is called To-day, lest any one of you be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin" (Heb. ii. 3; iii. 7, 13). If there *is*, after all, an answer to that awakening question, must we not regard the Word of God as here misleading in presenting it as unanswerable?

"And inasmuch as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this cometh judgment; so Christ also, having been once

¹ Dr. Rigg in *Contemporary Review*, May 1878, p. 362.

offered to bear the sins of many, shall appear a second time, apart from sin, to them that wait for him, unto salvation " (Heb. ix. 27, 28). If there were the least room to hope for change of destiny after death, we may be sure that here it would have been so told us: but, however long the interval between death and judgment, the one is spoken of as the sequel of the other.

In 2 Thess. i. 7-10, the Holy Spirit says, with reference to the Second Advent, "The revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven with the angels of his power in flaming fire, rendering vengeance to them that know not God, and to *them that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus*: who shall suffer punishment, even eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of his might, when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be marvelled at in all them that believed (because our testimony unto you was believed) in that day." It will greatly surprise those who have not read Dr. Farrar's books on this subject, to learn how he discharges from this passage its dreadful significance:—

"Neither here nor in any other passage of St. Paul, if the passage be explained on the analogy of Scripture language, is there anything about torments, or a word to show that the æon of this exclusion can never end. In point of fact, these words *were written at a moment of extreme exacerbation against the Jews of Thessalonica*, and what is here denounced upon them is a punishment like that of Cain—the *poena damni*—the being cut off from the presence of God—the *rupture of the old Covenant relation*. In estimating its force we must remember that the words rendered 'taking vengeance' mean rather 'inflicting retribution'; that the 'flaming fire' is *not* the penal flame of Gehenna, but the Shechinah splendour of the Advent; that those who are to be judged are *not* ordinary sinners such as are found among the myriads of mankind, but obstinately unbelieving Gentiles and obstinately disobedient Jews; and that the retribution of æonian exclusion is inflicted at the *First* Advent, not at the final Judgment Day."—Pp. 465, 466.

It was surely not worth while for this learned man to take any notice of words which, so far from having the authority of the Holy Spirit, were written "at a moment of extreme exacerbation against the Jews of Thessalonica." And after that, it seems of little use to point out to Dr. Farrar that he contradicts on page 466 what he has said on page 465, calling that "the *first* advent" which he has just called "the second." The most comforting reflection one can have about such a passage—and it is a fair specimen—is that the shame and

sorrow with which we transcribe it must be felt also by all reverent persons who read it, and that they will regard with suspicion a theory which has led a good man to do such violent dishonour to the language and to the authority of the Divine Word.

Other texts, particularly from the Book of the Revelation, might have been quoted, and the whole tenor of Scripture might have been further appealed to as teaching the finality attaching to the present life in the case of all who enjoy the light of the Christian dispensation. But enough has been said, we trust, to expose the unscriptural character of the theory of a Purgatory, and of such a position as is taken up in the novels of Dr. George Mac Donald. The prevalence of such teaching, however, is a serious fact, which earnest men cannot afford to despise. It is none the less acceptable to the masses though it is demonstrably false, for all men are by nature ardent Universalists so far as themselves and their friends are concerned, and are only too glad to have the halo of genius and the shield of supposed learning thrown over what they wish to believe. "For"—in the recent words of the Laureate—

"these are the new dark ages, you see, of the popular press,
When the bat comes out of his cave and the owls are whooping at noon,
And Doubt is the lord of the dunghill and crows at the sun and the moon,
Till the sun and the moon of our science are both of them turned into blood,
And Hope will have broken her heart running after a shadow of good!"

I must once more ask the reader who is interested in the subject not to judge of my views from this paper alone, but to refer to that formerly issued in these pages, specially in connection with the extent to which the Lord Christ has already applied and shall yet apply His own redemption. This paper has been devoted to a single vital point; and if the language used may seem strong, that is because I feel that to use even a hesitating tone about the supreme necessity of becoming united to Christ by instant faith would be criminal and unmerciful in the extreme. To repeat words of the venerable Dr. Angus that were quoted before: "Our modern benevolence is at least very cheap. What if it be also blasphemous and destructive; dishonouring by implication to God's philanthropy and precipitating the very ruin it professes to fear?"

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ART. V.—*The Spirit of the Father glorifying the Son.*

SUCH is the topic that we mean at present to deal with ; and that in a way not of ranging over all Scripture for our materials, but rather of opening up a little of what the Prince of Theologians, the Prince of Peace himself, says about it. " When he, the Spirit of Truth is come, he will guide you into all truth : for he shall not speak of himself ; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak. He shall glorify me : for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you. All that the Father hath are mine : therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you " (John xvi. 13-15).

I. There are three distinct views to be taken of the glory of Christ, or three different respects in which he is glorified. These are all beautifully bound up together, as we hope to show, and they are all more or less strikingly alluded to in the amazing discourse with which Jesus closed his earthly ministry.

1. In the *first* place, there is that glory of Christ which he received personally as his reward for his obedience, but which he received also for the benefit and in the name of his Church. Great grace and condescension were revealed and embodied in Christ's consenting at all to rise from the dead. He might have said, 'The ends of my incarnation, and of my humiliation by being exhibited in human flesh, are accomplished. Let my incarnation itself now cease. Let me be done with it. Let the grave retain the body of my humiliation, while my Godhead's glory shall now be revealed in a manner worthy of Godhead.' But no. It did not satisfy Jesus to be made flesh for a limited time, however long. Being once God-man, "this man abideth for ever:" and hence his resurrection from the dead. 'Tis with a view to, and in prospect of, that resurrection that he says (John xvii. 1), "Father, glorify thy Son:" and again (ver. 5), "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." Glorify thou him who presents himself before thee in a creature-nature and scorns not

creature-duties—(as thus, even now, in prayer): Glorify thou the Son of Man.

This supplication of our Lord began to be answered as soon as his body had lain the appointed time in Joseph’s tomb. “He was crucified in weakness, but raised by the power of God.” And, *eo usque*, he was glorified by the Spirit. For it is written: “He was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by his resurrection from the dead.” True, the glory was but sparingly assumed or exhibited at first. For the Lord’s resurrection-body must be shown by “infallible signs” to be the same identically with that which suffered—the very same, alive again after his passion; and so, lest it should fail to be identified, the glory is at first very much restrained. No dazzling, blinding, brilliancy is emitted from his person like that of the Shekinah when he was transfigured. Rather it was on this wise,—“Handle me and see, a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have;” and again, “Reach hither thy finger;” and again, “Children, have ye any meat? Come and dine.” And the conviction was complete; they identified their Lord. “And none of the disciples durst ask him, Who art thou? knowing that it was the Lord.” Yet, evidently, fain would they have asked him after all; they *would* have questioned his identity had the evidence been less than overpowering: but it was not, and they durst not refuse it. Yet it needed overpowering evidence; for there was some great change begun in Immanuel’s person: the *glory* was begun. Accordingly he does not dwell with them now as he had been wont to do. It is a sudden appearance, and reappearance occasionally, and, as it would almost seem, arbitrarily: and again, “he vanished out of their sight.” There is singular emphasis and meaning in the language used in recording these transient glimpses which the apostles now had of Jesus. “He was seen;” simply “seen.” “He was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; after that, he was seen of James; then of all the apostles.” “*He was seen,*” in brief and unexpected and miraculous glimpses rather than visits; enough for purposes of witness-bearing by the twelve: but transient, so much so that even Paul does not need to change the expression when he would describe his own view

of Jesus in his heavenly glory : “ Lastly, *he was seen* of me also, as of one born out of due time.”

But, ere Paul thus saw the Lord, that Jesus whom he persecuted had been invested with all glory at the right hand of God. His last, his parting blessing had been given to the twelve ; the cloud had received him out of their sight. The Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Mighty God-man, the Prince of Peace, had ascended, with the chariots of God, which are twenty thousand, even thousands of angels, the Lord among them, as in the holy place. “ Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive.” Neither the eye of sense nor of imagination can follow Jesus beyond the cloud which curtained in the view of his disciples. We cannot figure to ourselves with what attire of heavenly, magnificent, majestic state the Man of Sorrows took his way to the throne of his victory and reward. Nor, though we could, would the knowledge profit us. But we have a more sure word of prophecy, and from *it* we learn that as this triumphing Messiah entered the realms of glory, he ascended through all the high ranks of heaven’s holy hierarchy, he rose beyond angels and archangels, far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and every name that is named ; until, all things being under his feet, he was received as a “ priest upon his throne ;”—how touching !—in his office of priest, and all because he had loved us and given himself for us !—and the spirit of David beheld what David in Spirit had foretold in song, for “ Jehovah said unto *our* Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool” (Ps. cx. 1).

It is not easy to explain in few words the nature of the glory thus communicated to Messiah. (1.) As to his human nature, it is crowned, or, more correctly, in it *he* is crowned with honour immeasurably beyond what is found in any or all creatures ; filled with the everlasting fruition of Jehovah as its—rather, as in it, *his*—covenant God and head ; at once glorified and blessed in the unparalleled prerogative of being constituted the wonderful and willing medium through which—the living, co-operating, ever-blessed instrument through which—the glory of the Godhead has its brightest shining ; for in the Word-made-flesh, in the Man that is God’s fellow, there is beholden the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of

grace and truth. In the face of Jesus Christ, the light of the knowledge of the glory of God shines. (2.) As to his divine nature, it is glorified in the sense, that while hitherto it had been veiled and concealed from view in the likeness of sinful flesh, now its perfections and attributes begin to shine forth, no longer restrained and checked beneath the form of a servant, but in the person of One acknowledged to be Lord of all, before all, over all, and in all; no longer hidden in the garb and fashion of a man as in the days of his flesh, but rather declared the more clearly because in human flesh, and through his glorified humanity, with all of Divine glory that is in the nature of things visible, plainly brought to light, and all that is necessarily invisible revealed as it had never been before to spiritual wisdom. To the light of faith, his Divinity is glorified in that the most hidden glory of God is disclosed through the assumption, sacrifice, death, and exaltation of his human nature. His humanity, again, this human nature in such alliance with Deity, hath a glory unparalleled in honour and majesty, as being the real dwelling-place of God, and the perfection of beauty. And (3.) his entire person as Immanuel is glorified, in that as God-man he is the head of all the universe: holding of Godhead, as being himself one of the persons thereof; holding of man, as he was himself the Elder Brother, made most blessed for evermore; made exceeding glad with the light of God's countenance; invested with all right to rule, and all power in heaven and earth to conduct his government; the representative of the Creator to the creature, and reciprocally of the creature to the Creator; the representative of God to man in all that God is pleased to do toward men, and of men toward God in all that man can need from God; the king of angels, prince of the kings of the earth; the fountain of all authority, and well-spring of all beneficence and grace; in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; the storehouse of all treasures and unsearchable riches of blessing and power; that we, under his kingly hand, may have protection unto eternal life; may have a safe and sacred place on the platform of God's holy universe in the person and fellowship of the Son, and out of his fulness may obtain grace for grace. On earth he was the God-man as much as now, as much as ever. But *then* the

deep abasement of his humanity almost alone was visible : the unalterable, inalienable glory of his Godhead was retired from view. *Now*, his Divine claims are no longer in abeyance ; but all in heaven and earth are called upon to honour the Son (in human nature) even as they honour the Father. His power is no more under restraint, as when on Calvary he was crucified through weakness ; he wields the sceptre and holds the reins of universal sway over interests and governments which it would crush the feeble mind of man to have a moment's view of ; and all in the interest and for the advancement of our salvation. His all-sufficiency is no longer voluntarily locked up from his own use, as when he was content in Gethsemane to receive strength from an angel ; but in the midst of the throne he is seen to be the First, and the Last, and the Living One, with whom is the fountain of life and the fulness of being, and who feeds with endless life and faculty and holy joy the myriads that wait on his service and his throne.

All this glory of the Son of Man is given to him *for* the Church, in her name, or in her behalf. This revenue of majesty and honour, of strength and beauty, of shining, shielding power and grace and glory, Immanuel hath taken possession of, in his character or capacity as Head of the Church. All whom the Father hath given him are interested in this inheritance on which the Elder Brother hath entered, for they also are heirs of God, joint-heirs with Christ, and they shall finally be brought to share in all that is his, that his love and belovedness, his joy and glory, may be fulfilled in them.

And it is the Spirit of the Father that hath given him all this glory. "*He* shall glorify me." He shall glorify me *for* the Church.

2. But, *secondly*, besides the glory now spoken of, there is also that glory which accrues to Christ *in* the Church. We have seen that in heaven he is personally glorified *for* the Church, glorified on behalf of his people. But, in addition to this, he is glorified *in* his people. To this also express and distinctive allusion is made in his intercessory prayer (John xvii. 10), "I am glorified in them."

There is a close, a vital relation between this department of Christ's glory and the former. Indeed this second glory is none other than the former, in its ever-varying measures,

transmitted and communicated from the fountain-head, and now exhibited in the Church,—in believing souls as in its resting-place. 'Tis the glory in the Head revealed as grace in the members, and in them reflected back again as glory upon their living Head. It was in order that he might be thus glorified *in* the Church, both in heaven and earth, that he was glorified personally in heaven *for* the Church, in the Church's stead and name. The one is the designed and intended issue of the other. He was glorified *for* his people that he might be glorified *in* them: glorified in his saints, and herein most of all admired in all them that believe.

Now *this* also is a rich and fertile theme—the glory of Christ in his chosen,—and only a little of it can be brought under review. You will have some idea, however, of what is meant if you bear in mind that the word of Christ dwells richly in his people, and by its effects in them through the Spirit—by whom alone, and always, Christ is in every light glorified,—it greatly promotes the glory of the Word made flesh. Within his people's souls his eternal and unchangeable word of grace has been lodged by the Spirit more or less plentifully: and having, as it were, taken fire within them (for "is not my word a fire? saith the Lord"), it is burning up and consuming their dross and corruption, and refining them as silver is refined. Or, having as it were taken life (for Christ's words are spirit and they are life), it is working in them faith and penitence, and comfort, and joy, and holiness. It is no dead letter in their minds or consciences, but the word made alive, quickening and rousing their soul and all that is within them,—powerful, lively, living, life-giving,—moving, purifying, acting,—the living word of Christ, traced to him, known and read of all men, in which he himself is directly glorified.

Nor is it enough to say merely that Christ's word is *in* his people, and that thus they are his representatives and witnesses to an ungodly world in the bodily absence of the Lord himself. Thus, no doubt, he is greatly glorified; and precisely those attributes of God, and that revelation of his glory, which the work of inanimate creation cannot embody, are seen more or less in the written word, as it lives and moves and has its being and free course, and operates and cannot be hid when it transforms the Church into the image of her

living Saviour. But we must bear in mind, further, that the very life of Christ, as well as the word of Christ, is in his children, and it is there as a source of wonderful glory to him. Christ dwells in his own by faith: he is in them the hope of glory. Saith the apostle, "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20).

The life of Christ in the world, while he tabernacled with men upon the earth, was wonderful. To a spiritual eye, the spectacle of the Holy One having his abode in a corrupted and polluted world like this is passing strange. That holiness itself should have come into such close, continued, painful, and prolonged contact with sin,—should have suffered by sin on all hands for many long and weary years, yet uncontaminated, holy still, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, yet without sin,—this is indeed amazing. But when you pass from the life of Christ personal in this fallen world, the life and indwelling of Christ mystical in a fallen and but partially recovered soul, is in some respects a far greater, or, at least, additional mystery. To think of Christ dwelling in one who still has to cry, "I am carnal, sold under sin;" "In me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing;" "Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Here is Immanuel's life in far closer contact with sin, yet in no fellowship with it: more narrowly hemmed in by the evil, yet never touched or tarnished by it: far more likely to be choked in the atmosphere of uncongenial, contrary, destructive elements; yet living still, because fed from the fountain of eternal blessedness: far more nearly swamped in the waters of ungodliness and iniquity; but still surviving, a flame inviolable, which many waters cannot quench and the floods cannot drown, but which is dissipating and driving off the floods, mightier in its greatness than the noise of many waters: far more closely grappling with darkness, corruption, death; yet evermore holding its own, and proving more than conqueror. Is not this glory to Christ in the highest?

Further, Christ is seen to be glorified *in* his people when we think that his righteousness, as well as his life, is theirs, and when we think what it procures for them. It was little that for his righteousness' sake the Father should have been well

pleased with, and should have justified, the Son. It was a light matter that God should be pleased with Immanuel personally for his righteousness' sake, and should, because of it, admit him to everlasting favour and inalienable honours. Comparatively small was the glory accruing to him when, on his ascending up on high, he was accepted as God's righteous servant, whose days should be prolonged, yea, should last as long as the sun, and to whom there should be divided a portion with the great and a spoil with the strong. There was reserved for him a greater revenue and fund of glory to be derived from his righteousness than this, and it is given to him when he is glorified in his people. For surely it is far more wonderful when it is found that the same righteousness which has already carried God's servant to the throne of glory and acceptance, instead of having its merits or its power thereby exhausted in accomplishing the exaltation of the Son of God, prevails to raise aloft from death to life—from condemnation to favour—from hell to heaven—from a doomed and lost eternity to life, and bliss, and immortality, and confidential fellowship with God,—yea, even into the most tender and blessed, and eternal reconciliation with the righteous Father, myriads who lay exposed to all possible evils, most justly shut up to their endurance, but who now, through the robe of Immanuel's obedience unto death, shall pass into the everlasting glory, as they have already passed into the peace of God without all check, beneath the sanctifying gaze, and even with the entire approbation of God, and the universal plaudits of all his holy creatures. That this also should result from his righteousness—that the personally guilty and hell-deserving should be so dealt with for Christ's sake—is surely greatly to Immanuel's glory: herein indeed is he glorified. When he contemplates this primary and fundamental element of his people's salvation, surely he may well say, in the simple and touching words, "I am glorified in them." And "in him shall all the seed of Israel be justified, and shall glory," when they give unto him the honour of that name whereby he shall be called, "Jehovah-Tzidkenu," "The Lord our Righteousness."

There are many other views that might be taken of Christ's glory *in* his people. The Church is the place of his glory, for he dwells in it, and he shall glorify the place of his glory.

Zion is the "perfection of beauty," because Immanuel has here his desire and his abode; and that perfect beauty is none other than the exhibition of his own glory, when "out of Zion, the perfection of beauty, God hath shined." "Arise, shine; for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord hath risen upon thee" (Isa. lx. 1).

The manifestation of Christ's glory *in* his people is, as has been said already, the end and issue of his glory *for* them, as he sitteth at the right hand of power. These stand related to each other as cause and effect, or as means to an end. Never could Christ have been glorified *in* his people, had he not been glorified *for* them. Never could he have received glory in their name without causing it in due time to reach themselves in their salvation and holiness, so that he should be glorified in their persons. But it is certain he shall be glorified *in* them, though it were only because he was glorified *for* them.

But while we see this very close and beautiful connection between the glory that Christ enjoys *for* His people, and that which he enjoys *in* them, it still remains open for consideration: How, or by what means, agency, and process, the glory of Jesus as the Priest upon his throne, in his people's name, serves to produce ultimately a manifestation of his glory *in* their persons? Because Christ is glorified *for* them, it does not follow that he is therefore and thereby glorified *in* them without any intermediate agency or operation. What intervening process is there by which the glory of Immanuel's own person is safely and effectually lodged in the dwelling-place designed for it—in his people's persons—and beautifully and permanently manifested there? How do we account for the glory of Immanuel in the land that is very far off ever finding reception and exhibition in the Church and in the Christian in the land of their pilgrimage here?

3. The answer is, that there is a *third* glory of the Saviour—a third respect in which he is glorified—which comes in between the two already spoken of, efficaciously linking them together, and bringing it about that the *glory of Christ* *for* the Church on high, *as a means*, shall surely be productive of *glory to Christ* *in* the Church as the end in view. And this third glory of Christ is that spoken of in

the farewell address when he says, "He shall testify of me ; he shall glorify me ; he shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you. He shall not speak of himself, he shall testify of me. All that the Father hath is mine : therefore said I, He shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you."

The Spirit testifies of Christ and reveals his fulness of grace and glory to the believing soul. This is the intervening Agent ; this the intermediate process. It is in this way that the plenitude of grace and truth and glory that is in Christ—received by him as clothed in human flesh when he was received up on high and glorified with the Father *for* the Church, and made the living depository of her blessings, and her blessedness—is made available, and is dispensed *to* the Church, that he may be glorified *in* the Church, and admired in all them that believe.—Mark the complete arrangement for revealing Immanuel's glory. He is glorified *for* the Church, *to* the Church, *in* the Church. This is the whole in brief ; but it is complete.

First, He is exalted to the right hand of the Majesty on high, endowed with all power, and replenished with all blessing, grace, and glory as the Immanuel-Head of his people. He is glorified *for* the Church, or in her name.

Secondly, Jesus being thus glorified, the living Spirit, hitherto largely restrained, is freely and richly poured out. Previously he had not been given for this express reason, we are told, namely, because Jesus *was* not yet glorified. But now that the Christ hath gone to his reward, he sends him : and the Spirit's work is to reveal the gracious Saviour ; to open, exhibit, commend Immanuel to our faith, to take of the things of Christ and show them to us ; to glorify Jesus before our gaze. Now is Christ glorified *to* the Church, or in the Church's intelligent and delighted estimation.

And *lastly*, being thus glorified before the reverent, intelligent, believing, admiring gaze of his people, the sure and final consequence is that Christ, already glorified *for* and *to* his people, is now glorified *in* them—in their pardon, acceptance, reconciliation with God, their peace, and liberty, and joy, and holiness, and full salvation.

Because he has been glorified in heaven above *for* his people, and in order to his being glorified on earth below *in*

them, therefore is he glorified to them by the Spirit, in the means of grace, taking of the things that are Christ's and showing them to their believing and grateful souls.

Such is the place which the Spirit's work in this matter holds in the economy of glory to God in the highest, through Jesus Christ the Son of His love. The glory is seen issuing from the fountain of Immanuel's glory in heaven,—from that exhaustless well-spring or treasure-house of mercy, love, grace, truth, and blessing. The Holy Spirit, if the expression may be allowed, fills his hands when he visits the Church refreshingly; he brings the burden to his waiting people; and through the means of grace, through the word read and preached and heard in faith, and sealed believably in holy sacraments, he discloses to their faith the meaning, moral beauty, worth, and fulness of the things which are only “revealed from faith to faith,” because such is their nature that “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and there have not entered into the hearts of men the things which God hath prepared for them that love him; but God hath revealed them to us by the Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.”

“He takes of the things of Christ:”—of the wounds, the griefs, the sorrows, the curse-bearing, the wrath, the darkness, the desolation and abandonment of Christ, and shows *them* to the soul. The Spirit of grace and supplication bids the believer look upon Jesus whom he hath pierced; and convincing the conscience of deadly guilt as brought to light by the awful scene, he gives birth to the mournings of repentance and contrition of spirit.

“He takes of the things of Christ:”—of the same death of Christ in another view—of its sacrificial worth, its substitutionary character, its penal pain, its atoning design and efficacy, its sin-cleansing, peace-giving power, as endured by him only because he was a loving substitute, a holy sin-bearer:—not sinful because bearing the sin of others, but therein making sin the occasion of a holiness and holy love which without it the universe could have never seen; and revealing this at the same time, as a fountain of propitiating merit, inexhaustible, and ever full and free, without money and without price, to all who renounce all other merit and approach in faith, he brings into the very heart of contrite mourning that most blessed gift of heaven, the element of peace, the gleam of joy unspeakable

and full of glory, which makes the heart yet more tender, and true, and contrite.

"He takes of the things of Christ :"—of his meritorious obedience, his perfect righteousness, the abundance of the gift of righteousness, the everlasting and vicarious righteousness which Jesus brought in for his Church ; and opening the understanding to understand its meaning, history, design, and fullness—its necessity, availableness, and perfect adaptation to supply the place of Joshua's filthy garments, that so he may stand before the angel unquailingly, and have places to walk in among them that stand by the throne of God—no mere sufferance, but each his own place,—as righteously his own, on the joyful side of justice as that of Judas was his *own* on the awful side of justice and of vengeance,—no mere sufferance, but a legal title to dwell there ;—he shows the soul in this a plea for seeking in full assurance of faith all needful grace while here, all boundless glory hereafter.

"He takes of the things of Christ :"—of his power and strength, and victory and triumph, and shows *them* also to the weak, the weary, the wavering, the worn with the long conflict with sin and Satan and temptation. He shows them that the prince of this world is judged ; that Messiah grappled with the foe of man, and spoiled, and crushed, and trampled on him, flinging him down like lightning from heaven, to be devoured and engulfed in hell as the lightning is engulfed in the swiftly-following darkness for ever. He shows Immanuel's mastery over the believer's enemies, and cheers him on to keep his spiritual weapons still in constant, vigorous use, in the full assurance that victory is unfailingly the lot of those who hold on to the end. He shows the full fountain of Immanuel's endless strength and victory ; its free availableness and perfect suitableness to the weakest and most weary soldier in Immanuel's army ; and how gently it will be given him ; and how by the Spirit's grace he will be enabled to wield it, infinite and almighty in itself though it be. "And a bruised reed will he not break, and the smoking flax will he not quench, till he bring forth judgment unto victory" (Isa. xlii. 3).

But it were impossible to give an exhaustive description of the Spirit's work as he glorifies Christ to the believing estima-

tion of his people. One would have to speak of all the perfections of Christ, of all his work, of all his offices, and of the faithfulness and love of the Spirit in pouring his illumination over that love and these offices, and every part of all his action in them. Time would fail to tell how he shows to them the unsearchable riches of the grace of Jesus—his manifold wisdom,—and his love which passeth understanding. By his gracious spiritual work upon the soul, somewhat is rightly known of the mind, and will, and truth, and thoughts of God—of the hidden treasures, wisdom, and knowledge that are laid up in Jesus—of the love, mercy, tenderness, compassion, sympathy, and care of the good Shepherd of the sheep—of his brilliancy and splendour as the Morning Star—of his quickening, life-giving, life-sustaining beams as the Sun of Righteousness—of the comely beauty, order, harmony, and holiness of that government which he maintains as the King of Zion—of the honour, the very peculiar honour, which is seen upon him as a Royal High Priest, a priest upon his throne, dispensing righteous mercy and holy sanctifying pardon to the guilty ;—in short, of the power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and beauty, and blessing which are due unto the Lamb that was slain, and are ascribed to him by all that are around the throne, and by all here below whom the Holy Spirit hath enabled joyfully to join in the celebration of his power, and say—“Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God, even the Father, to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.”—Christ Jesus, the Son of God in human nature, is glorified *for*, *to*, and *in* the Church.

There are, at this point, three emerging questions—(1.) Would you know whether Christ has been glorified *for* you? (2.) Would you have Christ glorified *to* you? (3.) Would you have Christ glorified *in* you?

(1.) Would you know whether Christ has been glorified in heaven *for* you—for *you*? Then you must have Christ glorified *to* you, *i.e.* in your enlightened and believing estimation. There is no other proof that the glory Christ received *was* in your behalf, and in your name,—in your stead, as your own Head and Redeemer—except a present spiritual insight by the

Spirit into his glory. And the delightful consideration is, that infinite wisdom and grace have arranged that you cannot see his glory without by faith claiming himself; and further that that you cannot do without having the claim duly, divinely honoured, "My beloved is mine, and I am his;" "As the apple tree among the trees of the garden, so is my Beloved among the sons;" "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and on earth there is none besides thee; my heart and my flesh fail, but thou art the strength of my heart and my portion for ever." We take out no other extract from the registers of heaven to prove that the honoured Messiah at his ascension took possession of his glory in our name, than the thankful reception in our own souls of the gifts he ascended to give; and first of all, and as the fountain, pledge, guarantee, and author of all, his own adorable Spirit—the indwelling of his Spirit and the consequent views which we may receive of the grace, loveliness, love, love-worthiness, and glory of our exalted King. Jesus is glorified by the Spirit *to* all those *for* whom he was glorified.

(2.) And would you have Jesus glorified *to* you? Would you have your desire to see the King in his beauty gratified? Would you see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ? To enable you to look upon and appreciate such a sight is a work to which none but a Divine Person—the Holy Spirit—is competent. You cannot do it for yourself. Ministers cannot do it for you. "The Spirit," saith Jesus, "shall glorify me." He, and he alone. How diligent, then, ought we to be in praying for his coming, for he is given to them that ask him. How dutiful and diligent should we be in plying the throne of grace for one of those pure "revivals" with which he alone can enrich the Church! "For if men, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto their children, how much more will he give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?"

What a hold upon himself he hath given us, in assuring us that he hath redeemed us from the law for this very purpose, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit! And how careful should we be to avoid all that would grieve or quench the Spirit—for this brings darkness and blindness upon us, both as it injures our faculties, and as it grieves away the only agent that can savingly enlighten them. How precious,

moreover, should the Word of God be to us, read and preached, seeing it is the only glass into which the Spirit casts the glorious image of our Lord; yea, in which, intently gazing as "with open face, we may behold as in a glass the glory of the Lord."

(3.) Would you have Christ glorified *in* you? Would you reflect his glory? Would you be transchanged into the same image from glory to glory? Still the answer is the same. You must have the Spirit glorifying Christ to you. There is no other proof that he has been glorified *for* you. There is no other possibility of his being glorified *in* you. 'Tis by beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord that you are transformed into the same image from glory to glory. Faith must be in lively exercise. "Said I not unto thee, If thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of God?" And thus being strong in the faith, thou wilt *give* glory unto him. The hidden glory will be taken by the Spirit of glory and of God, and held up to your admiring view; and being seen in the very same light as the one intellect of Godhead, of the Three-in-one, and specially of the Holy Spirit, sees it, it will impress its living likeness on your souls, and now for the first time you will be unable to avoid knowing that seeing is believing, and believing is receiving, and that to see Jesus by the Holy Ghost is to see him as consciously your own. Seeing the glory of Immanuel in the Spirit, you will see it in him *for* you, to give sure salvation; while reciprocally, he will behold it again *in* you, to the praise of the glory of his grace.

Here, then, is the entire amazingly beautiful arrangement: Christ glorified now *to* you, and in your delighted admiration of him, the only evidence you can have that he was glorified *for* you: Christ glorified for ever *in* you, in your beauty and bliss and holiness, the sure result if glorified *to* you by the Spirit.

II. But this glorifying of the Son has its relation to the past purposes and present intervention of the Father as well as of the Spirit. For the very first beginnings of personal Christianity have relations with the Trinity, closer far than it is customary to give due consideration to. The ever-vital doctrine of Trinity comes out in Holy Scripture, not as an abstract

mystery, but as invaluable truth bearing incessantly on the well-springs, and the familiar and great principles of all true spiritual religion. If there be not three persons in the God-head equal in power and glory: one of them—the Second Person, the Eternal Son himself, in his person, not in something that he has done, and which would of course have its limits, but in his person, which is infinite in being, resources, and glory—the propitiation for our sins, and our endless peace with God; another, the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, infinite in being, grace, and power, pledged to see us united in our person and being to Christ; while the First Person is a Father, and knows all a father's feelings and love unquenchable—If all this be not true, then what hath the righteous done? But if it is true, then when is it time for a believer's despondency or fears?

Now this, in connection with the origination and first up-springings in us individually of Divine light and life, is no where more beautifully brought out than by Jesus himself in this same farewell discourse. And the words are peculiarly rich and deep: "All that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, The Spirit shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you" (John xvi. 15). By this one step of reasoning, the Prince of Peace, who is the prince of theologians and logicians too, vindicates his having given the promise of the Spirit to testify of him, to take the things of Christ and show them unto us. "All that the Father hath is mine:" that is, 'To me there belongeth essential Godhead, with all its inalienable prerogatives, rights, and possessions. Not only am I, as the Eternal Son, equal in power and glory with the Father, as I have been from of old, from everlasting; but now, as Mediator, the God-man, Immanuel, though in that capacity the Father's servant, still to me as Mediator, as your advocate, propitiation, and high-priest, your living head and sympathising friend—to me belong the same exhaustless and unsearchable perfections, prerogatives, and possessions as to the Father himself who sends me. I am secluded, as Mediator, from the possession, declaration, employment, or use of no powers, counsels, designs, judgments, claims, or excellencies which are mine in Godhead as the Father's fellow—daily his delight, rejoicing always before him. As Mediator, I still possess them all, to reveal, employ,

communicate them all, as their respective natures may admit, as my will and honour may suggest, or your necessity and advantage require. "All that the Father hath is mine." And that is the ground and reason and justification of my promise of the Spirit, the Comforter, to reveal them: "Therefore said I, The Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you."'

It is very striking that in each of the three views or relations that Christ gives us of his glory,—his being glorified *for*, *in*, and *to* his people,—in each and all he is careful in the same manner to identify his own glory with the Father's.

(1.) When he prays that he may be glorified *for* the Church, he does so on the ground that originally, in his Divine person, he is equal in glory with the Father; and that for less than *that* to be apparent now in his Immanuelism,¹ would be a punishment instead of a reward. "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was" (John xvii. 5). 'Let nothing that was mine, as I was with thee as one brought up with thee, be restrained, secluded, or withheld from me now that, as thy righteous servant, as thy holy child Jesus, as **the** Man who is thy fellow, I return, O righteous Father, my work complete, my sheep redeemed, thy name declared, thy glory made great in the salvation wrought by me: glorify thou **me** with the everlasting, incommunicable glory, that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and that the Church may know that all that the Father hath is mine.' Thus, when glorified *for* his people, Jesus rejoiceth to remember and assert that "all that the Father hath" is his.

(2.) When Jesus speaks of his glory *in* his people—"I am glorified *in* them" (John xvii. 10)—still he speaks of that glory as common to him with the Father; and this consideration he employs as a plea in interceding with the Father for them, and praying that he would keep and sanctify them. The Redeemer has three arguments in pleading for his people:—

The *first* argument is that they are his own—his own by his Father's gift. They have been given him by the Father himself; and on this ground he would be encouraged to pray

¹ A phrase peculiar, I think, to my late beloved and lamented friend, Dr. Samuel Miller of Glasgow. A very few of us Disruptionists will be left by and bye, with the touching lament, "The flowers of the forest are a' wede awa'."

the Father for them, seeing he is but following out the Father's own purpose of eternal love : " I pray for *them* : I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me " (John xvii. 9). ' I am praying only for those for whom, O holy Father, thou hast already manifested thy love in giving them to me ; " thine they were, and thou gavest them to me."'

The *second* argument urged by Jesus for his people is that they are the Father's. ' I pray only for thine own. I seek blessings, O righteous Father, for none that are outcasts from thy love, or family, or councils.' " I pray for them, for they are thine " (ver. 9).

A *third* plea Jesus has with the Father in praying for his people, and this perhaps is more exactly the point in hand. It follows the other two (in the 10th verse), reiterating and re-impressing and combining them : " And all thine are mine, and mine are thine, and I am glorified in them " (ver. 10). This is not a pleonasm, or an empty repetition of the former arguments, as if it merely re-assured us that the elect are Christ's and the Father's also. Such is not our Lord's meaning ; nor is the slipshod ever a feature in his reasoning. For this, indeed, is not said of persons at all, but of things, as being true of all things, or all possessions of whatsoever kind, no doubt true of the elect also, but not spoken here in that narrow sense, but in the same large and all-comprehensive sense as in his vindication of the promise (John xvi. 15), and which implies that all necessary possessions and prerogatives of his are coeval, co-equal, and co-extensive—yea, identical—with the Father's. And this marks the pressing urgency and force of the plea which Jesus founds upon it : '*first*, I pray for my people ; they are my own that I pray for ; those whom thou didst commit to me and my care : yea, *secondly*, I pray for them, O righteous Father, because they are thine. And, *thirdly*, I pray for them because I am glorified in them ; and this cannot be but that thou also wilt be glorified, " for all mine are thine, and thine are mine." My honour and excelling glory in their salvation, purity, and peace, and protected holy blissful estate of grace and glory, are thine honour and thine excellency also, O righteous Father. Therefore I pray for them, that I being glorified in them, thou also mayest be glorified. And this cannot fail to be, since all of " mine "

that shall become visible upon them, is simply "thine" seen upon them, "for all mine are thine."

(3.) And now, as in speaking of his glory *for* the Church and his glory *in* the Church, Jesus is thus careful in both instances to identify all that the Father hath with his own, claiming for himself an unlimited possession of the boundless "all" that Godhead claims and holds, shall it be thought wonderful that again, the *third* time, when it is presented to our notice in this department of it, namely, as revealed by the Spirit *to* the Church, in order that the same Jesus who has been glorified *for* the Church may now be effectually glorified *in* it, the same rule is maintained, the same holy policy observed, *ex expresso* and *in terminis*, identifying his glory with the Father's? Nor may it be at all mysterious, or even unexpected, if he should rest on this ground the reasons why he desires the manifestation of what is thus to be manifested to the Church: "All that the Father hath is mine, *therefore* said I, He shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you."

Let us address ourselves to the delightful task of pointing out some of the many sides, evolving some of the various lines of force of this argument—this beautiful argument of the Prince of Logicians—himself the Logos of Jehovah. There is absolute storage of electric force and light in this "therefore."

I. This "therefore" holds good in respect of our Lord's possession, jointly with the Father, of the Spirit himself. "All that the Father hath is mine, *therefore* said I, the Spirit shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you." For among the all that the Father hath, is the fulness of this glorious spiritual agent, the holy and loving Spirit of grace and power. He proceedeth from the Father and *from the Son*; 'therefore have I a right to arrange in covenant what the Spirit shall do, and as the Logos of God, the Eternal Word, to say or foretell the same. He is given without measure, restraint, or modification to me, in my mediatorial person and work; and when I go away I will send him. It is true I have told you that the Father will send him; but even then it shall be in my name, it shall be as my Spirit, as the Spirit of the Christ, the anointed, that he will come unto you—the Spirit of the Son crying Abba, Father. For what possession and control the Father

hath over the agency of the glorious and co-equal Spirit, the same also have I. As the Father sent me, and I came to testify not of myself, but him—even so will I send the Spirit; and exactly thus he shall testify not of himself but of me. As the Father's official servant in this high economy of grace and salvation, I speak not of myself, but what I have seen and heard, and in words which the Father gave me. And thus also, as my special servant, to apply and complete the high achievement, will my Spirit come to you in like manner; to speak not of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak. And just as my word is not mine, but his that sends me, so his word is not really his, but mine that send him; and he shall take of mine and show it unto you. On this ground I vindicate my great master-promise, as one which I am fully able to fulfil: "I will send the Comforter," and truly he is mine to send; for "all that the Father hath is mine, therefore said I, the Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you."

II. Our Lord's "therefore" is of force in a second respect—in reference, namely, to the grandeur of the things to be revealed, and the consequent necessity of the Spirit to reveal them. 'It is all the Father hath that is to be revealed unto you; and *therefore* I said that the Spirit would do it. What you are to see is not only mine, but the Father's. When you receive of mine, remember it is the Father's. The truth you are now to understand is the name, and counsel, and inner intellect, the free thoughts, and purposes, and love of Godhead, the profound designs and hidden wisdom of the only wise Jehovah. The grace you are to experience, to be subdued by, to be sanctified by, to enjoy and delight yourselves in the abundance of, is to be straight from the overflowing fountain of the Divine nature, the deepest love of God, the covenant mercy, the sovereign grace of him that is past finding out,—a love the existence of which in the searchless depths of Deity, was never dreamt of by highest archangel till it was voluntarily revealed in me, the Son. The wisdom you are now to follow in many of its beautiful and precious arrangements is the wisdom which reconciles the extremes of damning justice and pleading love, of divinest glory and deepest shame, in the person, humiliation, and sacrifice of the Son of God; which has accomplished harmonies and comely order where discord

and disorder reigned ; built up the things that cannot be moved, out of what was moral wreckage and seemed eternal ruin, and made sin itself the occasion of God's brightest declaration of his holiness.¹ The promises you are to receive, and the spiritual gift thereby to be conveyed, are such as only the Divine being could give, and the Divine nature yield ; and in every respect the disclosures that I provide for you, and now invite you to expect, are such as an insight into Divine manifestations alone could afford. Wonder not, then, that you shall need, as your teacher, an Agent of unfathomable wisdom, of boundless power, of exhaustless and untiring grace, of glorious spiritual efficacy to reveal and communicate marvels such as these. You will indeed require that Sovereign One who worketh in every one severally as he will ; who, being in creation the father of the spirits of all flesh, shall adapt and prepare *your* spirit to receive, and understand, and profit by the disclosure, even as he alone can dispose of, and divide out to, every one sovereignly and severally as he will. None but the Spirit can wield and handle these mysteries and weighty gifts of God. None but he may dare to intromit with them. None but he can with right or with success enter into the counsels of Godhead. For who else hath known the mind of the Lord ? Who but he hath been his counsellor ? Who but he, being God, can by searching find out God ? It is he that beareth witness : and he is qualified, for not only is he the Spirit of truth, but intrinsically and essentially, the Spirit *is* truth. With him is the fountain of light, and in his light shall you see light.

' It is on this ground that I vindicate my promise of the Spirit to be your teacher. You will indeed require his aid, and you shall have it. " All that the Father hath is mine ; therefore said I, the Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you. " '

III. The argument is good in reference to the inexhaustible and all-satisfying nature of the things to be revealed, and these as offered to be a substitute, and more than a substitute, for our Lord's continued bodily presence. " All that," etc.—that is

¹ Our students were better furnished when they used to read so plain but valuable (or rather invaluable) a book as *Bates on the Harmony of the Divine Attributes*.

to say, 'I have promised you the Spirit, the Comforter, that his presence and spiritual action in you and on your behalf may more than counterbalance the disadvantage of the want of my bodily presence. Do you say that none can be a substitute for the absent Jesus?—that you can think of none and will hear of none but myself? Be it so, beloved children; the Spirit shall fully gratify you. He shall not speak of himself, it shall be all of me. "He will take of mine and show it unto you." "He shall testify of ME." "He shall glorify ME." Do you reply, that it were better still to have me with you: that present vivid sight were better than any remembrance, any rehearsal, and any anticipation that the Comforter may give, let them be ever so bright; and that whatever may be the power of memory, and howsoever whetted by the Spirit (the master of man's spirit) to make you live over again once more the days you spent with me, and cause you to feel again as in my presence in the days of old, yet they must ever be inferior to continued personal intercourse with Jesus? There might be truth and reason in this, were it only your old views of Jesus that the Spirit shall revive and unfold again. But it is not so. What you have seen of me is but very limited indeed; and it will be the Spirit's work to give you greatly enlarged views of that Jesus whom you would detain among you that you might know him better, but who will go away that you may know him better far. As yet it is little more than his humanity and his humiliation that you have known. You have been familiar chiefly with his deep abasement. But in Jesus, your faithful friend, there are other things to be disclosed which you little wot of, which when you see you will rejoice that I have gone to the Father, and you see me no more with eyes of flesh. And these things the Spirit will reveal unto you. I have many things to say unto you through him. Now you are not able to bear them. You have indeed been unable to avoid knowing that I came out from God. Ye have seen and thought rightly of Jesus, even that he is the Christ, the Son of the living God. But, ah! how little of the mercy and glory which this involves has opened out to your view! How little of the illimitable compass of this truth have you discovered! How little spiritual power does it exert upon your understandings, your characters, your wills! Alas! so little, that in

a few brief hours, thou, Peter, wilt deny me, the rest of you forsake me and flee. Behold, the hour cometh and now is, when ye shall be scattered every man to his own, and shall leave me alone. You have indeed seen little of the Jesus whom I admit you unfeignedly love. You need yet to see in him precisely what the eye of sense can never see—the all things of the Father, which are his also. The Spirit will show you this. The Spirit will teach you that the fulness of the Godhead dwelleth in your friend, though he shall be emptied¹ by and bye on Calvary; that almighty, boundless, creative power is his—the power of Him who fainteth not, neither is weary—though he shall be crucified in weakness on Calvary. Hitherto ye have known me chiefly after the flesh. You will never know me rightly till ye know me thus no more, till ye know me spiritually and after the Spirit. Hitherto I have been revealing among you little else than what I have in common with the brethren, with whom, because they are partakers of flesh and blood, I also took part in the same. But when the Spirit is come, far greater things than these shall ye see, because I go unto the Father, and ye see me no more; for besides those things which I have in common with the brethren, ye shall see those things which I have in common with the Father. Ye shall then understand how all power in heaven and earth that is my Father's is mine also—your friend's, your brother's, your mediator's. Knowing not this, ye have hitherto asked nothing in my name, for the boundless compass of my power is hid from you; but at that day ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you. You shall then know me as possessing all that the Father hath—as being myself over all, and above all, and in you all, who am before all, and by whom all things consist. You shall have disclosed unto you the fulness of the Godhead dwelling in me bodily, that ye yourselves, in comprehending my love with all saints, may be filled with all the fulness of God. The living Spirit whom I will send shall do all this for you. He shall so irradiate your minds with light and glorious revelations, that the Jesus who can send you such an Agent to perform for you such a work, you shall clearly understand to be himself reposing in the light that is inaccessible and full of glory. Your own blessed conscious-

¹ Phil. ii. 7, Revised Version.

ness under the informing guidance of the Comforter, shall then tell you that the Father hath loved the Son and given all things into his hands. At that day ye shall *know* that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. At that day ye shall give acknowledgment that you know *that* in me which is worth knowing indeed : for ye shall say, "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding to know him that is true ; and we are in him that is true, even in his Son, Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life" (1 John v. 20). "All that the Father hath is mine ; therefore said I, the Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you : " and surely, in order to know these things, "it is expedient for you that I go away : for if I go not away, the Spirit will not come unto you ; but if I go away, I will send him." "

Yes, beloved,—we may hear Jesus in conclusion adding,—
'it is no inadequate return ye shall receive for parting willingly with Jesus. Ye shall know him better far then than now. Ye shall see him from everlasting the heir of God, possessing all that the Father hath, and yourselves joint-heirs in him. It is this that emboldens me to say that the Spirit's advent will be better than my abiding. Otherwise I could not say it. I could not trifle or tamper with your feelings. But as it is, I tell you the truth. It is the truth I tell you when I say, "It is expedient for you that I go away," and that precisely on the same grounds on which you dread my departure—in reference exactly to your future prospect of knowing me better. Do you not see it yourselves, since "all that the Father hath is mine ? " And do you not see it as flowing inevitably from the fact (1.) that all that the Father hath are mine ; and (2.) from my consequent determination that his Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you ? '

IV. Our Lord's logic and argument—his striking and fertile "therefore"—are good in another point of view ;—in reference even to those things that are Christ's, and not the Father's—yea, very specially with regard to those things.

There are many such. There is a whole wonderful class of peculiarities in our Lord's person and history, and the entire essence of the Christian faith turns upon them. There is the incarnation, the humiliation, the blood-shedding of Christ—the propitiatory sacrifice—the human sympathy and fellow-feeling, the reign in human nature and by the Holy Ghost,

the expectancy till all his enemies be made his footstool, and thereafter his headship in our humanity over all the universes—the resurrection, the ascension, the reward, the intercession,—there are all these things which belong to Jesus and not to the Father. Is it imaginable that his logic refers not to these? Impossible! It must refer to them by way of eminence. It cannot be supposed that he pretermits and overlooks them, and makes no arrangement for revealing them in grace and in spiritual power to his elect. This were to make void his glorious gospel utterly. And there is no ground in his careful, rich, and pointed language, for such a thought. For it is not said, ‘All that the Father hath is mine, therefore said I, the Spirit shall take of *his* and show it unto you.’ But “*shall I take of mine.*”

For indeed the things which the Son hath, and which the Father hath not, are worth your knowing only because all the Father hath are his. Under the Spirit’s guidance you shall consider him who endured such contradiction of sinners against himself, lest ye be weary and faint in your minds. ‘And ye shall look on me whom ye have pierced, and mourn and be in bitterness. Yea, and all that ye have known of me and my sojourn among yourselves, the Spirit shall bring to your remembrance, interpreting and irradiating more brightly than before. And whereas there was great fragmentariness before, there shall be no reserve now. In his light shall you fully see light; and truly Christ shall not be divided. But consider: while these things that are peculiarly and exclusively mine, and not the Father’s, are not excluded from the sphere of the Spirit’s revelations, on what ground is it important that these very things should be known by you? Why do I look for great results from the spiritual revelation of my humanity—ingemmed as it is in words of the Holy Ghost’s teaching, and these more especially shone upon by him, “A body hast thou, O Father, prepared for me.” Why am I so solicitous that the Spirit should reveal to you, as he only can, my humanity, my humiliation, my covenant-obedience and suffering, my sacrifice—my propitiation and peace-making, my sympathy and intercession, and every peculiarity which is mine, and not the Father’s? Solely because, while the Father hath not these things as the Son hath, yet are they embued with infinite, exact suitableness, availableness, and grace, and

ready worth to you, by being in indissoluble union with all that the Father hath.

‘ It is this in reality which gives them all their power, all their preciousness, all their peculiarity so grand and unapproachable. There have been other sufferers, other martyrs, other sympathising brothers, ere ever Jesus came into the world. But because “all that the Father hath is mine,” there have been, and can be, none like me. You have heard of the sufferings and patience of Job, as well as mine; of the blood of Abel as well as mine; of Jeremiah’s generous tears as well as mine; of Elijah’s ascension as well as mine. But who save Jesus was ever in circumstances to say, “All that the Father hath is mine? *Therefore* said I unto you, the Spirit shall take of mine and show it unto you.”’

It would, indeed, be wrong, as it is groundless, to call this *the* enlightening work of the Spirit, as if there were no enlightenment in that prior work of reproof or convincing, which is set forth in so orderly and, indeed, philosophical or scientific arrangement in this same chapter (John xvi. 8-11). The reverse is the case. There is much of heavenly light in the Holy Spirit’s reproof. Especially it must be so when the reproof ranges over so wide a moral field as “sin, righteousness, and judgment.” There must be light in such a case; and light in no small degree. Indeed, in all true and honourable reproof there is light, and especially is this true when reproof is allied with conviction—when reproof is well-nigh identical with convincing or convicting. Light must precede and accompany true conviction, and is presupposed by it. Proof must precede re-proof. Reproof—by the very construction of the word—is reduplication of proof. It is proof, addressed as proof to the understanding, reiterated as conviction or re-proof on the conscience. *Reproof* is a reproduction in the conscience of what was simply science (knowledge) or *proof* in the understanding. The man who attempts or professes or pretends to *reprove* me without prior proof (proof suitable to the case or circumstances),—*i.e.* who attempts to reach my conscience otherwise than through my understanding—cannot possibly convince me, and does not really reprove me. He does not reprove: he simply rages. He dishonours one of the noblest parts of my nature, and insults me.

Now God cannot do that. He never insults any of his creatures. Perhaps one of the finest and most irresistible arguments for the Inspiration and thorough Divineness of the Scriptures might be based on the fact, that much as they have to say to guilty sinful men, they never insult even the chief of sinners. Much as God speaks to me in his word, and terrible as some of his utterances are, he never insults me. He is too honourable to do that. If he re-proves, he first *proves*. Proof irresistible precedes his re-proof. As even grammatically it ought to be, his reproof is true reduplication on his proof. He “proves you,” before he reproves you. And if you only suffer him thus to prove you, “he will do you good in your latter end.”—In particular, in the reproving work of the Spirit, eminently he will do you good :—

(1.) He reproves you of sin—the sin of *unbelief*;—the proof being, that the object of faith is worthy of all acceptance, and that you are bound by Divine authority to receive the gift of God.

(2.) He reproves you of *righteousness*;—the proof being that Jesus has gone to the Father, and we see him no more. For no more do we need to see him here below, his work of atoning righteousness being perfected on earth and accepted in heaven; and him the heavens, therefore, must righteously retain till the righteous restitution of all things.

(3.) He reproves of *judgment*;—the proof being that the prince of this world is judged; not merely that Satan personally is judged; that to me is but a small matter, however solemn, and exemplary, and instructive, and impressive it may be. But, *as* the “prince of this world”—the leader of this evil and apostate state of things in which I am immersed, and which has such paralysing hold upon me—in that character or capacity Satan is judged. In other words, the very life-centre and nerve-centre of the evil and apostate world-power that paralysed me, and made my return to God hopeless and, indeed, impossible, is itself smitten with paralysis, insomuch that I am this moment absolutely and wholly free, simply if I will; and, escaping from the judgment, like Lot from the cities of the plain, and taking hold by faith of the righteousness and victory of this conqueror of the world-power and its prince, I may stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ makes me free.

This is the Holy Spirit’s convincing or reproving work, all

built on *proof* preceding the *reproof*. Let me only accept honestly the proof, and it reappears as re-proof; it appears now in the very depths of my inner man as a repetition, a reduplication, a re-presentation of the very transaction in that cross of Christ which, (1.) so loudly calling for faith, condemns unbelief; which, (2.) so clearly revealing righteousness, calls to holy reconciliation with the Father, and justification of life eternal: which, (3.) so terrifically spoiling the spoiler, sets every captive free who simply *will*. All this is re-proved—proved a second time; reproduced—when I accept the Spirit's proof and reproof. And in this very acceptance of his proof I prove *him* and see. I get experimental proof that his reproof is an excellent oil which does not break my head, but heart—an unction from the Holy One: and being once willing, giving up my will to God's will, I prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God. But this is the will of God, that every one that seeth the Son, the glorious object of faith, the Lord our righteousness, now with the Father, the conqueror of the world's power and the world's prince, should have everlasting life, and Christ shall raise him up at the last day.

There is enlightenment, therefore, in the Spirit's work of gracious conviction and reproof.

But when it is successful, the Spirit goes on to give more and more light. Enlightenment now becomes pre-eminently of the very essence of what the Spirit now goes on to do. For when contritely accepted in his reproving work as an excellent oil, this "unction of the Holy One," this anointing that ye have received of him will abide in you, and the same anointing will teach you all things, for it is truth (personally and essentially truth) and no lie, even as it hath taught you, as it hath already taught you—taught you the enormous guilt implied in not believing on so glorious an object of faith—taught you to apprehend by faith the perfect righteousness—taught you to defy in faith the sin-power, the world-power, the devil-power, all the power of him who is the author of sin and the prince of the world. There is, indeed, no limit now to what the good Spirit of God will show unto you. "When he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear that shall he speak; and he shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine and shall show it unto you."

We are chargeable with great ingratitude to the good Spirit of truth, the Comforter. The very faithfulness with which he executes his office lays him open through our infirmity to be ungratefully dealt with. He is, if I may reverentially say so, so unobtrusive of himself, so wholly replenished, in his teachings and revelations, with the Son, and with the all things which being the Father's are the Son's also. His own equally divine and glorious personality is kept all the while in the background. "He does not speak of himself." "He does not testify of himself." "He does not glorify himself." "He glorifies Christ," "testifies of Christ," "speaks what he hath heard the Father speak with Christ, and Christ with the Father;" "he takes of the things of Christ and shows *them* to us." All the while he keeps himself in the background, not presenting his own personality—simply doing his work, and that work to make Christ glorious in our eyes; to glorify the Son, and the Father in the Son. And *therefore*, alas! having the provocation, the temptation, the opportunity, the scope for being ungrateful, we embrace it; with fatal certainty we turn the risk into a reality; we forget our obligations to him, and because he does not protrude himself and his claims, but Christ and Christ's glory, therefore, alas! *therefore* we are unthankful. We are taken up, or *think* we are taken up, with the Christ of whom he testifies, the Christ whom he glorifies, and we forget that Christ without the Spirit would be no anointed One, no Christ at all to us. We forget *him* without whom we would never see Christ nor the Father; never hear Christ's voice nor the Father's word; never have that word abiding in us. How base is this ingratitude! How dark-hearted is this requital! Ah! we will never glorify our Lord till we deal more righteously with his promised Spirit. "*He* shall glorify me," saith Jesus. And only in the communion of the Holy Ghost, whose office alone it is to glorify Christ, and who alone hath competence and power to glorify him—only by being led to fall into the concert and communion of the Spirit, as he glorifies the Son by taking of the things that are his and showing them to our souls—only thus shall *we* ever glorify our Lord himself, or the Father in whom the Son is glorified, and who is glorified in the Son.

ART. VI.—*The latest Outcome of Free Thought in those who still cling to the name of Christian.*¹

MR. FARRAR, in his able Bampton Lectures entitled "A Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion," thus defines Free Thought—"The revolt of the human mind against the pressure of external authority." It is a good definition, and I accept it, but my present range is much narrower than Mr. Farrar's. I mean to deal exclusively with those in our own country who, in the exercise of this Free Thought, have at length announced as their present landing-place the rejection of all external authority in religion, and yet, in a sense to be afterwards explained, still call themselves Christians. The programme of this new Christianity is the recent Lecture of one of the most eminent living thinkers and beautiful writers of our day—Dr. James Martineau—whom to know personally, as I can testify, is to esteem and love in no common degree. Though now retired from the exercise of a long ministry, he still continues, as Principal of the Manchester New College in London, to superintend the studies of those who are in training there for the Unitarian ministry; and the Lecture to which I now refer, and since published, was delivered a few months ago, at the request of a large number of his former pupils, some of whom occupy no mean position in theological literature. The lecture is entitled, "Loss and Gain in Recent Theology." The "losses" mean the views of his own body, formerly held, but now renounced, while the "gains" are the advantages arising from their new positions. And my present purpose is to state what those positions are which have had to be given up, and what are the gains believed to result from this surrender. In doing this I hope to say some things which to students here should not be without their use.

At the era of the Reformation there was one position on which the opposing parties were perfectly at one. All alike regarded the Scriptures as of Divine authority, the record of direct communications from God to men as to what they were to believe and how to live. Even the Polish

¹ Being the substance of a Lecture delivered at the opening of the Free Church Collège, Aberdeen (for Session 1881-82), on 2nd Nov., 1881.

and Transylvanian Unitarians—though disowned both by Protestants and Romanists—took the same view of the Scriptures as their opponents. As for the Protestants, particularly those of our own country, their great object was to lay open in the vulgar tongue the precious treasure so long withheld from them. And so eager was the popular thirst for this that long before Luther came on the stage Wiclif's translation from the Latin Vulgate was read in secret meetings, held in the dead of night, to crowds of eager listeners, and a man was known to give a load of hay for a single leaf of it. At length Tyndale's noble Version, made from the sacred originals, came into circulation, and Revision after Revision of it was hailed as helping towards a more perfect knowledge of God's Word. But this morning freshness of a new life began to fade, religious warmth to cool, secularity to creep in, and spiritual life to wane. Spiritual apprehension now gave place to a purely human way of looking at Divine things, and new principles began to be applied to the interpretation of the Bible. The distinctive features of Revealed Religion began to look harsh and stumbling to rational views of Divine things. One class kept all difficulties out of view, dealing both in pulpit and press with the mere general principles of religion and morality which no one would question. Such was the Hoadly school of able divines of the Church of England about the close of the seventeenth and up to the middle of last century. Among the Nonconformists, and especially the Presbyterians, during that period of religious decline, there were many who sympathised with this Hoadly school, who were on terms of intimacy with several of them, and whose own productions, though not wanting in ability, were frigid in the extreme. But others faced the difficulties by putting on the passages that contained them constructions more consonant, as they held, with sound reason than the usual orthodox interpretations, yet cautiously, not to create alarm; semi-Pelagian views of the Doctrine of Grace came creeping in, while the atoning character of the sufferings of Christ was only not explicitly denied. One of the best, however, of such productions was Locke's Paraphrase and Notes on several of the Epistles, devout in tone, and explicit in holding the recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as the promised Messiah to be the proper designation of a Christian. Of Nonconformist productions

of a low Arian tone, but certainly able, was Peirce and Hallett's Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, which Michaelis translated into German, with notes of his own. In fact, Arian and semi-Socinian publications met with more acceptance than one would have expected. Even Dr. Isaac Watts, in his later years, was thought to be tinctured with similar views of the Person of Christ, not to say that the same was believed of Philip Doddridge, though only in his earlier years. Then came Dr. John Taylor, of Norwich, author of the well-known "Hebrew Concordance," in whose bold "Paraphrase of the Epistle to the Romans, with Key to the Apostolic Writings," the whole apostolic language about redemption, reconciliation, regeneration, and the like, is interpreted as purely figurative, borrowed from the outward privileges common to all Jews under the Old Testament, and simply transferred to Christians in the New Testament to express their standing, and without respect to their personal character. At the Warrington Dissenting Academy, where Taylor was a professor, all opinions about Christ and Christianity were freely discussed, and affirmed or denied, with entire freedom. That classical scholar Gilbert Wakefield, who, on embracing Socinianism, had surrendered his position at Oxford, was received as classical tutor at Warrington, and there it was that Joseph Priestley, who eventually gained a European celebrity by his attainments in Natural Science, first began to attract notice, though not till some time afterwards known as a pronounced Socinian. Still, as a body, the Nonconformists were not prepared for such a descent. In the English Church, indeed, Arthur Ashley Sykes was known to be an Arian, and his work on Sacrifice makes the sacrificial character of Christ's work to be all figure. But Dr. Lardner—who laid the Christian world under such lasting obligation by his great work on the Credibility of the Gospel History—was fain to delay for thirty years the publication of his treatise on the Logos of John's Gospel, embodying, as it did, virtual Socinianism. I have said that Joseph Priestley became a pure Socinian, but to the end of his days he was at one with all Protestant Christians up to his time in loyalty to the Scriptures, as the supreme external authority, the final arbiter in all questions of faith and duty. The late devout and candid John James Tayler, the beloved associate of Dr. Martineau in the Man-

chester New College until his death some years ago, thus speaks of Priestley :—

“Brought up among the Independents, Priestley inherited through them from the old Puritans a profound sense of the value of revelation and of the authority of Scripture, which through all his changes remained with him unabated to the last. . . . Like Faustus Socinus, he was disposed to regard a special revelation as the main source of all positive religious belief ; and, I must think, undervalued the natural arguments for a future life. The opinion repeatedly occurs in his writings, and is steadily urged as an argument for Christianity, that the rejection of revelation draws with it, if not logically, yet as a usual consequence, the abandonment of all deep sentiment of natural religion.”

Further, in an essay of Priestley's on the *Inspiration of Christ*, the following striking statement occurs :—

“If there be any truth in history, Christ wrought miracles as a proof of his mission from God ; he preached the great doctrine of the resurrection from the dead ; he raised several persons from a state of death ; and what was more, he himself died and rose again in confirmation of his doctrine. The belief of these facts I call the belief of Christianity.”

How different a Christianity this is from that now avowed in the Lecture of Dr. Martineau you will soon see. Mr. Belsham—who, at the close of last century and beginning of this, stood at the head of English Unitarianism, and best known as the author of what he calls *An Improved Version of the New Testament*—held precisely the same views with Priestley on the authority of Revelation. And as for the eloquent Dr. Channing, on the other side of the Atlantic, so entirely did he coincide with them in this that some of his best theological productions consist of discourses on the “Evidences of Christianity,” and in one of the best of these, the evidence for miracles in general, and those of the “Gospel History” in particular—including the resurrection of Christ—is put with a terseness, force, and felicity not exceeded by Paley, which made a deep impression upon my own mind while I was yet a student. In fact, up to the time of Theodore Parker, and that beautiful writer but transcendental and pantheistic thinker, Ralph Waldo Emerson, the authority of Revelation was never questioned by transatlantic Unitarians. Professor Andrews Norton's work on the *Genuineness of the Gospels* is proof enough of this. But far more refreshing is the fact that, while the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel is entirely given up by the new school of English Unitarians, one who stands at the head of transatlantic scholarship in New

Testament criticism, Dr. Ezra Abbot, of the Boston Unitarian School of Divinity, and, as a member of the American Revision Company is justly looked up to as an authority in that department, has published a small volume in vindication of the Joannean and apostolical authorship of that Gospel, the arguments of which the new English school will never refute.

But, as I said, the old Biblical school is dying out in England, nor could any efforts be expected to succeed in establishing Unitarianism on a Biblical basis. The younger men began to see what forced interpretations the Biblical school required for its support; and getting familiarised with that class of German critics who freely admit that the New Testament teaches the orthodox view of Christ's Person and death, but sit loose to it, they began to speak pretty freely against the inspiration and authority of the apostolic writings, holding it enough if they believed in Christ Himself, as represented in the Gospel History. But next, since even Christ, if only a mere man, could not have transcended the limits of humanity, and so must have been liable to err—and as a Jew must have had his ideas largely cast in a Jewish mould, little adapted to an advanced state of society—they began to go outside the Gospels themselves, and sit critically upon them; and, applying the verifying faculty which every one possesses, they set themselves to test by it the whole matter of the Gospel History—facts, doctrines, and all—according as the instinctive sense of credibility might or might not set its seal upon them. Some of the elder school of Unitarians shrank from this, as a going out to sea without compass or rudder, and making shipwreck of the faith; but they did little, and the little they did only proved how completely the old faith was gone. About three years ago I was introduced to a venerable retired minister of that body, and on alluding to the two schools, the old and the new, he said, "I belong to the old school. We are called the evangelical Unitarians, because we cling to the written Gospel as the charter of our faith." But what was this gentleman himself? He was the son of an orthodox Presbyterian minister, who seeing how the Presbyterians of England were running into Unitarianism, left them and joined the Independents. But his son had caught the infection of his day, though only in its Biblical form, and now his son has taken the further step,

and belongs to the new non-Biblical school. Such is the Incline upon which that body necessarily stepped, so soon as they surrendered the key-stone of the arch of revealed truth; and how far down they have descended may be judged from one other fact, before I come to the crowning evidence of it in the Lecture before us. Many years ago, an earnest and popular Unitarian minister, of the old Biblical school, in a large provincial town of England, grieved to observe how all belief in the connection of the Old Testament with the New was dying out among them, and, determined that at least his own faith should be known and marked, caused the new church which was built for him to be named "The Church of the Messiah." And more than that, he moved at the annual meeting of the Unitarian Association, that the term of admission should henceforth be the recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah of the Old Testament; no great stretch, it might seem, since it was precisely the position not only of John Locke but of Joseph Priestley. Being told that such a motion could not be taken up but as a notice of motion that year, he brought it forward the following year, but was supported by no more than himself and the seconder of his motion; the rest holding it enough to recognise in Jesus the best of human teachers. What sort of pulpit work this would produce you may judge for yourselves, and the facts of the case are pretty well known.¹

Coming now to the Lecture before us, it takes stock, so to speak, of the "losses" which may be supposed to result from their surrender of all the old beliefs of the body; and over against these are placed the countervailing "gains." The losses, which are startling enough, are expressed with a clearness that leaves no room for doubt as to their meaning, and with that earnestness and elevation of tone which are so characteristic of the Lecturer. At the same time there runs through the whole an unmistakeable consciousness of the deep cut which he was making into every old belief even of his own body, and of the disadvantageous impression this would produce, if not upon his actual hearers, yet upon many still connected with them in

¹ I myself happened to see in a Unitarian newspaper not long ago, a letter from a lay member of that body, to this effect:—"Our ministers are calling upon us to subscribe for the building of more chapels; but let me tell them (and I speak for many of my brethren), that if they don't give us more Christianity from the pulpit, they will soon find that we have not too few, but too many chapels."

ious fellowship. The "losses"—or their "superseded logical beliefs"—are only two, but in their prodigious sweep embrace the whole field of written Christianity—in fact everything save bare Theism. *First*, all revealed religion is totally renounced, and with it, of course, all external authority in religion; *secondly*, and naturally enough, all faith in a promised Messiah is not only given up, but pronounced to be a mere mythology. Hear our Lecturer :—

There is a total discharge from our religious conceptions of that central Jewish dream, which was always asking, '*Art thou he that should come, or we for another?*' Consider first (says the Lecturer) the total discharge from our branch of the Reformed Church of all *external authority* in matters of religion."

The prediction of the Church of Rome (he says) has at last become true, that those who threw off the yoke of the Church should never rest till they had thrown off the yoke of the Bible. Yes, he says, we *have* cast off the yoke of the Bible. Henceforth there is for us "no Canonical literature."

"I need not remind you how innocently and how inevitably this has come about; how completely the conception of a Canonical literature that all for ever serve as a Divine statute-book belongs to a state of culture that has passed away. It is simply a fact that *dictated* faith and duty are no longer possible; and that by the way of textual oracle you can carry to the soul no vision of God, no contrition for sin, no sigh for righteousness. The time is past when a doctrine can save itself from criticism by taking refuge under an apostle's words, or a futurity authenticate itself by a prophet's forecast, or a habit become obligatory by evangelical example."

You will naturally ask—Did the Lecturer expect such statements to be received quite coolly and accepted quite readily by all his auditors, or, if by them, by the generality of his own country? You shall judge for yourselves when you hear what follows :—

"To our function, as witnesses for divine things, this seems at first little more than a loss of both the credentials and the instructions which legitimate our message. We naturally think how easy was the preacher's task when he had only to exhibit the sacred seal, and make clear the sentences it revered, and the Reason of men would accept them as truth, and the Will would bow before them; when doubts of Providence fled from the sufferer at the mere sound of the words, 'The hairs of your head are all numbered,' and the shadows of death vanished before the voice, 'This mortal must put on immortality,' and the guilty conscience shuddered to hear, 'There shall no wise enter therein anything that is unclean, or that maketh abomination and a lie.' In our moments of weakness, we may long for some allible support, etc."

Alas! from this new school all that is gone. It will no longer do, it seems, to hope that by whispering to the Christian sufferer "The very hairs of your head are all numbered," doubts of Providence will vanish; for, however true in itself, the voice of Him that uttered it adds nothing to its weight. While standing by the bedside of a dying Christian we must not expect the shadows of death to be lifted off by the words, "This mortal must put on immortality;" for not only has this school ceased to believe in the resurrection of Christ Himself, and, of course, in the resurrection of any others, the statement carries no more weight as coming from an apostle, than if it came from me. How different is this from the faith even of Joseph Priestley! When he was dying in America, he caused part of the 14th of John to be read to him, and then spoke as follows:—"I shall soon be a heap of unconscious dust" (for Priestley believed in what was then called the corpuscular theory, or, we should now say, he was a materialist); "but, resting on these words of Christ, I am as sure that I shall again live in the body as that I am now speaking."

But to resume. "Are we then to despair of our office because what was once used as a divine text-book has become a human literature? On the contrary, we claim it as a noble though severe advantage that we are driven from words to realities, and must sink right home to the inward springs of religion in our nature." But what, you will ask, are those inward springs of religion in our own nature? those "*unwritten* oracles of God that," our lecturer says, "have most deeply stirred the hearts of the devout"? His answer is, "The beauty of the heavens and the earth, the secret heroism of duty, the mystery of sorrow, the solemnity of death." But are these "silences" what indeed "most deeply stir the hearts of the devout"? Does experience proclaim the potency of such shadowy abstractions as reflection on the beauty of the heavens and the earth, the felt mystery of sorrow, and such like, in hours of suffering and on a deathbed? Nay, does not all history attest the truth of the Apostle's words, that "the world by wisdom knew not God"? and even in our own times it is notorious that any such knowledge of God as even Dr. Martineau himself would count true, is to be found only among those who either still believe in Divine Revelation, or, though

they have given it up, were yet reared within its pale and hopefully nurtured in the faith of it. He may claim it as a noble advantage to be driven out of his faith in the written, down into the unwritten, oracles of God within us. But he is constrained to admit that it is a "severe advantage;" and, far from wondering at his calling it so, I honour him for the noble sincerity which it evinces, and only regret that at the expense of such "severity" his new position has been taken.

But now for the *second* of those "Losses in Recent Theology" enumerated in this Lecture:—

"And now take the measure of another great change, which, though timid in its advances, has reached its completion within our own memory—the disappearance from our faith of the entire Messianic mythology. I speak not merely of the lost 'argument from prophecy,' now melted away by better understanding of the Hebrew writings, or of the interior relation, under any aspect, of the Old Testament and the New; but of the total discharge from our religious conceptions of that central Jewish dream which was always asking, 'Art thou He that should come, or must we look for another?' and of all its stages, its drama, and its scenery. It no longer satisfies us to say that Jesus realised the Divine promise in a sense far transcending the national preconceptions, and revealed at last the real meaning of the Spirit which spoke in Isaiah. Such forced conforming of the Jewish ideal to the Christian facts, by glorifying the one and theorising the other, was inevitable to the first disciples, and could not but colour all that they remembered and thought and wrote; and the imagination of Christendom, working with indiscriminating faith on these mixed materials, has drawn upon its walls a series of sacred pictures from which Art has loved to reproduce whatever is tender and sublime, and which have broken silence in the *Divina Commedia*, in the *Paradise Lost and Regained*, in plaintive passion-music, and the kindling popular hymn. All this is of intense interest to us as literature, as art, as the past product of devout genius. Nor will I too rigorously question those elements of it which fairly admit of symbolic use in setting forth the truths we really mean and the affections we deeply feel. But as *objective reality*, as a faithful representation of our invisible and ideal universe, it is gone from us; gone therefore from our interior religion, and become obsolete mythology. From the person of Jesus, for instance, everything *official*, attached to Him by evangelists or divines, has fallen away: when they put such false robes upon Him they were (that is, the evangelists were) but leading Him to death (!) The pomp of royal lineage and fulfilled prediction, the prerogatives of King, of Priest, of Judge, the Advent with retinue of angels on the clouds of heaven, are to us mere deforming investitures, misplaced, like court-dresses on 'the spirits of the just;' and he is simply the Divine flower of humanity, blossoming after ages of spiritual growth,—the realised possibility of life in God. And if He is *this*, He has no consciously exceptional part to play, but only to *be* what He is, to follow the momentary love, to do and say what the hour may

bring, to be quiet under the sorrows which pity and purity incur, and die away in the prayer of inextinguishable trust. And to see Him thus, we go to His native fields and the village houses of Galilee, and the roads of Samaria, and the streets and courts of Jerusalem, where the griefs and wrongs of His time bruised Him, and brought out the sublime fragrance of His spirit. All that has added to that real historic scene—the angels that hang around His birth, and the fiend that tempts His youth, the dignities that await His future, the throne, the trumpet, the great assize, the bar of judgment, nay, the very boundary walls of the cosmic panorama that contains these things,—have for us utterly melted away, and left us amid the infinite sea and the silent stars.”

Well, this is fine writing, but is it anything more? When M. Renan issued his *Life of Jesus*, it created a great sensation; but the best judges of historical criticism, even those who criticised it only to try what historical truth there was in it, pronounced it no history at all, but a romance founded upon the Gospel History. But M. Renan has again spoken upon Christianity, and this time in no less a place than Westminster Abbey, as one of the Hibbert Lecturers. Well, his position, as now expounded, is plain enough. He constructs Christianity out of the progress of events. It was simply evolved, and Jesus Himself, as an historical character, was simply the ripened fruit of all the growth of preceding times—there was nothing supernatural in it at all. Now, wherein does our Lecturer's position differ from this? In Jesus he sees simply (to use his own words) “the divine flower of humanity blossoming after ages of spiritual growth,” one who “had no consciously exceptional part to play,” who had simply “to be quiet under the sorrows which pity and purity incur, the sublime fragrance of whose spirit was brought out by the griefs and wrongs of his time, which bruised him,” and who just “died away in the prayer of inextinguishable trust.” From the person of Jesus everything “official attached to him by evangelists or prophets has died away” out of our faith. But where does he find such a Jesus? He goes to the right quarter, no doubt—to the Gospels; for, he says, “to see him thus we go to his native fields and the village-houses of Galilee, and the roads of Samaria, and the streets and courts of Jerusalem.” Well, I go there with him, but there he finds what others see not; and what to others is in every scene and almost every verse is to him nowhere. Do you ask how I explain this? It is the

easiest thing possible. You can construct such a "Jesus" out of the Gospels for yourselves, if you will only do what I bid you. First, put your pen through every scene in which He expressly claims a supernatural commission, with all the scenes in which He attests that claim by healing supernaturally every human malady, and even raising the dead with a word; next, blot out every scene and every speech in which He attaches Himself to the Old Testament in His entire teaching and work, as its divinely ordained and predicted completion: this must be all given up as Messianic mythology—a huge heap of myths, pure Jewish dreams. Having done this, proceed further, and put your pen through that scene of mysterious agony and bloody sweat in the prospect of death, which, if He had been a mere man, would sink His courage below that of thousands of His adoring followers, who in every age have cheerfully laid down their lives for Him, but would shudder at being compared with Him; in a word, blot all those scenes in which He dies sublime amid appalling manifestations of a Divine presence, and, after every precaution had been taken to guard His sepulchre from disturbance, bursts the tomb, and, while His guards were quaking and were like dead men, rises the third day, overpowers the doubts of the most sceptical of His own followers, and before their eyes "ascends up where He was before." If this seems rough handling, you will find it rougher still, when on closely examining what you have blotted out, you discover that you have cut out of the Gospels precisely those scenes which, to have invented—and to have been invented by such men and at such a time—would have been a literary impossibility, or a literary miracle. But even this will not do it. For in the small residuum left to you, you will find, in verse after verse, His supernatural claims and character either cropping out in so many words, or so clearly presupposed and implied that they must go too. Well, when you have succeeded so far by picking and choosing, cutting and carving, upon those peerless Records, what have you got? The Christ you have got by such destructive criticism is simply an ideal figure of your own creation, which no genuine, sober criticism can pronounce historical. Least of all is it the Christ of the Gospels.

In a Lecture which I delivered some years ago from this

place, I adverted to the difference between Francis Newman's view of the character of Christ, and that of Dr. Martineau. Mr. Newman maintained that viewing Jesus of Nazareth as a mere man—as both of them did—it was impossible to admire his character; impossible, rather, not to condemn it—marked, as it was, by an arrogance intolerable in any mere man, by pretensions which, in a mere man, were simply incredible; by manifold inconsistencies, and, in some cases, by what must be set down to moral obliquity. In these dreadful conclusions I was constrained to admit that Mr. Newman was right, following, as it seemed to me, irresistibly from the premises common to both gentlemen. But I added that I would infinitely rather be inconsistent with James Martineau, than terribly consistent with Francis Newman.¹ But how sad is it that such as Dr. Martineau, whose instincts resent the conclusions of Mr. Newman, should deem it a noble though severe advantage to have been left, as they say they are, “amid the infinite sea and the silent stars”—a dreary enough region surely—no revelation from Heaven to lighten their darkness, no direct voice from God to men to cheer them.

But now, some who hear me may be saying to themselves—This is all very interesting, but what have we to do with it? My answer to this question will close the present Lecture. First, then, if you confine your theological studies to the creed of your own Church, you may be useful enough in some remote place where no such views are likely to be heard of; though even there you may find reading young men who know more than you think, who have their own religious difficulties, and who will not think the more of you if you are not able to help them. Even in your own studies

¹ Since the present Lecture was delivered I have received a pamphlet entitled, *What is Christianity without Christ*, by Francis W. Newman (1881),—which, though not naming Dr. Martineau, seems plainly to have been written in reply to his Lecture on *Loss and Gains in Recent Theology*, on which I am here commenting. The whole object of that pamphlet is (1), to show that the character of the “Christ” of the Gospels is far worse than anything the writer had ever said of him before (and here his language is such that it would defile these pages to quote even a line of it); (2), that, when you cut out of the Gospels all that goes to prove what is here affirmed, you leave no Christ at all; and consequently, (3) that “a Christianity without Christ” being an absurdity, the name of “Christian” should no longer be retained; but (4) that, when this is done, enough religion remains for all the purposes of a true life, in the fear and love and service of God.

for the pulpit, if you care only to meet your weekly necessities, with no broad reading and thinking, your ministry will not long retain its freshness and force. Second, in our Halls of Divinity we require to bring before you from session to session the various ways in which Divine truth has been viewed and handled, on the wrong side as well as on the right, by friends and foes; and we tell you in what works these different views are most ably represented, works open to all students in our own Library; remembering the apostolic injunction, "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good." But we know the dangers incident to this, and can never forget how some young men of high promise, both intellectually and spiritually, deeming themselves proof against such dangers, have made shipwreck of faith and of a good conscience. Alas! I suffered too much from them myself to forget such dangers; and, *Haud ignarus mali, miseris succurrere disco*. But your dangers are even greater than mine were. In my day, coldness, deadness, indifference to everything in study but what would forward their prospects of a parish church was the reigning tendency; and it was only a few earnest students who were troubled with difficulties about the Bible and its teaching—difficulties, however, which threatened to end in their abandoning all thought of the Christian ministry. Now, all that is changed; the very atmosphere is charged with the spirit of doubt; and the effect of this upon able and inquiring students is painful to perceive. For though no vital truth is surrendered, there is a want of felt certainty in those truths, which is the secret of their power in the heart, of their spell in the pulpit, and of preparedness to die for them such as thrills us as we read it in Church History, and happily is not extinct. Further, in the theological literature which some like best, you have that senseless cry against dogma—which just means the truths of the Bible, the very backbone of Revelation. While of this there is very little, the ethical and emotional elements of religion are pressed into the foreground. In the Person of Christ, what is called the human element is so emphasised as to overshadow the divine; though formerly, beyond doubt, the opposite extreme did much harm. As for what they call the divine element, this is often toned down into what is called "the divine" in man; and so you have virtual Unitar-

rianism, which, while using Scripture language, evacuates the meaning of it. As for the sufferings of Christ, what the New Testament makes the turning-point of their saving efficacy—their substitutionary character—this is shaded off and virtually sunk in the heroic way in which He died. In this connection I am unwilling to name that notorious volume of “Scotch Sermons,” which is an exaggerated specimen of that school of theology, and which, I would fondly hope, has received a check. But, certainly, if one would know how to eviscerate, without explicitly denying, the most vital truths of Revelation in the pulpit and through the press, I could point to no volume that so perfectly succeeds in it. But how stands it with ourselves? Complaints are certainly arising on this score. Those who remember what we were as a Free Church, when the dew of our youth was upon us, think they perceive in not a few quarters a lack of what did more to draw our people around us than many abstract arguments—a lack of that unction and fragrance of spirituality, that power of personal and present conviction, on the part of the preachers, that bearing in upon the conscience, that zeal for souls, which was like life from the dead then. Of talent and learning, it is admitted, there is no lack, but they would not have this as a substitute for the other. Well, dear young friends, I will not say how far there is ground for this or not. But “forewarned is forearmed.” O! let it not be said of us as a Church, as was said by the Master, of the Church of Ephesus, while commending them for their manifold activities in His service, “Nevertheless, I have this against thee, that thou hast left thy first love.” Without this, even the activities themselves will not abide, and we shall cease to have even a name to live. May the Spirit of all grace come down in power upon all our Halls of Divinity, upon those of our sister Presbyterian Churches, and upon every such Hall of Divinity, as a quickening, heart-warming power, before which scepticism, whether open or covert, will never stand. For now, as ever, “this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our *faith*.”

DAVID BROWN.

ART. VII.—Note on Luke II. 49.

Καὶ εἶπε πρὸς αὐτοὺς, Τί ὅτι ἐζητεῖτέ με ; οὐκ ᾔδειτε ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου
δεῖ εἶναι με ;

And he said unto them, How is it that ye sought me? wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?—*Authorised Version.*

And he said unto them, How is it that ye sought me? wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house? *Revised Version.*

THIS is the first recorded utterance of our Lord when on earth; and it is somewhat remarkable that, short and apparently simple as it is, there should be doubt and dispute as to the meaning of the important part of it. The words used by our Lord, as they fell from his lips, were doubtless free from all ambiguity; and though it is said that they to whom they were addressed "understood not the saying which He spake unto them," this has reference not to the sense of his words but to the import of what He said. But reported in a language different from that used by our Lord, what, as uttered by Him, was perfectly unambiguous, may, from a difference of idiom, have become of doubtful interpretation, especially to us, to whom the language in which our Lord's words are reported is a dead language, the exact force of whose idioms we can seize only by patient investigation and the application of criteria furnished from the stores of learned research. The words ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου are susceptible of a double interpretation. They may mean "in the house of my Father" (A), or they may mean "in the business of my Father" (B), and between these interpretations translators and exegetes have been divided from the earliest times. Some, indeed, have proposed to combine the two. Thus Capellus, whilst preferring A, adds "negotiis non exclusis;" Doddridge, though in a note he decides also for this, in his paraphrase combines the two thus: "Did ye not know that I ought to be at my Father's? and that wherever I was I should be so employed in his service as to be secure of his protection?" Simon Grynäus (*Die Heilige Schrift übersetzt*, Berl. 1782) has "Wusstet ihr nicht dasz ich in meines Vaters Geschäften in seinem Hause seyn muss?" De Wette, whilst admitting that the rendering "in the house

of my Father" is the more natural, thinks that this does not exclude the other meaning, which "gives to the utterance a deeper significance, and one more in keeping with the non-understanding of the parents and the importance attached to it by the Evangelist" (*Exeget. Handbuch*, in loc.). Alford says much the same. But surely this is an expedient which should not be resorted to. Our Lord must have intended to convey one or other of the meanings which his words may bear, and the business of the interpreter is not to combine the two as he best can, but to determine, if possible, which is to be preferred.

Of the ancient Versions, the majority simply translate the words of the passage without giving the force of the idiom. Thus the Philoxenian Syriac has ܕܠܗ ܕܡܝܬܐ ܕܐܒܝ ܕܡܝܬܐ in his patris mei; the Vulgate, in his quae Patris mei sunt; the Gothic, niu visseduth thatai in thaim attins meinis skulda visan? So also the Arabic and Ethiopic of the Polyglott and the Coptic. These Versions therefore decide for neither of the interpretations, though perhaps they may be held as inclining to B. The Peshito, however, decidedly commends A; it has ܕܠܗ ܕܡܝܬܐ ܕܡܝܬܐ quod in domo Patris mei oportet me esse, and with this the Curetonian Syriac agrees. So also the Persic of the Polyglott and the Armenian, the former of which is made from the Peshito, the latter much influenced by it. The Anglo-Saxon rather favours the other interpretation: nyste gyt dhaet me gebyrath to beonne on tham thingum dhe mines Faeder synt? This rendering probably determined that of Wiclif: "Wisten ye not for in tho thingis that ben of my fadir it bihoueth me to be?" Tyndale has, "Wist ye not that I muste goo aboute my father's business?" and this Coverdale and all the later English Versions have followed. Luther follows the Vulgate: *Wisset ihr nicht dass ich seyn muss in dem des meines Vaters ist?* But the Zürich Bible of 1597 has *Wustend ir dann nit dass ich in meines Vaters geschäftten sein must?* And the Dutch Authorised Version has *En wistet gy niet dat ick moet zijn in de dingen mijns Vaders?* The French, Italian, and Spanish Versions (Ostervald, Martin, De Sacy, Diodati, Martini, etc.) all adopt B (Fr. *aux affaires* or *à ce qui regarde*; It. *nelle cose*; Sp. *los negocios* or *las cosas*).

Passing from Versions to Interpreters, it appears that the Greek Fathers took the passage in the sense of A. Thus

Origen: "When the Virgin spoke of Joseph, who was called his father, as his father, He said, My father is not Joseph, but God, He who is master of the temple; for, being in the temple of God, He said (εἰς τὸν ναὸν γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὧν ἔφη), *Did ye not know,*" etc. To the same effect Epiphanius (*Panar.* i. 30): "indicating that the temple was built for the name of God, that is, of his Father (σημαίνων ὅτι ὁ ναὸς εἰς ὄνομα Θεοῦ, τουτέστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς ὡκοδομήθη). More explicitly, Theophylact: "The Virgin having called Joseph his father, He said, This is not my true father, for then should I have been in his house; but God is my Father, and therefore I am in his house (to wit the temple, ἡγουν ναῶ)." So also Euthymius Zigabenus: "*In the house of my Father.* He spoke of the temple which Solomon built to God and his Father. His mother indeed had spoken of his adoptive father (περὶ τοῦ θέσει πατρὸς αὐτοῦ), but He by this made known Him who is his Father by nature (τὸν φύσει πάτερα αὐτοῦ ἐγνώρισε.)"¹

Among later interpreters, A is adopted by Grotius, Hammond, Whitby, Krebs, Keuchen, Palaiet, Nic. Fuller (*Miscell. Theol.* P. iv.), Reland (*Antiq. Hebr.* p. 54), Kuinoel, Meyer, etc. For B are Maldonat, Cartwright, Buxtorf, Loesner, Valckenaer, Rosenmüller, Ewald, Van Oosterzee.

On the whole, the preponderance, in respect of authority, though not great, is in favour of A. The fact, however, that the balance is so nearly even, makes it all the more imperative that we should endeavour, by a careful consideration of the words of the passage, to determine each for himself how they are to be interpreted.

We may begin by showing that both interpretations are philologically legitimate. 1. The phrase τὰ τινός, as is well known, is used in classical Greek in the sense of "the house of one." Instances of this usage are furnished in abundance by Wetstein (*Nov. Test.* t. i. p. 668), and by Bos (*Ellips. Gr.* p. 209, ed. Lond. 1825). One or two may suffice here: καὶ ἐρωτᾶσιν ὅπη

¹ Chrysostom has left no commentary on Luke, nor does he refer to Luke ii. 49 in any of his extant writings. But as Theophylact and Euthymius are almost invariably in accordance with him, we may infer his opinion from theirs. To these authorities of the Eastern Church may be added the Latin poet Juvencus, who in his *Historia Evangel.* thus paraphrases our Lord's words :-

"An nondum sentis genetrix quod jure paternis
Sedibus atque Domo natum inhabitare necesse est?"—Lib. i. l. 300.

βαδίζοιμεν; ὁ δ' ἔφασκεν εἰς τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἐμοῦ—Lysias, *contr. Eratosth.* p. 392, ed. Stephan.; ἤδη δ' εὔσα μέσον κατ' ἀμαξιτόν ἃ τὰ Δύκωνος, *Εἶδον Δέλφιν*—Theocritus, *Idyl.* ii. v. 76.¹ More to our present purpose are the instances of this usage from the LXX. and Josephus. In Gen. xli. 51 the Hebrew בֵּית אֲבִי is rendered in the LXX. by πάντων τῶν τοῦ πατρός μου, but as “house” here means not the dwelling, but the family or household, this may be held as not an instance fairly in point. The following instances, however, cannot be disputed:—Esth. vii. 9, for the Heb. בֵּית הַיָּבֵיב the LXX. has ἐν τοῖς Ἀμάν. Esth. viii. 2, ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν Ἀμάν. Job xviii. 20, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ζήσονται ἕτεροι. Joseph. *contr. Apion.* i. 18, τὸν τὲ χρυσοῦν κίονα τὸν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Διὸς ἀνέθηκεν; *Antiq.* v. i. 26, πανταχοῦ δ' ἐν τοῖς τοῦτου (sc. θεοῦ) ἐστε; *Antiq.* xvi. x. 1, ἦν δ' αὐτῷ καταγωγὴ ἐν τοῖς Ἀντιπάτρου. Sometimes a plural adjective is used instead of the noun, to denote the person whose house it is. Thus Sirac. xlii. 9, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πατρικοῖς αὐτῆς ἔγκυος γένηται. Analogous to this is the use of ἴδια in the N. T. Comp. John i. 11; xvi. 32; Acts xxi. 6. In the N. T., however, the construction with the noun very rarely occurs in this sense; indeed it may be questioned if a single unexceptionable instance can be found. Such phrases as ἐκ τῶν Χλοῆς, 1 Cor. i. 11; τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβύλου, and τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ναρκίσσου, Rom. xvi. 10, 11, cannot be held as in point, for there the phrase means “those of the family” or “people of Chloe,” etc.

2. The phrase τὰ τινός is used in the sense of “the things belonging to or characterising one,” the qualities, affairs, business, interests of one. Thus ᾧ τὰ τῆς τύχης κρατεῖ, *Soph. Oed. Tyr.* 977, the qualities constituting Fortune = Fortune herself; νοσεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, the things belonging to, the affairs and interests of, the gods are in disorder, Eur. *Troad.* 27; τοιοῦτοι μὲν εἰσὶν οἱ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τιμῶντες, “they who honour the Father and the things of the Father,” i.e. the Father's commands and claims (=the Father's business), Philo, *De Temulent.* p. 250 E.; “Seest thou how he teaches them not to murmur? inasmuch as murmuring is the part of ignorant and senseless slaves. For what son, tell me,

¹ The same idiom is found in the Latin. Thus Ter. *Adelph.* iv. 2. 43, “Ubi ad Dianae veneris, ito ad dextram;” Hor. *Sat.* i. 9. 35, “Ventum erat ad Vestae.” In English also we say, at least colloquially, “He is at his father's,” “I called at yours to-day,” and such like.

labouring in his father's business (ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς πονῶν), and labouring for himself, murmurs?" Chrysost. *Hom. vii. in Ep. i. ad Corinthios*. This passage, it is true, may be cited as favouring the other rendering of the phrase under consideration, and has indeed been so cited. But the connection, and especially the identifying of the labouring ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς with the labouring of the son for himself, seem to fix the meaning of the phrase to the rendering above given. In the N. T. this is the usual, we might say the invariable, meaning of the phrase; comp. τὰ Καίσαρος, τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, Matt. xxii. 21; τὰ τῆς σαρκός, τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, Rom. viii. 5; τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης, xiv. 9; τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 1 Cor. ii. 11; τὰ τοῦ Κυρίου, τὰ τοῦ κόσμου, 1 Cor. vii. 32, 33, etc. So also with the article in the singular, τὸ ἐαυτοῦ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου, 1 Cor. x. 24; τὸ τῆς αὔριου, James iv. 14; τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, 2 Pet. ii. 22.

3. The phrase εἶναι ἐν τινί may mean either to be in any place or condition, or to be engaged in any occupation. The former is the common and proper meaning of the phrase, and of it no illustration is needed; but the latter is also in usage, and examples of it may be abundantly produced. Thus Aelian, *Var. Hist.* i. 31, ἄτε δὴ ὄντες ἐν γεωργίᾳ καὶ περὶ γῆν πονούμενοι, "inasmuch as they were engaged in agriculture and tilled the ground;" Philo, *De Migr. Abrahami*, p. 421 D., ἔτι ὦν ἐν τοῖς πόνοις, "being still engaged in labours" (quoted by Loesner, p. 98); Herod. iii. 27, οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι . . . ἦσαν ἐν θαλίῃσι, "The Egyptians were engaged in festivities;" viii. 99, αὐτοὶ ἦσαν ἐν θυσίῃσι, "They were occupied with sacrifices;" Thucyd. i. 22, ἡ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, "either being about to make war or already engaged in it;" vii. 11, "Now it is time to take counsel since you know in what condition we are (ἐν ᾧ ἐσμέν);" Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 562, "Was this soothsayer at that time occupied with his art (ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ)?" Eurip. *Hip.* 452, "They who are always occupied with poetry (αὐτοὶ τ' εἰσὶν ἐν μούσαις ἀεὶ);" Xenoph. *Cyr.* iii. 1. 1, Ὁ μὲν δὲ Κύρος ἐν τούτοις ἦν, "Cyrus was occupied with these things;" iv. 3. 23, οἱ μὲν δὲ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἦσαν, "They were engaged in these discourses;" Plutarch, *Vit. Pomp.* [Plut. *Parallela*, ed. Bryan, vol. iii. p. 499], ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὖν ὁ Καῖσαρ ἦν, *dum haec agit Caesar*, "whilst Cæsar was thus occupied," or "was about this business." Of

these examples some have reference to the person's usual employment or occupation, but the majority respect his occupation at the time referred to ; but this is of no importance as regards the meaning of the phrase, the point at present in question. In the N. T. the phrase is found only in the passage we are considering, and in 1 Tim. iv. 15, ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι, of which "give thyself wholly to them," is perhaps too strong a rendering, as the phrase only means "be occupied with them."

The result of this inquiry is the conclusion that either A or B is a legitimate rendering of the passage, and that there is a slight preponderance in favour of B from the usage of the N. T., where τὰ τινός has invariably the meaning of "the things belonging to one," "the affairs or business of one," never "the house of one."

In further support of this conclusion it may be observed that in other cases where St. Luke has occasion to mention "father's house" as the place in which any one is or anything is done, he uses οἶκος. Thus xvi. 27, "I pray thee, therefore, father, that thou wouldest send him to my father's house (εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς μου);" Acts vii. 20, "nourished up in his father's house (ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τ. π.);" St. John also reports our Lord as saying of the temple, "Make not my Father's house (τὸν οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς μου) a house of merchandise;" and when speaking of the heavenly state He uses οἰκία, "in my Father's house (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τ. π. μ.)." This renders it probable that had our Lord meant to say, "Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" St. Luke would have reported Him as saying, ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ πατρὸς μου, and not ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου.

In fine, the use by our Lord of δεῖ here is strongly in favour of the rendering in the Authorised Version. This verb always conveys the idea of necessity or obligation, and is properly rendered in English by *must* or *ought*. Now there was no necessity, physical or moral, for our Lord's being in the temple rather than in any other house ; nor was it so likely that He should be there as that He should be in the house where He had stayed with Joseph and Mary when they were in Jerusalem. Even had He been in the habit of spending His time in the temple (of which, however, there is no evidence), though He might have said, "You should have expected to find me

in my Father's house," He could hardly have said, "Wist ye not that I *ought* to be in my Father's house?" As, however, He had come to do the work of God on the earth, and as it **was** his meat and his drink to do the will of his Father, He was under a moral necessity to be engaged in his Father's business. With perfect propriety, therefore, might He say to his parents, "Wist ye not that I *must* be about my Father's business?"

Notwithstanding, then, that the majority of interpreters are in favour of the other rendering, and though a very high authority has recently declared that this "is, as Dr. Field has shown, the almost certainly true rendering of ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου,"¹ I venture to assert that something may still be said for the other rendering, and probably my readers may join with me in regretting that in the Revised Version there has not been retained the rendering which has hitherto appeared in all the English Versions from the time of Wiclif downwards.

W. LINDSAY ALEXANDER.

ART. VIII.—*Some Difficulties of Modern Materialism.*²

ABOUT half a generation ago the leaders of advanced thought appeared in the philosophical and theological wilderness, announcing that the kingdom of science was at hand. Of course the way had to be prepared for the new kingdom by uprooting old views, and the aforesaid leaders were very efficient in this work. Armed with a logic variously described as rigorous, unsparing, relentless, etc., they pushed in all directions as effectually as the beast of Daniel's vision. They pointed out the incoherences of received views so clearly as to make it plain that no honest man with the least ability could retain them longer. So well was this work done, that the bystander could hardly help thinking that nothing but

¹ The Dean of Peterborough, in the *Contemporary* for July 1881. The work of Dr. Field, to which the Dean refers, is a treatise on this verse replete with learning, and marked by that exact scholarship and perspicuous argumentation which characterises all Dr. Field's writings. Though differing from Dr. Field as to the meaning of the passage, the author of this paper has been much indebted to Dr. Field's essay in the preparation of it.

² From the *Princeton Review*.

mental dishonesty would explain the tenacity with which apparently intelligent persons clung to old beliefs. Indeed the prophets of the new era did not fail to hint with great plainness that the old views derived not a little support from unworthy motives. But this necessity of incessantly attacking and exploding old views has been a disadvantage to the new. The advanced thinkers have been so absorbed in attack and negation, as to give little attention to unfolding their own solution of the perennial problems of thought and life. As yet the new philosophy has not attained to proper self-knowledge, though it can hardly be said to be lacking in self-consciousness; but it only vaguely perceives its own implications. One resulting evil is, that advanced thought does not succeed much better with logic than the unprogressive thought of the past. It is indeed logical enough in dealing with other systems; but it clings to the old theological method of instinct, compromise, and half-way measures in general, in adjusting itself to thought and life. This is doubtless due to its militant history. It cannot be that the brave men who have put to flight so many armies of theological and illogical aliens in the name of logic are in the least afraid to follow logic whithersoever it may lead. They have simply had too much on their hands to attend to it. But the lack of this self-knowledge is a defect nevertheless. The chief demand upon advanced thinkers at present is that they leave the theologians for a time, and set their own house in the true order of logic. To help on this good work we propose to discuss the nature and difficulties of modern materialism, especially in its bearing on the problem of knowledge. By materialism we mean any doctrine which makes mind the product or result of organisation.

But the simple statement that mind is the product of organisation does not give a clear conception of materialism. Indeed the materialists themselves have hardly cleared up their own thought on this point. The difficulty is not merely to know how mind can be a product, but in what sense mind is a product. Of course it is not held that the elements create a substantial mind, but only that mind is the sum of mental states which are produced by organisation. But the sense of this production is unclear. For a time the formula

among materialists was, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. This view regarded thought as a thing, and further overlooked the fact, that the secretory organs either separate from the blood what is already in it or make the products from materials contained in the blood. This view, then, would imply, either that thoughts pre-exist in the blood or that they are made out of blood. In either case, a very sharp eye would enable us to see them. This view of course was speedily abandoned, and the immateriality of thought was insisted upon. Most advanced thinkers would feel insulted if such gross notions were attributed to them ; and one of the leaders has stigmatised them as "the materialism of the savage." Unfortunately they have succeeded better in telling what they do not believe than in telling what they do. Sundry nerve-centres are said to have the function of producing consciousness, just as other nerve-centres have other functions ; but still the sense of this production is left unclear. As long as thought was viewed as material, there was no absurdity in viewing it as a brain-product. The brain produces nothing, but merely modifies existing matter.

If, then, thought be a material combination, it is easy to understand how it may be produced by the brain. There is no unlikeness between the antecedent and the consequent. The difficulty with this view is that it is nonsense, not that it is unintelligible. But when thought is viewed as immaterial, it is hard to understand the sense in which it is a product of material activities. The difficulty with this view is that it is unintelligible, and it may also be nonsense. The trouble here arises from the laws of energy and continuity. The conservation of energy demands that no energy shall be lost ; and as nerves consume energy in performing their functions, thought must represent a certain amount of energy consumed in its production. If physical energy is spent in producing thought as thought, it must lay aside all its distinctive features and disappear in the mental realm. But in that case either physical energy would be lost or mental energy would be as real as physical energy. The physical realm would be in interaction with the mental realm, and thought, feeling, and volition would count in the course of events as well as the physical forces. It would even be possible in that case to

view the mental side of matter as basal, and the physical side as appearance. Of course the materialist will not accept this view. For him the physical series is the abiding and independent fact. As such it is controlled only by the laws of force and motion. The thought-series is effect only, and never cause. But in order to make it effect only we must deny that physical energy is ever expended in producing thought as thought. It must be spent only in producing those physical states which have thoughts for their inner face; and these thoughts, as thoughts, must be powerless. They can affect the physical series not as thoughts, but only as having physical states for their outer face. Any other conception would bring us into collision with the conservation of energy; for under this law there can be no effect which is not reciprocally a cause.

These considerations have gradually led the more logical materialists to the following view: The physical series is self-contained and independent. It suffers no loss and no interruption. Both energy and continuity are absolutely conserved. Each physical antecedent is entirely exhausted in its physical consequent; and, conversely, each physical consequent is fully explained by its physical antecedent. All physical movements are physically determined. The mental series is not properly caused by the physical series, but attends it. If the latter caused the former in the sense of expending energy upon it, either the continuity of the physical series would be broken, and energy would be lost, or thoughts would be as real as things. But the thought-series cannot be independent of the physical series, for that is contrary to the hypothesis. There is only one course left. We must view the mental series as the subjective shadow which attends the physical series. When, then, the physical series is of a certain kind and intensity, it has a mental side; but the reality, the energy, the ground of movement, are entirely in the physical series. Physical energy is never spent in producing thought as thought, but in producing physical combinations which have a thought-face. Conversely, thoughts count for nothing as thoughts, but only as represented in the physical series by physical states. Memory, reflection, and reasoning are only the mental side of changes in the brain. Mental movement of every sort is due not to any self-determination of reason, but

to the nervous mechanism. A change of ideas means that the corresponding physical states have been displaced by others. This view has been elaborated at greatest length by Mr. Spencer in his *Principles of Psychology*. He aims to show how all mental phenomena are but the inner side of molecular motion in the brain, or of what he calls nascent motor excitations. But the view is best expressed in the following quotations from Professor Huxley's lecture "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata :"—

"It may be assumed, then, that molecular changes in the brain are the causes of all the states of consciousness in brutes. Is there any evidence that these states of consciousness may, conversely, cause those molecular changes which give rise to muscular motions ? I see no such evidence.

"It is quite true that to the best of my judgment the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men ; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us as in them are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of any change in the motion of the matter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism ; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act."

It is easy to see how the materialist comes to this view. He must maintain the continuity and independence of the physical series. Hence he cannot allow that physical energy ever becomes anything else. Again, he cannot allow that the mental series has any energy or principle of movement in itself without making it as real as the physical series. Hence he is shut up to the view that the mental series is only a powerless attendant upon the physical series. But while it is easy to see how we come to this view, it is doubtful if its implications are fully understood even by the advanced thinkers themselves. If we observe the myriad movements of a great city, we are apt in uncritical moments to fancy that thought and purpose enter into them as originating and controlling. But now we know better. There is no ground for believing that any mental state can affect any physical state. The movements, then, are purely automatic ; and though we may believe that they are accompanied by thought and purpose, the thought is not the source of the movement, but only a sign

that the movement is going on. In strictness there is very little ground for admitting the co-existence of thought with these movements; and it is very difficult also to tell for whom thought exists as a sign that nervous movements are going on. We may be tempted to say that the sign exists for the mind; but the mind is the sign. In strictness there are no advanced thinkers, but only advanced thoughts and feelings. The so-called thinker is but the sum of the advanced states. Again, we may suppose an advanced thinker preparing and delivering a lecture in support of the doctrine in question. Even the thinker himself, owing to the contagion of old views, would be likely to fancy that his thought and purpose count for something in the outcome. But this is plainly a mistake. To begin with, there is no advanced thinker; and if there were, he could only be a passive spectator of his mental states. The writing and reading of a lecture is purely a matter of physical movement; and we know at last that no mental state can affect any physical state. The preparation of the lecture may be attended by thought, though that is doubtful; but it certainly takes place without any intervention of thought. The thought, if present, is only the sign to nobody in particular that the nerves are doing the work; and if the nerves remained unchanged, they would do the work just as well if thought were entirely absent. On this point we have not the slightest doubt; and the doctrine enables us to understand many of the homilies from this quarter. It has long been a puzzle to the critical mind how any rational being could produce some things which have appeared among the clumps of advanced thoughts. But now we see that reason has nothing to do with their production; and the wonder rather becomes that the nerves should do so well.

But even yet we have no clear conception of the relation of the thought-series to the thing-series. Taken in earnest the theory in question reduces to pure magic. In physics, under the law of conservation and correlation, there is no effect which does not in turn become a cause; and as by hypothesis thought as thought is never causal, it is never properly an effect. If we could look into a living brain, we should see the molecules in movement in various ways. This is the physical side and series. But some of these movements and combinations are said to

have a subjective face. This is the mental side and series. This mental side, however, would not appear as such in the physical series. We should see, then, various combinations and movements of molecules. The movements may be conceived as spiral, elliptical, rectilinear, oscillatory, etc. When given groups of molecules are moving in one form, as an ellipse, they have no inner face; but when they are moving in some other form, say a spiral, they are attended by thoughts. No physical energy is drawn off to produce them; they are simply there. The spiral movement confines itself strictly to being a spiral movement, just as the elliptical movement confines itself to being an elliptical movement. Why, then, should the spiral movement be attended by thoughts while the elliptical movement is not? There is no answer except to say that it is the fact. There is no difficulty in understanding the generation of the spiral movement; but whence comes this new series? We get no hint of it by studying the spiral movement. The thought-series as such is simply and purely magic. There is no ground for it in the physical series; and there is no mental subject to generate it as the result of its interaction with the physical series. Thoughts appear and disappear without any assignable reason whatever. It does not help us to assume a hidden mind-face to matter which is manifested only under certain conditions, say upon occasion of a spiral movement among the molecules; for it is plain that to be manifested at the proper time the mind-face must be acted upon by the physical face. Otherwise the mental manifestation might occur at any time, and in any form whatever. There must be something in the elliptical movement which represses mental manifestation; and there must be something in the spiral movement which elicits it. But this puts the origin of thought back of the spiral movement and in the hidden nature of matter. There is, then, a double movement in matter—a physical and a thought movement. But this leaves it doubtful whether matter as thinking, or matter as moving, is the true reality, or whether there may be something deeper than both. Either alternative is fatal to the assumed self-sufficiency of the physical series. Many materialists are inclined at this point to take refuge in the notion that the reality is deeper than both the physical and the mental series, but in so doing they fall into all the difficulties of Spinozism.

The unknown reality, as having physical manifestations, contains no explanation of its mental manifestations. The latter must find their ground not in the physical series, but in the thought-nature of the true reality. But how comes the latter to have two sides? and how come these two sides to be parallel as thought and thing? Thus our monism vanishes into dualism; and thus the question escapes the materialist, and disappears in the region of high metaphysics. Of course the materialist will not allow this, but will still insist upon the self-sufficiency of the physical series. In that case all our difficulties come back. We cannot allow the mental series to have any energy in itself, or to be in interaction with the physical series. We must always remember that there is no reason for believing that any mental state can affect any physical state; for the physical series goes along by itself. There is no double movement in matter, for by hypothesis the reality is entirely in the physical series. The thought-series appears as a magical and groundless addition to various parts of the thing-series. Thus the same logic which brought us hither takes us farther. It is a break of continuity to assume that the thought-series can determine the thing-series. It is equally a break of continuity to assume that the thing-series can determine the thought-series as such. What, then, is the relation of the two? We cannot call it occasionalism, for occasionalism would imply a cause apart from the thing-series which adjusted the thought-series to it. It is occasionalism in the sense that the physical series does not produce thoughts, but occasions them; but as it occasions them without becoming them or expending energy upon them, the relation between the two series is that of pure magic. The materialist cannot admit the efficiency of thought as thought, hence he is shut up to affirming either the materiality of thought or a magical occasionalism. Either we must allow that certain molecular groupings are not merely attended by thoughts, but are thoughts, or we must take refuge in magic. The first view is intelligible, but nonsensical; the second view is not intelligible, and hence it is difficult to say whether it is nonsense or not. Thus we see that while the materialistic doctrine seems very clear, it is fundamentally unclear not merely in its possibility but primarily in its meaning.

Few materialists would accept this conclusion, owing to the

little attention they have bestowed upon the problem. In particular they would repudiate occasionalism, even in its unmagical form, as a moth-eaten relic of metaphysics. But when it comes to telling in what sense thought is caused by matter, or how the impotence and immateriality of thought can be reconciled with the laws of continuity and conservation, they implicitly take refuge in a magical occasionalism. Every physical effect is a new condition of matter ; and as thought is not matter in any condition, it is put outside of all physical effects. One distinguished writer upon the new philosophy assures us that no study of the physical series would give us any hint of the thought-series which attends it. The latter is always there when summoned ; but it sits apart from the moving matter. This would be quite intelligible if there were a mind outside of the physical series, but it is quite magical on any other theory. When heat and light are "summoned," energy is always spent in summoning them ; but when thought is thought is summoned, it appears without any assignable ground, certainly without any expenditure of energy. One very popular attempt to escape this difficulty deserves mention, for it underlies all materialistic theories at this point. Thought is said to be a phenomenon of matter ; and this formula is supposed to remove all difficulty. Phenomena are not caused, but simply appear. This suggestion does seem to help us a little until we remember that a phenomenon implies not only something which appears, but also a subject to which it appears. When, then, the thought-side of matter is said to be phenomenal, the question at once emerges, What is the subject and where the consciousness for which the phenomena exist ? For the materialist there is no such subject. Yet so natural is the thought of self that we never divest ourselves of it even when denying it. When the materialist views the brain as a thinking machine, he always tacitly assumes himself as a reading machine which reads off the result. When we are told that nerve-motions have thoughts for their inner face, a self is always supplied for whom the thoughts exist. Materialistic statements tacitly assume back of the organism which conducts the mental processes a looker-on who tells off the processes and interprets their meaning. Thus thought is said to be a sign of nervous processes ; but for whom does the sign exist ? The outsider

could not see the thought, but only the nerve-movement. For whom, then, is the thought a sign? For the thinking self of course. Thus the self which the materialist labours to destroy peers complacently through the very arguments which are framed for its destruction. Materialism succeeds in reducing the self to passivity so far as the physical world is concerned; but it remains throughout a critical spectator of the on-going. But this is a grave inconsistency. Materialism allows no self, and hence it cannot make thought phenomenal. The thought-series cannot be an appearance, for there is no one to whom it can appear. It cannot be a sign or symbol in consciousness only, for there is no one to read and interpret the sign, and consciousness itself is nothing apart from the sign. Thinking, then, as such, must represent a real process in matter. But this also is contrary to the hypothesis. Matter does not think, but moves. Some of these movements are said to have thoughts on the inside, but the moving matter is the only reality. Where, then, and how do the thoughts exist? They do not exist in mind, for the mind is but the sum of the thoughts. Nor do they exist in consciousness, for this is nothing apart from its objects. The conscious thoughts, then, must exist in matter itself. But this, too, is contrary to the hypothesis, for the physical series as such is supposed to be the only reality. Thus the mental series is supposed to be something external to the physical series, and hence external to reality. This is a grand embarrassment. It would seem that the physical series has its inner face not in itself but in consciousness. In itself the physical series is a redistribution of matter and motion, and it becomes more only in consciousness. But consciousness, again, is the inner face and not the place of its existence. Hence matter must have its inner face in itself. It would, too, be highly presumptuous on the part of consciousness to give reality any qualities which it does not have. Thought and consciousness, then, are real processes in matter. Thus we come round to the old possibility that matter as thinking and conscious may be the true reality, and that matter as moving is only an appearance. It is very hard to unravel this puzzle. If matter only moves, whence is thought? If it both moves and thinks, what becomes of the claim that all energy is in the physical series? If matter does not think, and if the

mind is nothing, what does think? Perhaps it will be well to leave these problems to the materialists themselves. As yet they have given us no clear statement on these points. It would be a boon if they would state their doctrine so that it neither vanishes into magic nor identifies thought with material movements. We do not care to have the doctrine proved, but it would be well to have it clearly stated.

Thus far it has not been our purpose to dispute, but only to expound. We have not sought to disprove materialism, but only to find what it is. The materialist holds that thought is produced by organisation; and it is interesting to know the sense of this production, and especially how the impotence and immateriality of thought can be either maintained or given up on materialistic premises. We pass next to discuss the bearings of every form of materialism on the problem of knowledge. And first we point out that we reach the thing-series only through the thought-series. We know that there are things, and what they are, only through thought. Hence while the thing-series may be first and fundamental in the order of fact, in the order of knowledge the thought-series is first. A first question, then, would be, What warrant is there for affirming a thing-series at all? If the thought-series be so emaciated and helpless as the materialist teaches, why trust its reports about things in any case? Why may not the thing-series be after all only a phase of the thought-series? From Hume to Spencer, materialistic philosophers have defined the thing-series as a series of vivid states of consciousness; while the ego is a series of faint states of consciousness. But vivid or faint, this definition makes both subject and object states of consciousness, and hence both belong to the thought-series. Here is the place where materialism always tumbles into the idealism, whenever it attempts to reason out a theory of perception. It is well known that Spencer, at this point when his theory was about to collapse into nihilism, saved himself by reinstating the ego as a true agent. The ego, from being a series of faint impressions or the inner side of nerve movements, suddenly becomes a true source of energy; and the warrant for affirming a thing-series apart from the thought-series is found in the fact that our own energy is resisted by an energy not our own. This is excellent doctrine; but it does not agree with the other

doctrine that the ego is only a sum of mental states, and that mental states affect no physical states; for it makes our own consciousness of effort and energy the turning-point in the debate between idealism and realism. Upon the whole, we advise the materialist not to debate this point, but quietly and colossally to ignore it. It will be hard to get out of the debate either without falling into idealism or without admitting the real agency of the ego. Logic is a good thing, but in such a state of affairs it would be easy to get too much of it.

We pass this point and raise another. All arguments for the efficiency of matter assume that we have a valid knowledge of matter. That X is adequate or inadequate is a proposition which admits of no discussion. The thought-series, then, must reproduce the thing-series, and it is of interest to know how this can be. The general notion that the latter determines the former in no way implies that the latter must determine the former so as to correspond to itself. If an organism be able to generate thoughts, it by no means follows that the thoughts must represent external objects. One would expect that the thoughts would represent, if anything, the organic processes of which they are the inner face; whereas they never refer to these, and commonly refer to things entirely apart from the organism. Nervous combinations and movements are said to have ideas for their mental face, and the natural thought would be that those ideas would be ideas of their peculiar nervous correlates. But this is never the case; indeed the current doctrines about those correlates are even now matters of not very cogent inference. This complete silence of the organism as to what is going on in itself, and the reports instead of what is taking place in the outer world, are very remarkable facts. Certainly when matter is declared to be double-faced entity, we expect to find the mental face reflecting that part of the physical face which is over-against it; but the mental face never reflects the series which produces it, but other and unconnected series. Thus rays of light fall upon the body and a thought results, but not a thought of nerve-processes nor of vibrating ethers, but of an external luminous object. It is strange indeed that anything should result, but that the thought should be of an object at many removes or mediated action is surprising in a far higher degree. The

wonder is still greater in our perception of others' thoughts. Here some waves of air fall upon the ear, and at once the nerves produce thoughts with the added assurance that they are the reproduction of a thought-series existing apart from our own. There is the additional wonder in the latter case that some nerves produce thoughts only in response to certain vibrations, and other nerves need different vibrations. The difference between a Frenchman and an Englishman is fundamentally a difference of nerves. We can now understand the problem. If knowledge is to be possible, the mental series must truly reproduce the physical series and all other mental series; but what ground is there for affirming that they must correspond? This particular problem has not received the attention from materialists which it deserves. In general, they have never considered the problem of knowledge at all, but have taken the crude theories of common-sense for granted. But the problem is a real one and demands a solution. And for the materialist there is no solution except some debased form of the pre-established harmony. He must assume not only that matter can generate thoughts, but that it is shut up by its nature to the generation of thoughts which correspond to the outward fact. He must even assume that bodies are so related to their surroundings as to be under obligation to generate correct thoughts about things in general. We call this a debased form of the pre-established harmony, because it denies the pre-establishment which alone saves the doctrine from imbecility. Many materialists have taken refuge from this admission in agnosticism; but materialism will not unite with that view except as a dogmatic affirmation. The entire proof of materialism rests on the assumption that we have a valid knowledge of matter. The thought-series, then, must correspond to things; but why? The only answer is, that matter is such that in the main it must produce true thoughts; but this is simply to affirm the fact without giving any insight into its grounds. But this theory is far worse than Leibnitz's pre-established harmony. Leibnitz found some reason for the harmony in the fact of its pre-establishment, but the materialist has simply to assert it and leave it unexplained. Moreover his harmony is not such a harmony between thought and thing as between body and thing. As

the materialist degrades the Cartesian occasionalism ~~into~~ magic, so he degrades the Leibnitzian pre-established harmony into an opaque and unintelligible fact. This is a rather ~~sony~~ outcome for a system of reasoned truth. Instead of progress we have a remarkable case of reversion, or atavism, and also a somewhat striking illustration of the law that degradation is as possible as progress.

Still the problem has not been entirely unnoticed. Notably the Spencerian evolutionists have sought to account for the harmony in question by a theory framed from natural selection and heredity. According to this view there is no original need that matter should think rightly; but if any organism should think wrongly, it would soon collide with reality and perish. Right thinking, therefore, is necessary to continued existence. Natural selection must tend to pick out the sound thinkers from the unsound; and by heredity their tendencies will be integrated and transmitted. The final result will be that thought will at last be adjusted to things, yet without any reference to an opaque and uncaused harmony.

The ingenuity of this view is wonderful; still more so is the uncritical faith which can receive it. For since thought has no effect on physical processes, it is hard to see what effect for good or evil thought can have. The survival of the organism is a purely physical matter with which, by hypothesis, thought has nothing to do. There seems to be here a trace of the antiquated notion of self-control, according to which our knowledge determines our course. In a system of freedom the theory would have application; but when thought is only the powerless shadow of reality, its misadjustment is insignificant. In this theory the destruction of the organism is not due to a maladjustment of thought, but to maladjustment of the organism. Those organisms which perish are not those which think wrongly, but those which cannot maintain their equilibrium with the environment. But there is nothing in this which implies that those organisms which are in equilibrium with the environment must produce true thoughts of the environment. The crystal maintains itself against its surroundings by virtue of its physical structure; but it does not follow that, if a crystal should have thoughts, they must reflect the surroundings. But why should

the same equilibrium imply more in the organism? Why must organisms which can physically maintain themselves think rightly about their surroundings? This they must do if knowledge is to have any validity; but it is hard to find any reason for it. We are forced either to abandon knowledge, or else to fall back again on a grotesque harmony between organisms and their surroundings, such that when they take to thinking they can but reflect their environment. But this is Leibnitz's theory of pre-established harmony in its most debased form. Leibnitz was not content to affirm the harmony between mind and its objects; he explained it by its pre-establishment. Materialism degrades it to a physical significance and leaves it unaccountable.

Again, it is very remarkable that the narrow range of the Spencerian principle should have been overlooked. If it were true, it would provide for valid thoughts only as they are related to survival; whereas the bulk of our thoughts have no bearing on survival. A mistake in our theory of double stars or in our solar physics would not be attended with any physical disaster. The true theory and the false theory are equally without significance for survival. And since this is the case with the mass of our alleged knowledge, the action of natural selection can never come into play to separate the true from the false. What warrant, then, have we for trusting the report of thought on these things? The uninitiated may be tempted to think that we reach these things by reasoning; but on this theory, reasoning itself is only a function of the nerves. It is but the subjective side of the nervous mechanism; and there is no assignable reason why the nerves should reason more accurately than they perceive. If reasoning were an independent mental activity, self-poised and self-verifying, the case would be different; but the mind is only the sum of mental phenomena, and these phenomena are called up and shifted by the nervous mechanism. Once more, then, what warrant is there for trusting our nerves? That they should produce thoughts about everything is very remarkable, but that these thoughts should represent the reality is in the highest degree surprising. The mental series which originally was the subjective face of sundry nervous movements turns out to be the inner face of all physical series or movements,

with the one amazing exception of the physical series on which it depends. To retain our trust in knowledge we must make once more the assumption of a pre-established harmony in its worst form. Who would have expected to find the ghost of Leibnitz in a somewhat degraded state lurking among the ponderous phrases of the Spencerian philosophy !

Another difficulty with this theory of knowledge is that its appeal to heredity and experience is not clearly justified by the principles of the theory. It is well known that when materialism comes to psychology it always allies itself with empiricism and associationalism. Thus Mr. Spencer, when he had conducted the evolution of the universe up to the borders of the mind, attached the associational psychology to his system, and thus mind was brought into line with all below it. He also apparently greatly increased the resources of associationalism by his doctrine of heredity, whereby a race-experience was exchanged for an individual experience. In this way the system gained time for its transformations. This is very clear in appearance, but rather confused in fact. In order to learn from experience, there must be something which learns; whereas on the materialistic theory the learner is the experience itself. We learn from experience by remembering the past and deducing principles for present and future guidance. But this is impossible where there is no rational subject which stands apart from the experience and draws inferences from it. Now, according to materialism we do not have ideas, we are the ideas. And these ideas are not the product of some past experience, but are the outcome of the organism as it is. An organism made at first-hand from the inorganic would have precisely the same ideas, feelings, recollections, and general insight. The only way, therefore, in which experience can affect our mental life is by modifying the organism; it can directly teach us nothing. Nor is it in any sense our mental experiences which modify the organism; these by hypothesis are powerless. And the mental manifestations of the organism are in no sense learned from experience, but are the expression of what the organism is. We may speak of a gradual development of the organism and a corresponding development of mental manifestation, but we cannot speak of experience in the philosophical sense of the word. The same

considerations apply to heredity in a materialistic system. Experience cannot be inherited because no one has it, and there is no one to inherit it. We are the experience, and the experience is the outcome of the organism. The experience from which we are supposed to learn is of course mental experience, and this by hypothesis never reacts on the organism. From another standpoint, also, this alliance between empiricism and materialism appears as impossible. The elements from which the materialist builds everything are subject to fixed laws. In all their inorganic manifestations they manifest not their habits but their inner nature. Chemical affinity and molecular combination in general are not the outcome of experience, but of the nature of the atoms themselves. We should expect, then, if the elements should ever rise to vital and mental manifestations, that these also would be fixed expressions of what the elements are; not something acquired and adventitious, but something inherent and essential. Indeed from this standpoint the notions of heredity and experience are grotesquely untenable. The elements have laws, not habits; and they neither have nor inherit experiences. Their combinations, also, must be of the same sort; and if it be absurd to speak of the complex molecule as forming habits and learning new forms of action, it is equally absurd to speak of organic molecules as so doing; for organic molecules are simply complex molecules, and the organism is only a group of complex molecules. It is, then, a grave inconsistency when materialism is joined to empiricism, according to which mental manifestation has no fixed and necessary laws, but is a pure product of experience. According to materialism, there is no need of experience for any depth of insight, or even for any amount of memory. All that is needed in order to have a perfect insight into both present and past is that the appropriate organism be produced. Materialism, then, is compatible only with a high form of a-priorism; and the laws of mind have as good right to be viewed as essential and inviolable as the laws of gravity and chemical affinity. Indeed, materialists and evolutionists in general show a very imperfect appreciation of causation in their theories of life and mind. Beginning with fixed elements, the outcome must be fixed; and the fancy that mind may waver and be this or that contradicts the notion of law which is at the

bottom of the system. The laws of mind must be fixed in the nature of matter. This is a somewhat bizarre and unexpected result, but it must be admitted. It is needless to point out that psychological empiricism when logical makes materialism as a reasoned system impossible. The union of the two must be regarded as a kind of philosophical adultery. And so we come round to our previous conclusion, that the materialistic theory of knowledge is that of an opaque harmony between the organism and the surrounding world.

We have already pointed out that natural selection, as a principle of belief, does not escape the admission of an uncaused harmony between the body and its environment ; we have next to refer to a peculiar difficulty which arises from the principle, if allowed to be valid. It follows directly from the doctrine, that no belief can become wide-spread which is contrary to reality ; for maladjusted beliefs must lead to collision with the nature of things and consequent destruction. It further follows that every wide-spread and enduring belief must correspond to the nature of things. Certainly those beliefs which originated in the earliest times, and which have maintained themselves ever since, must be viewed as having far higher probability than the late opinions of a sect. The great catholic convictions of the race represent the sifting action of the universe from the beginning. They are therefore the only ones which, on the theory, can lay the slightest claim to our acceptance. It is, then, in the highest degree inconsistent when the disciples of this view reject a belief because it is old and reaches back to the infancy of the race ; for this is the very characteristic of true beliefs. A belief which has only recently appeared can hardly lay any claim to be considered at all. What then shall we do with such beliefs as the belief in God, freedom, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and the existence of a moral government in the universe ? Of course as materialists we cannot accept them ; but how can we as materialists reject them ? The same brain which has ground out the truths of materialism has also ground out these other notions. That they are not fatally maladjusted to the nature of things is proved by their continued existence ; and by hypothesis they are products of that natural selection whose special business is to sift the true from the false. There is nothing to do but to

attempt a distinction between maladjusted thoughts which lead to destruction and others which do not. Our thoughts of God and supersensible things are of the nature of dreams. They lie outside of any possible physical experience ; and hence they cannot collide with reality any more than with a ghost. Unfortunately it is not easy to draw this line so as to conserve those physical truths which lie outside of any possible experience, and at the same time put religious and other obnoxious ideas to flight. It is a very grave circumstance that matter should be so given to dream and error. Of course the uninitiated will think that reasoning will serve our purpose ; but reasoning itself is a part of the nerve-process.

Throughout the past, natural selection has favoured anti-materialistic views ; in the future, the same process must eliminate materialism. It is plain that those beliefs which make most of the person and which give one most energy and hope must, in the long-run, have an advantage over others which are relatively discouraging and depressing. Hence in the end, beliefs which tend to righteousness and cheerfulness must overcome all beliefs which tend to looseness and despair. The former will tend to conserve the physical and moral health both of the person and of society ; and the latter will be in alliance with destruction. If it be said that we here forget our previous assumption that a mental state cannot affect a physical state, we reply that that assumption is not our own but the theorist's. We do not assume any responsibility for any of these views ; we inquire merely into their implications. And since the theorist has introduced natural selection as a determining principle of belief, we inquire whither it will carry us. That this principle does not agree with the other principle, that the physical series goes along by itself, is not our affair. And even if the two did agree, it would be highly unscientific to hold that a change of opinion will have no effect on action. As opinion, of course, it would be powerless, but as opinions are only the subjective sides of nervous states, it follows that a change of opinion points to a change in the nervous processes, and hence it must lead to change of action. Now, as a matter of fact, the belief in God, immortality, and moral government has a great value both for personal and social well-being. It is the great source of courage, hope, cheerfulness, and stead-

fastness in righteousness. And on the other hand, it is undoubted that materialism, atheism, etc., are relatively depressing and demoralising. The rapid spread of pessimism among the more earnest of the advanced thinkers is sufficient proof of this. Hence, under the operation of natural selection, the former set of beliefs will have a decided advantage over the latter; and in the end they must conquer. That matter can form the conception of freedom, the soul, and God, we know by the fact; hence they are plainly not repugnant to the nature of matter. The direction which its future thinking must take under the influence of natural selection is plain. Matter must come at last to a firm faith in the soul, immortality, and God. Of course the eager objector, carried away by his nerves, urges that believing them would not make them true, but would leave them cherished delusions. It is odd how hard it is for one to master his own theory. By hypothesis matter is capable of valid thinking; and why should we not trust it when it thinks about God as well as when it thinks about the world? We do not insist that it is equally trustworthy; we only ask for some standard whereby one set of thoughts can be ruled out while another is retained. Of course we are beyond the point where we fancied that reason itself is such a standard; for reasoning itself is part of the nerve-processes. It does not contain any standard of truth in itself, but comes and goes according to the principles of nerve-mechanics.

This raises the further question how the materialist can speak of error at all. We have seen that to save knowledge he must fall back on the notion of a necessary harmony between mental action and its objects. But such a theory makes no provision for error. Like the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, it is incompatible with the admission of error. The theory implies an exact and consistent report of all mental objects, whereas in fact we have the most confused and conflicting accounts. The question, How is error possible? is of the utmost speculative significance; and yet it has been almost entirely ignored in the history of speculation. If knowledge be determined by law, why is not the outcome necessary? And if reasoning be governed by the inviolable laws of thought, how is mistake possible? In order to put any trust in perception every school of thinkers must allow that the interaction of thought and organism must be fixed, so that

given physical excitation will have a definite and fixed mental reaction. But the results of this reaction, in turn, are under the control of fixed mental law. How, then, is error possible either in perception or in reasoning? But if error be as necessary as truth, what reason is there for distinguishing between them? No system of necessity can answer these questions so as to save knowledge. No system of metaphysical necessity is compatible with either science or philosophy. In every such system all beliefs are effects only, and are fully explained by their antecedents. They are not deduced from grounds, but are produced by causes. A rational belief, on the other hand, is one which has grounds as well as causes; and to discern its rationality we must have a standard of truth in the mind, and we must be able to apply it to our beliefs, and to accept or reject them accordingly. Freedom is necessary to reasoning. In a system of necessity all beliefs are *de facto* and none are *de jure*; or if this distinction should exist for an observer outside of the circle of necessity, we who are in the circle could never distinguish the *de facto* from the *de jure* in belief. For to do this we must be able to control our thoughts according to some law of truth, and this by hypothesis is impossible. And allowing it to be possible, we are still greatly embarrassed as materialists; for a great many conflicting and contradictory beliefs exist. Matter is engaged in producing a great variety of opinions on many important subjects; and it is interesting to know which are to be accepted. Probably the materialist would urge us to accept his views, and would give us his word of honour for their truth. Unfortunately words of honour have no value in logic, and we need something more. The most natural assumption would be that those views are most likely to be true which matter produces most freely; and hence we might test the truth by taking a vote. But sadly enough, the average brain is not so made as to grind out materialism or atheism. Matter in its thinking has a strong tendency towards theism and spiritual conceptions of things; and it has even devoted much attention in the past to metaphysics. Of course these views are false, but how are we to escape them unless the nerves take a new direction? If the human mind were something which is capable of free reflection, and which develops variously according to its circumstances, we might account for much variation by the mental environment; but of course this is not the case. It

is indifferent to a molecule where it is ; and it ought to be indifferent to any complex of molecules. In particular, it is hard to see how the organism can be affected by its mental atmosphere. Prejudice and superstition might influence minds ; but they do not seem adequate to influence material movements. Besides, if they could, they are themselves the outcome of material activity. If there be prejudice, superstition, and stupidity in the world, matter is to blame for it. It is matter that hath made both us and our opinions, and not we ourselves. If, then, there could be any distinction between reason and unreason in this system we should be forced to allow that along with a little right thinking matter has done a vast deal of wrong thinking. It has an inherent tendency to irrationality and falsehood. It is the sole source of theologies, superstitions, and anthropomorphisms, as well as the sun-clear truths of advanced science. If we were persons with faculties which could be carelessly used or wilfully misused, these things might be laid to the charge of individual carelessness or stupidity, or dishonesty ; but as we are not such persons, all these things must be charged to matter itself. This conclusion remains if we call matter the unknowable, the mysterious one, or anything else which may strike our fancy. In every system of necessity we have to posit in being, along with reason, a strong tendency to unreason which throws discredit on all knowledge. According to the materialist himself, for one sound opinion matter has produced a myriad unsound and grotesque ones. But even yet we have no ground for distinguishing the rational from the irrational. In the old philosophy the distinction between rational and irrational belief is, that the former rests on grounds which justify it, while the latter is groundless. But the new philosophy cancels this distinction entirely, and reduces all beliefs to effects in us. It recognises production only, and allows of no deduction. All our beliefs are explained by their causes, and none have any rational advantage over any other. The only distinction is of relative extent ; and the only standard possible, unless we yield to pure ipse-dixitism, is to take a vote, and view rational beliefs as those which are most wide-spread and enduring.

Our nerves being in motion along this line, they next point out that the possibility of error can be reconciled with the validity of knowledge only in the fact of freedom. Error must

be the outcome of carelessness and volition, if knowledge is to be saved. If it be a necessary consequence of being, knowledge is overturned. The question of freedom is commonly supposed to have only a moral bearing; and its significance for the theoretical reason is entirely overlooked. The utmost that is generally claimed is that if it be denied, moral distinctions vanish; we insist, in addition, that rationality also vanishes. Discussing the question entirely in the realm of duty has the disadvantage also that questions of passion and interest are especially prominent in that field; and thus there is great room for talking of the strength of motives and of the necessary victory of the strongest. In this way both the subject and the debaters often become sadly confused; and hence it is of advantage to extend the debate into a different realm. Now the essential nature of freedom is not the power to act without a motive, but the ability to choose an end, or law, and to govern one's activities, mental and executive, accordingly. This government may take the form of guidance or of repression. The being who cannot do this is neither moral nor rational. A rational activity demands just such a power. The aim of reason is to bring the *de facto* order of mental experience into the *de jure* order of thought. The mental mechanism under the laws of association brings us mental states in any and every order just as experience furnishes them. As thus produced they are simple facts, and are all on the same plane of actuality. The distinction of true and false, rational and irrational, does not yet exist. This first emerges when the mind comes to transform the actual order of fact into the ideal order of thought; and to do this the mind must be free. To bring its experience into rational order, the mind must be able to test its thoughts, to compare, to retain, or reject them as they agree or disagree with the inner law of reason. The mind must not accept thoughts as they are thrust into it, but must sit regnant over the mental mechanism of association, sifting, testing, and ordering its own course according to the law of reason. The mind makes reason its norm, searches in the chaos of sense for the rational, and rejects the irrational; and only thus does it rise to true rationality. It is plain that a mind which could not do this would be totally untrustworthy. Its beliefs would sink down into mere facts and below the dis-

inction of truth and error. And even if there be such a thing as truth, our ability to reach it depends entirely on our power to control that which is given in thought, to suspend judgment, to eliminate the irrational, and to transform the chaos of experience into the transparent order of reason. This does not mean, of course, that the mind can coerce the conclusion, but that to reach a sound conclusion it must be able to control and coerce its activities. On the materialistic theory, the mental state, or rather the physical state, does coerce the conclusion; and thus the conclusion represents no truth of reason, but only the resultant of conflicting nervous movements. It is not properly a conclusion, but an effect of its causes. That these will be the same next time we do not know; and if thought be tolerably clear, a complete scepticism of reason must result. Oddly enough, the determinists generally allow such a self-control in reason. They grant a power of thinking twice and of suspending and postponing both judgment and action. They grant that though the mind cannot coerce reason, yet sound thinking does not come of itself. The inviolable law of reason may be present in the mind, yet unless the mind accept it and make it the norm of its activity, the outcome is error and confusion. Hence the care and circumspection of the scientist and the true thinker. They give all diligence to have their facts established and their premises unambiguous. In particular, they are on their guard against the misleading influence of association which tends to put on a delusive appearance of rationality. Even the associationist assumes a power over the associations, and an ability to criticise them according to the law of reason. He interrupts the processes of association, tears apart their conjunctions, disputes the beliefs which they are said to have produced and withholds his assent from various alleged intuitions on the ground of his criticism. But in such activity we have one of the purest examples of freedom; and in such freedom we have an absolute postulate of rationality. In order to reach truth the mind must have a standard within itself, and it must also be self-controlling. The law of reason itself does not secure obedience. The mind must be able to choose the law and to govern itself accordingly. With this assumption of freedom we can explain error without overturning the trust of the mind in itself. Error is the outcome of a careless or wilful use of our

edom. Our faculties are made for truth, but by neglect or abuse they may lead to error. Without this assumption of freedom, truth and error are alike necessary and alike justified. There is no longer any standard of distinction ; and one belief is as good as another as long as it lasts. The belief in the ideal is a fact which things have produced in us. The belief in materialism is a fact of the same sort. Neither has any special advantage over the other. If it were possible to reason, to examine the grounds of each belief, to compare them with the inner standard of truth, and to accept or reject accordingly, it would be otherwise ; but as it is, both are at once logically groundless and necessarily produced. We do not claim that these considerations prove the fact of freedom ; but we do claim that whoever will follow them to their consequences will see that freedom and rationality stand or fall together. A common assertion of the advanced thoughts is that freedom would make science impossible. It is well, then, to set up the counter-claim, that without freedom there could be neither philosophy nor science.

It is strange how old delusions haunt us. Throughout this paper we have assumed that a power of reasoning is possible, and that there is such a thing in thought as sound logic. Hence we have assumed to judge and criticise as if logic were still in existence. While we have allowed the nerves to be all, we have assumed to remain as a critical spectator of their performances. We have also treated the materialist as if he had power at least over his thinking ; and we have urged him to rectify his views, if that were possible. And all thinkers of every school make the same assumption. The advanced thinker complains of the conservative that he fails to draw the most obvious conclusions ; and this failure is even made the ground now and then for righteous indignation at the cowardice or dishonesty thus played. On the other hand, the conservative complains of the advanced thinker that he has not the courage of his opinions, and often falls into grievous backsliding from the faith. All we appeal unto logic, and all alike assume both the power and the duty of being logical. The materialist may have some doubt of others' power to reason, but he has not the slightest doubt concerning his own. But these appeals to logic are all logical, and show that we are not fairly under the influence of

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freedom. Our faculties are made for truth, but by neglect or misuse they may lead to error. Without this assumption of freedom, truth and error are alike necessary and alike justified. There is no longer any standard of distinction ; and one belief is as good as another as long as it lasts. The belief in the soul is a fact which things have produced in us. The belief in materialism is a fact of the same sort. Neither has any logical advantage over the other. If it were possible to reason, to examine the grounds of each belief, to compare them with some inner standard of truth, and to accept or reject accordingly, it would be otherwise ; but as it is, both are at once logically groundless and necessarily produced. We do not claim that these considerations prove the fact of freedom ; but we do claim that whoever will follow them to their consequences will see that freedom and rationality stand or fall together. A common assertion of the advanced thoughts is that freedom would make science impossible. It is well, then, to set up the counter-claim, that without freedom there could be neither philosophy nor science.

It is strange how old delusions haunt us. Throughout this paper we have assumed that a power of reasoning is possible, and that there is such a thing in thought as sound logic. Hence we have assumed to judge and criticise as if logic were still in existence. While we have allowed the nerves to be all, we have assumed to remain as a critical spectator of their performances. We have also treated the materialist as if he had power at least over his thinking ; and we have urged him to rectify his views, as if that were possible. And all thinkers of every school make the same assumption. The advanced thinker complains of the conservative that he fails to draw the most obvious conclusions ; and this failure is even made the ground now and then for righteous indignation at the cowardice or dishonesty thus displayed. On the other hand, the conservative complains of the advanced thinker that he has not the courage of his opinions, and often falls into grievous backsliding from the faith. All alike appeal unto logic, and all alike assume both the power and the duty of being logical. The materialist may have some doubt of others' power to reason, but he has not the slightest doubt concerning his own. But these appeals to logic are all illogical, and show that we are not fairly under the influence of

the new views. It has doubtless been a surprise to all critical readers to find the materialist so loud in affirmation and so puzzle-headed in argument, so fierce in his demands for logic and so backward in furnishing it. Bottom in his two moods is inevitably suggested. "I will roar you that it will do any man's heart good to hear me;" but fearing to frighten the ladies, he changes his mind and resolves, "I will roar you as gently as any sucking dove; I will roar you an 'twere any nightingale." At times the advanced thinkers flirt with instinct and impulse in the old common-sense fashion; and once in a while they even go so far as to blaspheme logic and logical consequences. Especially do they turn a deaf ear to demands for consistency, and practise the old theological eclecticism. One professor, in the very lecture in which he proved that we are in all respects what the viscera and nerves make us, urged us to do the duty which lies next to us, as if an automaton could have duties. Our advanced teachers abound in moral exhortation. Many of their performances in this direction are as edifying as the old manuals of devotion. Assuming logic to be valid and logical reasoning to be possible, we feel insulted by such exhortation. We have a feeling that our teachers are poking fun at us. But all our trouble arises from the fancy that logical reasoning is still possible; and all our difficulties vanish when we abandon this pestilent heresy. Reasoning is only the inner side of a nerve-process. Consistency might be expected of free minds; but who would expect consistency of nerves? From this standpoint, the abiding wonder is not that the nerves reason badly now and then, but that they ever reason well. If, then, a clump of advanced thoughts fall into irrelevant and inconsistent moral exhortation, it only means that the nerves have wrought in that direction. If such a clump show a remarkable backwardness in drawing a conclusion, the reason is that the nerves are set in another way. The amiable commonplace, the mild religiosity, the occasional attacks of fierce morality, which are the chief components of an advanced thinker, are no indications of personal character, but represent only the droll ways of the nervous plexuses and their nascent motor excitations. Matter plays hide-and-seek, with us, that is all. If the advanced thinker were a person, and were free to think rationally, we should insist on logic; but as this is not the case, the nerves

must be left to their own devices. Anything good which they may grind out is so much clear again ; their illogicality and frequent errors must be reckoned to the misery of being.

Looking, then, at the world-system with materialistic eyes, we see a perpetual and necessary kaleidoscopic process. Parts of this process are attended by thoughts partly true, but mostly false. By hypothesis all of those thoughts which collide with materialism are false. In particular, the notions of right and wrong and freedom and all religious beliefs are pure fictions, by hypothesis, of course. Throughout the world-process there is a strong and almost overwhelming tendency to dream and falsehood ; and but for a few advanced thoughts, error would have reigned supreme. Sadly enough, also, whether these advanced thoughts shall hold their own depends in no way upon their truth, but upon the nerves. Beliefs too are seen to be changing. This fact in itself is insignificant, but it is important in its implications. Each belief is the inner side of a nervous state ; and a change in one points to a change in the other. What direction the nervous states will take in the future is not clear. It is highly improbable that the evolution philosophy is itself the only philosophy which is exempt from the law of evolution. We must expect that sooner or later all things and opinions will pass, the evolution dogma among the rest. The outlook upon practice is equally suggestive. Hitherto action has been under the influence of those nervous states which have God, freedom, and righteousness for their inner face. It is not sure what it will be when they are displaced by opposite nervous states. History and experience are not without their suggestions ; and theory points to a reversal of current principles of action. If it were simply a matter of opinion, it would be immaterial ; but as it is a matter of profound changes in the nerves, a change of some kind must result. There is no telling what horrors the nerves may have in store. Of course in this language there is an implicit assumption of freedom, but it is in the language only. We expressly disclaim all power to order our thoughts, to criticise, to draw conclusions, or to resign ourselves to the inevitable.

Plainly this result logically cancels all further inquiry. If there were a mind able to grasp the theory and its consequences, it would declare that the mind can be only a passive

spectator of the nervous unfolding. But of course there is no spectator, passive or otherwise. The advanced thinker himself vanishes into advanced thoughts. The nerves are all and in all. The preparation of this paper has been attended by some thoughts; but that thought at most was only the sign to nobody that the nerves were at work. If, then, any advanced nerves should produce a feeling of dislike to anything therein recorded, the nerves which produced this paper produce also the hope that the advanced nerves will supplement the dislike by producing the soothing conviction that it is all a necessary nerve-process. Finally, if any advanced thinker should escape from his nerves so as to become capable of logical reasoning, we request, as a great favour, and as a duty to advanced science, that he show where the logic of these conclusions fails. We have learned by heart the various assurances that truth can do no harm. We fear also that this half-heartedness, this dallying with compromise, this sewing of the new cloth to the old garment, prevents us from reaping the fulness of blessing which advanced science has procured for us. Moreover, it is bringing advanced science itself into discredit. When an advanced thinker begins to descant on duty, there are sundry advanced actors who say with Gretchen, though by no means in her spirit, "That's about what the preacher says, only with rather different words." Then follow sundry brutal sneers about a chromo-religion. And the theologians, too, are beginning to take heart. A few years ago they were pretty thoroughly cowed, or at least bullied; but now that the advanced thinkers have been so illogical as to lay stress on duty and religious sentiment, they are bringing out their degrading dogmas with the old assurance. And it must be confessed that Christianity can outdo advanced science on the field of instinct and sentiment. Besides, we who have followed the prophets of the new dispensation out of the theological and illogical Egypt, ought not to be left in the desert without manna and without sight of the promised land. Our nerves, however, will not stop without jotting down the remark that they are not able to produce much expectation in this direction, owing, of course, to the illogical ways of nerves in general and their nascent motor excitations. And even this will not satisfy them, but they must add that at present logic is not the strong

point of advanced thinkers. They are sentimental, ethical, religious, and highly prejudiced; but they are not logical. So strong are their tendencies to worship that some of the stricter positivists have taken to mixed ancestor-and-progeny-worship. Strauss and Clifford have urged us to worship the Cosmos with the devotedness of the Christian in his worship; and the suggestion has been received with great favour. So fearful are they also of any contamination of selfishness that many of them will not hear of a future life lest the purity of moral action be sullied. All are full of the most engaging sentiments; but it would be of advantage to all concerned if they would for a time forego sentiment and cultivate logic. May the advanced nerves speedily take this direction!

BORDEN P. BOWNE.

ART. IX.—*A Sober View of Abstinence.*¹

THIS article contains an endeavour to find in some of the facts and circumstances of the case a reasonable footing for a practical abstinence from alcoholic drinks as a good rule,—the dictate of common prudence and Christian benevolence. The words “practical abstinence” or “abstinence” are used instead of “total abstinence,” inasmuch as this latter phrase, though apparently more definite, is in reality less so, because it is necessary in practice to qualify it with other words, such as “beverage,” which, again, are indeterminate, and open a wide field of discussion as to what constitutes a convivial, dietary, or medicinal use. It is enough if abstinence can be established as the best general rule, to which use forms the exception. Our inquiry falls under three heads: first, prudential abstinence; second, benevolent abstinence; third, objections.

I. PRUDENTIAL ABSTINENCE.

The reasons for abstinence as a measure of prudence are derived (1) from physiology, (2) from experience. Let us consider, then,

¹ From the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

1. *Prudential Abstinence in the Light of Physiology.*

Dogmatism here is very common, and in view of the enormous evils of drunkenness very tempting, yet caution and candour are greatly needed. In the present state of physiological chemistry we are not to look for proofs which will amount to a demonstration, but rather for evidence of tendencies. When scientific men who have spent their lives in investigating the subject speak of their knowledge as imperfect, and their conclusions as tentative, it becomes others to be modest.

1. We take up first the question as to the effect of alcohol upon the nervous system, because this is its most obvious and important effect, the effect which probably to a large degree controls all others, especially that upon the circulation and nutrition. Now what in general is this effect? Science and also experience when carefully interrogated at once answer, It is anæsthetic, or deadening. This is the perfectly well known and most prominent action of alcohol, that which makes it at once a charm and a curse, and also gives it whatever value it has. It cannot better be stated than in the language of Dr. E. A. Parkes of Netley Hospital, whose death in 1876 removed one of the most profound and candid observers. Speaking of the effect of alcohol on the nervous system, he says: "In most persons it acts at once as an anæsthetic, and lessens also the rapidity of impressions, the power of thought, and the perfection of the senses. In other cases it seems to cause increased rapidity of thought, and excites imagination; but even here the power of control over a train of thought is lessened."¹

It is true in popular language this effect of alcohol is spoken of as stimulating, but in general no more misleading word could be used. Men do not drink to have their nerves excited, but really to have them partially paralysed, and if in some cases pleasurable excitement seems to follow, it is because a greater or less paralysis of the nerves controlling the circulation and mechanism of the senses and the feelings is taking place, and hence the blood moves faster, the sensibility is blunted, and the sensitiveness of the entire organism is agreeably diminished. The whole secret of the fascination which alcoholic beverages

¹ *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, by Edmund A. Parkes, M.D., F.R.S. (4th ed., London, 1873), p. 274.

have always had is just here. As Professor William James says: "The reason for craving alcohol is that it is an anæsthetic even in moderate quantities. It obliterates a part of the field of consciousness, and abolishes collateral trains of thought."¹ Let almost any one who has been a total abstainer take even a single glass of claret, containing hardly a thimbleful of absolute alcohol, and watch critically his feelings, and he will be apt to discover a slight deadening of the sensibility. Dr. Samuel Wilks remarks: "If most persons analyse their sensations after the imbibition of any alcoholic drink they will soon discover that to describe the effect produced upon them by it as stimulating is a misnomer, and that consequently the employment of the word almost begs the whole question as to its operation and value. . . . Its stimulating effects may be regarded as *nil* compared with those which may be styled its sedative or paralysing ones. In a word, alcohol for all intents and purposes may be regarded as a sedative or narcotic, rather than a stimulant."² And he points out as evidence the fact that an attack of toothache, for example, which a stimulant would increase, is relieved by a little brandy and water; that a drunken man may have his teeth knocked out in a brawl, and be unconscious of his loss; and that a violin soloist about to perform will find his notes blurred, his sensibility benumbed, and the edge taken off his bow by a single glass of wine. Similar are the statements of Sir William Gull, who speaks of alcohol as being beneficial in certain conditions when the nervous system needs to be deadened. It is this which gives it value in certain diseases.³

But while no one doubts that any considerable quantity of alcohol is an anæsthetic, producing narcosis, and ultimately, if large enough, coma and death, the critical and all-important question arises, Do small quantities produce in proportion the same effect? Here we come to a comparatively recent theory, which claims that there is a radical difference not only in *degree*, but also in *kind*, between the effects of a large and of a small dose of alcohol. This theory is so important, if true,

¹ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 19, 1881. See also *Diet in Health and Disease*, by Thomas K. Chambers, M.D., F.R.C.P. (London, 1876), p. 232.

² *Popular Science Monthly* (New Issue), Supplement, Feb. 1879, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.* p. 13 seq.

and, though adopted by few, if any, of the great authorities on the subject, is so repeatedly, confidently, and dogmatically urged by many semi-scientific writers as an unanswerable physiological argument in favour of moderate drinking, that it deserves very careful attention.

The theory was maintained with much persistence by Dr. Francis E. Anstie of England, who died in 1874. The pith of it, as set forth in his work on *Stimulants and Narcotics*, and in various medical journals, is that alcohol is a true stimulant or true narcotic according to the amount used; that there is a fundamental difference in kind between the two results of such use; that the effect of a small or "stimulant" dose is indistinguishable from the effect of "the digestion of a true food," and that there is no more recoil or depression from the one than from the other; while the effect of a large or "narcotic" dose is "no less than the severance of the copula of life, . . . in fact a more or less paralysis of the nervous system. . . . The use of even a single truly narcotic dose very probably produces a real physical damage to the nervous tissue, which absolutely requires a certain time for its repair."¹

Now, if this distinction in kind exists, and if this sharp line is to be drawn between the stimulant and narcotic, the food and poison effect of alcohol, according to the amount taken, the marks of these effects must be distinct. It becomes, therefore, of the first importance to determine what are the earliest and precise symptoms of each effect. Investigation on this point is not complete; but it is agreed that narcotism by alcohol first produces paralysis of the vaso-motor nerves.² Flushing of the face is mentioned by most observers as the first sign of this. "The most conspicuous of the primary actions of alcohol is a dynamic narcosis of the ultimate fibres of sensation and of vaso-motion—most conspicuous because exhibited in the cutaneous surface under our eyes."³ Anstie says: "The first warning of alcoholic inebriation is flushing of the face;"⁴ . . .

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics: their Mutual Relations*, by Francis E. Anstie, M.D., M.R.C.P. (Philadelphia, 1865), p. 218, and *passim*.

² "Nervous filaments, principally from the sympathetic system, accompany the arteries in all probability to their remotest ramifications. These 'vaso-motor' nerves play an important part in regulating the function of nutrition."—Flint's *Physiology* (New York, 1876), p. 67.

³ *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. lviii. p. 2.

⁴ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 171.

and it is interesting as being the first symptom probably (when it occurs at all) of narcosis."¹ In speaking of the stimulant or food action of alcohol, he says that to produce this effect it must be taken "in doses just too small to produce flushing of the face and sweating of the brow."² Professor John Fiske makes the same statement.³ Anstie fixes the maximum amount of absolute alcohol which can be taken daily by the adult male without causing any narcotic effect at six hundred grains, or about an ounce and a half;⁴ and yet in giving the details of an experiment made on himself of taking an ounce and a half of whisky, equal to about three-fourths of an ounce of alcohol, he admits that "in this instance I used a quantity of alcohol so small as I should not beforehand have supposed capable of producing the poisonous results." But "the poisonous effects were fully developed, though not very lasting. . . . The face felt hot, and was visibly flushed; pulse eighty-two, full and bounding; slight perspiration on the brow."⁵

Now without dwelling on the fact at which Anstie hints above, and which is a matter of common observation, that some people are narcotised by alcohol without any flushing of the face at all, it naturally occurs to any one to inquire whether it is not possible that this paralysis of the vaso-motor nerves may take place in some slight degree at least long before it is manifest in the flushing of the face; and whether a sharper scrutiny may not detect some more subtle and earlier evidence of such paralysis than this "conspicuous" symptom, and a paralysis which may be the result of even smaller doses than those which "beforehand would not have been supposed capable of producing the poisonous results." A hint which may help to answer this question is given in the observations made by Drs. Nicol and Mossop of Edinburgh. These gentlemen, conducting a series of experiments upon each other, examined the base of the eye by means of the ophthalmoscope while the system was under the influence of various drugs. They found that the nerves controlling the delicate blood-vessels of the

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 204.

² *Ibid.* p. 113.

³ *Tobacco and Alcohol* (New York, 1869), p. 92.

⁴ *London Practitioner*, vol. xiii. p. 28. *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, p. 7.

⁵ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, pp. 187, 345.

retina were paralysed, and the vessels themselves congested by a dose of two drachms of rectified spirits—less than a *quarter of an ounce* of absolute alcohol—or about a table-spoonful of brandy.¹ Here was a genuine paralysis, “a real physical damage to the nervous tissue,” wrought by a dose of alcohol so small as to be regarded by Anstie as only very mildly “stimulant.” The narcosis caused by this minute dose was, of course, less extended, but just as real as that which occurs when a man becomes dead-drunk.

As the nerves and blood-vessels of the eye have a peculiarly intimate connection with the brain, this experiment would seem to show us, through this little window, as it were, to the cerebrum, how it is that even half a glass of light wine “goes to the head” of many people, that is, causes for a moment a slight dizziness and blurring of sight; and also how it is that, as Dr. E. Smith has shown, all the senses, particularly the sight, are blunted by very small doses of alcohol.² Is it impertinent to suggest that even smaller quantities than this quarter of an ounce may cause incipient narcosis, if only we had an instrument sharp enough to detect it? If so, the distinction in kind between the effects of large and of small doses vanishes.

Some further light is given on this point by experiments made by Dr. Mulvaney, staff-surgeon of the Royal Navy, upon the effect of alcohol upon the electrical currents of the body. He discovered that an ounce of brandy, equal to about half an ounce of alcohol, taken by a healthy man, raised the galvanometer in a few minutes in one case twenty-five degrees, and in another case forty-five degrees. He concluded that the thermo-electric currents of the system were strongly excited by small doses of alcohol, and that this excitement may be profitably employed when there is “clear evidence of derangement of function springing from enfeeblement of the organic system of nerves;” but that “in health, when function, nutrition, and blood and nerve influence are harmonised by structural integrity,” such artificially excited currents, by tending to abstract an undue amount of water from the brain-cells, “must interfere with their normal working.”³ This is

¹ *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. 1. p. 200 *seq.*

² *Transactions of the Royal Society*, 1859, p. 732. *International Scientific Series*, “Food,” by Dr. E. Smith, p. 430.

³ *London Lancet*, 1875, vol. ii. p. 166.

clear testimony to the bad effects of even small amounts of alcohol in health, a matter to be noticed further on ; but the precise point to be observed here is that the galvanometer affords a delicate test of the action of comparatively small quantities of alcohol upon the nerves, and of their narcotic, and therefore injurious, effect long before the ordinary signs of narcosis are apparent.

Relevant to the same point is some of the evidence as to the effect of alcohol upon the temperature of the body. This question has been profoundly discussed, chiefly in relation to the supposed food-action of alcohol, but it also has a bearing upon the inquiry as to the signs of narcotism.

That the temperature of the body is lowered by the administration of alcohol may now be regarded as a fact established by the investigations of nearly all observers.¹ The substance of the fact is well stated by Professor Carl Binz : "The thermometer, the only reliable guide, indicates no important rise or fall after small doses of alcohol. Given in quantities a little larger, but still sufficiently moderate not to cause drunkenness, it causes a distinct fall, lasting half an hour or more ; while after a dose powerful enough to inebriate, a still more decided lowering of the temperature, from 3·5° to 5° Fahr., is observable, which lasts several hours."² Now the precise action of alcohol in diminishing animal heat is still in debate, but it is agreed that one way in which it acts is by relaxing the muscular tone of the capillaries through paralysis of the vaso-motor nerves, thus increasing the action of the heart, and bringing the warm blood more rapidly to the surface, where (though a sensation of warmth is experienced) it is cooled at the expense of the internal heat.³ But we have the testimony of Professor Binz, above quoted, to the fact that though small doses do not produce any *important* rise or fall of the bodily temperature, yet "a distinct fall, lasting half an hour or more," is effected by a dose sufficiently moderate not

¹ Ringer's *Therapeutics* (New York, 1876), p. 275 ; London *Lancet*, 1866, vol. ii. p. 208 ; Richardson's *Cantor Lectures on Alcohol*, Nat. Temp. Soc. (New York, 1881), p. 111 ; London *Practitioner*, vol. v. p. 101. For other authorities, see *Treatise on Therapeutics*, by H. C. Wood, Jr., M.D. (Philadelphia, 1876), p. 115 Ref.

² London *Practitioner*, vol. xxvi. p. 286.

³ *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. lviii. p. 2 ; and Dr. Lauder Brunton, London *Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 63.

to cause drunkenness. This extract from Binz, as well as others to the same effect which might be made from Ringer, Rickard, Wood, and others, certainly does not seem to indicate any difference in kind, but only in degree, between the effects of large and of small doses. It points to a regular gradation in narcosis from the action of the smallest to the action of the largest dose. Certainly it shows that the thermometer reveals minute paralyses of nerve-filaments produced by quantities of alcohol so small that they are called by some only stimulant doses, because they do not effect *obvious* signs of narcotism.

The fact is, Anstie's theory and his experiments and arguments in support of it are unsatisfactory. The theory so implicitly relied on by the friends of moderate drinking is by no means proved. It is no doubt true that in increasing the dose of alcohol from minute quantities a point is finally reached (never a fixed one, as we shall see) when the *ordinary* signs of narcosis begin to appear, but it is not shown to be true that no narcosis whatever exists till that point is reached, still less that an effect entirely different in kind goes on up to that point. Analogy leads us to believe that, without evidence to the contrary, the same effect in kind is produced by a small as by a large dose. But such evidence is wanting. On the other hand, experience and many of the more refined and recent experiments, though certainly not conclusive, tend in the other direction, and indicate that the anæsthetic effect of a small dose, though not exhibited in the usual way, and not appreciably harmful, simply because there is no pronounced effect of any sort, is yet a real effect, and increases, as the dose increases, to distinct narcotism.

We are aware that it will be said in reply that other substances, such for example as salt and iron, have one action when given in small, and an entirely different action when given in large, amounts; in the one case being necessary to life, in the other being deadly poisons. But the analogy does not hold when applied to the action of alcohol, for we have very clear evidence that the food-action of salt or iron consists in a series of chemical and vital processes, by which these substances are partly absorbed and partly decomposed to become normal constituents of the body; while the poisonous action of large quantities of these substances is simply irritant

and inflammatory—an entirely different thing. But in the case of alcohol, though large and concentrated doses doubtless have a certain amount of irritant and corrosive effect in addition to their narcotic, yet the *distinctive* action of the drug, whether in large or small amounts, is practically one and the same in kind—anæsthetic, sedative, or narcotic. There may, indeed, often seem to be a stage of true food or stimulant action wrought by small doses of alcohol, but the evidence adduced would appear to show that this is not a direct, but a secondary effect, produced by a quickened circulation through a very slight deadening of the vaso-motor nerves,—the narcotic action being real, though practically imperceptible.

Before proceeding further it is worth while to notice that this theory of Dr. Anstie applies as much to opium as to alcohol, and abstractly gives the same countenance to the moderate use of the one as of the other. Dr. Anstie, speaking of the abuse of opium by Orientals, declares that with them “its *use* is an important and genuine one: it acts as a powerful food-stimulant, enabling the taker to undergo severe and continuous physical exertion without the assistance of ordinary food, or on short rations,”¹ and he believes that to a certain extent the same remarks apply to natives of England, though the doses are generally smaller. While he thinks there is seldom “any noticeable intermediate state between the stimulant and narcotic dose of opium,”² yet he feels sure that its use in quantities of from one to three drachms of laudanum daily is very common among “persons who would never think of narcotising themselves any more than they would of getting drunk; but who simply desire a relief from the pains of fatigue endured by an ill-fed, ill-housed body and a harassed mind.”³ That is, more exactly, like the moderate drinker of alcohol, they desire just enough paralysis of the nervous tract as shall suffice to dull sensibility, and blot out annoying impressions. But the man who therefore, wholly sustained by this theory, should advocate the moderate use of opium as a food-stimulant to be used generally, would be regarded as an enemy of his kind. Dr. Beard, a fair witness on this point, says: “I would rather risk my life by jumping off Niagara Falls than by forming the habit of opium

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 139.² *Ibid.* p. 141.³ *Ibid.* p. 141.

eating.”¹ Since the two drugs belong essentially to the same class, is, then, abstinence from alcohol, as the rule, unreasonable?

But even if we concede the truth of the theory under consideration, it is of no practical value except as inculcating abstinence; for the vital question immediately arises, What is a stimulant, and what a narcotic dose of alcohol? Here we are launched upon a sea of uncertainty of the most dangerous sort. If we take the view of Dr. Anstie, what he calls “the poison line”—the line, that is, where stimulation ends, and narcosis begins—is never the same for any two individuals. And even in the same person it is continually shifting from a great number of causes. Climate, occupation, age, hereditary tendencies, previous habits, the character of the beverage used, the time, accompaniments, and frequency of its use, the degree of health, and various minor conditions, which change from day to day, make it impossible to give any absolute rule for a perfectly safe dose, except none at all. Almost all scientific observers, whose opinion is entitled to weight, now so clearly recognise the dangers consequent upon this fact, that, while they may indicate the amount of alcohol which may, as a matter of theory, be taken without apparent harm, it is so small, and even this small amount is prescribed with such earnest cautions and strict limitations as enormously to widen the boundaries of practical abstinence. So that the latest improved and scientific moderate drinker and the teetotaler are not half so far apart as they suppose. In fact it is only theory, and for the most part only a hair-breadth of that, which separates them. Thus Dr. Anstie, as we have seen, fixes the maximum quantity of absolute alcohol which can be taken by the adult male “without any perceptible injurious effect” at one and a half ounce daily, but he admits that “this amount is distinctly within the average consumption of persons of [so-called] moderate habits,” and would generally be regarded as “Utopian in its standard of temperance.”² He acknowledges that many persons cannot safely take as much as this, or even any at all, and he states his “firm conviction that for

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, by Geo. M. Beard, M.D. (New York, 1871), p. 149.

² *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, p. 7.

youths, say under twenty-five, the proper rule is, *either no alcohol, or very little indeed.*"¹ Dr. Parkes, as the result of the experience of the Ashantee campaign, and of prolonged experiments upon healthy soldiers, fixed the amount which could be taken daily without visible narcotic effects, and with any advantage, at one ounce, and from that to one and a half; but he distinctly states that women cannot take as much, and that children ought not to take any.² For the purpose of stimulating a flagging appetite, he thought half an ounce sufficient.³ Dr. Garrod, the great authority on gout, whose opinions are of special value, fixes the maximum amount of absolute alcohol which can be taken with safety in the twenty-four hours at less than one ounce, "and many would find this more than is really suitable to their constitutions, and would be better if only two-thirds, or even less, were taken."⁴

So much for generalisation. But it is conceded on all hands that there are many persons who, from constitutional peculiarities or hereditary tendencies, can take absolutely no alcohol at all without narcotism,—“persons,” as Dr. Brunton says, “on whom the smallest quantity of alcohol seems to act like the taste of blood on a tiger, producing in them a wild desire for more, and destroying all self-control. For them alcohol is a poison, and total abstinence their only safeguard.”⁵ It needs to be observed that these “unfortunates” belong by no means to the lowest class, but are found in all classes; that their number is uncertain, but would appear to be large, and, through over-work and the progress of nervous diseases, to be constantly increasing. They constitute a solid fact which tells heavily against the theory we are discussing, and renders its application a fatal snare.

Another fact which seriously damages the theory, and which may properly be considered in connection with the effect of alcohol upon the nervous system, is that alcohol in *any* amount is entirely needless, if not positively injurious, in health.

¹ *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, p. 40; *Practitioner*, vol. vi. p. 96.

² *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, 1870, 1872, 1874; *On the Issue of a Spirit Ration during the Ashantee Campaign of 1874*, by E. A. Parkes, M.D., F.R.S. (London, 1875), pp. ix, 33; *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, p. 277.

³ *Lancet*, 1874, vol. i. pp. 758, 759.

⁴ *Popular Science Monthly* (New Issue), Supplement, Feb. 1879, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.* Dec. 1878, Supplement, p. 143.

Upon this point there is substantial unanimity among scientific men. Professor Binz, for example, says: "With respect to the requirements of the healthy organism, I consider the use of alcohol in health as entirely superfluous. A physician may therefore recommend total abstinence to healthy persons in every instance."¹ Ringer declares that "experience plainly shows that, for the healthy, alcohol is not a necessary, no, nor even a useful, article of diet."² Dr. Brunton testifies to the same effect,³ and so does Dr. Parkes.⁴ Not to speak of numerous other cases in which experience and science unite in forbidding the use of any alcohol, and which will be noticed further on, we have in this testimony, adverse to its use in health, a very strong practical argument against the theory of Anstie.

But it will be said that "there is no such clear line between health and disease as is assumed in common speech,"⁵ and that there is a very large number of people who are not altogether well or wholly sick; but are, or think they are, just between the two, and who find their daily dram a comfort, and to whom it is a benefit, never an injury. To the positively sick and diseased, alcohol, in the hands of a skilful physician may, it is well-nigh universally conceded, be a useful remedy, though Sir William Gull doubtless gives utterance to the opinion of the best medical men now when he says that "it is over-prescribed."⁶ To the positively healthy it is useless or hurtful. But it is in behalf of the nondescript dwellers on the border-land between health and disease that the benevolent appeal for moderate drinking is made. Respecting these persons and their habitual use of alcohol, several things need to be said. In the first place, they are not for the most part diseased persons, but those who are physically exhausted through over-work, over-excitement, and excess of care. They take alcohol *mainly* for the sake of its anæsthetic effect, that is, because it dulls the sensibility, and for a time enables them to forget their sense of fatigue; and also through a mistaken notion that it supplies force for their work, which

¹ *London Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 336.

² *Therapeutics*, p. 277.

³ *London Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 122.

⁴ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 284.

⁵ *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, by F. E. Anstie, M.D., p. 3.

⁶ *Popular Science Monthly* (New Issue), Supplement, Feb. 1879, p. 13.

in point of fact it does not supply. They have no idea of becoming drunkards. Very likely they do not become openly such, but, as Dr. Anstie says, starting "with the intention of using only such a moderate quantity as in fact would not be narcotic at all [?], but would merely relieve weariness, they suffer themselves to be persuaded that by increasing the dose the relief will be increased,"¹ until their daily potation becomes a necessity, if not a destruction.

Here we need to bear in mind the evidence already adduced which shows that genuine narcosis may take place without becoming at all manifest by the usual signs, and from a far smaller dose than that commonly supposed to be narcotic. In some individuals this is the case far more than in others. There is no telling what a narcotic dose is, only we know that for many persons *any* dose is, and that it *may* be for the majority. Then we need to remember that *any* narcosis is simply destruction for the time being, to a greater or less extent, of the functional activity of the nervous system, "a severance of the copula of life," as Dr. Anstie vigorously puts it, and probably arises, as Dr. Parkes suggests, "from a direct though transitory union of the alcohol with the nervous substance."² Temperance literature with all its high colouring can hardly match in vividness the scientific description of this effect which is given by Dr. Anstie when he says: "The use of even a single truly narcotic dose very probably produces a real physical damage to the nervous tissue, which absolutely requires a certain time for its repair. If the process of recovery be interrupted by an early repetition of the poisonous dose, it will be afterwards more difficult, and the reiteration of this vicious sequence will at last render a more or less considerable portion of the nervous system useless as a conducting medium of the peculiar impressions which it is its function to transmit; and hence arises an insensibility, which makes larger doses of the narcotic necessary, as already explained. Moreover, this insensibility is accompanied, almost necessarily, by an habitual feeling of languor and depression, which is very disagreeable, and with which the delusions of narcotism contrast very favourably.

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 217.

² *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, p. 276, note, and p. 274.

The dose is repeated, and, for reasons mentioned, in increased quantity; and the physical damage to the nervous system progresses in a way which it is not difficult to understand; for although the patient may have brought his nervous system to a state in which the symptoms of narcotic poisoning no longer include pleasant effects upon consciousness, the devitalising influence continues to be exerted.”¹

Supposing, now, the “truly narcotic dose,” causing this “real physical damage,” be, as both science and experience abundantly prove it is for many, and may be for the majority, the sip or two of brandy, the two or three glasses of claret or sherry, or the five or six glasses of beer, or even much less, which the “Utopian” moderate drinker takes during the day, then have we not very clearly set before us the danger to which these jaded people, who are neither sick nor well, are exposed from the charitable advice of the advocates of moderate drinking? Do we not also get a glimpse here at the normal genesis of the authentic drunkard?

But, in addition to this, we must recollect that, as Dr. Anstie and others point out, and as is well known, the habit of even a “stimulant” indulgence in alcohol tends to enable the system to bear a larger dose without narcotism, or rather without its ordinary signs. For example, all the observers of the effect of alcohol in diminishing the animal heat referred to above, draw attention to the fact that upon those who habitually use even a very moderate quantity the effect of a larger amount is not to lower the temperature so much as it does with abstainers. The reason is, that the extreme sensitiveness of the nervous tract is very slightly yet permanently impaired by the composition of the narcotic with its substance. In this way the system gradually acquires what is called “a toleration of alcohol.” The man never gets seriously drunk, for he is always more or less minutely so. His narcotism does not show itself. Very likely he is not at all aware of it himself. Nevertheless, it is there all the same.

It is here that we find an explanation of those abnormal and monstrous cases of men who are said to drink daily sixty or seventy glasses of beer, containing four or five per cent. of

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 218.

cohol, without appearing to be sensibly narcotised. In these instances the system becomes accustomed regularly to relieve itself of this vast amount of liquid by the kidneys, and with it a large proportion of the alcohol is thrown off, else it would become almost immediately destructive. In respect to this power of elimination, individuals differ enormously. But when it is said that these men are never intoxicated, and perhaps never could be, by this liquor, it must be remembered that language is used in its popular significance, and that there is evidence which shows that in these cases, in addition to more obvious evil consequences, a prolonged course of slight narcotism is going on, which gradually deprives part of the nervous system of its co-ordinating power.

Dr. Anstie describes this insidious process as a gradual degradation in the structure of those nervous centres upon which alcohol has the most powerful influence. The amount of food received tends to diminish, yet vigour is often maintained. These changes in the nervous matter—apart from other diseases to which they give rise—may shorten life, or they may not. They may after a time bring about a sudden rupture of brain fibres, resulting in instant death, or they may cause a “gradual shrinking of the brain or spinal cord, or both, in bulk, and the degeneration of a certain amount of their vesical matter.”¹ In this way he accounts for those extremely rare cases in which life is prolonged to great age, with little or no food, through the use of excessive quantities of alcohol—which, however, do not cause drunkenness, simply because a large portion of the nervous tissue is permanently narcotised, and has “ceased to fill the role of nervous tissue,”² yet the man exists.

It is true that Anstie attributes this progressive and generally swiftly-run course of narcotism to the constant repetition of what he calls “a truly poisonous dose” of alcohol. But what is a truly poisonous dose? We cannot too often insist that even theoretically this is an entirely uncertain and undecided quantity; that individuals differ so very greatly that generalisation is hazardous, if not impossible,

¹ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 216.

² *Ibid.*

and that practically it is most likely, as Anstie himself admits, the very dose which the moderate drinker is daily taking "without thinking of getting drunk."¹

We are now prepared for the judgment of two or three scientific men, whose opinions deserve attention, as to the prudence of this course of moderate indulgence which is urged for the benefit of those overworn and harassed people who are on the border-land between health and disease. And here, as elsewhere in this article, the testimony of those who might seem prejudiced in favour of total abstinence is purposely left out.

The editor of one of the ablest British medical journals says: "We frequently meet with most respectable people, both male and female, who have never been drunk in their lives, yet have lapsed into a condition of alcoholism by taking extremely small doses of stimulant between meals to enable them, as they say, to bear up against their work. These people have more difficulty than drunkards have in surrendering their appetites,"² the reason being that through their slight, but long-continued indulgence the nervous matter has been more profoundly and permanently degraded than in the man who drinks excessively, and in a short time becomes a gross drunkard.

Dr. Brunton, the distinguished editor of the *Practitioner*, referring to those who use alcoholic liquors with the hope of aiding them in mental work, remarks: "Such persons may sometimes go on taking alcohol in moderation for a long time without doing themselves much harm, but they run great risk. For the very increase in power which the alcohol gives them is apt to induce them to use it more, and when their nervous system begins to fail under the combined effects of the excessive demands upon it which alcohol enables them to make, and the destructive action of excessive drinking itself, their self-control disappears, and they may sink into a drunkard's grave."³

Again, Dr. Parkes says, speaking of some of the remote effects of alcohol, "To use Dickinson's expressive phrase, alcohol is the very 'genius of degeneration.' And these alcoholic d

¹ See *Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, p. 7 *seq.*

² *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. lviii. p. 6.

³ *Popular Science Monthly*, Dec. 1878, Supplement, p. 143.

of six days of varying doses, daily work in excess of this, amounting to 15·8 tons lifted one foot.¹ With claret the results were almost identical with those from brandy. Upon the results of their experiments these distinguished observers remark : " In spite of our previous experience in the use of alcohol and brandy we were hardly prepared for the ease with which the appetite may be destroyed, the heart unduly excited, and the capillary circulation improperly increased."²

4. As to the action of alcohol upon the stomach great risk is incurred in its use, and its value in stimulating appetite and promoting digestion is over-estimated. In many cases requiring substantially medical treatment it no doubt helps ; but even in these cases, unless taken with great care and in very small quantities, it more frequently weakens and eventually destroys both appetite and digestion by supplanting, through the tendency to increase the dose, the natural stimulus of food. Dr. Parkes says : " In very small quantities it appears to aid digestion ; in larger amounts it checks it, reddens the mucous membrane, and produces a chronic catarrhal condition ;"³ and Dr. Brunton remarks that " healthy stomachs with ordinary food do not require it, although in small quantities it may do little harm. A larger quantity, however, is certain to do harm. Moreover, if regularly used, even in small quantities, the stomach may become habituated to it, and refuse to respond to the stimulus of food alone unless supported by that of alcohol."⁴ This is a scientific description of the fact constantly observed, viz., that there are men, not intemperate, whose digestion is spoiled by indulgence for a long time in very moderate quantities of alcohol. In general, in its action upon the digestive organs, as elsewhere, it proves itself to be an abnormal agent, to be used only in abnormal conditions. In this particular instance its useful effect seems to be mainly in rousing the nerves of taste ; and the same end can generally, and with much less risk, be attained by change of food and the use of fruits and other flavours.⁵

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 390 ; *Parkes' Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273 ; *Richardson's Cantor Lectures*, p. 85.

² *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 394.

³ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273.

⁴ *London Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 63.

⁵ See Prof. William James in *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 19, 1881.

attraction between the nervous element and alcohol."¹ If we except the mischief done to the mucous membrane of the digestive apparatus, almost all the alcoholic derangements of the system, including those of the mental functions, are the result of the breaking down of the co-ordinating power of the nervous organism, probably through a combination of the alcohol with its substance.² Let us now glance at some of these effects, brought on by habitual, but comparatively small quantities.

2. The action of alcohol on the blood, as shown by Harley and Smiedeberg is to lessen the power of the red corpuscles to give off oxygen, thereby diminishing the oxidation of the tissues, and reducing the heat and functional activity of the body. "The chemical changes of the blood are partly arrested."³ In certain diseases, especially in fevers, this may be helpful, but when the processes of the body are normal, it is likely to be injurious; though if the quantity of alcohol taken "be small and not frequently repeated, little or no harm will come of it. If it be frequently taken, however, by persons in average health and fair digestion, its effects will become obvious in the imperfect combustion of fat and its consequent accumulation in the tissues."⁴ Because of this the potatory habits of people who are not suspected of taking alcohol can be detected by a certain velvety quality in the skin. It is partly in this way that the redundance of fat and fatty degenerations are brought about which are often seen in persons who take only very small amounts of alcohol in the form of fermented liquors, especially beer. In such cases there is no drunkenness; but these changes go on slowly and insidiously to the ultimate disorder of all vital processes.

3. The effect of even small amounts of alcohol upon the action of the heart, while doubtless beneficial in cases where that organ is enfeebled, has been fully proved to be injurious in the average subject by the elaborate researches of Dr. Parkes and Count Wollowicz, who found that a single ounce of alcohol increased the number of daily heart-beats 4300 above the number when water alone was used; and that, taking the usual estimate of the heart's daily work, it did, during an alcoholic period

¹ London *Lancet*, 1872, vol. ii. p. 663.

² See Anstie's *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 160 *seq.*

³ Parkes' *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 274.

⁴ London *Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 122.

of six days of varying doses, daily work in excess of this, amounting to 15·8 tons lifted one foot.¹ With claret the results were almost identical with those from brandy. Upon the results of their experiments these distinguished observers remark: "In spite of our previous experience in the use of alcohol and brandy we were hardly prepared for the ease with which the appetite may be destroyed, the heart unduly excited, and the capillary circulation improperly increased."²

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¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 390; *Parkes' Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273; *Richardson's Cantor Lectures*, p. 85.

² *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 394.

³ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273.

⁴ *London Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 63.

⁵ See Prof. William James in *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 19, 1881.

5. As to the hotly-debated question respecting alcohol as a food, or food-stimulant, much has been anticipated in what has been said with regard to its action upon the nervous system and the blood. The inquiry whether alcohol is eliminated unchanged, or is decomposed within the body, and if so in what way, derives its chief importance from its bearing upon this question. Much stress has been laid, by those who claim that alcohol is not a food, upon the supposed fact that it is not transformed in the system, but is at once thrown off by various channels. This declaration was made with confidence in 1860 by certain French chemists. Their conclusions were, however, speedily criticised, and have been overthrown by later investigations. It would seem to have been proved by exhaustive experiments that, except in large doses, alcohol is not generally thrown off from the body unchanged, and even then only in proportionately small amounts. Within certain limits its "destructive decomposition within the body" would now seem to be a pretty definitely settled and accepted fact.¹

Precisely how this decomposition takes place and what are its products is still in debate. Many observers, including Anstie, Binz, Baudot, Dupré, Brunton, and others, believe that it is oxidised within the body, as it is without, into carbonic acid and water, though this is by no means conclusively proved. Richardson thinks that it is changed "into a new soluble chemical substance, probably aldehyde."²

But the question whether alcohol is a food—chiefly a question of definitions—is not positively determined by settling whether it is decomposed in the body or not, and, if it is, into what products; for water, which is absolutely essential to life, and must, therefore, in a broad sense be regarded as a food, is not transformed at all. On the other hand, if alcohol is transformed in the body it would *seem* to show that it is a food. Yet, as Dr. Parkes suggests, "even if its complete destruction within certain limits were quite clear, this fact alone would not guide us to the dietetic value of alcohol. We have first to

¹ Anstie, *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 358 *seq.*; Schulhaus, *Archiv der Heilkunde*, 1866, quoted by Anstie, *London Lancet*, 1866, vol. i. p. 12; Dupré, *London Practitioner*, vol. viii. pp. 148, 224 *seq.*; Anstie, *Ibid.* vol. xiii. p. 15; Binz, *Ibid.* vol. xvi. p. 360; Dr. Lauder Brunton, *Ibid.* p. 124; Richardson, *Cantor Lectures on Alcohol* (New York National Temperance Society), p. 110.

² *Ibid.* p. 117.

trace the effect of that destruction, and learn whether it is for good or evil"¹ This statement contains the pith of the matter. It is agreed that alcohol does not directly build up the system. "Alcohol is active rather in the direction of repressing than of forwarding the growth of new structures."² It is not a food, then, in this sense. But in the sense of supplying energy, though it may itself be oxidised, and therefore seem to supply force and heat, yet it also diminishes oxidation, thus overcoming what might be, and what in febrile disease are, its food effects. We have to look at what else it does besides being itself burned.

As Ringer states: "Even if the greater part of the alcohol is consumed, and thus ministers to the forces peculiar to the body, yet alcohol, by depressing functional activity, favouring degenerations, etc., may do more harm than any good it can effect by the force it sets free during its destruction; even if taken in quantities too small to do harm, yet it can scarcely be classed as an economical food for the healthy. Granted that dietetic doses check oxidation in the healthy, and thus economise the blood and tissues, still, unless it can be shown that in health there is constantly an excess of consumption over and above that required by the body, a diminution of oxidation could only result in lessening the amount of force set free and put at the disposal of the organs, entailing, of course, a diminution of the functional activity of the body."³

Dr. Hammond, indeed, found that when he took too little food and lost weight, alcohol prevented the loss, and even supplied gain;⁴ and Anstie has collected some cases in which he claims that life was supported for years by large doses of alcohol with substantially no food;⁵ but, as Parkes says, these cases "demand more exact data;"⁶ and Hammond himself remarks that "when the supply of food is normal, and there are *no special circumstances existing* which render the use of alcohol advisable, it is not to be commended."⁷ In short, its use for any purpose of nutrition must be the exception, and not the rule.

¹ Letter to Anstie, *Practitioner*, vol. viii. p. 82.

² Anstie, *Practitioner*, vol. xi. p. 364.

³ *Therapeutics*, p. 276.

⁴ *Treatise on Hygiene*, by Wm. A. Hammond, M.D. (Philadelphia, 1863), p. 536 seq.

⁵ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 386.

⁶ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 281.

⁷ *Treatise on Hygiene*, p. 537.

About the most that can be said of alcohol is that under certain exposures it is a "saving food," retarding tissue irritation, and that it may for a time draw upon his reserve energy. In controversy there may be, all observed as a nourishment for mental or physical in very small doses, is utterly decided from the experience of the Army experiments that it was worthless for the muscles, and that they were supplied by meat extract.¹ And the experience of the enterprise as shifting the gauge of a railroad-line, a work requiring the greatest exertion, shows that "weak skilful" gives a strength and vigour that is not the use of alcohol as a giver of energy. A physiological opinion is unanimous in quantity.

Theorise and define as we may, it is no agent, unless in exceptional cases, and is just about as sensible as the advice of a new comer: "Don't waste your money on gin; it's cheaper." Science would not waste money on either: get a dish of soup or of coffee, or of meat-extract. It is the safer.³

6. At this point an interesting question is said that we have been dealing with simple alcohol, an article which, when obtained with difficulty, the common use of distilled liquors, is discountenanced by the advocate temperance, but whose use in the form of fermented liquors, is not the action when taken alone. This is not clear as to pass without proof; but

¹ *On the Issue of a Spirit Ration* in the Army, p. 56, *et passim*.

² *British and Foreign Medical-Chemical*.

³ See Sir William Gull in *Popular Science*, 1879, Supplement, p. 12.

entirely upon the *quantity* of alcohol
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as a "wiser because a more accurate

beer is not alcohol at all, but some sort of a nutritive chemical combination of it with other elements.

There are, of course, in fermented liquors a large number of other substances besides the alcohol; but whether these substances are in themselves helpful or deleterious is an open question upon which authorities differ, and which is dependent chiefly upon the precise character of the liquor used, and the condition and idiosyncrasies of the drinker. That these substances are sometimes tonic and alimentary is clear; that they are very often seriously harmful and the active cause of a class of diseases like dyspepsia and gout is equally clear. Wholly apart from their alcoholic effects, and from the large question of adulteration, it really demands much experience, or the judgment of a physician or expert, to determine what, if any, wine or malt liquor is helpful in a given case.¹ But the almost sole reason for drinking these liquors is, after all, the alcohol they contain, without which they would be flat enough; and so far as the alcohol is concerned, the reason for taking it in them rather than alone is, for the most part, the same as that for taking it mixed with water and with food, viz., simply that it may be liberally diluted, and therefore that its acronarcotic or corrosive effect upon the stomach and alimentary canal may be avoided, and that it may be absorbed more slowly, causing, as Dr. Parkes says, a more "moderate paralysis of the vaso-motor nerves of the stomach."² But the assumption that, apart from this dilution, the alcohol in wine and the alcohol in spirits have an essentially different action, is overthrown by the elaborate researches of Dr. Parkes and Count Wollowicz upon the effect of red Bordeaux wine upon a soldier, which are summed up by saying, "In general terms we may say that the results obtained were the same as those observed in experiments with plain spirits and brandy."³

Besides this, we need to recall the fact, to which we have already quoted the testimony of Anstie, that the changes wrought in the nervous system by alcohol are far more important and serious than all the other disorders brought on by this agent, and then put with this the fact, which Anstie also

¹ See Anstie *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*.

² *Lancet*, 1874, vol. i. p. 759.

³ *Practitioner*, vol. vi. p. 102; *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, 1870, 1872.

emphasises, that there is this important difference between alcoholic action upon the nervous system and other organs of the body, especially upon the digestive apparatus, that "whereas in the latter case very much depends upon the kind of alcoholic liquor taken, and *particularly upon its degree of concentration*, the effects of alcohol upon the nervous system seem to depend *almost entirely* upon the *quantity* of alcohol taken in each day or week, and very little upon the *kind* used."¹

The distinction between the alcoholic action of pure spirit and of wine thus dwindles to a mere nothing, and is dependent almost solely upon the fact that one is simply more concentrated than the other.

A strong protest is made against drinking distilled liquors by those who advocate the use of fermented beverages as a cure for intemperance. As reformers they stay themselves mainly upon this protest and advocacy. Yet they are really inconsistent. The distinction between the two kinds of alcoholic beverage is less important than they suppose; for, if only distilled liquors be properly diluted and taken with food, there is excellent authority for saying that in many cases this is the best way to take alcohol if it is to be taken at all. Thus Dr. Parkes says: "When the effect of alcohol upon digestion alone is sought, I think by far the best plan is to follow the plan advocated by Wilks, and give rectified spirit, properly disguised, as medicine. We shall then be certain of purity; that the proper quantities are given, and at the times we desire."² The same course is recommended by Binz in view of the difficulty of obtaining pure wines,³ and by Richardson and others as a "wiser because a more accurate and measurable method."⁴

Indeed, in connection with the fact that the precise point where narcotism begins is indeterminable, and that the minimum quantity of alcohol which produces it is also indeterminable, it is obvious that one of the chief perils of the habitual drinker of fermented liquors is that he never knows, or is careless about, the exact amount of alcohol he is daily taking, and thus the actual danger of that slow and insidious narcosis already

¹ *Lancet*, 1872, vol. ii. p. 661.

² *Lancet*, 1874, vol. i. p. 759.

³ *Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 365.

⁴ *New York Independent*, article by Dr. Coan, spring of 1879.

pointed out is increased by the use of what he considers pre-eminently safe beverages.¹

7. We may glance at a few of the restrictions scientifically put upon the use of alcohol, which constitute a strong argument in favour of abstinence. Thus all physiological authorities insist that any alcohol is almost always useless, if not positively hurtful, in health; that even in minute doses it is poison to many people; that it should never be taken by children, or habitually even by young men or young women; that it is useless, and even dangerous, to take it in extreme heat or extreme cold; that it must never be taken during exertion, either mental or physical, with the idea of supplying strength, which in point of fact it never does supply in such cases, except at the cost of subsequent depression; that it must not be taken by athletes, or by those who have severe and critical mental or physical work on hand; that it must never be taken early in the day; never on an empty stomach; never in more than one form daily; and never unless largely diluted either naturally or artificially. All of this makes practically in the direction of abstinence. These broad and well-grounded restrictions put the advocate of habitual moderate drinking, as that phrase is commonly understood, in the position of one who must give a distinct reason for his habit.

And here we may sum up this part of our subject in the language of a medical writer already quoted, who says: "Few persons will deny that there are circumstances by no means of infrequent occurrence when it must contribute to the well-being of the individual to modify the nutrition and other vital acts of the body in the directions indicated above [*i.e.* in the way of deadening nervous irritation, rousing the heart, stimulating the circulation, etc.]. But a great many will dissent from the opinion that it is wise to employ the means thus placed at our disposal. They say you are paying too much for your whistle; that the retardation of the blood-current and the relaxation of the capillaries necessarily tend to permanent organic lesions, latent indeed, but insidious, and aggravated by each additional dose in proportion to frequency."²

¹ See Anstie *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*, p. 7 seq.

² *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. lviii. p. 2.

Practically the whole matter is in a nut-shell: Will it pay? In view of the utterances of science the answer of prudence would seem to be, No. Good sense must make abstinence the rule, use the exception. We now take up

2. Prudential Abstinence in the Light of Experience.

It does not come within the scope of our purpose here to consider the enormous evils of intemperance,—evils so great that the simplest statement of the facts has come to be regarded as gross exaggeration, and so fails to impress us,—evils so complex in their causes, and so far-reaching in their effects, that they are awakening, as never before, the attention not only of reformers, but of statesmen and sociologists the world over. Intemperance is admitted to be a chief curse of civilised society. Yet we are not now concerned with this gigantic evil except to say that it constitutes a hard fact—the dark background against which all discussions respecting the use of alcoholic liquors as common beverages are thrown into sharp prominence, and by which all theories and experiences as to the good or ill of such use, must inevitably be gauged.

Bearing this in mind, and not attempting any discussion of intemperance itself, we wish here to point out two or three results of experience which show that abstinence as contrasted, not with drunkenness, but with moderate drinking, is the dictate of good sense and prudence.

1. The statistics of life insurance companies in Great Britain prove conclusively the advantage of abstinence over moderation. In the United Kingdom Temperance and General Provident Institution there are two sections: one of abstainers, the other of persons selected as not known to be intemperate. The claims for five years which were anticipated in the abstinence section were £100,446, yet there were actual claims for only £76,676. But in the section consisting of persons simply temperate, the anticipated claims for the same five years were £192,352, while the actual claims were no less than £230,297. That is, for five years the claims of the abstainers were only seventy-six per cent. of what was expected to be paid them, while for the same

period the claims of the moderate drinkers amounted to *one* hundred and eighteen per cent. of what was expected to be paid them,—a balance of forty-two per cent. to the credit of abstinence. It is no wonder that Dr. Parkes, from whom these facts are taken, though himself not an abstainer, *calls* this “very striking evidence in favour of total abstinence *as* contrasted with moderation.”¹

He remarks, also, that “the much greater longevity of the abstainers is better seen by the amount of bonuses paid to each £1000 whole-life policy in the two sections for the same five years,” and then gives a table by which it is seen that the abstainer received as bonus, for the five years period, a sum varying from £26, with an entrance age of fifteen years, to £51, with an entrance age of fifty-five years, *in excess of that received by the moderate drinker for the same period*. “At every age, therefore,” says Parkes, “the abstainer has a very great advantage.”²

The same advantage is brought out in another form when we find from insurance statistics that for a given period, where calculations from the tables of mortality anticipated the death of 1110 abstainers, only 801 did die; but where the death of 2010 ordinary people was anticipated, 1997 actually died.³ The contrast, be it observed, is not between abstainers and drunkards, for the latter are never insured, but between abstainers and moderates.

Now these are weighty facts. There is no sentimentality about them. They show that the calmest results of experience harmonise with the deductions of physiology, and they constitute a downright argument against moderate drinking which the dullest can appreciate.

2. A second class of facts, to which we can only briefly refer, shows that in times of great exposure and hardship, as also under the attacks of disease and sudden accident which bring men into extreme prostration and peril of death, the abstainer invariably has the advantage over his brother, the moderate drinker, under the same conditions. The whole nation has lately been witness to a thrilling instance of this.

¹ *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, p. 270, foot-note.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 19, 1881; see also *New York Independent*, July 7, 1881, p. 7; and *Princeton Review*, Jan. 1881, p. 83 *seq.*

Dr. Parkes gives abundant examples in proof of the same thing;¹ and the medical experience of our late war, as well as the records of every city hospital, establish the facts; so that it has almost passed into a proverb, that in such circumstances the abstainer has the best chance of pulling through.

Now, it is said by the advocates of moderate drinking that none of us lives an ideal life, that we must often submit to impure air, to overwork, and under-sleeping, which reduce vitality and strength, that perfect health is almost unknown, and therefore alcohol should be used to give us support. Is not the argument really all the other way? We cannot live ideally. Even those most happily situated are daily exposed to emergencies of care and depression, to sudden drafts on strength and spirits, to insidious disease and violent accident,—how much more so the poor and habitually ill-housed, underfed, and overworked,—and therefore no one can afford to take the additional risk and burden which even a moderate habitual indulgence in alcohol implies.

3. An argument which comes home to every one, and of which every one, if he is honest with himself, must feel the force, is that practically, let our own theory or habits be what they may, we always rejoice to feel sure that those to whose hands we commit any interest whatever are abstainers. We cannot help being uneasy if we are aware that our janitor, clerk, or agent is a moderate drinker. We have a greater sense of security if we know that the captain or pilot of our steamer, the engineer of our train, the bridge-tender or switchman to whose steadiness we must trust, does not habitually drink even fermented liquors. Many a man ridicules teetotalism over his wine or spirits who will not have a coachman who takes even beer. The coachman may never have been drunk, but the risk of his becoming so—the risk of his hand and eye becoming a little unsteady at the critical moment—is too great. All of us demand that practical abstainers shall be in these places of responsibility. A general regulation of one of the largest railroads in the country, the Pennsylvania, is that “No person addicted to the use of intoxicating drinks shall be employed or continued in its service.”

¹ *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, p. 277 seq.

attraction between the nervous element and alcohol.”¹ If we except the mischief done to the mucous membrane of the digestive apparatus, almost all the alcoholic derangements of the system, including those of the mental functions, are the result of the breaking down of the co-ordinating power of the nervous organism, probably through a combination of the alcohol with its substance.² Let us now glance at some of these effects, brought on by habitual, but comparatively small quantities.

2. The action of alcohol on the blood, as shown by Harley and Smiedeberg is to lessen the power of the red corpuscles to give off oxygen, thereby diminishing the oxidation of the tissues, and reducing the heat and functional activity of the body. “The chemical changes of the blood are partly arrested.”³ In certain diseases, especially in fevers, this may be helpful, but when the processes of the body are normal, it is likely to be injurious; though if the quantity of alcohol taken “be small and not frequently repeated, little or no harm will come of it. If it be frequently taken, however, by persons in average health and fair digestion, its effects will become obvious in the imperfect combustion of fat and its consequent accumulation in the tissues.”⁴ Because of this the potatory habits of people who are not suspected of taking alcohol can be detected by a certain velvety quality in the skin. It is partly in this way that the redundance of fat and fatty degenerations are brought about which are often seen in persons who take only very small amounts of alcohol in the form of fermented liquors, especially beer. In such cases there is no drunkenness; but these changes go on slowly and insidiously to the ultimate disorder of all vital processes.

3. The effect of even small amounts of alcohol upon the action of the heart, while doubtless beneficial in cases where that organ is enfeebled, has been fully proved to be injurious in the average subject by the elaborate researches of Dr. Parkes and Count Wollowicz, who found that a single ounce of alcohol increased the number of daily heart-beats 4300 above the number when water alone was used; and that, taking the usual estimate of the heart’s daily work, it did, during an alcoholic period

¹ London *Lancet*, 1872, vol. ii. p. 663.

² See *Anstie’s Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 160 *seq.*

³ *Parkes’ Manual of Hygiene*, p. 274.

⁴ London *Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 122.

of six days of varying doses, daily work in excess of this, amounting to 15·8 tons lifted one foot.¹ With claret the results were almost identical with those from brandy. Upon the results of their experiments these distinguished observers remark : " In spite of our previous experience in the use of alcohol and brandy we were hardly prepared for the ease with which the appetite may be destroyed, the heart unduly excited, and the capillary circulation improperly increased."²

4. As to the action of alcohol upon the stomach great risk is incurred in its use, and its value in stimulating appetite and promoting digestion is over-estimated. In many cases requiring substantially medical treatment it no doubt helps ; but even in these cases, unless taken with great care and in very small quantities, it more frequently weakens and eventually destroys both appetite and digestion by supplanting, through the tendency to increase the dose, the natural stimulus of food. Dr. Parkes says : " In very small quantities it appears to aid digestion ; in larger amounts it checks it, reddens the mucous membrane, and produces a chronic catarrhal condition ;"³ and Dr. Brunton remarks that " healthy stomachs with ordinary food do not require it, although in small quantities it may do little harm. A larger quantity, however, is certain to do harm. Moreover, if regularly used, even in small quantities, the stomach may become habituated to it, and refuse to respond to the stimulus of food alone unless supported by that of alcohol."⁴ This is a scientific description of the fact constantly observed, viz., that there are men, not intemperate, whose digestion is spoiled by indulgence for a long time in very moderate quantities of alcohol. In general, in its action upon the digestive organs, as elsewhere, it proves itself to be an abnormal agent, to be used only in abnormal conditions. In this particular instance its useful effect seems to be mainly in rousing the nerves of taste ; and the same end can generally, and with much less risk, be attained by change of food and the use of fruits and other flavours.⁵

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 390 ; *Parkes' Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273 ; *Richardson's Cantor Lectures*, p. 85.

² *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, p. 394.

³ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 273.

⁴ *London Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 63.

⁵ See Prof. William James in *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 19, 1881.

dictate of benevolence—as a good rule for the sake of others. They constitute a substantial ground on which to base an appeal for abstinence to those who may not think they need it for themselves, but who by their example can help those who do need it.

It is admitted that the Bible does not prohibit the use of wine, though it utters earnest warnings against excess, and though it gives, as we shall see, general principles which afford ample foundation for abstinence. It is admitted that science does not always forbid the use of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, though it often does so, and though it always surrounds that use with such strict limitations as practically to advocate abstinence as the best general rule for the many. However, leaving out of account the therapeutic action of alcohol, it is granted that there may be some—how few no one knows—who can use these beverages without sensible injury, and perhaps, under certain conditions and in certain amounts, with benefit. Now, whether these shall abstain from such use for the sake of others, and if so to what extent and under what circumstances is ultimately a question for the exercise of private judgment and of individual benevolence in view of the facts of the case. Such abstinence is an act of grace, and rests on precisely the same basis that self-denial for the sake of others in the use of anything not in itself sinful rests.

The general principle is abundantly set forth and illustrated in the New Testament. Paul makes it very plain in specific instances in Romans xiv. and 1 Corinthians viii. Some of the Christians at Rome and Corinth had conscientious scruples against eating certain meats which had been offered to idols. In itself eating the meat was a matter indifferent. Yet Paul urges those who have this “knowledge” not to eat such meats lest thereby they should cause their weak brethren to sin. Of course in this case the ground of the appeal was the fact that the weak brethren were likely to be led by the example of the stronger to do an act which their consciences disapproved. But the same general principle applies to the case of those who, by their use of a thing in itself indifferent, may lead others to such a use of the same thing as for them involves sin in the sense of physical as well as moral debasement and ruin. In both these ways, that is, for the sake of those whose spiritual

trace the effect of that destruction, and learn whether it is for good or evil.”¹ This statement contains the pith of the matter. It is agreed that alcohol does not directly build up the system. “Alcohol is active rather in the direction of repressing than of forwarding the growth of new structures.”² It is not a food, then, in this sense. But in the sense of supplying energy, though it may itself be oxidised, and therefore seem to supply force and heat, yet it also diminishes oxidation, thus overcoming what might be, and what in febrile disease are, its food effects. We have to look at what else it does besides being itself burned.

As Ringer states : “Even if the greater part of the alcohol is consumed, and thus ministers to the forces peculiar to the body, yet alcohol, by depressing functional activity, favouring degenerations, etc., may do more harm than any good it can effect by the force it sets free during its destruction ; even if taken in quantities too small to do harm, yet it can scarcely be classed as an economical food for the healthy. Granted that dietetic doses check oxidation in the healthy, and thus economise the blood and tissues, still, unless it can be shown that in health there is constantly an excess of consumption over and above that required by the body, a diminution of oxidation could only result in lessening the amount of force set free and put at the disposal of the organs, entailing, of course, a diminution of the functional activity of the body.”³

Dr. Hammond, indeed, found that when he took too little food and lost weight, alcohol prevented the loss, and even supplied gain ;⁴ and Anstie has collected some cases in which he claims that life was supported for years by large doses of alcohol with substantially no food ;⁵ but, as Parkes says, these cases “demand more exact data ;”⁶ and Hammond himself remarks that “when the supply of food is normal, and there are *no special circumstances existing* which render the use of alcohol advisable, it is not to be commended.”⁷ In short, its use for any purpose of nutrition must be the exception, and not the rule.

¹ Letter to Anstie, *Practitioner*, vol. viii. p. 82.

² Anstie, *Practitioner*, vol. xi. p. 364.

³ *Therapeutics*, p. 276.

⁴ *Treatise on Hygiene*, by Wm. A. Hammond, M.D. (Philadelphia, 1863), p. 536 *seq.*

⁵ *Stimulants and Narcotics*, p. 386.

⁶ *Manual of Hygiene*, p. 281.

⁷ *Treatise on Hygiene*, p. 537.

About the most that can be said of the dietetic value of alcohol is that under certain exceptional conditions it may be a "saving food," retarding tissue change, deadening nervous irritation, and that it may for a brief period enable a man to draw upon his reserve energy. But whatever theoretical controversy there may be, all observations conclusively show that as a nourishment for mental or physical exertion its use, even in very small doses, is utterly deceitful and bad. Parkes found from the experience of the Ashantee campaign and other experiments that it was worthless as a source of energy to the muscles, and that they were supported far better by coffee or meat extract.¹ And the experience of engineers in such an enterprise as shifting the gauge on the whole length of a great railroad-line, a work requiring the most rapid and prodigious exertion, shows that "weak skilly"—thin oatmeal porridge—gives a strength and vigour that no grog can supply.² As to the use of alcohol as a giver of strength in mental work, physiological opinion is unanimous against even the smallest quantity.

Theorise and define as we may, to use alcohol as a dietary agent, unless in exceptional cases, is, in the view of science, just about as sensible as the advice of an old factory girl to a new comer: "Don't waste your money on pie: get a glass of gin; it's cheaper." Science would say: Don't waste your money on either: get a dish of soup, of oatmeal gruel, a cup of coffee, or of meat-extract. It is better, cheaper, and vastly safer.³

6. At this point an interesting inquiry arises. It will be said that we have been dealing hitherto with the effects of simple alcohol, an article which, in its absolute form, is only obtained with difficulty, the common use of which, in the form of distilled liquors, is discountenanced by all who in any way advocate temperance, but whose action, when it is taken in the form of fermented liquors, is entirely different from its action when taken alone. This last statement is not at all so clear as to pass without proof; but before turning to this, there

¹ *On the Issue of a Spirit Ration during the Ashantee Campaign of 1874*, p. 56, *et passim*.

² *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, vol. lviii, p. 7 *seq.*

³ See Sir William Gull in *Popular Scientific Monthly* (New Issue), Feb. 1879, Supplement, p. 13.

individuals, we may say, as Paul did, the thing we are giving up is lawful for us, but it is not expedient; and by expediency here we do not mean a politic and worldly compromise for worldly ends, but we mean the most manly and benevolent action done by us in wise view of the effect of our example upon our fellows, and not as under law to man, but to Christ.

Apply these principles to the question of abstinence from intoxicating liquors for the sake of others. Every man of Christian principle at least will often see the fitness, if not the obligation, of abstaining from the moderate use, which, if it does not benefit, certainly does not seem to hurt him, for the sake of his example upon his son, his intimate friend, or his neighbour, over whom he has influence, and who is in peril of slavish drunkenness. At the same time such a man may resent a demand made upon him by others that he *must* so abstain because his use is in itself sinful. The obligation to abstain does not inhere in the use itself, but in the circumstances which affect the bearings of that use upon others; and respecting these circumstances the man himself, though he may make a great mistake for which he will suffer, is the final judge.

But while this is true, it is also true, that if he is a genuinely benevolent man, he will not be apt to continue and justify himself in his indulgence on the ground (commonly adduced by moderate drinkers to relieve themselves from responsibility for drunkenness) that his son or friend in becoming a drunkard is not following his example, but is immoderately drinking whisky, while he himself only temperately uses wine. The quality of self-sacrifice is not strained. We do not stand upon the letter of the bond when, through the denial of ourselves, we seek to remove stumbling-blocks from one another's paths. If we did, the world's finest deeds would turn to ashes. We may often make an excuse for our action which will stop men's mouths but will not satisfy ourselves.

Even those who favour moderate drinking as the rule of life will thus in the concrete and personal case wholly concede the principle for which we are contending. Why then should they decline to admit its validity in wider spheres? If under the obligation imposed by the law of love a man may reasonably abstain for the sake of his family, may he not for the sake of a community or a nation? Our opponents will say that one

beer is not alcohol at all, but some sort of a nutritive chemical combination of it with other elements.

There are, of course, in fermented liquors a large number of other substances besides the alcohol; but whether these substances are in themselves helpful or deleterious is an open question upon which authorities differ, and which is dependent chiefly upon the precise character of the liquor used, and the condition and idiosyncrasies of the drinker. That these substances are sometimes tonic and alimentary is clear; that they are very often seriously harmful and the active cause of a class of diseases like dyspepsia and gout is equally clear. Wholly apart from their alcoholic effects, and from the large question of adulteration, it really demands much experience, or the judgment of a physician or expert, to determine what, if any, wine or malt liquor is helpful in a given case.¹ But the almost sole reason for drinking these liquors is, after all, the alcohol they contain, without which they would be flat enough; and so far as the alcohol is concerned, the reason for taking it in them rather than alone is, for the most part, the same as that for taking it mixed with water and with food, viz., simply that it may be liberally diluted, and therefore that its anæsthetic or narcotic or corrosive effect upon the stomach and alimentary canal may be avoided, and that it may be absorbed more slowly, causing, as Dr. Parkes says, a more "moderate paralysis of the vaso-motor nerves of the stomach."² But the assumption that, apart from this dilution, the alcohol in wine and the alcohol in spirits have an essentially different action, is overthrown by the elaborate researches of Dr. Parkes and Count Wollowicz upon the effect of red Bordeaux wine upon a soldier which are summed up by saying, "In general terms we may say that the results obtained were the same as those observed in experiments with plain spirits and brandy."³

Besides this, we need to recall the fact, to which we have already quoted the testimony of Anstie, that the changes wrought in the nervous system by alcohol are far more important and serious than all the other disorders brought on by this agent, and then put with this the fact, which Anstie also

¹ See Anstie *On the Use of Wine in Health and Disease*.

² *Lancet*, 1874, vol. i. p. 759.

³ *Practitioner*, vol. vi. p. 102; *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, 1870, 1872.

emphasises, that there is this important difference between alcoholic action upon the nervous system and other organs of the body, especially upon the digestive apparatus, that "whereas in the latter case very much depends upon the kind of alcoholic liquor taken, and *particularly upon its degree of concentration*, the effects of alcohol upon the nervous system seem to depend *almost entirely* upon the *quantity* of alcohol taken in each day or week, and very little upon the *kind* used."¹

The distinction between the alcoholic action of pure spirit and of wine thus dwindles to a mere nothing, and is dependent almost solely upon the fact that one is simply more concentrated than the other.

A strong protest is made against drinking distilled liquors by those who advocate the use of fermented beverages as a cure for intemperance. As reformers they stay themselves mainly upon this protest and advocacy. Yet they are really inconsistent. The distinction between the two kinds of alcoholic beverage is less important than they suppose; for, if only distilled liquors be properly diluted and taken with food, there is excellent authority for saying that in many cases this is the best way to take alcohol if it is to be taken at all. Thus Dr. Parkes says: "When the effect of alcohol upon digestion alone is sought, I think by far the best plan is to follow the plan advocated by Wilks, and give rectified spirit, properly disguised, as medicine. We shall then be certain of purity; that the proper quantities are given, and at the times we desire."² The same course is recommended by Binz in view of the difficulty of obtaining pure wines,³ and by Richardson and others as a "wiser because a more accurate and measurable method."⁴

Indeed, in connection with the fact that the precise point where narcotism begins is indeterminable, and that the minimum quantity of alcohol which produces it is also indeterminable, it is obvious that one of the chief perils of the habitual drinker of fermented liquors is that he never knows, or is careless about, the exact amount of alcohol he is daily taking, and thus the actual danger of that slow and insidious narcosis already

¹ *Lancet*, 1872, vol. ii. p. 661.

² *Lancet*, 1874, vol. i. p. 759.

³ *Practitioner*, vol. xvi. p. 365.

⁴ *New York Independent*, article by Dr. Coan, spring of 1879.

dead father, that they may become his followers, his command is simply the dictate of common sense on which prudent and effective men are acting every day without thinking of being especially virtuous, still less of being unmanly. Every one of us daily abstains from a multitude of things lawful in themselves, just because, relative to him and the ends God has set for him, their use is not good. In short, the expense, distraction, and risk incurred by even restrained indulgence in them are too great. It does not pay.

There is nothing super-pious, ascetic, or unmanly in this. It is simply sensible. When a man like General Grant always quietly abstains and turns his wine-glasses upside down at public dinners merely as a measure of good sense; and when thousands of the best and noblest in the land, with no thought of being better than their fellows, as a general rule practise abstinence because they see that, as things are, moderate drinking is not good for them or their children, it will hardly do to charge them with cowardice or with going contrary to the spirit of Christianity.

But it will be said that no one objects to the practice of abstinence by a single individual if he thinks it is prudent for him; that is not ascetic or unmanly. The objection is made against abstinence on the part of a whole community. Is then a rule which is prudent when practised by one man evil and unmanly when under similar conditions it is practised by five or five thousand? So much for the objection as aimed against prudential abstinence.

But the objection is even more utterly invalid as directed against benevolent abstinence, for this, so far from being contrary to the spirit of the gospel, contains its very essence. We are bidden by the example and precept of Christ and his apostles, to sacrifice what may be a thing lawful, and even helpful and necessary to us, for the sake of others. All the sweetness and light in Christian civilisation are the outcome of this principle. Here, again, what is a good principle for one man is a good principle for thousands. As we have seen, almost any Christian, at least, who advocates moderate drinking, will admit that it is a privilege, if not a duty, to abstain for the sake of another under certain circumstances; but is this principle to be approved when embodied in the conduct

of one man, and condemned as unchristian when it is seen in the action of hundreds of thousands, the peers in intelligence and virtue of any in the land? These, knowing well all their rights in the use of alcohol, yet habitually abstain from its use, because from the soundest deductions of science and experience they see, as Colonel Higginson says, that "it is better for the health of nine-tenths of the people never to take a drop, and that anything but abstinence sets an example which invariably proves disastrous to the hundreds who are incapable of self-control."¹ This is not asceticism.

2. It is objected against abstinence that it tends to weaken and pervert character, because it does not afford the discipline which a self-restrained indulgence in alcoholic beverages gives, and because it attaches to a mere expedient the sanctions which belong only to divine law.

It is no doubt true that in general a higher virtue is attained by a successful self-control in the use of dangerous things than by refraining entirely from them. But practically we are constantly striking a balance between the worth of such a discipline and the risk incurred in getting it: so that, in point of fact, every intelligent man and community quietly lays aside altogether many weights, because, as experience proves, the carrying of them involves more of evil than it yields of good. No one thinks it necessary in order to cultivate self-control to make great effort to use temperately these things which by long trial have been proved to be more productive of evil than good. We can pray, "lead us not into temptation," and make every effort to avoid it, and still feel sure that we shall have all the discipline we want in the necessary ongoing of life.

For example, the use of opium is not in itself sinful. It is a most valuable creature of God. In extremely small quantities, daily taken for years, it may be a "care-breaking" luxury, and even a saving-food. In the successful effort to use it thus temperately, a man, if he had nothing else to do, might gain great self-discipline; but in view of the infinitesimal profit and enormous peril which experience shows attend this use of it, is it cowardly, is it contrary to the spirit of the gospel, is it an ignominious neglect of a means of moral training, to

¹ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, March 10, 1880.

abstain from it altogether? Let the judgment and habits of sensible men answer. The argument applies equally to the use of alcoholic beverages. If we were obliged to use them to make the most of life, or if their use were on the whole more helpful than injurious, the case would be different.

As to the second part of the objection, undoubtedly much mischief may be wrought by not placing abstinence on the right ground. Great care should be taken that it—a prudential and benevolent rule—be not confounded with the definite enactments of the moral law. Because the rule is put on a false foundation, or clothed with improper sanctions, certain consciences in breaking over it may be perverted and led to despise God's law. But, even if this be sometimes the case, the objection under consideration would have no weight, because it would prevent the establishment of any rules, for all rules are liable to a similar abuse. If the rule be on the whole a good one, the fact that it is sometimes misconceived and abused is not a conclusive argument against it.

3. It is objected against abstinence from alcoholic beverages that our Lord by his example in making and using wine sanctioned our use of it. If by this objection is meant merely that our Lord's action indicated that the use of wine is not in itself sinful, but indifferent, and, like the use of other indifferent things, dependent for its moral quality upon the times, circumstances, and motive of the user, the objection is at once granted, without invalidating in the slightest degree the grounds on which we have endeavoured to place abstinence.

But the objection seems intended to mean much more than this. By the use of the word "sanction" in this connection the idea of authoritative enactment is covertly brought in. Webster defines sanction as a "solemn or ceremonious ratification; an official act of a superior by which he ratifies and gives validity to the act of some other person or body; establishment of anything as valid, or giving authority to it." Now, to hold that Christ by his use of wine officially ratified, established as valid, and gave his authority to our use of it, apart from times and circumstances, savours of bondage to the letter. Does any one believe that the custom of wine-drinking was solemnly established as an institution of the Christian commonwealth by the action of its Founder? This kind of appeal

to Christ's example has been and still is productive of serious evils. The fallacy of it consists in the assumption that our Lord definitely legislated for his people by his own acts. The absurdity of this will at once appear if we examine certain parallel cases.

For instance, Christ himself lived a life of absolute poverty, and even indirectly, if not directly, enjoined poverty upon his followers. Did he therefore sanction poverty in the sense of giving it authoritative ratification upon his people as a fixed institution? Many in the early and mediæval church thought so; some here and there may still think so. But sound Christian sense perceives that in this matter Christ did not legislate for his people, but only vividly illustrated principles, and that the Christian millionaire may follow his Lord far more closely in this respect than the mendicant friar; that there are circumstances in which poverty is a crime and riches a duty, and circumstances in which the exact opposite is true; and that except as setting forth and enjoining upon us the great doctrine of divine unselfishness, which we are bound to carry out whatever our circumstances may be, our Lord's conduct in this thing is not a law for us, and could not have been intended as a law.

Again, Christ practised absolute non-resistance to evil assaults, and even commanded it to his disciples. There have been individuals and sects who have regarded his example in this regard as a statute literally binding upon them as the rule of life. Certainly that example embodies a deep principle which every true Christian endeavours to realise, but obedience to the spirit of it may often demand that a man knock down his fellow-man, and the adoption of its letter by all who profess and call themselves Christians would bring society into anarchy in an hour.

Further, our Lord conspicuously cultivated association with the debased classes of the community—with depraved men and dissolute women,—so that this, like his wine-drinking, was made a reproach against him. The great law of divine love and human brotherhood thereby set forth, the Church has always recognised and sought to fulfil by her own efforts; but does any one suppose that because Christ did this, therefore the habit of doing it is sanctioned, made obligatory, or even

permissible for others without regard to their relationships and purposes?

But why, then, should Christ's conduct in the use of wine be seized upon, isolated in principle from his other acts, and be regarded as ceremoniously ratifying upon us moderate drinking as a fixed rule of life, to which abstinence, if practised at all, must be looked upon as rather a forlorn and contemptible exception, fit only for moral and physical incapables, when his more pronounced action and even precept in regard to poverty, non-resistance, and association with the dissolute is by no sound man thought to sanction them as a custom, but only to illustrate by them the great duty of self-denial, and to permit them for special ends under peculiar circumstances? A man who should attempt to justify voluntary poverty solely by the example of Christ, and without the support of specific reasons, would be regarded as a fool or a knave. In spite of the steadfast example and even injunction of the Divine Master, such poverty is now the decided exception among sensible Christian people, to be accounted for by peculiar circumstances. So far as our Lord's custom is concerned, why should not wine-drinking be so?

No doubt if Christ had entirely abstained from the use of wine, as he did from the possession of money, his example would now be very vigorously claimed by multitudes as authoritatively sanctioning total abstinence. But such claim, apart from other considerations, would be wholly unreasonable and invalid. To urge his example as in like manner authoritatively sanctioning moderate drinking, is equally unreasonable and vain. There is the same misconception, the same bondage to the letter, the same narrowness, in the one case that there would be in the other.

The truth is that the example of Christ leaves the use of wine, like the possession of wealth, precisely where the teaching of the Bible and of common sense leaves them, as things *per se* indifferent, but gaining moral quality by being indulged in or refrained from according to the motives of the individual, and the circumstances and tendencies of his times.

But it is said that, in respect to the use of wine, Christ's circumstances were essentially the same as ours. This might be said with far more force respecting the possession of

property, but in fact it is not true of either. His nature, his powers, his mission, inevitably precluded that our Lord should be a model to be literally followed by his people. It is admitted that this truth has often been overstated to the damage of the Church ; nevertheless it is a truth to which we constantly yield our practical assent. As the personal embodiment of the life of God, and as planting in the hearts of mankind the principles of that life, it was possible and necessary for him to do many things which it is impossible and absurd for us to attempt to do. Is it presumptuous for us to say, for instance, that it was necessary for him in bringing in a new dispensation thoroughly to break up the bigotry and formalism of the Jewish system by associating with publicans and harlots, and by eating and drinking wine ; just as it was necessary for him in living fulfilment of the truth of self-sacrifice not to have where to lay his head, and to be led unresisting to the cross ? So much for that which in his person and work separates our Lord from us.

But the contrast is in some respects even greater between his outward circumstances and times, and ours. In regard to the use of alcoholic beverages we have only to glance at a few salient points to see the immense difference in these circumstances. Consider the soft, mild, even climate of Syria, conducing to the extreme deliberation of Oriental thought and movement, and to life in the open air ; and our keen, exciting atmosphere, with its violent extremes of heat and cold, stimulating nervous activity, and leading to highly artificial methods of living. Consider the occupations of the people of Judea, where agriculture, slow moving, with the most primitive appliances, was the chief thing, and commerce and manufactures were comparatively unknown ; and our mechanical life, the herding of vast masses in the unnatural excitement of great cities and factories, the changed and abnormal conditions wrought in all departments by machinery, and the superlative intensity given to every phase of existence by steam and electricity. Consider the contrast in the beverages used : the simple red wine manufactured by the crude arts of peasants, and not possibly containing in any case more than seventeen or eighteen per cent. of alcohol ; and our distilled and doubly distilled liquors, our reinforced wines, our complicated chemical

processes and appliances, by which liquors are combined, adulterated, and made up with various poisons, so as vastly to increase the means of intoxication. The circumstances offer scarcely a point of likeness.

Drunkenness no doubt existed in Christ's time, and was a great evil; but that it could have had the dimensions which it now has is simply impossible. Observe that those who endeavour to prove the opposite are generally those who insist that the free use of light wines here and now would altogether do away with intemperance. Perhaps it would. But if so, how is it possible that the drunkenness of Bible times, which was caused wholly by light wines, could have been as great as ours is to-day? The two theories hopelessly demolish each other.

But after all, this discussion as to the relative amount of drunkenness does not touch the main point. Admit, if you please, that there was as much drunkenness then as now. The question is not chiefly as to the amount, but as to the bearing and the results of such drunkenness. The very mechanism of modern life—to the highest degree intense, complicated, and interdependent as it is—makes not merely drunkenness, but, as we have already pointed out, those effects of alcohol which come far short of actual drunkenness, prolific, in a thousand relations, of consequences so disastrous as not to have been possible or even conceivable in the time of our Lord. Where then was the steersman of the steamship, the engineer, the reporter, the telegraph-operator, half of them working at night under the most trying conditions, guiding the tremendous enginery of our times, to whose steadiness millions of property and lives are constantly committed, and the delicacy of whose sight or touch may be wrecked at the critical moment, to the ruin of thousands, by two or three glasses of wine? An atom of drunkenness can cause more desolation now than an avalanche of it could have caused in the first century. Where then were the thousands of business men whose years are spent travelling hundreds of miles every week, and who daily work in the stress of an excitement unknown even fifty years ago? Where the millions under the fierce competitions of manufacture, trade, education, politics, and social life, driven to the last pitch of endurance by steam and electricity, whose lives have no margin of repose, and in whom insanity and nervous disease are so

common ?¹ In a thousand ways unknown to the ancients the relations of modern life constitute a state of unstable equilibrium which a gill of alcohol can topple over to destruction. The train is laid. A spark can fire it. Indeed, we need not go back eighteen centuries to note the contrast we are pointing out. We need go back but one. A brilliant writer has lately said with scarcely a touch of hyperbole that "twenty-four hours of such responsibility and strain as now come upon the average American would have killed the strongest man the eighteenth century ever shone upon." Certainly alcohol has a destructive force now that it never had before.

Here it may be observed that those who advocate moderate drinking as sanctioned by the example of our Lord, allege in objection to abstinence that it is no modern invention ; that it was a custom centuries ago among the Hindus and Moham-medans ; that it was practised before Christ by Rechabites and Nazarites, and in his time by the Essenes, and that he did not by his example give any approval to this exceptional method of religious devotion. Certainly he did not. One object of his coming was to break up for ever the idea that the kingdom of God consists in meat and drink. But this objection does not even remotely touch the abstinence advocated in this article. The abstinence practised by all these sects was a memorial, ascetic, ceremonial, or extra-pious abstinence. Modern abstinence is nothing of the sort. It is simply a hygienic measure of good sense and benevolence. It has no more to do with religion directly than have the latest rules respecting drainage and ventilation. In this sense it is modern. It is as much a product of this century as are these other principles and rules of good health and well-being. For it is to be carefully noticed that this abstinence has had its rise as a scientific and experimental necessity of the conditions that this century has developed. It has had its immense and beneficial spread in the full light of modern science, and during precisely the period, and among just the people who are more liberal in thought, and more intolerant and contemptuous than any other people in the world's history of everything merely ceremonious, monkish, or morbidly religious. The idea that in these times absti-

¹ See pamphlets on *The Insane Diathesis*, and *The Relations of Insanity to Modern Civilization*, by Henry P. Stearns, M.D. Hartford, 1880.

nence could live for a day as a mere ascetic observance, among the intelligent men and women of every form of belief who now adopt it, seems little short of an insult to them.

4. It is said that abstinence involves contempt of the moral teachings of the Bible; that it constitutes a departure from those teachings, and is an attempt to supersede them by mere human reason. The reply is, that the real misconstruction and disparagement of the moral principles of the Bible come from those who assume that they are rules, and not principles; that their illustration is legislation; that they have not that power of adaptation which fits them to the changing conditions of mankind; and that under their tuition there is no progress in the moral sense and intelligence of society which are capable of applying these principles in entirely new directions and with new measures.

No plea has been made in this article for perpetual and universal abstinence. Such abstinence may be neither possible nor desirable. Other lands and other times with different conditions from ours may not need it. We can well enough leave all that to the future, and to that science and experience which will have yet more to say on the subject. It is enough that a practical abstinence is called for here and now. But if the common sense of any age, or of any or all communities, shall clearly discern that universal abstinence is on the whole the best, does any one suppose that the ethics of the Bible forbid it any more than they forbid universal suffrage, or the universal preaching of the gospel by paid and well-furnished pastors and missionaries, or the universal admission of women to the profession of teaching, though Christ told his disciples to go forth without money or wallet, and Paul said, "I suffer not a woman to teach"? Bible ethics are not best honoured by making them mere rubrics.

5. It is objected that the principles of abstinence and its advocates are fanatical and tyrannical. Doubtless this great measure of reform, like every other, has its full share of over-zealous, narrow, and uncharitable aggression. Doubtless there are those who put it on a wrong basis, who assume too much for it, and who insist upon it with unwarrantable sanctions, and sometimes with a domineering spirit. They are, however, exceptions, and they have large excuse in the almost

infinite and seemingly incurable evil at which their efforts are aimed.

But after all, this objection goes too far, and so overthrows itself. It is the stock argument of the conservative and obstructionist. It has ever been applied to all the principles and all the men who in any way have sought to rid their fellows of great burdens. Virtue and the rules of better living in every department always have a certain aspect of extravagance and oppression. From the promoters of village improvement to the agitators for civil service reform and the establishers of Christian missions, all who seek to bring in a better thing are either ridiculed or hated, or both. The abolitionists for years suffered this accusation. The advocates of compulsory education, of compulsory vaccination, of rigid sanitary inquiry and regulation, of the best plans of charitable endeavour, have all their turn of being denounced and branded as fanatics and tyrants, as urging some chimera, or trampling on some rights. The advocates of abstinence need not be dismayed at this charge. They need only keep their cause free from all assumption, from all false foundation, and be patient.

6. The final objection to which we shall refer is, that as a basis of reform abstinence is foolish, because it is impossible; that men everywhere have always habitually used some kind of alcoholic liquor, or some other narcotic more deleterious, and that they always will use it, and this uniformity shows that in spite of its abuse its use is a necessity. The general answer to this objection is, (1) that a measure directed to the reform of any evil is not proved to be unwise or without value because it does not attain complete success; and (2) the failure to remove a given evil by no means shows that such evil is necessary. If the contrary of these two propositions were true, all effort for the elevation of mankind in any direction would be paralysed.

But to reply more specifically, it is not true that alcoholic liquors are universally drunk. "Whole nations, Mohammedan and Hindu, use no alcohol or substitute."¹ It is sometimes affirmed that on this account these nations are effeminate and inferior, while the Northern and Teutonic, which are

¹ *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, by E. A. Parkes, M.D., p. 277.

the dominant races, are all alcohol-drinkers, the assumption being that they are strong by reason of their alcohol; but the fact is that their strength is from other sources, while their use of alcohol is admitted to be a prime cause of their degradation.

But besides these nations large numbers of the ablest, hardest, and most effective workers and thinkers, who lead in the centres of modern civilisation and power, habitually use no alcohol; and thousands upon thousands, under the severest stress of anxious and incessant toil, declare that they are better off for being practical abstainers. These destroy the objection that alcohol is a necessity, even if they do not prove that it is an injury. Further than this, Dr. Parkes well says that the same argument which alleges that alcohol is a necessity, "might prove the necessity of tobacco, which, for this generation at any rate, is clearly only a luxury. The widespread habit of taking intoxicating liquids merely proves that they are pleasant,"¹ the prime object of their use being, as we have already shown, to benumb the faculties so as to render them oblivious of annoying impressions.

It may well seem, as Dr. Parkes says, "incredible that a large part of the human race should have fallen into an error so gigantic as that of attributing great dietetic value to an agent which is of little use in small quantities, and is hurtful in large, . . . but the argument though strong is not conclusive; and unfortunately we know that in human affairs no extension of belief, however wide, is *per se* evidence of truth."²

Inasmuch as alcohol, so far from being proved to be a necessity of the race, is admitted by the most dispassionate authorities to be the active cause of evils so great "that if it were unknown half the sin and a large part of the poverty and unhappiness in the world would disappear,"³ all just efforts to promote a practical abstinence from its use have a solid ground in fact and reason.

DANIEL MERRIMAN.

¹ *Manual of Practical Hygiene*, by E. A. Parkes, M.D., p. 277.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 270.

ART. X.—*Current Literature.*

AT last a powerful reply (1) has appeared to the "Lectures on the Old Testament in the Jewish Church," and it is to be strongly desired that, now the vital question at issue on the chronology, veracity, authenticity, and credibility of the Old Testament can be impartially, if not dispassionately, discussed apart from ecclesiastical complications, the numerous official and amateur specialists in Hebrew and Old Testament history will follow the example so ably set by Professor Watts, who, to contribute to a pressing controversy of the day, has even left the field of his customary studies. For this reason, were there no other, we are anxious to see Mr. Robertson Smith's positions turned,—we have too high a respect for his ability to believe he has himself said his last word. As objections taken to his views from time to time have manifestly caused him to amend an error here and reject a theory there, nay, even to choose a path deliberately where he had previously betrayed considerable uncertainty as to which of several roads to take; so we cannot help thinking that the reasoned replies of opponents will have large influence in moulding and shaping his final opinions. Every candid inquirer, of whatever tendency, must hail such a work as this, because clearness is so much more beneficial than uncertainty, and unmistakable statement than vague expressions, with which we cannot say whether we agree. With the skill of a practical controversialist, Professor Watts selects his line of reply, and adheres thereto strictly, neither looking to the right hand nor the left. He does not concern himself to explain how the newer criticism has reached its conclusions; he does not find it necessary to use scholarly appendices or digressions to impress with his learning; the history of the genesis and development of thought, whether in the minds of the leaders of the critical school, or in that of its great Scotch advocate, he rigidly eschews; he scarcely refers, to say nothing of expounding or analysing, to the minute reconstruction of the sacred books

(1) *The Newer Criticism and the Analogy of the Faith: a Reply to Lectures by W. Robertson Smith, M.A., on the Old Testament in the Jewish Church.* By Robert Watts, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the General Assembly's College, Belfast. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

which has resulted from the labours of a generation of rationalistic exegetical experts ; in a word, he neither busies himself with philosophical basis nor theological superstructure,—he simply accepts Mr. Smith's work itself as a fact to be met with facts,—as a fact, since it embodies the views of Mr. Smith, to be met with facts, in order to discover whether the opinions of Mr. Smith are Bible-truth. Accepting the representations of the “newer criticism,” as expressed in the lectures controverted, four questions are asked,—*first*, What says the Old Testament to these representations ? *secondly*, What says the New Testament to them ? *third*, What is the position of the Westminster Confession relative thereto ? and, *fourthly*, Do the views in question bear traces of inconsistency with each other as well as with external authorities ; the main stress of the argument being laid upon the two first queries. Full, therefore, as the book is of matter for adepts in Old Testament study, it is admirably suited to popular reading. And its popular use will be aided by another peculiarity of method. In working out the plan laid down, the whole subject is split into separate points, and each point is subdivided under convenient headings, so that the book may be taken up and laid down at any time without danger of losing the thread. We could have wished that an index, or at least an analysis of contents, had been added ; nevertheless, the lucid arrangement and beautiful printing will largely facilitate its use by the general reader. Whilst adhering strictly then to the method selected, such prominent themes are passed under review as the argument from the reformation of Josiah, the recognition by the critics of the Deuteronomic code in Josiah's day, the transmission of the Pentateuch, the ceremonial *versus* the moral law, the critical notion of Old Testament worship, and the several arguments from the Levitical ritual,—the sacrifices, the ark, the priesthood. We are afraid that Professor Watts has laid himself open to cogent rejoinders here and there ; but it is the book as a whole that must be demolished, if its assault is to be repelled. From the nature of the form of attack adopted, it teems with crucial instances, the truth of any one of which means the downfall of the elaborate structure of the “newer criticism.” We thank its author for its directness, tact, learning, and ability, and we trust it will find many readers.

Turning from the work of applied Hebraism to Hebrew theory, we have much pleasure in calling attention to a learned treatise, just published by the Clarendon Press, upon the accentuation of the Books of Psalms, Proverbs, and Job (2). Every tiro in Hebrew is aware that, when a system of vowel points was invented, or, to speak with more accuracy, adopted, to fix the traditional pronunciation of each word in the Bible of the Jew, a series of signs, called accents, was also invented to guide the official readers to the traditional modulation of each word. Every tiro also knows that the three poetical books, as they are called, are distinguished from the twenty-one prose writings of the Old Testament, by a different system of accents. The peculiarity of these Hebrew accents, as compared with the accents of Latin and Greek, is, that they really served a threefold purpose; they were signs of accent proper, or the stress to be laid upon the syllables; they were punctual signs, and regulated the arrangement of words into sentences; and they were also musical signs, guiding the reciter of the synagogue to the risings and fallings of that characteristic cantillation the Jews called reading the Scriptures. By means of the traditional interpretations handed down from the scholastic age of Hebrew literature, as well as by means of the rational investigations of Ewald and Baer in more recent times, the broad principles of the Hebrew accentuation, especially of the prose writings, have become tolerably well understood. The peculiar system of the poetical books, however, is largely still a matter of darkness and difficulty. Certainly it is manifest, as Dr. Wickes remarks, that this poetical accentuation was the refinement of one class of scribes, the Palestinian synagogue and schools, and also that its aim was, as contrasted with the commoner system, to prompt "a finer and fuller, more artificial and impressive melody;" but the distinctive principles, to say nothing of the entire theory, has not yet been explained—nay, has commonly been regarded as inexplicable. An explanation has been attempted in this treatise, and with more success than might have been anticipated, mainly for one reason, it is true,

(2) מַעְמֵי אֲמִ"ח : *A Treatise on the Accentuation of the three so-called Poetical Books of the Old Testament—Psalms, Proverbs, and Job*; with an Appendix, containing the treatise assigned to R. Jehuda Ben-Bil'am, on the same subject, in the original Arabic, by William Wickes, D.D. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

—the careful researches of the author in textual criticism and accurate orthography. Very justly surmising that the printed texts, varying as they do from each other in the matter of accents, pre-eminently varied also from the ancient manuscripts which these printed copies represent, he has undertaken a laborious collation of the best authorities, printed and written, attainable, the results of which not only facilitate his main object, but have an interest of their own. The various points of the theory itself, of course, require a long and careful testing; but, whether they prove ultimately satisfactory or not, such conscientious and painstaking research, in a recondite field, merits the warmest commendations of all Hebraists. In an appendix, an Arabic treatise of Rabbi Jehuda Ben-Bil'am, upon the accents of the three books, is printed in Hebrew characters.

Dr. Franz Delitzsch, by a long and wide series of writings, now extending over fifty years, has raised himself to a very unique position in all questions connected with the language and exposition of the Old Testament. A hearty welcome may therefore be given to the notes, just published by Dr. Curtiss, of his lectures upon the *Old Testament History of Redemption* (3). It is the custom of German professors to dictate a series of paragraphs to be taken down by their students *verbatim*, and to be subsequently expanded by oral or written additions, sometimes to be discussed by the class. This book, as Dr. Curtiss says, is essentially an accurate reproduction of the paragraphs delivered to the theological students in Leipzig during the summer of 1880. Fragmentary as these lectures necessarily are, they teem with suggestive hints. Nor are these skeleton lectures by any means unimportant as a contribution to the history of the Old Covenant. The work may be described as an attempt to trace the development of what we call distinctively Christian doctrine in the education of the Old Testament Church. The plan followed will be understood by the mention of the seven periods through which Professor Delitzsch traces the progress of this evangelical teaching:—1. The primitive period before and after the flood, with the dawning of the light in the dark-

(3) *Old Testament History of Redemption*; Lectures by Franz Delitzsch, translated from Manuscript Notes by Samuel Ives Curtiss, Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

ness, which began before the flood and was renewed after it. 2. The period of the patriarchs, or the separation in the tumultuous sea of nations. 3. The period of Israel's development, and its transplantation to the promised land. 4. The period of David and Solomon, or the rising and setting of the royal glory over Israel. 5. The period of Israel's conflicts with the world-empires, and the elevation of prophecy, which poises over both states until their fall. 6. The period of the recognition, which breaks through in prophecy and chochma, of the Mediator and of the Logos, and the historical appearance of the Messiah, who is no longer conceived of in a one-sided way as national, but as human and spiritual. 7. The death and burial of the One who has appeared, and with Him of the old covenant; "the concluding Sabbath of the Old Testament history." It is a peculiarly characteristic feature of this division that it carries out the Sabbatic—or rather hebdomadal—idea so visibly; the time of God's dealings with His ancient people starting as it were from the Creation Sabbath, and ending with the Sabbath of our Lord's rest in the grave; and there is something alike profound and beautiful in the comparison which Professor Delitzsch draws between the Creation Sabbath—"a dividing wall between the creation of the world and the world's history"—and the Sabbath of the Redeemer—"the dividing wall between conflict and victory." Taken throughout, the volume comes to us opportunely at the present time; for it recalls us from the discussion and criticism of external aspects of Old Testament history to the great inward truth which it was designed to unfold both to the fathers and to us. There are many points dwelt upon here which we could willingly discuss at length, did space allow; and there are some—notably that of sacrifice, where the author draws a subtle distinction between the pouring out of the blood and the slaying of the animal as to their symbolical efficacy—which need to be studied in the light of his other writings. These we must forbear to touch, as no mere mention of them would be satisfactory: all that we can further do is to indicate some of the interesting side-lights which are shed upon matters which we are at present constantly discussing. The story of Jonah, for instance, which Delitzsch appears to accept in its literalness, is regarded as an exemplification of a

conflict with Jewish exclusiveness ; Jonah's dislike of his commission being the outcome not so much of abstract wilfulness, as of unwillingness to look beyond the bounds of the chosen nation. His burial in the great fish is thus a sign of our Lord's burial, inasmuch as it prepares the way, like the latter, for the widening of the evangelical call. Again, as to the Book of Job : "The hero of the Book of Job is a personal and actual proof of the grace which is also active outside of Israel, and the entire book is a protest against the legal pride of orthodox Phariseeism, which having run fast into the dogma of retribution, is not able to keep sin and suffering apart." The book is assigned by the author to the period of "Solomonic literature." Solomon's Song is "a circle of dramatic pictures which place before our eyes the love of man and woman in its monogamous and divinely sanctified ideality;" and Ecclesiastes—which the author places between 405 and 359 B.C.—takes its place in the redemptive history as representing the confession of the "inability" of the old covenant, and thus singing its "burial-song." This book is not one of Biblical criticism, and the author gives his conclusions, as a rule, without argument; we do not feel therefore called upon to say anything regarding his dates, save this, that they are not to be accepted as infallible; nor can we pass from the subject without the remark that his interpretation of Canticles does not appear upon a first reading peculiarly happy, or even for that matter peculiarly intelligible; indeed, we confess to a fancy that it does not quite satisfy himself. Let this be sufficient to indicate what we mean in our commendation of this book; we prize it as a devout attempt of a profound and profoundly spiritual mind to trace anew through Old Testament story the central truths of the Christian faith; but we do not by any means go with the author into every turn and winding of that attempt. Indeed, nobody, we suspect, knows better than Professor Curtiss (who, by the way, has done his translating work as well as the author's well-known idiosyncrasies of expression will admit) that to get the best use of Delitzsch's mind you must be content at times to let it fly into the clouds for a little while now and again, and to pursue your journey till it rejoins you.

Words of commendation have several times been spoken in

this Review of the successive volumes of the *Preacher's Homiletical Commentary*. The latest volume, upon Jeremiah (4), seems to us the most complete of the series. The plan of this Commentary, it will be remembered, is to give brief critical and explanatory notes, of various kinds and from many authors, upon the text of the several books, but to concentrate the main strength upon the homiletical features. Mr. Jellie's section has evidently been a labour of love. He tells us in his preface that "many of the choicest hours of the past five years have been devoted to the production" of this work; and there are evident traces everywhere of nights and days given to laborious reading even amongst uncommon authors, as well as to careful thought and original workmanship. From the nature of the case, indeed, Jeremiah has been a largely neglected field of pulpit exposition, and it was impossible to draw, as predecessors had done in other volumes of this Commentary, upon a large and ever accumulating mass of outlines, sermons, and homiletic suggestions. Twenty columns of Darling suffice for a statement of the commentaries and sermons upon Jeremiah, whereas seven times that number are required for such a book as the Psalms; add to which, that the sermons catalogued in the former case have no further connection with Jeremiah than that they have a few words therefrom as their title. There thus lay an almost unexplored domain before the author. How the task has been fulfilled may be judged from the fact that, out of the eight hundred and thirty outlines this book contains, the author has himself constructed no less than four hundred and seventy, and has either condensed from printed sermons by famous preachers, or obtained from well-known ministers, whose aid he has sought to bring variety, three hundred outlines more. After looking into this Commentary with some care, we can give it a strong recommendation. Its expository features, with all their brevity, afford many tit-bits of interpretation, illustration, and criticism, which are the gleanings of a large library; and its original homilies have a healthy, common-sense air, and an appropriateness, rare in works of this kind. Judiciously used, this collection of sermon-plans may aid the skilled and guide the unskilled preacher.

(4) *The Preacher's Commentary on the Book of Jeremiah*, by Rev. W. H. Jellie. Richard D. Dickinson, London.

From the pen of Mr. Paxton Hood we have before us a delightful volume, the biography of *Christmas Evans* (5). Mr. Hood has given to the world many books, and every one of them is interesting, but none will probably receive a higher place amongst his writings than this. The author's love for men out of the common run, and his love of nature, have both found here full play; for Christmas Evans was no ordinary man, and the scenes amid which he spent his days and did his work are full of sublimity and beauty. Moreover, to write the life of Christmas Evans is to be drawn into a circle of Welsh preachers, the Williameses, and others, all of them striking men, men of character and of exceptional gifts; and Mr. Hood is drawn aside to tell us much of them also, sometimes at the expense of the symmetry of his book, but always to the enhancing of the reader's interest. His book is in fact a portraiture of Welsh preaching and of Welsh religious life in the end of last century and in the earlier decade of this: and as we have traced it in these pages, we have been again and again reminded of the similarity between the outward aspects of religious life in the Scottish Highlands and in Wales. We see here the same religious fervour which marked the Northern gatherings in the days of M'Donald, the "Apostle of the North;" the same strong emotion makes the crowds to "surge and heave;" there is the same sense of awe before the Divine Majesty, though here with more admixture at times of something like humour; and the great throngs are not unlike the old Sacramental gatherings of the far North, marked by the same "spirit of hearing," and sometimes we fear also by a certain tendency to hero-worship and what we may call favourite-preacherism. Mr. Hood gives us ample material from which to judge of Evans's preaching; and if the "Hind of the Morning"—an address here given at length—be anything like an average test of it, we do not wonder at its effects. This, which is an impassioned sketch of our Lord's Passion and Resurrection, is enough to show that Christmas Evans was a poet of high gifts as well as a preacher. The story of this man's life, grand and picturesque as it is, is not always bright; and it seems to have been his lot, both in his Anglesea minis-

(5) *Christmas Evans, the Preacher of Wild Wales.* By the Rev. Paxton Hood. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

try and afterwards, to experience only too painfully the weak side of Dissent, and especially of Dissent south of the Tweed ; and it is with some shame that one reads of this man's frequent expeditions to raise money for the payment of his chapel debts. Such a picture of a man made to "leave the word of God and serve tables," and embittered by "Diotrephesian troubles," may be well pondered by us in a time which, while it appreciates the vast advantages of voluntary support of religion, is sometimes a little oblivious of its responsibilities.

Another biography comes to us from the same publishers, viz. that of *William Carey*, by Dr. Culross (6). Coming to it from that of Christmas Evans, what a change ! and yet how rich the age which claimed them both ! No finer delineator could be found than Dr. Culross for Carey ; his own chaste mind, and his quiet, but long-cherished and burning interest in the cause of missions, combine to fit him for a task which he has executed in a manner almost without flaw. We are not conscious anywhere of mere "book-making," the vice peculiar to books in series ; indeed the reader is not much conscious of anything save the theme. Carey is traced from his lowly beginnings, preaching first, he thinks and says, because he did not seem to have "a sufficient degree of confidence to refuse," on to the end of his glorious work in India ; and what is not the least remarkable thing about him is that he remains—save for his growth in grace and understanding—the same William Carey to the end ; there is no period traceable at which he appears to draw himself up and say, I have become so-and-so. For his work we must refer our readers to Dr. Culross's delightful pages, in which once more we trace the rise of the missionary spirit in England, and the immense impetus it receives from Carey's famous sermon and from Andrew Fuller's help. One thing which has specially interested us is the comparatively quiet manner in which missionary enthusiasm asserted itself. It rose like the tide, inch by inch, and to this we trace, under God, its deep seat in the heart of modern English life. Somehow—as a rule—great movements, however

(6) *Men worth Remembering: William Carey.* By James Culross, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

good, which "come with observation," serve to give a powerful impulse, but they do not enter into the substance and form the bone and muscle of our system, as do those movements which are at first as quiet in their rise as they are afterwards resistless in their influence. Not less are we impressed as we read these pages, with the references to comparatively solitary workers who had preceded Carey; unconsciously preparing the way for him and for his colleagues. To us they seem—as perhaps they seemed to themselves—as free-lances of the church-militant; but we grow impressed, as we read this story, with the wondrous unity of God's work, and the part which has been played in that unity, by stray workers and little-known societies. Nor must we forget the help that was rendered to such early labourers as Ziegenbalg and Plutschau by the Christian Knowledge Society.

We can only glance at the interesting *Memorials of Bishop M'Ilvaine*(7), which have just been published by Mr. Elliot Stock. They have been prepared by Canon Carus, a close friend of this admirable American bishop, and they give us a very clearly defined idea of him as a man who filled a very large place in his own church and time. That he was a *genius* his most ardent admirer would not say; his mind had in it no fund of originality, and he was not a breaker of new paths.

His strength lay in other directions: he was a Protestant and an evangelical, and was not ashamed; he was devout and wise, firm in mind, clear in judgment, skilful in administration, and in this combination of qualities we are to find the explanation of the force which he wielded. The glimpses which we here get of American church life from a bishop's point of view are full of interest; but the volume has a special claim upon our attention from the reminiscences which it contains of Bishop M'Ilvaine's visits to our own country, and of the impressions which he formed regarding it. Such men as Charles Simeon and Daniel Wilson of Calcutta were amongst his English friends, and the former appears to have gained from him almost the devotion of a disciple. In his own country his hands were full of manifold labours, and he had occasion some-

(7) *Memorials of the Right Rev. C. P. M'Ilvaine, late Bishop of Ohio.* Edited by the Rev. Canon Carus.

times to raise his testimony, which he did very manfully,—as in the case of the hateful distinction, drawn even at the Sacramental Table, between the black and the white man, and, again, in vindication of Protestant doctrine and worship against the growing ritualism of later days.

A beautiful book has just been issued by Mr. Isbister, entitled *The Poet's Bible* (8). This work, in its complete form, is to consist of an Old Testament and a New Testament section, and its leading idea is to associate with each leading incident and character in Gospel story some choice poem, which may illustrate its meaning and reflect its beauty. Mr. Horder, the editor, has shown his special qualification for this work in a "Book of Praise for Children" which he published some years ago, and which revealed a devout and cultivated taste; and we are certain that this larger effort will justify the promise of the earlier one. The volume before us contains the New Testament section only; and the best we can say of it is that we do not see how the Old Testament section can surpass it, taken as a whole. There is not a leading incident in the life of our Saviour which has not some fine poem or lyric attached to it. Poets from different ages and from many lands besides our own are pressed into the service; and one of the most striking side-lessons of the book is the manner in which God has claimed for the illustration of His Word some of the noblest sons of what we call *secular* song. Shakespeare and Ben Jonson are here as well as George Herbert and John Keble. The collection is enriched by some pieces, not hitherto published, from the pen of Dr. Plumptre, now Dean of Wells, pieces characterised by deep insight into the Word and into the human heart, as well as by poetic skill; and George MacDonald is represented by many quaint and tender little songs. We hope to see in a future edition, which we are certain will be asked, more flowers culled from the anthology of Greek and Latin sacred song; for whilst the old singers often weary us by their fancifulness, their better songs have an aroma of the early Christian morning which we would not miss.

(8) *The Poet's Bible: New Testament Section.* Edited by W. Garrett Horder. London: W. Isbister (Limited).

Readers in all parts of our country, and not a few beyond its bounds, will welcome a volume of *Sermons* (9) from the pen of Dr. Dykes. It is no infrequent thing to hear the complaint that this is not an age of great preachers, and, indeed, as we look round us, it does occur to us that many of the men who are most prominent in the various Churches to-day do not owe their prominence specially to their preaching power; one is a profound theologian, another a good administrator, a third an ecclesiastical lawyer, and so on. But whilst the minister of Regent Square has many other claims to the high place which he holds in his own Church, it becomes increasingly evident—of which let these *Sermons* be witness—that he is pre-eminently a preacher. We do not think that we are extravagant in saying that within past years we have come across very few volumes of sermons of such a high order. There is a depth of thought, a power of spiritual analysis, and a dignity of style and tone rarely to be met with in combination in times when the narrowing of the distance between pulpit and pew, locally and otherwise, has introduced—at least in England—a certain ease in pulpit address, not always accompanied by either high thought or refined utterance. We have indeed been reminded several times, in our perusal of this volume, of the style of the great Anglican preacher, Canon Liddon, whose sermons—as sermons—rank higher than those of any living preacher of his Church; there is a similar penetration and insight, a similar habit of building the thought of a sermon from the text upwards, until you are left with a sense of massiveness and completeness at the close; and there is common to both a certain mode of thought and expression which bespeaks a mind which instinctively regards the object of its study at some distance, and thinks by itself. We do not, indeed, profess to say that these sermons of Dr. Dykes's are uniform in their merit; their strength and their weakness lie, we think, in this, that they are sermons for *strong men and women*. We have felt before, in reading works from Dr. Dykes's pen, and we feel again here, that the lowlier class of hearers would scarcely keep pace with the preacher, and also that, even in treating consolatory subjects, his style

(9) *Sermons* by J. Oswald Dykes, M.A., D.D. London: James Nisbet and Co.

ministers almost too strong a tonic to those who are borne down under the burden of sorrow. We can fancy such turning aside to such sermons as those of the Master of the Temple, or of Thomas Guthrie, or of John Ker, and finding in them the healing they are seeking. But we repeat that these sermons will claim a place in the very first rank of present-day pulpit literature; and we commend them not only as a companion to devout thought, but as a lesson—worthy of special study from students and ministers entering upon their work—in the sacred art of preaching.

Mr. Malleson's work on *The Acts and Epistles of St. Paul* (10) is written for the ordinary reader; and it is likely to take no unimportant place in our popular religious literature. So far as we have been able to judge of it, we should not expect that it would ever be regarded as a reference-book for students upon the Great Apostle; and hence it will not take the place of, or even claim comparison with, such works as "Conybeare and Howson." But it will probably be read where the latter would be found too scholarly and elaborate; and we may safely say that Mr. Malleson throughout shows the marks of such careful and ardent study of his subject, as to inspire confidence in the reader who is not able to go back to his authorities. If we were, again, to compare Mr. Malleson's work with that of Canon Farrar, we should certainly not give the palm to the former in the matter of style; but while the Canon wields a more graceful pen, Mr. Malleson conveys always an impression of walking upon firmer theological ground, and his book will therefore be more gladly accepted by many evangelical readers. The book seems to us to fail chiefly in the apparent temptation to fine writing, which the writer indulges, sometimes provoking comparison with the rounded and polished periods of Canon Farrar. But what we have in this work—and this is much—is a study of the life of St. Paul and of his work, from a Pauline standpoint—sympathetic, clear, and interesting; and recommend it as, apart from general reading, a volume which would form an admirable companion in any continuous treatment of the history of St. Paul, in Bible-classes or at

(10) *The Acts and Epistles of St. Paul.* By the Rev. F. A. Malleson, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Bible-readings. The map of St. Paul's journeys—prepared by Messrs. W. and A. K. Johnston—will be found of great service.

A new edition of Mr. Edward White's little book on *Certainties in Religion* (11) has just been issued, and its appearance gives us an opportunity of repeating the high estimate which was expressed regarding it in a recent number of this Review. It is a compact, able, and fresh contribution to popular apologetics; and if we may be allowed a play upon the word, it is all the more a satisfactory *apologia* that it conveys no impression of Christianity as needing to be apologised for. A treatment of the subject so clear and decided, yet with no trace of dogmatism, as we have here, cannot fail to gain a hearing from the fair-minded reader; and we again commend the volume specially to the study of young men, who will find it eminently helpful.

Since the publication of Deutsch's ingenious vindication of the Talmud in the pages of the *Quarterly*, there has been an intelligible desire for a fuller and more exact acquaintance with the contents of this vast repository of Jewish thought. Not content with such traces of wisdom as its admirers succeed in discovering and demonstrating, inquirers are rather concerned to know what is its general drift and value. Mr. Paul Isaac Hershon undertakes (12) to furnish fitting materials for the formation of a correct opinion. We have examined his volume with some care, and we unhesitatingly commend it as a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject. It is eminently characterised by a judicial fairness in the selection of specimen passages. In addition to a very full index of topics discussed, there is a specially interesting and helpful index whereby the reader is enabled to compare Talmudic teaching with the teaching of Scripture. This volume justifies Milman's description of the Talmud:—"That wonderful monument of human industry, human wisdom, and human folly."

(11) *On Certainties in Religion*. Second Edition. London: Elliot Stock.

(12) *Treasures of the Talmud*, by Paul Isaac Hershon. London: James Nisbet and Co.

Among the so-called "Faiths of the World," the creed of our Aryan ancestors has been much studied, and, in certain quarters, greatly lauded. Through the zeal and industry of Max Müller and his coadjutors, opportunities are now afforded for the study of its earliest records. Perhaps the first feeling of one who makes acquaintance with the Rig-Veda by a perusal of selected extracts, is a feeling of surprise and pleasure on finding so much that is comparatively pure and wholesome in its ancient hymns. But the satisfaction is not likely to grow with increasing knowledge. Modern praises of the Vedic religion can only spring from partiality or ignorance. A tolerable familiarity with its literature reveals its hollowness and selfishness. Within a reasonable compass Mr. Macdonald (13) furnishes us with sufficient information on which to found a definite and defensible judgment. His book is eminently satisfactory. It is worthy of wide circulation and careful study.

Notwithstanding the many excellent manuals on Eastern customs already existing, Mr. Neill has produced a volume (14) which is certainly not lacking in freshness and interest. During a three years' residence in Palestine, and by a continuous habit of keen observation, he has gleaned, from well-reaped fields, sheaves that are not to be despised in our estimation of the harvest.

Nothing more is needed to justify this reprint of Sir Richard Baker's *Meditations and Disquisitions on the Psalms* (15) than Mr. Spurgeon's testimony in his valuable *Commentary and Commentaries*: "O rare Sir Richard Baker! knight of the flowing pen. His meditations and disquisitions are altogether marrow and fatness. We have often tried to quote from him and have found ourselves so embarrassed that we have been inclined to copy the whole book." The reprint is excellent,

(13) *The Vedic Religion, or the Creed and Practice of the Indo-Aryans three thousand years ago.* By the Rev. K. S. Macdonald, M.A., Missionary of the Free Church of Scotland, Calcutta. 2d Edition. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(14) *Palestine Explored.* By Rev. James Neill, M.A. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(15) *Meditations and Disquisitions upon certain Psalms.* By Sir Richard Baker. London: Charles Higham, 27A Farringdon Street.

and it is enriched by a characteristic introduction from the pen of Dr. Grosart. The volume itself is a storehouse of quaint, spiritual, and suggestive sayings.

We have much pleasure in calling attention to a very handy and useful epitome (16) of facts that ought to be generally known in connection with the Revised Version of the New Testament. Mr. Carter tells the "story" of the New Testament in a manner at once simple, scholarly, and reverent.

What can we say of those attractive-looking volumes (17), except that year by year they are increasingly welcome? The engravings, especially the coloured ones, are very good, and the literary matter is excellent and varied.

A charming story of child-life (18). Now, as we read it by our winter fire, the little ones are carried away in imagination to the daisy-clad meadows and breezy hills, as they follow the footsteps of "Bobby" and "Rosie," and their faithful German nurse.

Whatever Dr. Macduff writes is sure to be worth reading, and this volume (19) will be especially welcome to parents, who are so often at a loss for a really *interesting* as well as instructive book for Sunday afternoons or evenings. These sermons possess the advantage of having been *spoken* to children, and they have a freshness and simplicity of style which is very attractive. They are intensely practical, and well fitted, by the cheerful tone which pervades them, to commend the Gospel to the consciences and hearts of the young.

(16) *The Story of the New Testament told in connection with the Revised Version.* By Rev. Andrew Carter, M.A. London: Whittaker and Co.

(17) *Leisure Hour*, 1881. *Sunday at Home*, 1881. London: Religious Tract Society, 56 Paternoster Row.

(18) *A Summer in the Life of two little Children.* By the Author of "Lilies of the Valley and other Stories." London: J. Nisbet and Co.

(19) *Hosannas of the Children, and other Short Sermons for Young Worshipers; or, a Chime of Bells from the Little Sanctuary.* By J. R. Macduff, D.D. London: J. Nisbet and Co.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1882.

ART. I.—*Jehovistic and Elohistic Theories.*

THERE are few critical questions that call so loudly for inquiry as this which is indicated in our title, and to which we have already directed attention in a recent paper. The alternation of the Divine names, GOD and LORD, *Elohim* and *Jehovah*, forms so remarkable a feature of the Old Testament Scriptures that, so soon as attention is turned to it, there is an instantaneous conviction that it is not the result of accident, and there is a desire awakened for some explanation. For more than a hundred years this desire has been mocked by one great critical school, and it has been left practically unanswered by the other. The variation in the names has been made a foundation for the wildest theories of rationalism, and has played its part in every modern attack upon the integrity of the books of the Old Testament; while, on the other hand, we have the almost unanimous confession of orthodox theologians that it has never yet found an adequate explanation. On the one side there is confident assertion and the most determined persistence in pushing so-called facts to their furthest consequences; on the other, while there is success in the criticism of hostile theories, there is, in the attempt

to explain the phenomenon, only manifest failure or unconcealed despair.

It would appear indeed that, notwithstanding all the attention which the question has excited, it is still necessary to ascertain the very elements of the problem. Two writers on the Psalms, to whom the English public owe a debt of gratitude, and who have no sympathy with the theories which the alleged facts are made to support, give currency, for example, to the assertion that in the first forty-one Psalms *Jehovah* occurs 272 times and *Elohim* only fifteen times.¹ The former statement is nearly correct, but the latter gives less than a third of the real number. *Elohim* occurs, in fact, no fewer than forty-eight times. But the implicit faith reposed in the results published by Delitzsch has led to a more astounding statement. Perowne says: "From Psalm lxxv. to the end of the Psalter the name Jehovah again becomes prevalent, and, to such an extent, that in Books iv. and v. (Ps. xc.—Ps. cl.) it occurs 339 times, and Elohim, of the true God, but once (cxliv. 9)." Binnie gives the same figures, but with the important modification that *Elohim* occurs occasionally "in a composite form," though "in its simple form" it is but once met with as applied to the true God. "These curious facts," he adds, "were first collected by Dr. Delitzsch in a work published twenty-four years ago. Their importance has been universally recognised." It is an unpleasant task to point out mistakes in works otherwise so painstaking and admirable; but it is hard to imagine how so unfounded a statement ever came to be made. In Psalm cviii. alone *Elohim* is found six times in its simple form; and for Books iv. and v. of the Psalter the true figures are—*Jehovah* 384, *Elohim* 45. Hengstenberg has allowed himself to be misled in the same way. "In the whole fourth book," he says, "*Elohim* does not occur once, in the fifth only seven times, while *Jehovah*, according to Delitzsch, occurs 236 times." It will hardly be credited in the face of these statements, made by one writer and adopted by another, both of European fame, that in the seventeen Psalms which form the fourth book (Pss. xc.-cvi.), *Elohim* occurs eighteen times, and in the fifth (Psa. cvii.-cl.) twenty-seven and not seven times!

¹ Perowne, *The Book of Psalms*, i. 75; Binnie, *The Psalms*, etc., 128.

at this absence of careful inquiry is as painfully conspicuous in many of the theories. Colenso maintains that *Elohim* the older name, and was gradually supplanted by *Jehovah*. Robertson Smith believes, on the contrary, that *Jehovah*, regarded in later times as too sacred a name for use, was discontinued, and that *Elohim* was not only used instead, but even substituted for *Jehovah* in writings of an older date. The slightest glance at the names in the books of the Old Testament is, as we shall afterwards see, alike destructive of one theory and the other. Hengstenberg asserts, with as little foundation, that, while "*Elohim* had become so rare in later times that only the *Jehovah*-Psalms of David were fit for insertion into the later cycles," yet at some earlier time *Jehovah* had been so abused that it was discontinued in favour of *Elohim*, and that *Elohim* by itself is to be taken as equivalent to *Jehovah-Elohim*! The opinion of Delitzsch is equally curious. He holds that the names neither indicate different authors, nor is the choice of them determined in any way by the subject with which the author deals. It was only an attempt to honour God by using now the one name and now the other. "One and the same author at one time used himself in the use of the Divine name *Elohim*, and at another time in the use of the Divine name *Jehovah*!" With Kalisch, and others, *Elohim* is the name of God in His relation to mankind at large, and *Jehovah* His name as Israel's God; and yet we find *Jehovah* in places where no reference to Israel is possible, and even in the lips of the heathen. Quite the opposite importance seems to be attached to consistency as to identity. Colenso strenuously contends that the use of the one name is an undeniable mark of different authorship. And he not only admits that both were used alike by the Deist and by the Jehovist: he is at pains to show that they are not synonymous, and that each writer was occasionally misled by his subject-matter to use the name which is said to characterise the productions of the other.¹ What possible conclusion can be left for the rationalistic theory after such an admission as this? The same confession is made even more fully by Bleek. Not only does he admit that the names are synonymous: he contends that there are cases where

¹ *The Pentateuch, etc., critically examined*, p. 257, etc.

Jehovah and *Elohim* could not be exchanged. What place is left then, the reader asks, for the theory which Bleek, like the rest of his school, supports? The reply is ingenious. Where either name may be employed so far as the context is concerned, you may then discover in their use the marks of diverse authorship.¹ But even under this form of the theory it is impossible for him to remain consistent. He goes right in the teeth of his own canon in his view of *Job*,² maintaining the entire unity of the book in the face of the most marked diversity in the use of the names that is to be found in the whole of the Old Testament.

While unfounded statements are accepted as undoubted facts, and theories are propounded which fall to pieces ere they are launched, it cannot be said that criticism has achieved, or even attempted, much in regard to this problem. Were this merely a critical question its present position might be of little moment; but in one which affects so closely the interpretation of many parts of Scripture, this position is the reverse of creditable to the boasted science of our time. In a previous article, on *The Divine Names in Genesis*,³ an explanation was offered of the variation in the use of the names; but little was then attempted beyond showing that it held for the Book of Genesis. It is indeed true that in Genesis the theories are supposed to find their fullest justification, and any demonstration, therefore, that they are needless there must touch them at a vital point. But the subject has wider ramifications, and in any full discussion of it we must necessarily pass beyond the Pentateuch. We now propose to offer another humble contribution toward the settlement of this vexed question, and to consider it in its relation to the entire body of the Old Testament Scriptures.

We shall notice first of all what are imagined to be undoubted proofs that the names are indicative of diverse authorship. These, it may be remarked, are mainly after-discoveries. They contributed nothing to the origination of the theories, but were subsequently cited as confirmatory of them. It is well to remember this, as it will help to explain a rather unusual feature in "proofs," which it will by and bye be

¹ *Introduction to Old Testament*, vol. i. pp. 268, 269.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 289.

³ April, 1881.

evident enough that these possess in a marked degree. The only "proof," which can be said to have suggested a theory in regard to the names, is that found in Genesis ii. 4-25, and which "liberal" theologians are wont to call a "second account of the creation of the world, and of man,"¹ or "some features of another cosmogony."² It has been already shown in our former article that the repetition in Gen. ii. 4-7, is only in keeping with the plan on which the book is constructed, and is, indeed, one among many proofs of its unity. The book is a series of genealogies, and every new section begins as here with a recapitulation. We now notice one or two other facts, alike fatal to the theory that we have here an independent account of creation, and therefore a proof that the use of *Jehovah-Elohim* instead of *Elohim*, employed in the previous chapter, marks the advent of a new author. It is quite clear, for example, that *Toledoth* ("the generations") does not refer to origin, but rather to after-development and history. The generations of Adam, of Noah, and of the sons of Noah, are not the story of *their* origin, but of the families and races which sprung from them. The very use then of the phrase, "these are the generations of the heavens and the earth" presupposes, if the account is to be complete, a previous section, in which the origin of the heavens and the earth is related; and this means, as we know, not with "These are the generations," but "In the beginning." History could go no further back,—*"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."* And, when we take up this "second account," every statement bears out the truth of our contention. It may not be beneath a careful critic to notice a remarkable change in the phraseology of Gen. ii. 4. The opening words of the verse are, "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth," but at the close this order is reversed. We read of "the earth and the heavens." The change is significant. It indicates that *upon the earth*, the end, toward which God was reaching in the creation of the material universe, is now to be manifested. Quite in accordance with this, the second chapter has no further reference to the heavens: not a word is said as to the creation of sun, moon, stars, or firmament. Is it possible for this silence to be

¹ Alford *in loc.*

² Kalisch.

explained on the hypothesis that we have here "another cosmogony," "a second account" of creation? It will be further observed that the predominating idea of the second chapter is Man, earth's lord and God's son. Everything has relation to him. The earth is prepared for *his* abode. A reference is made to the later creation of what was needed for his sustenance, of the plant and herb of the *field* (not of the earth at large, but of the field which man was to till). Then the mode of man's creation is fully told, and the paradise described in which God placed him. The animals, created for man's use and enjoyment, are brought to their lord; but, in the midst of the joy and power of the world's king, the sense of a mighty need deepens evermore: the need of one who can share the wonder and the joy, the need of another human heart to beat in sympathy with his own on this great and glorious earth; and then we are told how woman, the best of all God's earthly gifts, was given. Blot out all this, call it merely a repetition, let there be no second chapter in the Book of Genesis, and will there be no link wanting in the story, which neither the first chapter, nor the third, nor any other in the book, will be able to supply? Keep it where we find it, and do we not mark in these opening chapters simply the onward flow of a continuous story? To rest the theory, that the change of the divine names marks the introduction of another hand in the narrative, upon the supposed independence of chapter ii. 4-25, is not to build upon a foundation even of sand—sand has a palpable existence: this has none.

The "proof," based upon the account of the Deluge, is really unworthy of sober discussion. Its strength lies in the alleged contradiction between the first direction to take the animals into the ark by pairs, and the subsequent command to take the clean animals by sevens. The explanation is as patent and as old as the difficulty; and the alleged discrepancy might now be supposed to be beyond the range of serious consideration. But what the objection lacks in breadth and weight is made up by what truth compels us to characterise as reckless mis-statement. Bleek, for example, says:—

"The fact is this. In ch. vi. 14, up to the end of the chapter, it is related that God (Elohim) gave a command to Noah to build the ark, and

to *go into it* with his family, and with beasts of every kind ; and that he *should take a pair*, a male and female, of each sort, and that Noah followed *this* command of God. Then, in ch. vii. 1 ff., it is *again related* that *Jehovah* commanded Noah to go into the ark with his family, and with the living things ; but he tells him that he is to take with him one pair of all unclean beasts, but of clean beasts seven pairs."¹

Now, to clothe "the fact" with some importance, it is necessary to show that there is a repetition as well as a variation, and this is accomplished by representing the command to go into the ark *as given twice*. But in the 6th chapter there is no command to go into the ark, and therefore it is not "*again related that Jehovah commanded*" him to go into it ; ch. vi. 14 is merely an intimation that the ark he is to build will be a refuge for him and his : "and thou wilt come (וְאַתָּה) into the ark." In the seventh chapter we are told that after Noah had done "according to all that God had commanded him," in constructing the ark and storing the necessary food,—the animals he was not to gather, they were to come to him (vi. 20),—and the eventful day at last drew nigh, then, and not till then, the command was given : "Come thou (בֹּא-יְהוָה) and all thy house into the ark." Here again there is every mark of a continuous narrative, and even the variation in the directions as to the saving of the animals is quite in harmony with this continuity. The first command was very much an intimation of God's purpose, which enabled Noah to co-operate intelligently in the fulfilment of that purpose. It was not intended to be acted upon till the last moment ; but meanwhile it revealed to Noah much that else must have remained dark to him in the directions regarding the dimensions and arrangements of the ark, and the storing of the food. And, when the moment had come for action, the command was again given, and with the necessary minuteness.

But Bleek's attempt to make two commands to go into the ark, where the Scripture knows only of one, is a small matter when compared with other endeavours to construct an argument for the theories out of the story of the Deluge. By the most arbitrary methods, and at the expense of the utter dislocation of the careful reckoning of time, which marks the narrative as it

¹ *Introd. to Old Testament*, vol. i. pp. 273, 274.

stands, two accounts are made out of one. "These two accounts," says Mr. Robertson Smith, "are plainly independent, and each is complete in itself. It is impossible that the work of one author could so divide itself (!) into two narratives, and have for each narrative a different name of God."¹ Now this calm statement of the case does real injustice to the critics. It gives no idea of the toil and sweat which they have undergone to make up the two narratives, and quite generously attributes the result to a spontaneous bisection of the account in Genesis. And yet the whole of the latter part of what is called "the Jehovistic narrative" (ch. viii. 6-12),² is torn away from the very heart of an Elohistic section (viii. 1-19), and has *no name of God in it at all*. But, nevertheless, in the face of all this, the statement is made that the Scripture account divides "*itself*" into two narratives, and has "for each narrative a *different name of God*"!

Other assertions, equally baseless, are made with all the assurance that could possibly accompany the announcement of the most undeniable facts. It is said that the Elohist speaks of God occasionally as *El Shaddai* (the Almighty), but that this name is never used by the Jehovist. Now the truth is that the name is first of all met with in a Jehovistic passage:—"Jehovah appeared unto Abraham, and said unto him, I am *El Shaddai*" (Gen. xvii. 1). In Exodus vi. 3, Ruth i. 20-21, Job xl. 2, Ps. xci. 1, etc., it also occurs in Jehovistic passages. The purpose of such a statement is as patent as its inaccuracy; but it displays an eagerness to uphold a theory which has proved too much either for the critic's carefulness or for his honesty. "Again," says Colenso, "the Elohist uses *Israel* as a personal name for Jacob—the Jehovist never."³ The value of this will be understood when the two following facts are mentioned. First, in the Elohistic sections *Jacob* is not only used as well as *Israel*, but *more than twice as often*. Secondly, the only Jehovistic sections which are met with in Genesis, after the change is made in the Patriarch's name, are chapters xxxviii. and xxxix.; and there Jacob is not once referred to, and, as a matter of course, *neither name is used*.

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 328.

² *Ibid.* p. 433.

³ *The Pentateuch*, etc., p. 176.

A distinction is thus professedly drawn between the Jehovistic and the Elohist sections of Genesis in regard to the names of Jacob, when the Jehovistic has no occasion to employ the one or the other, and the use of both is confined to the Elohist ! It may be safely said that few controversies have been marked by more daring misrepresentations of facts.

But we have now to mention an alleged distinction between the sections, which presents the strongest appearance of all. It is said that each has its own name for the mountainous district to the north of Mesopotamia. "The Elohist uses always *Padan*, or *Padan-Aram*, . . . whereas the Jehovist uses *Aram-Naharaim*."¹ This statement is imposing. That each class of passages should have its own name for the same district, and should keep to it throughout, is almost sufficient in itself to settle the question of separate authorship. And the statement is put forth with a full consciousness of its decisive character. The existence of the distinction begets such gratitude in Bishop Colenso's breast that, for the moment, he is tempted to believe that its presence is due to a special providence. "This circumstance," he says, "that such *unmistakeable*" (let the reader mark the term), "such unmistakable differences of expression distinguish, throughout the book of Genesis, the parts which are due to these separate writers, may almost, with reference to the momentous issues involved, be called providential, since it enables us to speak positively on some points which might otherwise have been still subject to doubt."² These distinctive marks are indeed a vital part of the critic's case ; and this is beyond doubt the most important of them all. It might be permitted, perhaps, to raise the inquiry whether it is quite certain that the names are applied to the same place ; whether, for example, *Aram-Naharaim* (translated *Mesopotamia* in our English version), "the highlands of the two rivers," may not be the name of a wide district, and *Padan-Aram*, "the cultivated land of the highlands," the name of a particular part of it. But surely, in the face of even such semi-pious exultation as this, it could never be tolerated to hint a suspicion of the facts ! Whether there is ground for hinting a suspicion of them we shall now

¹ *The Pentateuch*, etc., p. 176.

² *Ibid.* p. 177.

let the reader judge. *Aram-Naharaim* occurs *only once in the whole of Genesis*, and then, too, as the name for a wide district: Abraham's servant "arose and went to Mesopotamia, unto the city of Nahor" (xxiv. 10). It occurs *only once besides* in the whole of the Pentateuch, and again as the general name of a district (Deut. xxiii. 4). We do not insist on this evident use of *Aram-Naharaim* as a general name. We ask attention to the fact that the word *occurs but twice* in the whole of the Pentateuch and only once in Genesis. Is not this a perilously narrow base for so mighty an induction? And does it not require a peculiar moral build to make so confident a statement, knowing there was only this behind it? But all is not yet told. The very first mention of *Padan-Aram*, the alleged distinctive name of the Elohist, *occurs in a Jehovistic section* (Gen. xxv. 20). This was not at first noticed, but, when attention was directed to it, what was proposed? To alter the theory to suit the fact? Little does he know of critical courage and resources who would think so. It was proposed to claim that verse as Elohistic for the sole reason that it had *Padan-Aram* in it! "Facts are against you" was once objected to a perfervid orator. "So much the worse for the facts" was the ready reply; and so here the fact was extinguished that the theory might be saved. We might characterise such procedure. When it marks the trade, the commercial speculations, or even the politics of the day, we know what terms spring unbidden to our lips. But it may be enough to say that, in pursuing it, the critics, whatever the temporary effect of their work may be, are not sapping the foundations of faith in the integrity of the Scriptures: they are only digging the grave of their own reputation.

In taking leave of the critical theories we submit what seems to us sufficient in itself for their refutation,—a table of the Jehovistic and Elohistic elements contained in the Old Testament. Opposite the name of each book will be found in parallel columns the number of times *Jehovah* and *Elohim* are found in it,—the divine names *El* and *Eloah*, also attributed to the Elohist, being included in the latter:—

	Jehovah.	Elohim.		Jehovah.	Elohim.
Genesis, .	162	228	Ecclesiastes, .	0	40
Exodus, .	397	118	Song of Solomon, .	1*	0
Leviticus, .	311	52	Isaiah, . .	448	101
Numbers, .	395	38	Jeremiah,† .	725	115
Deuteronomy, .	550	353	Lamentations, .	32	1
Joshua, .	222	70	Ezekiel, . .	435	40
Judges, .	174	52	Daniel, . .	8	57
Ruth, . .	18	3	Hosea, . .	46	26
1 Samuel, .	320	94	Joel, . .	33	11
2 Samuel, .	151	63	Amos, . .	81	11
1 Kings, .	258	92	Obadiah, . .	7	0
2 Kings, .	277	79	Jonah, . .	26	15
1 Chronicles, .	174	114	Micah, . .	40	11
2 Chronicles, .	384	185	Nahum, . .	13	1
Ezra, . .	37	97	Habakkuk, .	13	5
Nehemiah, .	17	74	Zephaniah, .	35	4
Esther, . .	0	0	Haggai, . .	35	3
Job, . .	32	113	Zechariah, .	133	12
Psalms, . .	737	410	Malachi, . .	47	8
Proverbs, .	87	6			

* Ch. viii. 6, "A flame of Jehovah," translated in E.V., "a most vehement name."
† The E.V. renders *Adonai-Jehovah* by Lord-God.

A glance at these results at once disposes of various contentions which have given colour and consistency to the theories. An essential element, common to all of them, has been the postulate that the prevalent use of the one name and of the other are to be taken as marks of different periods. Sometimes, as with Colenso, *Elohim* is declared to be the older, and *Jehovah* the later name. At other times the exclusive use of *Elohim* is said to be characteristic of a very late period. This last, as was observed before, is the position of Mr. Robertson Smith. The awe, it is said, with which the later Jews regarded the sacred name *Jehovah*, led not only to its disuse in later writings, but also to its removal from some of an earlier date. We shall look in vain among the results tabulated above for confirmation either of the one theory or of the other. Mr. Smith's hypothesis is contradicted by his own contention that Chronicles "was written long after the reformation by Ezra."¹ The Jehovistic character of Chronicles is as marked as that of any other book in the Old Testament

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 218.

canon. Either, then, the age assigned to the book must be wrong, or the exclusive use of *Elohim* was not a characteristic of that time. The same thing is true of his statement that "the collection, Psalms xc.-cl., and even the origin of many of the pieces it contains," belong "to a date subsequent to the reorganisation of the Theocracy by Ezra and Nehemiah."¹ And yet there is only one psalm (Ps. cxiv.) in the whole collection that has not the name *Jehovah* in it, and the entire section is the most *Jehovistic* in the Psalter. It will be observed that the books present a remarkable uniformity from first to last, almost all of them showing a marked preponderance of the name *Jehovah*. Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniel, are exceptions, but no conclusions can be drawn from these as to the tendencies of the age, for in Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi we have the same preponderance of *Jehovah* which marks the other books. The only other exceptions are Job and Ecclesiastes: from them no argument can be drawn as to the tendencies of any age in regard to the use of the names. But, on the other hand, these five books tell heavily against the theory that the names were altered in the course of editorial supervision. If *Jehovah* was changed to *Elohim* in these, why was the change not made elsewhere? Why were these taken and the others left? And if, in the other books, *Elohim* was exchanged for *Jehovah*, how was it that these five were overlooked? These exceptions put it beyond doubt that the uniformity which marks the other books is not due to editorial changes, but belongs to their original form. We have the most perfect demonstration, therefore, both in the historical books from Genesis to Nehemiah, and, in the prophetic, from Isaiah to Malachi, that there was no period when the one name or the other was in disuse. There was no Elohistic and no Jehovistic age. Both names, from the beginning of the era of the sacred literature to its close, were known, and were constantly employed; and, whatever the explanation of their use may be, this, that it was due merely to the fashion of the time or the predilection of the writer, must be discarded by every theory which seeks to reflect and to explain the facts.

That the same conclusion is forced upon us by the book of

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 192.

Psalms will be evident from a reference to Colenso's tables.¹ He gives the number of times *Jehovah*, *Elohim*, and *Adonai* (Lord) appear in each psalm, including, under *Elohim*, as we have already done, *El* and *Eloah*. An analysis of the figures given by Colenso might beget many theories. There is, for example, a preponderance of *Jehovah* running through the whole of Book I., and of *Elohim* in Book II., while Books III. and IV. are similarly distinguished. Now, an ardent fancy might rush to the conclusion that it had discovered here the principle of arrangement, and that the books have been arranged in pairs. The danger of such hasty theorising is seen not only in III. and IV. (Elohistic and Jehovistic) being in reverse order to I. and II. (Jehovistic and Elohistic), but also in the presence of Psalms lxxxv. lxxxvii. lxxxviii. and lxxxix., in which *Jehovah* predominates, being found in an Elohistic book. Conclusions, however, may be drawn of a more sober kind. It is admitted that the collections which form the books were the work of various periods; and it is maintained by many that they bear, if not in authorship, yet at least in selection, the impress of the ages in which they were made. If this be granted, we shall find that the conclusion, drawn from the former table, is abundantly confirmed by these, for they put it beyond doubt *that the use of both names marks every period represented by the Psalter*. In Book I., out of 41 psalms, 27 contain *Jehovah* and *Elohim*. In Book II. (31 psalms) 16 have both names; in Book III. (17 psalms) 16; Book IV. (17 psalms) 12; and Book V. (44 psalms) 21. That is, the use of both names is largely characteristic of all the Books, and is found in 92 psalms out of 150. The theory, therefore, that the one name or the other was in abeyance during certain periods, is as fully disproved by the Psalms as by the other books of the Old Testament.

But it is possible to raise this question to a level where such a hypothesis will be judged unworthy of a moment's thought, and where a purpose may be traced in the selection of the names in keeping with the freest and grandest literature of all time. It is universally acknowledged that the names are not synonymous. It must be further admitted, not only that the names *might* be used with discrimination; but that

¹ *The Pentateuch, etc.*, Part II. p. 310.

the theory which maintains that in their alternation we catch the reflection of the writer's changing thought and feeling, has, to start with, every probability in its favour. Everything now depends, however, upon the fidelity with which this principle is followed. We may abandon the clew it affords, and try to discover here and there the traces of technical rules, and, as the result of our labour, leave the conviction in every honest mind that no explanation of the use of the names is possible. The theory, propounded in the previous article, differs from the others that have been advanced solely in this, that the names are allowed to retain their meaning, and the writers their freedom. The names were Hebrew words. They were used because they fitly expressed the writer's thought, just as, when neither suited, both were laid aside and other names were taken. The most vital point then, in connection with our inquiry is to determine accurately what the words mean; and this, fortunately, can be done without any lengthened or intricate discussion. As to the significance of *Jehovah*, Exodus iii. 14 leaves no doubt. The continuity of God's nature, the unchangeableness of His purpose; in one word, the Divine faithfulness, is the purport of the Scripture definition, "I AM WHAT I AM." This, too, might be inferred, as was previously shown, from the form of the word. *Jehovah* is evidently the *Hiphil* of *Havah*, an older form of *Hayah*, and means, literally, "He will cause (it) to be," an opinion with which we are glad to notice Mr. Robertson Smith seems fully in accord.¹ Of *Elohim*, the plural of *Eloah*, the Scriptures contain no definition, and two different opinions have been held as to its derivation. *Eloah* (אֱלֹהִים) is the infinitive of either of two unused verbs: אֱלֵה, *to fear*, or אֱלֵה, *to be strong*. Used as a verbal noun with the usual abstract signification, *Eloah* would mean in the one case *fear*, in the other *strength*. Now, though the Scripture has no definition of *Eloah*, it puts it beyond doubt that the latter derivation is the only admissible one. This is clearly shown by the references in the following note from Gesenius: "There is a proverbial expression, Habakkuk i. 11, of an obstinate, self-confident man (וְכֹחַ כְּאֱלֹהֵהוּ) 'whose own strength is as his God,' that is, who

¹ *The Old Testament*, etc., p. 423.

despises every God, and confides in his own strong hand and sword. Comp. Job xii. 6, (אֲשֶׁר הֵבִיא אֱלֹהִים בְּיָדוֹ), 'who bears his god in his hand.'¹ Arms are intended." Here it is plain that the former interpretation must be abandoned. Can it be said that his own strength is to the self-confident man an object of fear? Does he stand in awe of his own might? Accept the latter derivation, and the phrase is at once intelligible. He so exaggerates his strength, that it seems to him there is no resistance which it cannot overcome, and no limit to what it may accomplish: in a word, it is to him what *Eloah*, the Divine Strength, alone, should be. It is gratifying to find that Ewald's great authority can be quoted in support of this contention. He speaks of *Enosh* (man) and *Eloah* as "the expression of the two contrasted ideas—of *God* as the absolutely *powerful*, and of *man*, matched with God, as the absolutely *weak*."² In reference to the plural form, *Elohim*, his words are well worth quoting: "The formation of these plural words for God and Lord leads us back into that far-off time when the conception of majesty and power seemed to be exalted by those of multitude and universality."³ We have, therefore, three cognate names of God which express in various ways the same attribute of power. There is, first of all, *El*, mighty one; then the abstract term *Eloah*, strength (compare our terms, "Lordship," "Grace," "Majesty"), a name in which the soul's reverence is expressed as well as the Divine attribute of might; and lastly, the plural form *Elohim*, in which both God's almightiness and man's adoration find a fuller utterance.

It might now be shown how this distinction in meaning becomes apparent again and again throughout the Old Testament Scriptures; but we propose, ere we conclude, to submit our contention to a test, which we trust will result in transferring it from the realm of theory to that of fact. Meanwhile, one or two other proofs may be noticed. That *Jehovah* expresses God's faithfulness is abundantly evident, for example, from the oft-repeated phrase, "Thus saith the LORD." It introduces commandment, threatening, promise, and upon all

¹ The rendering of the English version is, "Into whose hand God bringeth."

² *Hist. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 264.

³ *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 319.

it sets the stamp of eternal truth. It is the solemn intimation that all these are the words of Him who is faithful. Threatenings and promises are frequently concluded also by the brief emphatic sentence, "I am the LORD" (Exod. vi. 8, etc.) The very name is an argument to dispel fear and deepen trust. The peculiar significance of the name is even more apparent in the following passages: "I, Jehovah, have said, I will surely do it," etc. (Num. xiv. 35); "Jehovah that is faithful" (Isaiah xlix. 7); "For I am Jehovah, I change not" (Malachi iii. 6). That the three other names of God were ever felt to bear a different meaning, is quite clear from the fact that while the possessives "my," "thy," "his," etc., are frequently used in conjunction with *them*, they are never employed with *Jehovah*. The reader of the Old Testament will seek in vain for such a phrase as "my LORD." That from first to last there should be such a marked difference in the use of the names is in itself a convincing proof that the distinction in their meaning was ever felt to be deep and wide. It is easy to understand how the attribute of strength, expressed alike by *El*, *Eloah*, and *Elohim*, lent itself with peculiar readiness to such a use. By these names faith laid hold of God as the Almighty Helper. With that cry "my Elohim," the soul linked itself with, and clung to, the everlasting strength. We have said the Old Testament contains no definition of *Elohim*; but there are passages which almost amount to a definition. For example, in Gen. xvii. 7, God promises to be an Elohim to Abraham, and to his seed after him. Can this possibly mean that God is to be "an object of fear" to them, and that He is to demand something from them? Is it not written upon the very face of the promise that God is giving, not demanding, and that He will provide for them in the infinite strength a never-failing help and refuge? This reference is even plainer in Deut. xxix. 13, where Moses calls upon Israel to enter into covenant with Jehovah, "that He may be unto thee an Elohim, as He hath said unto thee." This covenant-relationship was the necessary condition of God's appearing in His might, and performing for them all that He had promised. The same book supplies us with two other examples. Israel forsaken by the Lord, trampled upon and devoured by enemies, "will say in that day, Are not these

come upon us, because our Elohim is not among us?" (i. 17). The shield of the infinite might had clearly been saved, or these ills could never have come nigh them. Among the last words of "the man of God" were these: "There is none like unto the El of Jeshurun, who rideth upon heaven in thy help, and in his excellency on the sky. Elohim of eternity is thy refuge, and underneath are the assisting arms; and He shall thrust out the enemy from before thee, and shall say, Destroy them" (xxxiii. 26, 27). It is clear that the idea of strength is expressed by *Elohim* as well as *El*, and that, in the glowing language of the Prophets, an advance is made from the weaker to the stronger and the fuller name of God in His unbounded and undying might. Before applying our test, it may be well to obtain some answer to a question of the utmost moment. We contend that the words are not synonymous; that, though both refer to the Divine Being, they are the expression of exactly distinct attributes. Now if this be true, the consciousness of this difference in meaning must, one would think, have left its impress. Is there any indication then that the names were thus regarded? We have already seen that in fact that possessives are frequently joined with *Elohim* but never with *Jehovah*, we have clear traces of a recognised distinction between the names common to every age of the sacred Hebrew literature. We have other proofs which leave it beyond doubt that the distinction between the names was deeply felt, and that they were not interchangeable, except in connection with a change in the writer's point of view. We have two versions, for example, of Psalm xviii., which in its two points present a very considerable divergence. "Between Psalm xviii. and 2 Samuel xxii. there are," says Mr. Smith, "one seventy variations not merely orthographical."¹ Now, on the face of the comparative freedom thus shown in the versions, is it not astonishing that we should have the Divine names in both exactly the same? In *Samuel*, the first verse is an introduction which is omitted in the Psalter, and the second verse of the *Psalms* does not appear in *Samuel*. In *Samuel* again *Jehovah* occurs twice in ver. 29: "For thou art light, O LORD, and the LORD will lighten my darkness;"

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 182.

while the corresponding passage in the Psalm (ver. 28), reads: "The LORD my God will lighten my darkness." With this slight exception, although the names occur twenty-six times in all (16 times *Jehovah*, and 10 times *Elohim*), they are never once interchanged; the same name occurs always in the same context. The same feature is found in the versions of Psalm cv. 1-15, and Psalm xcvi. 2-13, contained in 1 Chron. xvi. 8-33. In the midst of some marked variations, not one occurs in the omission, addition, or substitution of these names of God.

These facts do not seem to have been much noticed by the critics; but their importance in the present inquiry will be felt by all. A glance at the parallel passages in Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, might convey the impression that the names were interchangeable, as we frequently meet with *Elohim* in the one account where *Jehovah* appears in the other. It must be remembered, however, that in this case we are not dealing with versions, but with independent works, in which the writers, though deriving their matter from the same sources, were led by the circumstances of their time and other causes, to occupy different standpoints. But it has been supposed that in what have been called "duplicate," but what we should prefer to name "adapted," Psalms we have a clear proof that the names were interchangeable. It is well known that in the Psalter itself certain Psalms appear in two versions, which sometimes differ considerably in regard to these names of God. It cannot for a moment be supposed that the change was due to mere caprice, and it is necessary, not only to notice, but also to attempt some explanation of, the fact. Mr. Smith supposes that the Jehovistic version is the older, and that the Elohistic is due to the exertions of an editor, who, in order to adapt them to an age in which *Jehovah* had ceased to be used, set himself to substitute *Elohim* wherever the former name occurred. The explanation, if striking, is also exceedingly simple; but like some other ventures in the higher criticism, it shows considerable independence in regard to facts. Psalm xl. 13-17 reappears as Psalm lxx., when, says Mr. Smith, *Jehovah* is six¹ times changed into *Elohim*, "and only one

¹ This number evidently includes also the changes made in transforming Ps. xiv. into Ps. liii.; in Ps. lxx. *Jehovah* is only twice exchanged for *Elohim*.

converse change" is made.¹ That is, so determined an effort was made to expunge *Jehovah*, that it was six times replaced by *Elohim*, and yet where *Elohim* was already in the older copy, by some strange freak and in entire forgetfulness of the one purpose for which the revision was being made, this was put aside, and *Jehovah*, the name which could not then be used, was put in its stead! Is it possible to maintain such a theory, and continue to believe in that reviser's sanity? The fact is, that both names appear in Ps. lxx. It would seem, indeed, that the Psalm was adapted to circumstances in which need had arisen for the *immediate* aid of the Almighty Helper, and that the Psalmist was led to appeal to God both in His might and in His faithfulness. Ps. xl. 13, "Be pleased, Jehovah, to deliver me; O Jehovah, make haste to help me," becomes in Ps. lxx. 1, "Make haste, O *Elohim*, to deliver me; make haste to help me, O Jehovah." The proof which Mr. Smith believes he discovers in Ps. l. 7, of the tendency to substitute *Elohim* for *Jehovah*, is quite as imaginary. So determined was the attempt to suppress the latter name that the phrase, "I am Jehovah thy God," is said to appear there as "I am God, thy God," notwithstanding its awkwardness. And yet *Jehovah*, the name which was being suppressed with such efforts and at such sacrifices, appears among the very first words of the Psalm! How did it happen that the scruples against the use of *Jehovah*, scruples so great as to lead to the alleged misquotation of one of the best-known phrases in Israel, do not make themselves felt in verse 1, and only develop their force when verse 7 is reached? Such a theory is scarcely to be credited with an honest attempt to grasp the facts with which it professes to deal. The peculiarity of the phrase, "I am God, thy God" is explained by the opening words of the Psalm: "THE MIGHTY GOD, even Jehovah, hath spoken." These words strike the key-note of the Psalm. It sets forth God in the terribleness of His *power*, and hence the Elohist character which it presents throughout.

But to return to the duplicate Psalms. Ps. liii. is an adaptation of Ps. xiv., and the change here is very marked. In the earlier Psalm *Jehovah* occurs four times, *Elohim* thrice: in the later version we have seven times *Elohim* instead. But con-

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 187.

currently with this there is another notable difference. In the place of "Elohim is in the generation of the righteous" (xiv. 5), we read "Elohim hath scattered the bones of him that encampeth against thee" (liii. 5). The one variation explains the other. The Psalm was evidently adapted to celebrate some deliverance in which God had appeared in His might, and hence its purely Elohistic character.—Ps. cviii. embodies Ps. lvii. 7-11, but here there is only one change in the Divine names: *Jehovah* is once substituted for *Adonai*. With this exception the names appear the same number of times and in the same order. The conclusion (of Ps. cviii.) is made up of Ps. lx. 5-12, in which there is not the slightest change in the Divine name. This, along with the other instances already referred to, proves abundantly that, without some good reason for change, the names of God were scrupulously preserved. The many and not always unimportant changes in the versions of Psalms xviii., cv., and xcvi. show conclusively that the uniformity in the names was not due to a slavish or superstitious regard for literal exactness. To what then can we attribute it, if not to a sense of the fitness of each name for the place it held? When the aspect of the Divine nature, celebrated or appealed to, remained the same, they were left unaltered; when that was changed, they too were changed. And thus, though these facts alone were before us, the conclusion would be inevitable that the law which governs the use of these two names of God is simply their meaning as Hebrew words.

We shall now submit our contention, that *Elohim* is the name of God in His might, and *Jehovah* in His faithfulness, to one of the most thorough tests to which such a theory can be subjected. The variation in the names is more marked in the Psalms than in any other book of the Old Testament. This, it may be observed in passing, is quite in keeping with our explanation; for, if the names are used in accordance with their meaning, the variation must present a more decided feature where so many different experiences and emotions find expression, and where thought and feeling are deepest and most intense. But this feature has naturally made the Psalms the chosen battle-field of the theories, and we now accept the implied challenge to decide the matter there. A glance at

Colenso's tables will show that some of the Psalms are purely Elohistic and others purely Jehovistic; that is, the only Divine name in the former is *Elohim*, in the latter *Jehovah*. Now, if our explanation is correct, these must deal with God's faithfulness, those with His might. If the theory is not true, no speedier nor more effective method could be found for its refutation than to test it by these two classes of Psalms. But, if in these Psalms we find only an array of witnesses to its truth, the conviction will be irresistible that this is not the result of chance, and that the theory must be accepted as proved.

We now proceed with our test. There are only eleven Psalms wholly Elohistic, ten in Book II., and one in Book III. This last is the 82d. God is named twice, and on both occasions *Elohim* is used. The opening words have all the force of a demonstration: "ELOHIM standeth in the congregation of the mighty." The vision of that assembly, in which might is wedded to unrighteousness, begets in the Psalmist's breast neither despair nor alarm; for among them there is a mightier than they. This very name of God, *Elohim*, the Almighty, is here the expression of the calmest trust, the most assured hope. In the end of the psalm, where the name occurs again, we once more find the same contrast between the weakness of the mighty and the strength of God: "I have said, Ye are gods (*Elohim*, mighty ones), and all of you are children of the most High; but ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes. Arise, O *Elohim*,"—an appeal to God to appear in His might,—"judge the earth; for Thou shalt inherit all nations." The key-note of this Elohistic Psalm is undoubtedly, therefore, the omnipotence of God.—The 43d is the first met with in Book II., and is an appeal to God in His power. An entire people is arrayed against the Psalmist: he has but one Helper. "Judge me, O *Elohim*, and plead my cause against an ungodly nation: O deliver me from the deceitful and unjust man. For Thou art *the Elohim of my strength*" (verses 1-2). The reader will observe the importance of this last clause. It is impossible to deny to *Elohim* here a reference to the power of God. *Elohim*, the Almighty, is his fortress, his strong defence. With Him upon his side there is no room for despondency or fear, and he concludes with the expostulation: "Why art thou cast down, O

my soul? and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope in *Elohim*; for I shall yet praise Him who is the health of my countenance, and my *Elohim*" (verse 5). With that cry of faith, "my *Elohim*," "my Almighty one," the soul rose, as on eagle's wings, beyond the turmoil and the darkness into light and peace.

We come next to the 45th. *Elohim* occurs solely in the beginning of the psalm, which portrays the triumph and progress of the great Hero-King, the only world-conqueror, whose after-rest and joy are celebrated in the concluding portion. It is thoroughly in harmony therefore with the purpose of the psalm that God, who has anointed and equipped Him for the war, and from whom both His authority and might have been received, should be named by this name of power. But we have another proof in the application of the name to the King Himself. Verses 3-6 is a prolonged description of the Hero in His might. "Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, (most) mighty, with thy glory and thy majesty. And in thy majesty ride prosperously, because of truth and meekness and righteousness; and thy right hand shall teach thee terrible things. Thine arrows are sharp in the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under thee. Thy throne, O *Elohim*, is for ever and ever; the sceptre of thy kingdom is a right sceptre." In this name *Elohim* the description reaches its climax. It needed but this, the ascription of infinite and enduring might, to perfect it.—In the 49th we find *Elohim* twice. The psalm is a contrast between the trust that is placed on wealth and that which rests on the Almighty. We give the passages in which *Elohim* appears. "They that trust in their wealth, and boast themselves in the multitude of their riches, none of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to *Elohim* a ransom for him . . . that he should still live for ever and not see corruption" (verses 6, 7, 9). Here, opposite to the seeming might, is set the only real might whose grasp holds, whose word alone can free, in whose hand our breath is, and "the keys of death and of Hades." In the second instance the appropriateness of *Elohim* is apparent at the first glance. "But *Elohim* will redeem my soul from the power of the grave" (verse 15). Here the contrast is at once evident between the power of God and the hand or strength of

grave.—The 52d is not less emphatic in its testimony. v plain the reference here is to the omnipotence of God is in the admirable summary of its contents by Perowne :—

This psalm is not a prayer or complaint addressed to God against the ed ; it is a stern upbraiding addressed to the man who, unscrupulous e exercise of his power, and proud of his wealth, finds his delight in all rts of the practised liar. It is a lofty challenge, a defiance conceived e spirit of David when he went forth to meet the champion of Gath. calm courage of faith breathes in every word. There is no fear, no bling, no doubt as to the end which will come upon the tyrant. How is his boast in presence of the loving-kindness of God, which protects people, in presence of *the power* of God which uproots the oppressor ! is briefly the purport of the psalm."

o begin with, the mighty man is contrasted with the htier than he : "Why boastest thou thyself in mischief, ighty man ? The goodness of Elohim endureth continu- ." The latter clause may have one of two explanations : either a rebuke or a defiance. It may mean : "the might od is for ever linked to loving-kindness, why not thine ?" "the loving-kindness of *the Almighty* will defeat thy ice notwithstanding all thy power." But in neither the explanation nor the other can the reference of *Elohim* to power of God be overlooked. It is plain also from the owing that the might of God is the aspect of the Divine ure more prominently before the Psalmist's thought :—"El ll likewise destroy thee for ever, He shall take thee away l pluck thee out of thy dwelling-place, and root thee out of land of the living. . . . Lo, this is the man that made not him *his* STRENGTH, but trusted in the abundance of his riches, strengthened himself in his wickedness" (verses 5-7).—The has already been dealt with in our remarks on the dupli- : Psalms, and we pass on to the 60th, the next in order. e God is spoken of as the Mighty One, from whom alone ster and help alike can come : "O Elohim, thou hast cast ff, thou hast scattered us. . . . Thou hast made the earth emble, thou hast broken it. Heal the breaches thereof, t shaketh. . . . Who will bring me into the strong city ? will lead me into Edom ? Wilt not thou, O Elohim, who t cast us off ? and thou, O Elohim, who didst not go out t our armies ? . . . Through Elohim we shall do valiantly, He it is that shall tread down our enemies" (verse 1, 2, 9,

10, 12). Substitute for *Elohim* its rendering "The Almighty," or rather "Almightiness," and the appropriateness of the name will be seen at a glance.¹—Psalm lxi. is a cry of distress, and *Elohim* is used throughout with distinct reference to God's strength: "Hear my cry, O *Elohim* . . . For thou hast been a shelter for me, and a strong tower from the enemy. I will abide in thy tabernacle for ever; I will trust in the covert of thy wings" (verses 1, 3, 4).—Psalm lxiii. presents the same features: "O *Elohim*, thou art my *El*; early will I seek thee. My soul thirsteth for thee . . . to see thy *power* and thy *glory*" (verses 1, 2). The only other mention of *Elohim* is in the last verse. David's enemies, in their inability to save even themselves, are contrasted with God in His might: "Those that seek my soul to destroy it shall go into the lower parts of the earth; they shall fall by the sword; they shall be a portion for foxes; but the king shall rejoice in *Elohim*" (verses 9-11).—In the opening words of the 65th ("Praise waiteth for Thee, O *Elohim*, in Zion"), there is nothing to show what special aspect of the Divine nature is before the Psalmist's thought; but when we come to the next mention of the Divine name the significance of *Elohim* is at once apparent. "By *terrible things* in righteousness wilt Thou answer us, O *Elohim* of our salvation, who art the confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off upon the sea; who by *His strength* setteth fast the mountains, *being girded with power*" (verses 5, 6). The Psalm is a hymn to the Almighty, "the celebration of the mighty acts of Jehovah both in the world of nature and also among the nations."²—The last on the list is Psalm lxvii., in which the reason for the employment of *Elohim*, though not so strikingly manifest as in some other instances, is yet evident enough. The last verse (ver. 7) reads: "*Elohim*

¹ President Porter, of Belfast, in a recent paper on the "Edomites," in *the Christian Monthly*, says: "Edom was a natural fortress. Its chasms and rugged mountains, and rocks all pierced with the cave-dwellings of a wild people, seemed to bid defiance to every invader. Its ancient capital perched on the summit of a crag, was aptly called *Bozrah*, the strong. How appropriate then the language of the Psalmist, when appealing to the Almighty for help against the Edomites and others in a time of national peril! 'Who will bring me into the strong city? [Bozrah.] Who will lead me into Edom? Wilt not thou, O God?' The natural strength of the capital, and the difficulty of penetrating the country, are here brought out with much force." What President Porter discovers in the Psalm from a knowledge of the country of Edom is indicated in the very name which the Psalmist applies to God.

² Perowne, *The Book of Psalms*, i. 497.

shall bless us, and all the ends of the earth shall fear him." How shall the blessing of Israel bow the hearts of all nations in fear if the might of God is not revealed therein? The psalm is, in brief, a prayer to God to manifest Himself on behalf of His people, to show Himself the alone living and true God, and so bring the nations into allegiance to Him. "Let the peoples praise Thee, O Elohim, let all the peoples praise Thee; O let the nations be glad and sing for joy, for Thou shalt judge the peoples righteously, and govern the nations upon earth" (verses 3, 4).

Let us now glance at the Jehovistic Psalms, of which there are in all thirty-four. Twelve of these may be disposed of by one remark. They belong to the Psalms of Degrees. The fifteen psalms so entitled (Pss. cxx.—cxxxiv.) are all Jehovistic with three slight exceptions. Psalms cxxii. and cxxiii. have each *Elohim* once, both times in the name "Jehovah our Elohim;" and Psalm cxxx. has *Adonai* thrice. That all these psalms deal with the Divine faithfulness might be argued from the fact that they were the pilgrim songs of God's people as they went up to the Holy City, which spoke so loudly to the pious heart of God's promises and the purposes that He had still to accomplish; but we content ourselves with quoting the unbiassed testimony of Lampe: "The general argument of these psalms is the celebration of *the faithfulness and the constancy of God* in preserving His Church in the midst of all the billows of temptation in the sea of this world." The twenty-two Jehovistic Psalms which remain are too numerous to admit of our examining them all; but to avoid the suspicion of taking such only as best suit our theory, let us confine ourselves to the eleven contained in the first book. Psalm i. presents a totally different character from that of any of the Elohistic Psalms. God is now the God of the law, faithful in blessing and in judgment. It is the beatitude of the Old Testament. The man who keeps God's covenant "shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper. The ungodly are not so, but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away" (verses 3, 4). *Jehovah* occurs twice, first in the phrase "the law of Jehovah," where this very name *Jehovah*, the Faithful One, invests the Law with new grace and terribleness

—it is the law of Him not one of whose words shall fail. It is met again in the words, "For Jehovah knoweth the way of the righteous." On the word "knoweth" Perowne has the note—"regards *with watchful care and love*." The participle denotes that this is the *character* of Jehovah." From first to last the Psalmist's eye is resting upon the Divine faithfulness.—In Ps. vi. the same view of God prevails. The Psalmist is in great trouble, but in it all he discerns the Divine chastisement: "Jehovah, rebuke me not in thine anger, neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure" (verse 1). The psalm is a cry to the avenger of broken law, whose anger burns fiercely against sin. But there is mercy with God as well as wrath; He is the author of promise as well as threatening; and the afflicted one lifts the cry: "Have mercy upon me, Jehovah. . . . Return, Jehovah, deliver my soul; O save me for thy mercies' sake." He receives the assurance that his prayer is heard, and he knows that the Faithful One will now command deliverance: "Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity (*i.e.* It is in vain ye now plot and assemble), for Jehovah hath heard the voice of my weeping. Jehovah hath heard my supplication, Jehovah will receive my prayer." The very name *Jehovah*, "He will cause it to be," is now consolation and strength, and hence its reiteration.—Psalm xi. affords a still clearer proof. In verses 1-3 he recounts the advice given by well-meaning but timid friends, to seek safety in swift and far-off flight. They reply, by anticipation to his protest that he is innocent, and has therefore nothing to fear, by reminding him that the administrators of law and justice are those who see his life: "If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?" The Psalmist answers: "In JEHOVAH have I put my trust. How say ye to my soul," he asks in astonishment—"Flee, O bird, to your mountain" (verse 1)? His reply to what they urge as to there being no law to protect the innocent is this: "Jehovah is in His holy temple, Jehovah's throne is in heaven." The foundations still abide: the Faithful One ruleth over all.—The 12th Psalm affords one of the finest possible expositions of this great name of God. It begins: "Help, Jehovah; for the godly man ceaseth; for the faithful fail from among the children of men. They speak vanity every one with his neighbour; with flattering lips and with a double heart do they speak" (verses 1, 2). Does it not shed welcome light upon

these words, to note that, wearied with "the falseness and hypocrisy of the time," the Psalmist calls upon God by the name which speaks *His* eternal truth? And that the name is used with this significance is clear from the closing verses: "The words of Jehovah are pure words, as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times. Thou shalt keep them (the poor and needy), O Jehovah, Thou shalt preserve them from this generation for ever." No word of the Faithful One shall fail, and none shall trust Him in vain.—Psalm xv. contains *Jehovah* twice. It is an inquiry as to who shall be the honoured guest and trusted servant of God, in other words, what is demanded by Him who keepeth covenant: "Jehovah, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart," etc. (verses 1, 2). The second mention of the name is made in the latter part of the description: "In whose eyes a vile person is contemned, but he honoureth them that fear Jehovah" (verse 4); that is, whose fear is not simply awe of God in His might, but the enlightened fear of His people, the fear of Him who has declared His law, and who will fulfil His every threatening and promise.—Expositors have felt that between Psalms xx. and xxi. there exists a very close connection. In the 20th success is implored and confidently expected; the 21st tells that the cry has been answered, the expectation fulfilled. This explains why the 21st, the next on our list, is Jehovistic. The theme is still the same, the Divine faithfulness. It begins: "The king shall joy in thy strength, O Jehovah." Now here, in ordinary circumstances, seeing that the *strength* of God is spoken of, we should have expected *Elohim*. But listen to the explanation which immediately follows: "Thou hast given him his heart's desire, and hast not withholden the request of his lips" (verse 2). This is the keynote of the psalm. There is a loftier thought than even that of the strength of God; behind his power there is the glory of His unfailing truth.

In the 23d Psalm, which celebrates God's Shepherd faithfulness, little need be said to prove the appropriateness of the grandest of the Old Testament names of God. It occurs twice: it is the first word of the psalm, and it is found again among

the very last, and thus, this sweetest of all psalms is bound up within the name that tells of God's faithfulness. It is first of all an argument: "Jehovah is my Shepherd; I shall not want." Why is it that he will not suffer want? What is the ground of this bold assurance? May not the Shepherd forget His charge, or grow weary, and abandon it? The answer is there in the word that first meets the eye; this Shepherd is JEHOVAH. It is, in closing, a hope and a consolation: "Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the house of Jehovah for ever." What he will find there he does not say, nor does he tell why this was to him the crown of all his hopes. Nor did he need to do so. All is already expressed in that one word; it is the house of Jehovah, the Faithful One. If the way has been so full of goodness and mercy, what will the home itself be, the goal towards which from the first Jehovah has been guiding, and for which, in chastening and in blessing, He has ever been preparing us?—The heading to Psalm xxvi. in the E. V. is: "David resorteth unto God in confidence of his integrity." But there was also another ground for his confidence,—Jehovah is a God who keepeth covenant; and thus the psalm, while it asserts the writer's innocence, is throughout an appeal to the Divine faithfulness: "Judge me, Jehovah, for I have walked in mine integrity. I have trusted also in Jehovah, therefore I shall not slide. Examine me, Jehovah, and prove me. . . . I have walked in thy truth. I have not sat with vain persons, neither will I go in with dissemblers" (ver. 1-4).—The leading thought of Ps. xxviii. is the same. Hengstenberg, speaking simply as an expositor, and without the remotest reference to the Divine names, says:—"The situation and the fundamental thought in both (Psalms xxvi. and xxviii.) are, that God cannot bind up together in similarity of outward fate those who inwardly are different, and that the lot of the wicked cannot be the same as that of the righteous." Is not all this expressed when we say that both are Jehovistic psalms, appealing to, or celebrating the Lord's faithfulness? In this psalm we have both: "Unto thee will I cry, Jehovah, my rock; be not silent to me. . . . Hear the voice of my supplications. . . . Draw me not away with the wicked and with the workers of iniquity. . . . Blessed be Jehovah, because

he hath heard the voice of my supplications. Jehovah is my strength and my shield; my heart trusted in him, and I am helped: therefore my heart greatly rejoiceth, and with my song will I praise him" (verses 1-3, 6, 7).

The remaining Jehovistic psalms of the first book are the 32d and the 34th. The former is generally believed to have been written by David on receiving forgiveness of his great sin. He tells how he had sought to obtain peace by banishing all thought of his crime, and stifling his soul's cry. But the cry would not be stilled: "When I kept silence, my bones waxed old through my roaring all day long; for day and night thy hand was heavy upon me; my moisture is turned into the drought of summer" (verses 3, 4). And at last he took the path which God had from of old declared could alone lead to mercy and rest, and he found mercy and rest. The reference of *Jehovah* to God's faithfulness is touchingly indicated in verse 5: "I said, I will confess my transgressions unto Jehovah, and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin." In that one word *Jehovah*, there lay a world of promise and of hope for the broken heart. It whispered in the ear of repentant grief: "If we confess our sins, *He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins.*" The name drew him to the feet of God, and the psalm tells how the promise was kept, and is full of the praise of the Faithful One, who keepeth truth for ever: "And THOU forgavest the iniquity of my sin. For this shall every one that is godly pray unto thee in a time when thou mayest be found; surely in the floods of great waters they shall not come nigh unto him. Thou art my hiding-place, thou shalt preserve me from trouble, thou shalt compass me about with songs of deliverance" (verses 5-7). But in connection with this psalm a special difficulty arises. The 51st is generally believed to be David's prayer for the mercy which is here celebrated; in that psalm, however, *Jehovah* does not once appear; Adonai occurs once, otherwise Psalm li. is purely Elohistie. Does not this militate against our theory? In his prayer for mercy, could the Psalmist shut out from his mind God's faithfulness, or fail to use the name which put God in remembrance, so to speak, of His promises? Now, if we turn to the psalm itself, we shall see that to mark its Elohistie character is to find the key to its interpretation.

It is not a cry for mercy only, *but for renewal*. David, like many another, had fancied himself to be more righteous than he really was; sin was slumbering, and he supposed it did not exist. But the flood of light which burst upon the repentant heart had undeceived him. His need could not be met by blotting out the guilt of that one sin, nor of all that he had ever done. If God did no more than this, the future would merely repeat the past; for the pollution of sin befouled every fibre of his being. "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." The cry for forgiveness became a cry for the new birth, for re-creation; and therefore from first to last the appeal is made to God in His might. It was a task which almighty power alone could accomplish. "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow. . . . Create in me a clean heart, O Elohim, and renew a right spirit within me" (verses 7, 10). In Psalm xxxiv. *Jehovah* occurs no fewer than sixteen times. The reiteration of the name would lead us to expect that the psalm would keep the Divine faithfulness very prominently before us, and that it does so the slightest inspection will convince us. It opens, "I will bless Jehovah at all times, His praise shall continually be in my mouth. My soul shall make her boast in Jehovah, the humble shall hear thereof and be glad. O magnify Jehovah with me, and let us exalt His name together" (verses 1-3). Now, what has excited the Psalmist to this burst of praise? Why are we called upon to unite with him in exalting *the name of Jehovah*? The next words tell us: "I sought Jehovah and he heard me, and delivered me from all my fears" (ver. 4); that is, Jehovah has fulfilled the promise of his name. And, as we proceed, the theme is still God's faithfulness: "This poor man cried, and Jehovah heard him, and saved him out of all his troubles. The angel of Jehovah encampeth round about those that fear him, and delivereth them. . . . O fear Jehovah, ye his saints: there is no want to them that fear him. The young lions do lack and suffer hunger, but they that seek Jehovah shall not want any good thing" (verses 6-10). In the second part of the psalm (verses 11-22), the same aspect of the Divine character is presented in another way. God's faithfulness implies conditions. If we fulfil our

part of the covenant, He will not fail to perform His. "Come, ye children, hearken unto me : I will teach you the fear of Jehovah. . . . The eyes of Jehovah are upon the righteous. . . . The face of Jehovah is against them that do evil. . . . Evil shall slay the wicked, and they that hate the righteous shall be desolate : Jehovah redeemeth the soul of his servants, and none of them that trust in him shall be desolate."

No theory, we believe, could be put to a severer test than this, and, we venture to say, no issue could be more manifestly successful. We have not cited parts of Scripture which bore out our contention, and passed by those whose evidence might be against us. We have taken all the purely Elohistic psalms, and the whole of the purely Jehovistic contained in the first book ; and, without exception, the Elohistic speak more or less plainly of God's might and the Jehovistic of His faithfulness. We not only submit that, while no other theory accords with the facts, this does : we would also express our conviction that it presents us with a valuable exegetical help. The very name applied to God sets us at once at the writer's standpoint. In Exodus xiii. 17-19, there is a sudden break in the almost uniform use of *Jehovah* which characterises both the preceding and subsequent parts of the narrative. In these three verses *Elohim* alone is employed. Alford, in his posthumous commentary, says : "This seems to indicate distinctness of origin for this incorporated fragment. Even those who are fondest of finding subjective reasons for the change of the Divine names have, as far as I have seen, abstained here. Seeing that Israel was especially the people of Jehovah, and is here spoken of as under His special guidance, we might expect to find that His special name here, if anywhere." Now give to *Elohim* its meaning as to every other word in the passage, and not only does the difficulty disappear, the words are even set in a new and welcome light. "And it came to pass, when Pharaoh had let the people go, that Elohim led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near ; for Elohim said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt : but Elohim led the people about," etc. The change of the Divine name from *Jehovah* to *Elohim* quietly, but most effectively, emphasises the truth that this was done, not because God's

arm was not strong enough to smite their foes : the cause was Israel's faithlessness, not God's weakness. What a comment upon unbelief, that THE ALMIGHTY had to change Israel's path and lead them "about through the way of the wilderness". The change in the name indicates the lesson of the story.

There are minor points too which, in this light, acquire a new significance. It may appear, for example, that Gideon's battle-cry, "The sword of the LORD and of Gideon," savours somewhat of presumption. He seems to make himself God's ally. It is not God alone, but God and Gideon, by whom the victory is to be achieved. The difficulty disappears when it is observed that Gideon speaks of Jehovah. He is claiming the fulfilment of a promise. "The LORD (had) said unto him, Surely I will be with thee, and thou shalt smite the Midianites as one man" (Judg. vi. 16). Gideon's cry is simply the expression of his trust in the Divine faithfulness. There is another, though an unseen, sword by the side of his, the sword of Him who keepeth truth and executeth vengeance—the sword of Jehovah. Even in passages where it may seem that our explanation fails, it will be found that there is a depth of meaning in the names, which has long lain concealed. For example, Balaam says to Balak, "God is not a man that he should lie, neither the son of man that he should repent. Hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" (Numb. xxiii. 19.) All this is simply a prolonged representation of God's unchangeableness : why then is not *Jehovah* used—the name of God in His faithfulness rather than the name of God in His might? The next words indicate the answer: "Behold, I have received commandment to bless : and He hath blessed, and *I cannot reverse it*" (ver. 20). There was no more effective way of impressing upon Balak the vanity of contending with God than to name Him here by His name of power. God's unchangeableness would have meant little had it not been for the Almighty strength behind it. But, in the face of the infinite might indicated solely by the name, and the unalterable purpose dwelt upon in the description, what availed all Balaam's arts and all Balak's sacrifices?

We may add that to notice the significance of the names lends no mean aid in dealing with the books of the Old

statement. There are two which have presented the greatest difficulty to students of Scripture; and in each case the Divine name gives us the key to the interpretation. Differently different opinions have been expressed as to the import of *Ecclesiastes*. To some it has seemed the outpouring of a repentant spirit, to others the bitterness and scepticism of a satiated voluptuary. The true view of the book has been well expressed by Bleek: "The whole course of the argument is based everywhere upon the consciousness, expressed in the most distinct way, *that God is the Almighty*, from whom everything proceeds, who gives life, wisdom, and all good things to men, whose working is for everlasting." But it needs no deep study to discover this. To notice the fact that the book is purely Elohistic, that, in other words, the only name of God used throughout is that which designates Him as the infinite power, is to discover the purpose of the book at the very outset. *Ecclesiastes* is a call to submission and joyous trust. We cannot take our lives out of God's hands. We may dash ourselves against His arrangements to our own undoing, or fret under them and fill our lives with misery, but we cannot overthrow or change them. He with whom we have to do is the Almighty. "I know that whatsoever Elohim doeth shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it; and Elohim doeth it that men may fear before him" (iii. 14). "Behold what I have seen to be good: it is pleasant for one to eat and drink and to enjoy the good of all his labour that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life which Elohim giveth him, for it is his portion" (v. 18).—In the two first and the last chapters of *Job*, both names appear. The rest of the book, with one solitary exception (xii. 9), is wholly Elohistic. How this very fact sheds a flood of light upon its dark places. It is solely in this Elohistic portion, containing the speeches of Job and his friends, that the difficulty occurs; and the name they apply to God shows us where they alike erred. Both shut out of view God's faithfulness. Job's "miserable comforters" see nothing of the loving care and infinite purpose of God manifested in the troubles of the righteous: they do not know that God, just because He will give His people an everlasting inheritance, must lead them through the ocean depths and by the wilderness paths. Job, on the other hand,

sees nothing beyond the duty of submission to the Almighty and the eventual justification of the righteous. We might add to these instances, but we forbear. We are convinced that to understand these names of God is to find new light upon every page of the Old Testament Scriptures. The words are not meaningless. They were not taken at random, nor chosen in accordance with arbitrary and mechanical rules. They are laden with thought and feeling, they are full even to-day of that light from the Divine glory which beamed upon each writer's soul; and thus, setting us at his own standpoint, they help us to grasp more clearly the message which he brings.

JOHN URQUHART.

ART. II.—*The Place and Use of Doctrine.*

IT is but echoing an old and authoritative declaration to affirm that the function of Scripture is to make known doctrinal statements as well as practical duties. More than two centuries have passed since the Westminster Assembly put on record as a truth, for the instruction of "such as are of weaker capacity," that the Scriptures principally teach "what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." And thus for generations Presbyterianism at least has inculcated upon its children from their earliest years the fact that the Christian religion is equally and at once a system of faith and a course of life. The practice must have a principle according to which it is framed, and the principle in turn must rest upon a foundation of belief. Men's ordinary conduct is not accidental or unregulated in its action, but moved and moulded consciously or unconsciously by their acceptance of certain doctrines or opinions. In like manner Christian character is the outcome of received and recognised conceptions of God and duty—truths and facts believed in as real and reliable, and as necessary as the manner of life itself to make up the rounded whole of Christianity. What is to be believed and what is to be done alike demand our attention, because they appear as true and essential counterparts of each other. Leaving out either, we deal falsely, because unfairly,

with human experience, and at the same time fail to reach a full and correct understanding of Divine revelation in the greatness of its purpose and the richness of its meaning, as God's message of mercy to man.

When we examine the Bible we find doctrine occupying a large, and often a clearly-defined, place within it. To some it may appear fuller and more systematic than it does to others. Yet none can deny its presence. It is not equally or universally diffused, but wherever and however revealed, must be recognised and dealt with as part and parcel of the record. Just as the miracles are a factor in Christ's life, and cannot be rejected without destroying its sublime harmony, and subverting the simple consistency of the Gospel narratives, so the doctrines of Christianity are essential to its existence and continuance both as a moral system of truth and a conscious spiritual experience. They force themselves upon our attention, refusing alike to be forgotten as antiquated or to be ignored as useless. And their claim to consideration and acceptance is to be answered not by disputation but by disproof.

But while we grant the existence of dogma in revelation and in life, there is yet room for controversy as regards the place it holds, and the purpose it serves, in the economy of religion. And differences have arisen on these points, and been so keenly discussed as to show that the subject is one not merely of general interest, but of pressing importance and peculiar moment in these times. One may hear the complaint made that doctrinal views and confessional statements only burden man's intellectual powers without bringing any compensating blessing to his moral nature, while the assertion is strongly insisted on in reply that the lack of spiritual earnestness and strength, which all alike acknowledge and bemoan, is due to the inability or unwillingness to take a firm grasp and make a right use of dogmatic truth. Now, it may be both parties are in some measure right in their averments. If the symbolic systems of the Churches are looked upon only as digests of learned discussions or collections of abstract propositions, having no more vital power or human influence than mathematical formulæ, they may well be set aside as valueless to man's highest interests. But if, on the other hand, they are

regarded as the embodiments of historical facts and living experiences, if they are recognised as truths that have abiding life in themselves, and on this account furnish the proper sustenance of the soul, they cannot be rejected or neglected without grievous harm and loss. The solidarity of life, both in the way of co-existence and succession, is a Christian conception as well as a natural idea. But in order that this may be realised and felt in conscious experience there must be a process of transmitting and transfusing going on. The history of the past as a record of Divine manifestations and human activities is nothing to us unless as it enters into our breathing life, and is wrought out not merely in the community but in the individual sphere. However richly full and widely-spread, it requires to be gathered up, so to speak, in some complete and practical form, or its power to influence and enrich is dissipated and wasted. Just as the rays of light are concentrated and intensified by the medium of a burning-glass, or the varied colours mingled together in a pencil of light are caught and separated by means of the prism, so the faith and life of the past alike in their unity and diversity are received by us, and act upon us, in character and conduct, not less but more powerfully, through confessional books and dogmatic utterances. Truth in its undefined amplitude affects us little. History as a mere record of facts, apart from its exemplary teaching and philosophic application, wields little influence over the individual or collective mind. In order to make them effective as enlightening and educative agencies they require to be summarised and directed to a certain end. This process takes place to a greater or less extent alike in the domain of the secular and the sacred. The truths and facts of religion cannot be left vague and isolated in shape and sphere. It is when they converge or become condensed into the form of doctrine that they are most easily realised in life—reaching what is their highest and worthiest development, the living reality of experience.

The true place of doctrine then is intermediate between the revelation of truth in its historic form, as generally and universally applicable to man, and the realisation of it as a personal and practical possession by the individual. Now can we regard the connection in this chain of thoughts and

events as temporary in its duration or arbitrary in its character. Facts, doctrines, and experiences are linked together by strongest and closest bonds in a complete and reasonable whole. They lend not merely the harmony of beauty, but the unity of strength to each other. Our moral and spiritual condition is made to suffer through the neglect of the study and appreciation of the Christian system of doctrine—it runs the risk of being weakened and diseased unto death by the rejection in thoughtless ignorance or foolish waywardness of the facts of Christian history. And yet the purpose and use of these have often been strangely misunderstood, and more strangely perverted. It has been attempted by some to accept the ethical teaching of the gospel, and yet deny the facts of Christ's life upon which such teaching is founded; by others to distinguish between life and doctrine as essential and non-essential elements, the latter being of little value at any time, and of no value at all when the life is fairly enkindled. Such separation of history and philosophy in Christianity as a religious system, such disintegration of faith and character in the individual Christian, is unwise in itself, and unwarranted by the relation in which the human mind stands to Divine truth. The utility of facts and principles is not to be unduly limited by time, or injudiciously narrowed in sphere of action. Truth does not become effete through age or impotent by diffusion. The form may become antiquated, but not the substance, and even the form does not become worthless when it has served its more immediate purpose. It remains something more than a mere relic of the past, a body of words from which the soul has fled. Like the living seed found amid the dust of ruined Egyptian sepulchres, and wrapt in the mummy-cloth of forty centuries, God's truth retains its vitality unimpaired, and may be sown in another soil and sprout afresh in later ages.

The idea is abroad that dogma is but a dead-weight dragging down and making burdensome to the heart and mind of man the Divine revelation that is his sustenance and strength in life. Instead of giving help to the better understanding and fuller acceptance of Christianity, its doctrines have been regarded as hindering the true apprehension of its character and power, by demanding an unenlightened and unreasonable

submission to authority, and testing the intensity of affection and thoroughness of obedience of those who wilfully or witlessly are thus enslaved. We find Renan, for instance, complaining of the doctrinal encumbrances that burden and mar the beautiful morality of the Sermon on the Mount. And others take up the cry that the mysteries of our holy religion must be swept aside, as at best useless, at worst troublesome and perplexing to the believing soul. If such complaints and outcries arose only from those who have no faith in the supernatural, either in revelation or in life, perhaps there might be no special call to soothe or satisfy them. But one cannot resist the impression that doctrinal views are regarded as difficulties and discouragements by many who affect no denial of the Divine. Does not such an attitude of mind, however, spring from a false conception of the meaning and purpose of dogma?—from the idea that truth is the fetter of the slave to keep him in constraint, rather than the guide of the freeman to help and encourage him as he travels earnestly and happily onward in the path of life.

Law rightly understood is the true expression of liberty. It takes cognisance of our conditions and relations, and sets forth, in a form permanent and easily remembered, directions for our governance and guidance. Each sphere of life and action must have its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and these, arising from the very fact and mode of existence, require to be affirmed and to some extent formulated. Whether we regard ourselves as members of a family or citizens of a country, we are forced to recognise the interdependence of persons and things, the correlation of authority and protection, and the action and reaction of interests and duties. To know our true position is to know under what obligations we lie to ourselves and others. And what is this but to accept the fact that there are truths of faith and practice wherever our lot is cast, doctrines for the development and discipline of manhood in all its stages and circumstances? Now it is equally evident that the religious life has its connections and corresponding rules of action. Christianity confesses, and claims for its living disciples, a place in a glorious family-circle, a right of citizenship in an everlasting kingdom. Its doctrines are the statements of the conditions under which it

has sprung up, and the laws according to which it is regulated, —the explanations of the varied relations in which the Christian finds himself with regard to spiritual realities. A man must understand where he is, and what he is, before he can learn the range and character of his duties, or hope in any measure to perform them. Does it hinder any one's enjoyment of, or labour in, life to acquaint him with its great and guiding principles, or does any one consider the reception of these as hampering his liberty of will or action? And are we not bound to look upon the dogmas of religion in the light of guides and helps in the spiritual sphere, not to be accepted with hesitation and suspicion, but to be rejoiced in with gratitude and confidence? True as spiritual facts, they are reliable as essential principles. The necessity of relationship involves the necessity of formulated truth as a means of instruction and a rule of conduct. And the more fully and faithfully such truths and principles stand expressed, the more intelligently will they be apprehended and used as ready aids and incitements to the becoming practice of piety.

The revelation of Divine truth in its dogmatic form has clearly as its great purpose the awakening of holier aspirations in the human bosom, and the strengthening of purer habits in the human life. And it is strikingly fitted to accomplish these ends: indirectly, by making known the reason and reasonableness of its commands and ordinances; and directly, by its intrinsic power and beauty as a manifestation of the character and will of God. Such a disclosure rightly appreciated cannot fail to influence the heart. To know God and realise our relationship to him must excite the longing and striving after likeness to him. The Christian character grows by the fuller apprehension of truth, alike in its abstract form as a guiding principle, and in its full embodiment as a living power in the person of Christ. Doctrine thus acts as a cause as well as a reason, explaining how and why we are won to the faith and practice of godliness. In the adaptation of means to ends the wisdom of God is equally apparent in providence and in grace. Causes and effects are not more closely and certainly connected in the natural than in the moral world. The gospel is not merely suitable to, but satisfactory in, the accomplishing of God's purpose of mercy to man. "It

is the power of God (*δύναμις Θεοῦ*) unto salvation to every one that believeth" (Rom. i. 16). The expression means more than a sufficiency of capability to command this result, if awakened, and directed into the right channel. It gives the assurance of an efficiency of energy actually put forth with this intent, and infallibly having this issue in the case of the believer.

That the doctrines of the gospel are fitted to work out the ends of the gospel may be argued from the following considerations :—

(1.) In the very nature of things, truth received must have an outcome. Man is not a mere dead sea, getting but never giving. Rather he is a living lake, into which the rich treasure of streams is ever pouring, freshened by the ceaseless play of sunny breezes upon its bosom, and overflowing in a deep, full current. Truth is vital and pervasive, permeating the whole manhood. And the acceptance of it not merely gives the opportunity, but prepares the way, for its effectual inworking. The power to affect and mould is acknowledged alike by him who is conscious of the process in his own personal experience, and by him who studies its results in the case of others. Whatever the dogmatic truth may be, the natural and necessary consequence of its belief becomes apparent.

(2.) The nature of religious truth is of such a kind as to warrant the expectation that it will exert a wholesome influence over the life. Christian doctrine is not like scientific statement, contented with simply commending itself to the intellect. It has a moral force that makes it effective upon the emotions and the will—a spiritual authoritativeness that lays hold of the conscience, and claims to form and fashion the character. Beyond the speculative interest awakened by the gospel—and this is invaluable as a stimulus and a discipline to the mind—lies the more important, nay, all-essential, practical bearing of its truths upon the heart. The principles of Christianity are active powers. They do not merely inculcate opinions, but prescribe rules, and furnish motives for right conduct. In setting forth what is to be believed, they reveal at the same time how and why the articles of faith become the foundation and strength of morality.

(3.) The higher warrants and stronger motives afforded by

the revelation and inculcation of Christian doctrine tend to the rise and progress of godliness. Biblical truth comes with more authority and impressiveness than the teaching of any worldly philosophy. The sage, however pure-minded and true to the nature of things, lacks the special gift claimed and enjoyed by the prophet and the apostle. Their guiding thoughts and words flow from a higher source and through a holier channel than men's ordinary knowledge. And thus are they fitted and intended to touch the springs of action more deeply, and guide more surely the current of the life. The moral instruction of the wise of olden times failed on two accounts. It aimed at outward virtuousness, and neglected the culture of the heart. And it did not give sufficient reasons, or reveal satisfactory motives, for the carrying out of its requirements. But the teaching of Scripture, on the contrary, addresses itself to the heart, and, by seizing and renewing it, changes the whole man. From within, and not from without, is the conduct restrained and regulated. Altered thoughts and purified feelings betray themselves in speech and behaviour. The presence of powerful motives also distinguishes the Christian system from all merely philosophic schemes, and gives it an effectual hold in the world. However interesting and beautifully-contrived the instrument, of what value is it, if it cannot be used? To what purpose the principles and precepts that have no power to constrain or compel acceptance or obedience? They must fail in their end if that is anything higher than the excitation of admiring curiosity. It is not so with the doctrines of the gospel. Just as they aim at the enlightenment and sanctification of the man, so they possess means and motives for the accomplishment of this high and holy purpose.

(4.) The dogmas of Christianity are ever linked in thought and word with the idea of influence and formative power in regard to the conduct. Not by itself or for itself is truth declared. It has and must have an ulterior object, to the gaining of which it is directed. Knowing and being are linked together by moral as well as metaphysical bonds of union. And knowledge becomes truly valuable and useful when it is regarded as the right and befitting means for the production of the great end of existence. It is evident to every reader of the Gospels that Christ invariably regards the revelation of

his mission, and the doctrinal statements he sets forth, as not merely instruction to the mind, but guidance to the conscience and purification to the heart. What he declares of the relationship subsisting between God and man, what he proclaims of his own mediatorial position and work, bears within it the power to purge from evil and mould to good. And the apostles, alike in their spoken discourses as recorded in the Book of Acts, and in their formal and systematic treatises as embodied in the Epistles, plainly expound and apply doctrine to the purpose of exciting holier living. Sometimes they take for granted, quietly assuming without express affirmation or explicit argument, the consistency of faith and works. At other times they show and prove the necessary connection between sincere belief of the truth and faithful walking in the truth—insisting that a godly life can only be built up in strength and symmetry upon right principles, and that the acceptance of the gospel requires and demands the carrying out in character and conduct of its living tenets and pure, ennobling precepts.

The creed of Christendom, thoroughly understood and sincerely accepted, is not, and cannot become, a mere lifeless collection of historic facts, or a cold system of philosophic abstractions. There is a vital warmth that glows and pulses through it. And this is no artificial flush of fervour caught from the ardour of those who compiled it, or communicated by the enthusiasm of him who confesses it. Light and heat are in the truths themselves, nor can they be altogether clouded or chilled by the medium through which they are called to pass. However imperfectly comprehended, they remain influential, by their own inherent power, apart from any extraneous aid, illuminating the character with radiant purity, and inflaming the life with burning zeal. "A real apprehension of the character of God and His purposes towards us, and our relation to Him, without any mention of the precepts, would spontaneously produce the life of them within our souls."¹

But in opposition to all such averments it is said that, as an actual and patent fact, doctrinal views have not realised the practical results thus claimed for them. Whatever may be thought of the theory, the practice is unhesitatingly challenged.

¹ Erskine's *Letters*.

inconsistencies, contradictions are pointed out, and the conclusion is drawn that belief has no necessary connection with morality, or even, it is insinuated, that the creed must be false and immoral which has its outcome in such unworthy conduct.

The condition of the world, so long familiar with Christianity and influence, yet so darkened and degraded, is presented in illustration—the faults and follies of professing Christians, only to acknowledge the letter, but little evincing the spirit of the gospel, are set forth in array as pertinent and powerful arguments. Now it must be confessed that the world is not what it ought to be, and many that claim the credit of belonging to the company of believers reflect no honour upon their cause.

It would be an unwarranted and reckless assertion to say that on this account the doctrines of the gospel are powerless for good. And equally would it be unjustifiable to make the Church responsible for the guilty conduct of one and another who profess to accept, yet never seek to practise, its precepts. Just as on the one hand there are persons whose life is purer and nobler than one would expect, considering the political and religious views they hold, so on the other there are persons whose character is singularly at variance with the sentiments they utter, and whose daily course of action is almost a libel upon the name they bear. Men are not always rational either in their opinions or in their ways. The will, especially the self-will, introduces at times a disturbing element, setting all our theorisings and calculations at naught. But such exceptional cases are not to be regarded as of any great consequence on the one side or the other. They leave the matter very much where it stood, to be proved or disproved by evidence better in itself and wider in its range. The fullness and intensity of influence are to be judged of not by special or individual instances, but by the general effects produced. And the tendency of thought and belief shows itself most powerfully and correctly in the simple and natural workings of ordinary life in every-day circumstances.

Making due allowance for all that can fairly be affirmed of man's evil doings, notwithstanding the prevalence of Christianity, one may still with all confidence argue that the belief is well fitted to rule and regulate the conduct. The objection urged in reality has no foundation and no strength as affecting the

real question at issue. If we were contending, for instance, that the existence of doctrine *per se*, and altogether irrespective of its acceptance or neglect, is conducive to higher morality and piety, there might be some force in what is alleged; or if the assertion were boldly made that professed attachment to a system of truth results everywhere and always, in spite of indwelling evil and outward temptation, in the purity and perfection of godliness, there would be real validity of opposition in the appeal to the untoward circumstances of society at large. But it is beside the point to attain the Church's creed because the world is evil, or to deny the influence it exerts over those who own it because it fails to restrain and reform those who do not yield themselves to its sway. There is much misdirected argumentation and more misplaced sentiment lost through the lack of ability or willingness to distinguish things which differ. And in moral and religious matters this is specially observable. The difficulty of discrimination is greater, and the liability to deception from personal prejudice or relative circumstances is vastly increased.

In estimating the worth of the counter-statement that the actual condition of things is opposed to the idea of Christian doctrine conducing to Christian life, we must remember—

(1.) That the world as such is not actuated by a regard for the gospel—has not as a matter of fact received its principles. There is a clear and full distinction drawn in Scripture between the world and the church, and this for the most part rests upon the acceptance or rejection of Divine truth. Nor does the actual experience of life, when rightly considered, contradict the testimony thus borne by the Word. No doubt there is a tendency, sometimes a persistent attempt, shown to obliterate any such boundary-marks, but the separation nevertheless remains a fact practically as well as theologically. The two kingdoms have different citizens, and are constituted and governed according to entirely different principles. The world-spirit has nothing in common with living Christianity. It is held by other beliefs and controlled by other forces. And so the condition of those that are under it presents not a parallel but a contrast to the estate of "those not of the world." However much alike in certain circumstances, the two are

essentially opposed in character, and when closely examined are easily discriminated. The motive-power makes itself known in spite of all efforts at concealment, and society at large evinces by its manners and morals what spirit it is of. Not here are to be sought or will be found the fruits of faith. The world at large settles not the question of the relationship of creed and conduct. It cannot be summoned as a witness, for it has no standing in the case. Whatever testimony it bears to folly and sin, arises not from the presence but from the absence of true and living belief.

Yet, again, in weighing the matter as thus presented, we must consider—(2.) That many who profess to accept Christian doctrine hold it so loosely, or hold it in concert with opinions so opposed to its morality, that it never gets fair and full development in life. Truth cannot be held responsible for the error which may be mingled with it, or for the falsehood which may be alleged against it. Just as manifold crimes have been committed in the name of liberty, and guilt has often been sheltered under the plea of justice, so unrighteous lives have claimed the sanction of the purest motives and the most hallowed principles. It is no new thing to “turn the grace of God into lasciviousness,” and to make the strictest precepts of morality a palliation or even an excuse for the grossest vice. The experience of unfaithfulness in the first age of the Church has been repeated more or less in every succeeding epoch. Men are to be found who “hold the truth in unrighteousness,” but only because the truth is so feebly grasped that it sends no thrill of life and warmth through the soul. And it is no unfrequent thing to find it so misunderstood and misdirected that its proper and native influence is neither felt nor owned. No doctrine is rightly judged in its fruits where the soil has not been prepared for its sowing and room is not allowed for its growth. Is the seed to be condemned as bad or useless because it springs not up on the pathway, or gives no rich harvest in the rocky ground or among the thorns? As foolish would it be to deny the value or power of dogmatic truth because it brings not forth the Christian graces, where it is neither heartily received nor carefully nurtured. The claim that it suits or sanctions evil, made by those who are under the dominion of unhallowed lusts,

can in no whit prove it to be false in itself or futile in the tendency of its teaching.

One might rest contented with rebutting in this fashion the allegation of the practical powerlessness of creed in ordinary life. Perhaps it is undeserving of further or more explicit consideration, seeing it is so completely aside from the real point at issue, and is more shadowy than substantial as an objection. But it may be well to show how groundless the charge becomes when it is met and answered by the true facts of the case. Without much search in the past or present, one is able to present evidence of a positive kind sufficient to overthrow any assertions or arguments thus brought forward.

(3.) Where thoroughly understood and accepted, Christian doctrine has actually had the good tendency, and exerted the salutary influence laid claim to, and the more fully it has been appreciated the more powerfully it has acted. Appeal may be made without hesitation or reserve to the history of different Churches, and to the life-experience of individual believers. Laxity of faith has led to latitudinarianism in opinion and licence in conduct. Dogmatic truth has been doubted, or not held fast and held forth in the love of it, and men have strayed into error through lack of guidance, and sunk in the morasses of falsehood and folly, allured onward by the will-o'-the-wisps of airy fancies and hazy speculations. There are many instances in earlier and later times of such falling away from the faith of the gospel being followed up by utter neglect of religious ordinances, and decline, if not destruction, of moral life. But the truth thus taught by contrast stands confirmed by explicit testimony and example. The "beacons of warning" reveal the risk to which each Christian community is exposed, and the ruin into which it shall inevitably rush through doctrinal unfaithfulness. And to many such a mode of instruction is the most effective and salutary means of convincing the mind and leading to a practical result. They are "saved by fear," and learn the true value of right principles by seeing the bitter consequences of no principles, or principles that are wrong. This is not the case, however, with all, perhaps even with the majority of men. And so it is necessary for their sakes to make use of direct argument, and call up in evidence illustrations of a strictly positive kind.

Nor are these wanting to support and substantiate what has been urged in regard to the influence and importance of doctrine in moulding life. One might summon past and present adherents of the doctrines of grace, strictly so called, and from their lips learn how these are regarded as motive and formative in character, or, from their walk and conversation, judge of the intensity and range of their moral tendency. With perfect unanimity would testimony be borne in favour. Never have such tenets been adopted under the conviction that they would lead to, or even allow of the practice of, vice. Nor will any one readily be found who imputes his fall under the power of temptation, or his continuance in open sin, to the fact of his firm belief in such truths. Yet it is no uncommon thing for opponents to denounce the proclamation and acceptance of these as tending toward, if not directly encouraging, looseness of conduct. But, when the proof is demanded, vague assertions are submitted instead of convincing arguments and patent facts. The very charges are strikingly disproved by the moral condition of communities and Churches holding these doctrines most fully and faithfully. And equally are they hurled back by the sentiments and virtuous lives of individuals. We repudiate as illogical and unwarranted the conclusions thus drawn to the prejudice of gospel-dogma, and not merely challenge their truthfulness by appeal to the actual state of matters, but, by the same illustrative process, vindicate and establish the claim already made, that true doctrine has a real and lasting power for good upon those who believe it.

Perhaps it may be said, however, that the practical question, in so far as the most of men are concerned, remains unsettled, if not in great measure untouched, by controversies of this kind. It may be all true enough that belief moulds character and influences conduct where it is consciously and reasonably entertained. And it may be equally admitted that, in many cases, the life is not fashioned and guided by full realisation of, and direct appeal to, articles of faith. With such facts meeting us in the face, and knowing that the thorough discussion of doctrinal views is not competent, through lack of opportunity and ability, to vast numbers, would it not be well to let the matter rest? If it is unjustifiable to assert that dogma

has no living worth, is not the opposite proposition, that it is essential and invaluable, equally inadmissible? After all, is not the outcome this, that it is not of such paramount importance that it cannot be dispensed with, and that, for the ordinary ends of man's well-being, it may be regarded as of little or limited account? Now, whatever measure of truth or falsehood may be allowed to these vague utterances of undefined feeling rather than of settled conviction, it would neither be prudent nor advisable to leave ourselves and others in so insecure and assailable a position. The appeal to indifference is in any case unwise, and here it is also strikingly unworthy. For, in the very nature of things, men will gravitate from such an unsteady mental situation just as surely as they will be moved from a condition of unstable bodily equilibrium. And it is but a poor recognition of their powers to bid them be unemployed in the settlement of what is not merely an interesting, but, in some aspects at least, an important problem. Nor can one, without hazard, adopt this attitude of unconcern. It will certainly tend to weaken the grasp of moral principle, as all remissness invariably does sooner or later. And feebleness is apt to give the occasion, if it does not actually afford the cause, of failure. It courts attack, and is little prepared to withstand it. There is exposure on all hands, an exposure that will readily be taken advantage of to the injury and loss of him who is so careless or neglectful.

The lack of interest in, and regard for, doctrinal teaching and belief has not merely been excused in such general terms as those now considered, but defended by certain pleas and reasonings of a specious and popular kind. Nor is it difficult to find arguments for ignorance and indifference in regard to moral and spiritual things. Men are predisposed by nature to rest contented in this condition, and do not require much to be said in its favour to assure them that it is the best. The appearance of argument is sufficient for conviction when the heart is already captivated. It is not necessary either to be fertile in the invention of new reasons, or earnest in the repetition of old, to win assent to what is accepted or wished for. And the very character as well as the reception of the defences made in behalf of doctrinal unconcern abundantly show this.

We are made familiar with the statement, for it meets us in many shapes and in many quarters—

1. That sincerity is all that is requisite. The stress is laid **not** upon the matter of faith, but upon the manner in which it is exercised; nay, even upon the fact that it is in existence at **all**. It is not the kind and character of the belief that is held **important**, but the attitude and earnestness of the believer. **If** there is only thoroughness of conviction and faithful adherence to what is accepted as truth, all will come out right. **Now**, purity of purpose and strict honesty of intention are of **the** most essential consequence in spiritual as in social life. **No** article of faith can be of any solid worth to the individual **unless** it is received with unfeigned truthfulness. But it is **alike** illogical and improper to argue from this that belief in **anything**, or belief in nothing, if only it is strong and pure, is **as** honouring to God and as valuable to ourselves as the acceptance of sound doctrine. However highly we esteem **the** honesty of faith, it will bring but a disappointing result **unless** it is the good word of the kingdom that is believed. **It** is vain to imagine that the intensity of grasp or the simple trustfulness of apprehension will change the character of what is laid hold of. The more completely one leans on a broken reed, thinking that it is a stalwart oak, the more surely and speedily one is hurled to the ground. To be safe there must not merely be trust, but something trustworthy to which to cling. It is as possible to be sincere in the attachment to error as in the regard for truth. And however pure the motives and praiseworthy the intentions of one who follows false teaching, these, backed by the truest earnestness, will neither save him from deception nor afford much consolation under it. The utter insufficiency of such a guiding principle as mere sincerity of conviction will be apparent when we apply it to the concerns of ordinary life. To conduct business or carry out scientific pursuits in such a fashion would excite ridicule and amazement. Knowledge is demanded as a primary requisite—reliable information in regard to facts and recognised rules or forms. And it is only when a certain amount of truth consonant to the particular branch of trade or study has been actually gained that earnest and sincere action becomes valuable to promote the end in view. Without the

"articles of agreement" as a basis of operation there can only be enthusiastic impulse or eccentric movement instead of painstaking endeavour or sure progress. What cannot work well in common things can scarcely be relied upon as sufficient or satisfactory in the ordering of man's higher life. Nor would it be either a proper or a prudent policy to adopt as a motive power for ourselves principles, however apparently healthful in particular cases, which are found to be invalid or unfit for universal application.

2. Goodness in life, it is affirmed, is the essential matter. Men are to be concerned not about creed, but character. Deeds, rather than doctrines, works of faith rather than words of faith, demand attention. The test of noble worth in manhood is not accepted dogmas but acceptable service, by the exhibition of consistent conduct and the performance of acts of benevolence. In such fashion do many excuse their lack of interest in definite theological statements, or even vindicate their right to treat all religious opinions as equally valueless. And the proof-text of indifference is furnished by the oft-quoted couplets from Pope's *Essay on Man*—

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.
For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

That there is a measure of general truth in language of this kind, and in the thought underlying it, may readily be admitted. It is the natural protest against the sacrifice of living power at the shrine of dead principles. And no true advocate of doctrinal purity will commend a system of sound words as a substitute for moral blamelessness of life. He will demand as earnestly and consistently as the other that the conduct shall be single-hearted in its purpose and unselfish in its character. There can be no contradiction between faith and works when the nature and conditions of these are rightly understood. But what God hath joined men often attempt to put asunder in theory, because they are unwilling to submit to the unity in practice. To excuse inconsistencies in life a high profession of soundness in the faith is made, and, on the other hand, to palliate culpable ignorance or carelessness with regard to revealed truth,

rightness in business relations, and kindliness of disposition and action, are appealed to. Such a mode of procedure is just to both interests. It is not in the separation of creed and conduct, but in the mutual and harmonious union of the two that man reaches his full stature. And no one can afford to be indifferent about "modes of faith" unless he is prepared to leave it an open question whether his "life is in the right." He may shut his ears against the din of contending sects, but he forbids the entrance of the truth whose meaning is in doubt, it will be at the expense of living power. For when is life in the right, and how does it become and remain in that condition? Is it not when knowledge and action aid and abet each other? when simple faith in the doctrines of Christianity gives support to, and stands confirmed by, fervent and faithful adherence to its practices? However true and noble the outward manner of life, it must have originated, apart from, but in union with, conviction. A more or less apprehension of truth and of obligation to it lies as the motive power, concealed and unacknowledged it may be, in its character. And the neglect of this must in the long-run act disastrously. The warm heart may at times control the cool logical head—the earnest life may hide for a while the influence of settled principles; but it is for the most part the reverse. Where no regard is paid to doctrinal straight-forwardness or stability, it will become evident in the growing unsettledness and lack of beautiful consistency in the whole character and style of the man. The honest and good heart, however much it may be valued in itself, will furnish but a disappointing and profitless harvest where it is not sown with the true, fruitful seed of the kingdom.

There is yet another objection of a philosophic as well as scientific kind that cannot be passed over in silence. To what advantage this study of dogma, and why should one trouble himself, it is asked, in determining the truth or falsity of any particular doctrine? There is no necessity in the nature of things for coming to a decision, and it will make little difference to man's present state and future prospects what decision he comes to in regard to religious opinions and modes of faith. For, it is argued—

. Men are not responsible for their belief. It comes to them

not by act of will, but by circumstances beyond their control, like the place of their birth: it is beyond their interference to alter as much as their natural colour. And so they are not blameworthy, however much they may be commiserated, for the presence or absence, the truth or falsehood, of theological views. A creed is an accidental encumbrance that may be laid upon a man or lifted from off him according to his physical condition or moral surroundings. He cannot control his mind in such matters, or force himself to accept doctrine. And thus no one is to be commended or condemned for his belief or for the lack of it. There is no room for judgment upon ourselves or others. Such a condition of things reminds us of Gibbon's account of the Paganism of Rome: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful."

But upon what evidence is this theory of non-responsibility built up? Has it the logic of reasoning, or the teaching of history, or the facts of individual experience, as its basis and as the material of its construction? None of these are appealed to, but only the supposed deductions of a materialistic philosophy and the vague assertions of a poetic theosophy. And between the two, man's soul, with all its moral powers and spiritual activities, is got rid of,—degraded by the one to the level of brute nature, sublimated by the other to the essence of divinity. Perhaps in such a case argument would be as much out of place in our contention as it is wanting in what is thus presented before us. Certainly it is not called for to overthrow the opposition, or to maintain against any assaults of this kind the citadel of truth. One might well rest contented with a simple denial of the proposition that man is not responsible for his belief. It falls to the ground for lack of proof, whereas man's responsibility may readily be vindicated in different ways. Diversity in moral judgments between civilised and heathen nations, and variety of estimate in regard to the importance of particular doctrines, do not afford any valid objection. These are perfectly compatible with the duty of "proving all things and holding fast that which is good." Nor do they in any measure sanction the idea that religious truth is unknowable in itself or unimportant in its character.

Rather such divergencies argue the liberty and right to form opinion, and thus indirectly involve what they are supposed by many to discountenance, the moral necessity of gaining and using right notions of God and of man's relationship to him.

If man is accountable for his actions, it must be because he is a free and moral agent. And to this consciousness bears witness. But the disposition that gives its character to the action is equally a matter of accountability, for however fixed the original temperament may be, it is not lawless and unregulated, but controlled by reason and conscience. Nor is the region of thought and opinion to be regarded as altogether outside the sphere of moral responsibility. The mental condition is in measure at least dependent upon the use or abuse of opportunities and means of knowledge. Ignorance and misunderstanding are blameworthy when caused by neglect or wilfulness. And so our faith or lack of faith may be due to action or inaction on our part, and on this account, as well as from the fact that feeling, desire, will, restrain and modify our appreciation and apprehension of truth, we are compelled to acknowledge responsibility for belief. But the measure of responsibility, however variable a quantity—and it differs in individual cases according to the strength of evidence and the advantages, mental and social, of the man,—does not at all affect its reality. Whatever modifications take place are in the way, not of subverting, but confirming the fact, for they only show the limitations and variations under which this essential principle of human nature and experience may exist. Arguing from man's condition and circumstances in the world, or appealing to the consciousness of each individually, we reach the same result. Not that all will confess in words either the feeling or the fact. But taking the simple self, unwarping by prejudice, and under no necessity to find a reason or excuse for unworthy conduct, from it we receive the fullest testimony. And even the very intensity of opposition may furnish evidence in favour, for "why the invectives against dogmas except upon the supposition that men are responsible for framing and maintaining them? If they are not, men should be left alone; if they are, they are to be thought of as worse and better for their intellectual creeds."

The sense of responsibility beyond all doubt exercises a

most powerful and wholesome influence over the whole man. Let it be properly realised, and the high moral character bears witness to its effective inworking; but let it be loosened or lost, and the honesty of purpose and uprightness of action are certain to suffer thereby. Every-day observation and experience will abundantly prove this, whether we consider individuals or communities of men. Regard for religious belief, thorough acceptance of a true and pure doctrinal system, ennobles the mind and enriches the moral life, whereas the rejection or the neglect of this weakens the motive powers and stunts the living graces of real manhood. This is the conclusion to which we have come after thus considering what is said on the one side and the other. And however imperfectly the work has been done by us, certainly it is a work in itself that deserves and will repay fullest treatment by the most competent hand. One who seems as much at home, and as truly in earnest, in religious as in political matters, and who never speaks without commanding the deepest attention and respect, thus bears witness to the importance of this question of doctrine:—"To uphold the integrity of the Christian dogma, to trace its working and to exhibit its adaptation to human thought and human welfare, in all the varying experience of the ages, is, in my view, perhaps the noblest of all tasks which it is given to the human mind to pursue. This is the guardianship of the great fountain of human hope, happiness, and virtue."¹

ROBERT SANDERS.

ART. III.—*Conscience and the Blood of Sprinkling.*

A VERY strong argument for the strictly substitutionary, propitiatory, justice-satisfying character of the sacrifice of Christ may be presented and pressed from the fact of his blood being called the "blood of sprinkling," and spoken of, as it is so often in Holy Scripture, as having such bearing on the conscience—the peace, the purity, and the health of the conscience.

¹ Gladstone's *Essays*, vol. vi. p. 144.

Such argument is, in these days, assuredly not unnecessary, as must be known to all who are acquainted with the lines on which modern theological speculation runs. In the earlier decades of the century the Socinian view of Christ's death as an example—an example of patience under suffering—was almost the only theory antagonistic to the Westminster doctrine of propitiation which the Church was called on to contend against. And very noble and satisfactory were her contentings. Nor are they yet to be dispensed with. For that such a doctrine is eminently and fatally destructive of the truth as it is unto salvation we need scarcely say; and poorly equipped, indeed, for the office of the ministry must that unfortunate man be, who has not a heart-hatred for Socinianism, and a quiver well filled with deadly arrows against its soul-destroying errors, and especially this fundamental one. For no intelligent theologian can hesitate to give us his hearty concurrence when we say that in view of this leading tenet, Socinianism is even worse than Popery itself. Roman Catholicism has never abandoned the great leading truth of Christianity. Many even of her perversions of the truth are built on the great leading doctrine that the sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ was truly a propitiation for the sins of mankind. The very Mass itself might be mentioned as a testimony to this great truth. And while many of her tenets are fitted with diabolical ingenuity to make it void, still it is there, rendering these perversions themselves unintelligible without it. So much so is this true, that no intelligent Christian, if shut up to make a choice between Romanism and Socinianism, could have a moment's difficulty; because while by a simple combination of grace and providence, though born and brought up under the influence of Romanism, it might be possible to throw off the superincumbent mass of Romanising perversions, and find and feed upon the catholic truth of Christ and him crucified, there is nothing in Socinianism to favour the "precious redemption" of souls at all. We trust to meet in a better world with many who have lived and died in the communion of the Romish Church,—a hope which the entire ignoring of anything to be called real "reconciliation with God" on the part of the votaries of Socinianism renders simply impossible.

And, indeed, Socinianism is, and ever will continue to be,

the Church's most deadly antagonist. Notwithstanding the more fascinating aspects in which the Broad-Churchism of these later decades has succeeded in presenting a negative theology of "*example*," even when "*self-sacrifice*," and "*martyrdom*," and "*fidelity amidst suffering*," are contended for, the notion of "*example*" is, after all, the essence of every view of the Cross which fails to present it as a substitutionary sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice, and reconcile us unto God. In whatever fresh and constantly changing forms anything less than *that* chooses to present itself, it will uniformly be found that radically and at bottom it is really nothing more than a Socinian evasion of the idea of atonement, propitiation, substitutionary and juridical sacrifice. The arguments that suffice to overthrow Socinianism overthrow Broad-Churchism too. There are, indeed, these two alternatives, and no more—the orthodox "*sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice*," and the Socinian interpretation of "*example*." In all cases it is towards Socinianism that the natural man inevitably gravitates, because the other passes a severer condemnation upon himself than he can bear. He is content, from his want of conviction of sin, to take up with any view of the Cross that allows him to escape without assenting, and (especially) consenting, to those juridical views of sin in which the conviction essentially consists. Is "*sin any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God*"? Does every sin, as such, "*deserve God's wrath and curse, both in this life and in that which is to come*"? Then, without entering into any moral philosophy of the nature, origin, and function of conscience, enough to say that conscience is that faculty which consents unto the truth of these things: and if so, there is, staring us in the face, in point of fact, a juridical case already, calling for juridical redemption such as we have in view when, in the language of every Calvinistic church on earth, we say: "*Christ executes the office of a priest, in his once offering up of himself a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice, and reconcile us unto God; and in making continual intercession for us.*"¹ The whole Westminster, which is the catholic doctrine of sin and sacrifice-for-sin—wrath as sin's desert, and reconciliation as the result of such sacrifice—is seen to hold beautifully

¹ Shorter Catechism.

ther. The same thing is true of a correct representation of and of Christ's sacrifice for sin. The desert of sin must respond with his design of sacrifice for sin. If the real ure of sin be denied, as violation of necessary and truly al law ; and if (consequently) the righteousness of God's th and curse fail to be recognised ;—if, on the contrary, the ion be that sin is a calamity or a disease for which the quate attitude of the Divine mind must be compassion, th or curse would then only be synonymous with hatred l grudge—cruel hatred and degrading grudge, or rage ;—in t case, the only existing or tenable pre-supposition of holy, ice-satisfying, or reconciliatory sacrifice is altogether ab- ; and defence of the Westminster doctrine of the Cross omes impossible.

ur views of sacrifice-for-sin must be determined by our s of sin itself, and these again by our views of moral law. ere moral law is assimilated to laws of nature, and trans- sion of *it* to transgression of them, in the very nature of gs sin becomes more a calamity to be deplored than a inality to be condemned, and place cannot be found in 's minds for the idea of a propitiatory sacrifice. If a man ot say, " Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done in thy sight ; that thou mightest be justified when thou kest, and be clear when thou judgest," then how can he be ng to add, " Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean ; e me, and I shall be whiter than snow " ?

here is a passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 13, 14) h may at this stage be somewhat carefully examined, with ntage to our argument :—" If the blood of bulls and of goats, the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth e purifying of the flesh ; how much more shall the blood of st, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without to God, purge your conscience from dead works, to serve living God ? "

is evident that it contains one central and absolute and emely important proposition : " The blood of Christ purges conscience to serve the living God." The proposition, ever, is not put forward in this gaunt and naked form. It t off and enriched by a twofold rhetorical method. There *first*, the use of a comparison drawn from the Old Testament

ordinances, according to the use and wont of this archaic and beautifully variegated epistle, and followed by an argumentative "how much more?"—enforcing the still more obvious certainty that Christ's sacrifice for sin is efficaciously such as is being pleaded for. Into the nature, design, and results of those ancient and divinely appointed ordinances, with their certain action and unquestioned efficacy, we need not now enter, further than to notice these two essential points;—(1) that they were not matters of will-worship, but indeed appointed by Divine authority; and (2) that they carried with them undoubted efficaciousness for the ends for which they were instituted. Poor types or illustrations of the sacrifice of Christ they would have been had they not! But of the fact that "the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctified unto the purifying of the flesh," thoroughly removing in God's own way all disability for, access to, and engagement in, the worship of God as instituted and maintained in Israel of old, there could be, and was, no doubt whatever. And that the assertion of this undoubted fact was entitled to be followed by the "how much more?" when asserting the efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ is equally plain; while the otherwise absolute and somewhat bald-like statement of what is really the leading and invaluable proposition (concerning the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice) is, as we have said, both rhetorically enriched and argumentatively sustained.

But apart from this equally striking and powerful comparison, there is (2) a whole galaxy of considerations, rendering to the great central proposition the same service, in the words, "The blood of *Christ*, who, *through the eternal Spirit*, offered himself without spot to God." None of these considerations—and we find four of them, all equally conclusive—enter grammatically into what we called the great fundamental proposition which the inspiring Spirit is desirous of teaching us. That proposition is complete at once in point of grammar and logic and rhetoric without them. But that various really enhancing and enriching considerations are presented to our notice by these accessory statements, it may be important to tarry long enough to show.

First. Thus, as bearing vitally upon the efficacy of the

sacrifice, we are called to remember that he who offered it is the "Christ;" no private individual, engaging in a private and non-official transaction, but "the Christ" of God, divinely appointed by supreme Divine authority, and anointed and qualified by the Divine Spirit (Luke iv. 1) for offering a powerful, public, priestly, and efficacious atonement.

Secondly, We have the great thought that he was personally and perfectly holy: which he required to be—both the spotless Lamb of God, if he would take away the sin of the world (John i. 29), as well as a not only duly appointed but adequately furnished high priest; for "such an high priest became us, who was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners" (Heb. vii. 26). And in close alliance with that holiness, which "became" at once the object of worship (Heb. ii. 14), the offerer and the client (Heb. vii. 26), and which is so often adverted to as essential to "the Christ" who would redeem us, both as an acceptable Lamb of sacrifice and the efficacious high priest of our profession, we are taught to regard his resurrection and ascension, when, without either a break or a pause in his statements, the writer to the Hebrews goes on to tell us that he is now "made higher than the heavens" (Heb. vi. 26-27).

Thirdly, It would be an unpardonable mistake to omit pointing how powerfully discriminated and distinguished from all merely typical sacrifices that of Christ is, by his being priest as well as sacrifice,—a consideration never forgotten or omitted by the Spirit of truth—"He offered up *himself*."

And, *Fourthly*, The efficaciousness, acceptableness (to the Father, of course), and unsearchable perfection and glory of this sacrifice of Christ, are all affirmed in the strongest possible manner when it is declared that He achieved and presented this Sacrifice on the Cross in the utmost that even the eternal Spirit could enable Him to do, by filling his person and action with all the moral excellency and glory that he could create and impart to his person—"He through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot unto God."

Each of these four considerations enters vitally into the reality, efficacy, glory, and acceptableness to God, even the Father, of the propitiatory sacrifice for us which Christ offered on the Cross. And we might descant almost to any extent on

each of them, if our intention was to give a full exposition of the passage of Holy Scripture in which the *insignis locus* and this illustrious congeries of statements occur.

But after all that we could say—and there is scarcely **any** end to what might relevantly, forcibly, and with advantage **be** said on these great themes of theology—it still remains **an** indubitable, and to any clear-thinking mind it is, in point of fact, an undoubted truth that the grand thought is independent of them, and sufficient by itself alone to engross attention : “The blood of Christ purges the conscience from dead **works** to serve the living God.” And what possible meaning **such** language can have on any supposition anent the sacrifice of Christ which traverses the great truth that it is propitiatory, atoning, satisfying Divine justice, and righteously reconciling us to God, to a justly angry God, cleansing our persons **also** even unto the utmost depths of conscience from all imputation of sin both in God’s sight and our own, the moment we *concur* with him, and have *conscience* with him in our case as it **really** stands in his view, and as it ought to stand, and *does* stand in our own, if we have due conviction of sin,—it is impossible to see. Our argument will be strengthened by a careful examination of these great words.

“Dead works” are works done in a state of spiritual death. A man’s works are as the man himself is : If alive unto God, his works will be living ; if spiritually dead, so also will **his** works be. Dead in trespasses and sins, the unconverted **and** uncalled sinner cannot present a living sacrifice. The **very** “ploughing of the wicked is sin” (Prov. xxi. 4). Cut off from God personally, so also are his works, and therefore “dead.” It is the great principle that Christ himself pleads for : “**Ma**ke the tree good if you would have the fruit good ;” “An evil **tree** cannot bring forth good fruit, neither can a good tree **bring** forth corrupt fruit.” So also, “In that a man liveth, he **live**th unto God.” For he is the “Living God,” and, as such, **to** he effectually called and truly believing serve him. They “**serve** the living God.” Naturally we do not consider God for **any** practical purpose as the “living God.” The man whose **works** are “dead,” or who has not been “purged from dead **works**,” does not consider his God as “living.” He is himself **spiritu**ally dead, and his works are as himself. The moment **he**

becomes spiritually alive, he liveth unto a living God, the fountain of his own new life. He has living fellowship with a living God, and his works are service to a living personal being. He no longer serves 'the great first cause,' or 'virtue,' or 'the moral interests of the universe,' or 'the nature of things,' or 'the dignity of human nature,' or 'the claims of society,' or 'the interest of being,' or any of those substitutes by which men dead to God, yet not altogether lost to thought, shut out from their view the One Living and True God, and the claims which his holy moral administration has upon them and their love. No ; but "the living God."

Now there is nothing that tends to quicken this service more than an earnest, intelligent, believing dealing with the blood of Christ's sacrifice. And it may serve to make our views more exact and deep if we carry this thought with us throughout the present investigation. For the blood, or blood-shedding, the sacrifice or death of Christ, is not a "dead work." It is at the greatest conceivable distance from that. It is the greatest conceivable antagonist to death. "He, through the eternal Spirit," and with such a tide of life as the unction and indwelling of the eternal Spirit could not fail to give, "offered himself without spot to God" (Heb. ix. 14). "In the blood is the life." "Except a man drink my blood, he has no life abiding in him" (John vi. 53). "I am the resurrection and the life" (John xi. 25). And no one can have followed the views we lately gave of Christ's death, conquering death, and opening the way for life, and life-giving, without seeing this. "I am come that ye might have life, and that ye might have it more abundantly" (John x. 10).

No doubt in the Cross you have Christ's death—Christ dying—the separation of the soul and body. But what a tide of life ! what an intensity of life ! what a living transaction you have ! His life is not ebbing away, he is laying it down, he is offering it to God. That is of the essence of the service, the priestly service he is rendering. His life is not ebbing away. The language of the Paraphrase—reminding us by the way of the constant danger to doctrine in those unauthorised hymns—that talks about "light forsaking his closing eyes and life his *drooping head*," is most inaccurate ; as the old theologians used so vigorously to say, "abominably injurious" to the glorious fact.

Life did not forsake him : he was pouring it out : pouring out his soul unto death. He was bearing a burden that would have sunk all the angels of heaven. He needed to be the Resurrection and the Life : *and he was*, he was eminently, "the Living One" while dying ; and dealing with the "Living God" in the most intensely active and living service the universe ever saw. Such living power and amazing glory is there in it, that, because of it, "God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name" (Phil. ii. 9) ; and all holy beings proclaim but a simple fact when they proclaim him worthy to "receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing" (Rev. v. 12, 13). We know of none who deny that he was in possession of these things when they were ascribed to him. We know of none in any recognised sphere of controversy so stupid as to imagine that these things were first communicated to him when ascribed. We know of none so thoroughly low in their theology as to suppose that these things never would have been his but for angelic songs which ascribe them. Where, otherwise, could those angelic songs have found their own justification ? All those things which they ascribe to Christ in song were his in his dying moments,—they were in the "offering up of himself a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice,"—else were the question pertinent : Where did they find them ? They were *in his offering up of himself* : and it is somewhat shameful if his Church should require an argument to prove it. Holy heaven, in its worship of him, never did, nor does, nor will contribute any of these things ; his worshippers simply ascribe. They read off what they see : recognise them as belonging to him, and so belonging to him ("power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing") as to have been especially brought to light—brought into view, because into exercise—in pouring out his soul unto death as the slain Lamb of Sacrifice for sin. "Worthy is the *Lamb* to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing." They are declaring what they see : that is the praise of the enlightened. They are promoting his *declarative* glory,—no more. And all that they see and celebrate is an action on the cross ; and it is seen by faith—by every soul that believeth.

Take any one of these ascriptions—say the “blessing,” what of his endurance of the “curse”? How could he have endured the “curse,” but for the countervailing “blessing” ever present in its curse-extinguishing energy? In every way it would have been too late had it tarried to be conveyed over with the angelic ascription. And generally, summing up all up in that which they constitute, namely the Life, otherwise was it that death did its utmost on the cross, and yet was prevented from being victorious? How could death vanquished, if not by Life, that master of the world, destroying death and him that had the power of death? And who should stand and mediate between the living and the dead—the living God and sinful man dead in trespasses and sins? Who, if not the Living One? Oh, what life was that which was in him, and said, “I was daily his delight, abiding always before him” (Prov. viii. 30)? What life was that which said—“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do;” “Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit” (Lk. xxi. 5)? We speak of Christ’s active and passive obedience; it is inaccurate phraseology. The temptation to which it arises from the fact that he had to be obedient amidst intense suffering. Had there been no suffering, there could have been nothing to be called “passive obedience.” But we are apt, through a misuse of the phrase, to conceive of Christ’s obedience as if, whereas he had hitherto been going about doing good, *that* came to an end, and he had to do the best he could with his spiritual invisible energies ebbing away, and his whole attitude on the cross gradually becoming “passive.” The very reverse is true. His activity continued with his sufferings, increased with their increase, and in still greater exertion—so that it was greatest at the close. It culminated and triumphed in the *laying down of himself* a sacrifice; else never could it have been a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice and reconcile us to God. It was an active, powerful, loving service, when he expiated the guilt of our dead works: the great end of it was that we also might actively, powerfully, livingly “serve the living God,” and have consciences free to do so. But *that* they cannot be, except as the blood of Christ purges them, and that is what we are now being brought into.

Even the pacifying, purifying, strengthening, and gladdening of the conscience is not the ultimate end of the blood-shedding of Christ. Even these are but means to an end still more important. The blood of Christ purges the conscience from dead works *to serve the living God*. To this end was he appointed and constituted the Christ. To this end did he offer himself a spotless lamb unto God. To this end did the eternal Spirit fill his human soul to the uttermost with a holy affection towards God and man—zeal towards God's glory, and love for man's salvation; rendering him in the hour of his offering up a sacrifice most acceptable to God—acceptable in its essential and fundamental character as a sin-expiating, God-atoning, wrath-appeasing, justice-satisfying sacrifice: and, being in this character a living sacrifice, satisfying God, magnifying his law, it satisfies the conscience of the sinner the more fully the more it is enlightened, and purges it from dead works to serve the living God.

It "purges the conscience." Yes; but not to be sent adrift as a pardoned criminal may be, to whom a monarch, in a relenting fit, may have extended his pity in an hour when his compassion may have been awakened. For here is the difference: The human mercy may have been granted from relenting in a fit of imbecility, or mental weakness. With God, it is unto the illustrious forth-showing of his glory ("his glory is made great in the salvation wrought by him"). The human mercy may have been flung to the wretch from some doubt about the evidence, the pardoner merely stretching a point. Or it may have been contemptuously flung at his head. But here is *expiation*. In the one case, the wretch hugs himself in his good fortune, being nearly as much a wretch as ever. Here all is on honour. Specially is it so on God's part. The sovereign Lord God, instead of giving his law a wrench, hath magnified it and made it honourable—ascribing sovereignty unto it, and compelling universal recognition of it. "I have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return: Unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear. Surely, shall one say, In the Lord have I righteousness and strength" (Isaiah xlv. 23, 24). All is on honour on our part also when we believe. The offending subject of a truly most holy, moral administration, glorified as

that of God is by the Cross, cannot (simply cannot) understand, and consequently cannot appropriate, this pardon—can neither assent nor consent—without being on honour. "They shall look on me whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn" (Zech. xii. 10). The believer, on his own part, becomes free from guile when God frees him from guilt. Not from punishment or penalty merely, but—what is infinitely more and better—from the *liability* to punishment: not from punishment only, but from *guilt*—the desert of punishment. He becomes ashamed, yea, even confounded, and opens his mouth no more, when God is thus righteously pacified towards him. He becomes profoundly peaceful and pure; and his peace is not now marred by his mourning over his iniquity. This is, indeed, essential to his now being honourable with God. ("Since I have loved thee, thou hast been honourable.") And his forgiveness, being the fruit of love, as well as brought into an unexpected and glorious consonance with justice, instead of being the solitary privilege he obtains, after the obtaining of which he might drift away from the loving God, as if God should say, "Now you may go." No: God forbid. He is accepted and kissed, and clothed, and feasted; yea, and adopted, and the one grand motto of the complete transaction is, "This my son was dead, and is alive again; was lost and is found,"—found, to be lost again no more. This is, indeed, the jet, or edge, or joy, of his being "found." Instead of drifting away again, he is "found" so as to make that impossible any more. With all his heart, rather, will he henceforth serve the living God. "The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead (themselves and their works too): and that he died for all, that, living, they might not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him that died for them, and rose again" (2 Cor. v. 15).

There are three things that this sacrifice of Christ procures for those interested in it, and which go to render their equipment for "serving the living God" complete:—(1) By the sacrifice of Christ they obtain a *RIGHT* to serve the living God; (2) They procure a *DESIRE* to do it; (3) They procure the *ABILITY* to do it. And these three things are all that can be imagined to be either necessary or helpful. Let the Lord give a man (1) the Right, (2) the Desire, (3) the

Power for this service, and, immediately he enters on it, 'tis a case of the right man in the right place; and his language is:—"O Lord, truly I am thy servant; I am thy servant, and the son of thine handmaid: thou hast loosed my bonds" (Ps. cxvi. 16).

I. As to the Right. It is to be observed that this aspect of the matter turns essentially on the sacrifice of Christ being in its nature *atonement*. It is in that view alone that it bears on right, as right,—on the rights of God and of conscience—the being of God as the Moral Ruler of the universe, and the right, the moral and pleadable rights, of moral creatures over whom he rules. All other views of Christ's Cross fail fundamentally here, because they have no bearing on *right* at all. They never really touch on what in any true holy sense can be called the rights of men, because they do not come into the realm of *right* at all. To the spiritually dead sinner, the Lord denies all right to serve him. "To the wicked God saith, What hast thou to do to take my covenant into thy lips?" When such persons attempt to come before him with their services God saith, "Who hath required this at your hand?" (Ps. l. 16; Isa. i. 12.) Such persons have no idea that *right* has been violated and must be rectified. But that is the primary and essential idea at the root of all atonement—all sacrifice, propitiation, or expiation. No wonder, therefore, when the fundamental idea gets the go-by, though the blossom goeth up like dust Christ's death as an example, as a proof even of divine love, as a display even of the Divine perfection, as a transcendent instance of self-denial and self-sacrifice, may be fraught with many useful and most instructive lessons; and in all these points of view it may be worthy of most profound study and delighted admiration. But all of these taken together fail to present any bearing upon *right*—the rights of God, or the claims and requirements and rights of conscience. It is as an *atonement*—satisfying Divine justice, and on that ground reconciling us unto God (who otherwise insists that he is most righteously angry with us every day, and all the day long), that it bears on conscience, purging it from dead works to serve the living God. For it is in that view alone that it magnifies the Divine law, after which conscience craves continually, so long as conscience acts like itself at all, protesting for the

honour of that holy law, and never satisfied without its vindication.

For, while not thinking it necessary, in a way of explaining conscience, to do more than indicate the practical correlation between conscience and the law of God,—without tarrying to arrange a moral philosophy of the subject,—it is enough to point out that what we have called attention to is just what is commonly called conviction of sin; and *that* is intelligible to average readers—learned and unlearned alike—without any philosophical distinctions. It is just *conscious guilt*; and no moral philosophy can supply it, where it is wanting, or even deepen it where it is present, though defective or shallow. Substantially, it is just honourable and guileless confession. The claims of God's law, the rights of God himself, as the Moral Ruler of the universe, must be satisfied and vindicated, if I am to plead any rights; and before I can, save with consummate and inconceivable impudence, in the presence of high heaven, speak or even think of any rights of mine, or "rights of man." Till God's rights are satisfied, man's must be in abeyance, even my rights of conscience must till then be in abeyance—excepting only the rights of my conscience (if it is to be worthy of the name) to call for the vindication of the rights of God—even though that should be in the vengeance due to my own transgression. Here it is that the Cross comes in—satisfying this claim of conscience even in all its awfulness—vindicating the right of the living God to my service even more completely than it would have been by my total and eternal destruction; and vindicating also *my* right to serve *him*, though a thousand tempters and a thousand hells should reclaim against it.

Once I had a perfect and undoubted right to serve the living God. Once, in Adam—for "the covenant was made with Adam, not only for himself but his posterity descending from him by ordinary generation"¹)—I had a perfect right to serve the Lord: and when I heard his voice in the garden in the cool of the day, I had a right to run to him, and to present to him and call his paternal notice to whatever service I had been rendering as a son working in his vineyard, tilling the happy garden and keeping it. But alas! with Adam I "sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression;" and one of the deepest

¹ Shorter Catechism.

meanings I give to the expression, "I am lost," is that I have lost my right to serve the living God. "God drove out the man" (Gen. iii. 24), and drove out me. And while he placed "cherubim" at the spot where I had lost my right, in proof that a second Adam should regain it for me, he also placed a "sword" debarring me till then—debarring me till that sword should awake and smite the man that was Jehovah's fellow (Zech. xiii. 7). Blessed be the everlasting love of God, he gave me a second Adam, whose glorious right and power to serve the living God none may question! "Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my Spirit upon him: he shall not fail nor be discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law" (Isa. xlii. 1). And, blessed be the same sovereign grace of God,—the covenant being made *with him*, but *for* all whom the Father hath given to him, yea, for all who will,—(for all who *will*, *do* will because they are made willing in the day of his power),—Christ's willing work of service to the living God was exactly the work of vindicating (by the willing endurance of the curse of the law) God's violated and dishonoured but ever holy right to be served, and man's shamefully surrendered right to serve him. *That* is the sacrifice of Christ. *That* is the atonement (Rom. viii. 3, 4; Gal. iv. 4, 5). If it be not *that*, it comes not into contact with guilty and unclean conscience. If it be not *that*, it is not in the sphere either of man's conscience or God's law. Not only does it not purge the conscience to serve the living God, but it could not enter the same sphere as conscience at all. If it be not *that*, then so far as I, the chief of sinners, am concerned, it matters not what it is: it is the vilest, pettiest imposition. I can neither live upon it (John vi. 51; Heb. xi. 28), nor die upon it (Heb. xi. 29). If it be not *that*, it may awaken the admiration of holy angels: so they say; I do not know: it seems to me it would have been merely an *explosion*. Assuredly, it touches not the need, the primary indispensable need, of a guilty man.

But if it *be* that—if in its deepest essence it *satisfies* Divine justice—if the Lord God Omnipotent is well pleased for this substitutionary and sacrificial blood-shedding and righteousness of the Lamb—then not a shadow of a difficulty can there

be as to its purging the conscience, and making it whiter than the snow. For purposes of philosophy and learning, more accurate statements concerning the origin, nature, and office of conscience may be necessary than we should ever think of giving here. The continual presentation of the Divine law as moral (not physical)¹ is here enough. Conscience with any life in it will ever respond to that. And again we say, if this law of God have received at the Cross a vindication of those rights of God's government, and, therefore, of man's conscience, which sin had violated, then, on the supposition of my faith, that is, my intelligent assent and consent (Heb. xi. 28, 29), not a micrometer hair's-breadth of space can there intervene between it and my unclean conscience, nor an instant of time intervene between my sense (and acknowledged sense) of guilt (Ps. li. 4, 5), and my enjoyment of the peace that passeth all understanding. "Lo, this hath touched thy lips, and thine iniquity is taken away" (Isa. vi. 7). For under the acknowledged and vindicated rights of God I find mine restored, and primarily my lost right to serve the living God. For, how and in what sense can I who was lost be found, if my great right which I had lost be not found? In what sense, or to what effect had I myself been lost, if not in the loss of my right to serve the living God? There, and in that loss, you and I and all of us were lost. And in what sense, or to what effect, can I who was lost be found, if not in that I have found my God again, and found even him only and exactly in finding again my blessed right to serve him?

Nor am I merely entitled, in the name of Christ and of his sacrifice, of Christ and him crucified, to claim this glorious right again, but bound. There is not a nicer point in all the moral government of God from eternity unto eternity than is now found here. Behold my servant! Behold the Lamb of God! Behold him whom you have pierced, and whose wounds reconcile you to heaven and the throne thereof! Will you not have the reconciliation? While justice

¹ Physical law is merely generalised *statement of fact*. Moral law is authoritative *command*, and, failing obedience, *condemnation*. The *juridical* is an intuition never lost sight of by a people in their simplicity. An efflorescence of physical science, however brilliant, will never satisfy a nation, save in their decline and fall. The moral is similarly scientific, it is true; but it is more.

testifies its satisfaction and smiles approval, be ye reconciled to God. Is it possible you can still have your difficulties, now that the Moral Governor of heaven and earth has none? Is it possible you can still refuse the service of the living God, now that smiling cherubim—emblems of redemption—point the way (Ps. lxxx. 1, 7, 19), and no opposing “sword” (Zech. xiii. 7) bars the way to the tree of life or the throne of grace? What inveterate, envenomed enmity to God is this! If now ye will not come unto me that ye may have life, if sin can be, and can do, as *unbelief* in such circumstances has revealed and proved it can do and be, then was not sin altogether such an evil as demanded such a remedy? Who now will say that the Divine justice, which Christ crucified has satisfied, was too stern? Who would not now break down and worship him? Who shall not praise and glorify thy name? “O Lord, I will praise thee: though thou wast angry with me, thine anger is turned away, and thou comfortedst me” (Isa. xii. 1). Behold, Jehovah himself hath become my song, he also is my salvation. I “look on him whom I have pierced, and mourn,” while in the midst of the freely reconciled Church he “sings praise” (Ps. xxii. 22, Heb. ii. 12) unto the Father. “Gracious is the Lord, and righteous; yea, our God is merciful. The Lord preserveth the simple: I was brought low, and he helped me. Return unto thy rest, O my soul, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee. What shall I render unto him for all his benefits?” (Ps. cxvi. 5-7, 12.) And all *freely*? All free to me because they cost dear to Him—*him*, Jehovah’s Christ. All free and immediate to me, because they cost *him* groans and wounds and tears, to satisfy Divine justice. And he did *it*. He *did* satisfy Divine justice, and reconciled us unto God.

It is in this rectification of the juridical—this rectification of right—right on God’s part to be served, right on my part to serve him: it is in this judicial aspect of the Cross, that its primary preciousness consists. And it is in this that faith primarily, first of all, and always, and most of all, rejoices. Without this, conscience will never cease to assert its dissatisfaction and its wrongs. Have I any rights toward God? If I have, it can only be because God’s violated right in me have been vindicated. Can I aspire to say, “I have found God, the living God”? It must be because he has first

found me. For in violating *his* rights, I had lost *my own*; and in losing my God, I had lost myself. *Redemption*—REDEMPTION—is the essence of the only salvation I am capable of—redemption of myself, my person—and therewith of my right to serve the living God, founded on the glorifying of God's name in the vindication of his right to my person and service. And that is the vicarious, propitiatory service of the Cross, whereon, through the Eternal Spirit, my second Adam, the Lord from heaven, offered himself without spot unto God, a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice and reconcile us unto God. And why then should I not instantly, *instantly* serve him? Why not? O for a thousand of heaven's loudest trumpets to make all earth and hell resound with that "Why not?"

Receive, then,—call it old-fashioned doctrine if you please,—receive in simple faith (which neither adds unto nor diminishes from the Gospel which it embraces and assimilates) the Cross of Christ as yours, the death of Christ as yours, dying Christ and him crucified as yours; and therein receive and assert before high heaven the rectification of your conscience in its violated relation to the living God, and to the law and service of God. And then stand fast in this liberty of conscience wherewith Christ hath made you free. In fellowship with Christ and him crucified whereunto you are called of God by the Gospel,—claim your right to serve the living God; claim and exercise your right in companionship with Christ himself in this very Cross, as a service of the living God (Isa. xlii. 1), and his consequent or accompanying right to repel all who would hinder, and to attract all who would help, you in his service. Be one with Christ in that great experience, "I am crucified with Christ" (Gal. ii. 20). Be one with him in that great experience of his in serving the living God. And you shall be one with him in his victory of praise and his banquet of grace and joy, implied in that great historic word of the Holy Ghost concerning him:—"Then the devil leaveth him, and angels came and ministered unto him" (Matt. iv. 11). For be very sure in your holy conscience-cleansed service of the living God—God will fulfil, and in that service will alone fulfil, to you the promise—

"I will beat down before his face
 All his malicious foes ;
 I will them greatly plague that do
 With hatred him oppose :"

and also that other word :

"The angel of the Lord encamps,
 And round encompasseth
 All those about that do him fear,
 And them delivereth."

Have I a right to serve the living God ? Oh ! how precious it is ! How precious in itself, as the reversal and off-lifting of the sentence, "He drove out the man!"—as that at least ! And as the removal of the flaming sword ! As the simple presentation of the beautiful and peaceful cherubim, and of him who dwells between them ! How precious also as my right to defy the malice of Satan and to claim the sympathy of angels ! my right to defy the malice of hell, and to claim the protection of heaven !

And is it possible that, for a few mellifluous phrases, you could barter such a heritage ? Rather, as morning dawns upon you, will you not sing of it ? And as evening throws its shades around you, will you not return to your song ? Will you not keep your views of it ever fresh and lively by clinging to it and crowding the canvas of your history with active "service to the living God" ? For, be very sure that only in serving the living God can you succeed in resisting the powers of darkness or acquiring and retaining the sympathy of the powers of light. The former will not bate their opposition, and the latter will not waste their sympathy upon you in any dilettante trifling with the Cross. No ; not in amusement (of which there is none in all the history of your crucified Lord), but only in actual service will they acknowledge the result of justice-satisfying sacrifice ; therein will devils own your power, and angels sympathise with your weakness. They will not waste their sympathy upon you in any other light than as sympathy with you in service, nor will they care to shield you for any other end than to shield and augment your service. Nor will you ever make Satan feel your force—or the force of any weapon you try to wield against him,—save as you are wielding it as a servant of the living God. You may quote a whole volume

of threats against him and promises to yourself. Not a jot of his opposition will he bate on that account. He can quote Scripture too. But, if with conscience cleansed by the blood of sprinkling;—if with rights restored by that Greater Man in his work of blood-shedding, atonement, and redemption;—and if, in the actual service of the living God, you resist the *dévil*, he will flee from you: and in the joy and elastic freedom wherewith, on his fleeing from you, you return in holy liberty to the service of the living God, it is scarcely possible to tell how much of your blessedness may be the result of angels coming and ministering to you. One thing is clear: your right to his service is undoubted: and your right to be joyous in it equally so. God will not meet you with a “Who hath required this at your hands?” No: but with that great word of his holy righteousness and joyful delight in his people, “I will bring them to my holy mountain, and I will make them joyful in my house of prayer: For there will I require mine offerings, saith the Lord” (Ezek. xx. 40).

II. It is not the *right* only that the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ supplies, but also the *motive*, the *desire*. In shedding of the blood, Christ, as an atonement for sin, as a truly justice-satisfying sacrifice, secures, as we have seen, the right to serve the living God. But if that were all, the right might remain in abeyance, from not being claimed, not being taken advantage of, not being sued out, and urged, and acted upon. But the shedding of the blood of Christ as an atoning sacrifice, as a ransom for sin, is of such perfection and preciousness as shall secure that the right be claimed and enjoyed. It does not admit of the possibility of its being refused by man any more than by God. Refused on God’s part it cannot be: for while there are three persons in the Godhead, one of them is the propitiation for our sins. The God-Man, in his mediatorial intervenient position, is surety for both. Both his Father and his people shall see the preciousness of his blood. It does not admit of its being left in abeyance. It secures that those benefited in covenant by its being *shed*, shall desire to have it *sprinkled*; and shall, in longings of faith, exclaim, “Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean: wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow.” If this, however, is to be, it must have power to quicken the dead; and when

sprinkled, to stimulate them to long for the sprinkling of itself.

It doth *indeed* accomplish this sure result, namely, that every soul for whom it was shed shall ask for it, pray for it, receive the answer to its prayers, enjoy it, cry, "O Lord, truly I am thy servant: thou hast loosed my bonds;" find in this a precious reason for its *being*; live for it, and desire to *live* for it. And we really give an interest for the first time, an immortal being, intelligently reconciled to its own existence—its own never-ending existence—by the service of the living God, as that on which its existence is to be spent, and that worthily, honourably, unweariedly spent. "This is the true God and eternal life," cries out every soul who rightly deals with this precious blood. Thus, when Isaiah had his lips touched with a live coal from off the altar of atonement, and an opportunity of service offered, he longs and is in haste to be allowed to engage in it: "Here am I, send me." When the bands are truly loosed, as only a divinely-appointed, all-sufficient sacrifice of propitiation with which God declares himself satisfied can loose them—when guilt vanishes from the conscience—in that instant, mysterious, sweet, and inexpressible joy amidst which it is purged from dead works to serve the living God in newness of life, it has a right to serve. Indeed it has. "In the blood is the life." The Spirit of Christ never departs from the sacrifice of Christ. The sacrifice of Christ is no more a dead thing than ever it was. It was offered that we might have life, and that we might have it more abundantly. "They shall look on me whom they have pierced, and shall mourn," saith the Lord. And why? Because they cannot find the sacrifice apart from the Spirit. "And I will pour out on the house of Israel, and on the inhabitants of Jerusalem the Spirit of grace and supplication, and they shall look on me whom they have pierced." And the Spirit shall give such views of the goodness of a state in which the living God is served, as shall inspire with a longing for such service—for enjoyment of such right. And this the sprinkled blood of Christ uniformly does. For that blood of Christ is quick with the Spirit of Christ. "In the blood is the life," and the life is the Spirit. For "it is the Spirit that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing." Now the Spirit—the Eternal Spirit—

through whom the atonement was offered or the blood was shed, abides for ever by the blood of Christ. And just as he makes the word the vehicle by which he conveys his mind or meaning, he makes the blood his vehicle by which he conveys his love, his grace, his affectionate regard for the believing sinner, and his gracious power to quicken and renew the soul: and on these combinedly,—enlightening the mind in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing the will till it perceives the amiableness, goodness, beauty, and desirableness of Christ, and of God in him as the reconciled God, the very God of peace and comfort,—the Spirit moves the whole soul with admiration, love, and gratitude towards God which inevitably issues in an effort to “serve the living God.” Primarily the blood of Christ secures the *right* to serve God; and the sprinkling of that blood on any conscience in particular gives that conscience nothing less than the exact right, as a nobleman’s insignia of order entitle him to demand admission to any meeting of the knights of the special brotherhood, as the case may be.

But more than the right. Through the Spirit—who is the Spirit of light, and wisdom, and love, and of adoption—it gives *knowledge* of the right, intelligent, spiritual understanding of its preciousness, perception of its holy beauty, its grand condignity, its honourableness, its splendid congruities alike of manliness and godliness. The soul, through this same Spirit through whom Jesus offered himself without spot to God, is joined not by a legal covenant bond outside, but by love to Jesus: offers itself to God with Jesus in the eternal law-magnifying virtue of his blood, and meets with acceptance in the service: sees the blessedness and goodness of the service: tastes and sees that God is good, and that it is good to serve him: and is led to desire and long for, more and more, to engage in and delight in, the actual service of God, for its own sake, as the very zest and joy of life here below, and one of the highest forms under which it can imagine true enjoyment hereafter. Hence the grand brevity of the proposition, “His servants shall serve him.” Ay will they; that they will. It remains no more a beautiful ideal, that the service of the living God is a valuable estate of being: but the soul, from experience of its delights, goes forth towards it, delights to think that there can, even in eternity, be no *ennui* to “souls in

serving the living God," and the escaped bird escapes into no boundless contiguity of shade, but Home! Home, sweet Home! Home into the service of the living God, crying, "What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits towards me?" Nor, seen in the light of Calvary, is this the least, this right to serve. To see it in the light of the word and Spirit of Christ is to desire it. To see it thus is to see that it resembles God's law, "holy and just and good and spiritual." And, oh! joy of joys! To feel that I am no longer criminal nor carnal, "sold under sin," but redeemed! Oh! "how love I thy law!" The law thus magnified is my legal security for ever! "I *am* thy servant; truly I am thy servant;" and "being delivered out of the hands of thine enemies and ours, we will serve thee without fear, with holiness and righteousness before thee all the days of our lives" (Luke i. 51). "The love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then all died in him, that when they live, they should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him who died for them and rose again" (2 Cor. v. 15).

Yes: it is living service to a living God that is gained by a dying Redeemer. Returning from death and the grave, he says, "I am he that liveth and was dead, and behold! I am alive for evermore." By one offering I have for ever perfected them that are sanctified; death cannot come again. The God whom I reveal—the Father whom you see when you see him that died for you and rose again—for he that hath seen me hath seen the Father)—is the God of life and death in every possible sense—the living God, triumphing over death, never so much seen to be the living God as in putting away death for ever; giving you in me everlasting life, a life in which death's finger, death's interest, death's shadow shall never come again unto eternity! Oh! this is the living God, and you see him as such, and are become fit companions, in a sense, for him as such; citizens of the city of the living God. The Eternal Spirit, through the blood of Jesus, hath given you a longing for the service—a view of it that fills your heart with a sense of its dignity, its joy, its infinite worth to spend and be spent upon. For to spend my strength on this service is to conserve, increase, and renew it. "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength." Here you *get* by *giving*. "Give

unto the Lord glory and *strength*," if you would be mighty and "sons of the mighty." "Make a joyful noise unto the Lord, O ye lands. Serve the Lord with gladness; come before his presence with singing." The blood of the Lamb gives you the right and the desire. It purges your conscience to serve the living God.

III. If you would thoroughly equip the living and intelligent soul for this service, you must supply not only the Right, and the Desire, but the Power. Grant that: show a free full fountain of that: and nothing more is wanting. But the blood of Christ supplies that too. It supplies the Divine Spirit without measure to those for whom the atoning blood was shed. "He hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: that the blessing of Abraham might come upon us, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith" (Gal. iii. 13, 14). But this is one of those commonplaces of the Christian life of which we need not say more, than that while the old views of the sacrifice show it as providing us at once with the Right, and the Motive, and the Power to serve the living God, we shall have no hesitation in saying,—“No man, when he hath drunk old wine, straightway desireth new, for he saith, *The old is better.*”

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ART. IV.—*Chalmers and Schleiermacher.*

THEOLOGY is able in this century to produce from her ranks, along with a host of men of great talent, two of pre-eminent genius, whose names may stand alongside of any of their race—Schleiermacher and Chalmers. The latter requires no eulogy in the land where he flourished. Of Schleiermacher we need only record that the Danish students, upon occasion of his visiting Copenhagen, designated him, and not unworthily as far as mind is concerned, as the Calvin of the nineteenth century; and that Kahnis describes the whole subsequent theology of the century, even of the orthodox, as a mere working up in various proportions and colouring of the theses of Schleiermacher—a sentence in which Luthardt indirectly concurs.

Everything about these two men provokes to a comparison. They were the fittest representatives that could be desired of the two opposite careers, set forth with such appalling reality in Lessing's famous word;¹ Chalmers embracing out and out the truth presented in the right hand of the Almighty, and Schleiermacher choosing with equal decision and consistency the gift in God's left hand, viz., the chase after indefinite truth in the resources of the mind itself, declining to be biassed by any authority of a wisdom from above. Both adorned the earlier half of this century, and lived to such old age as to give full proof of their powers (Schleiermacher born 1768, died 1834; Chalmers born 1780, died 1847). Both were theologians *con amore* in the two most theological countries of the world. We see both for a time in the seclusion of country parishes, and soon after set in the eye of the public in the respective capitals; both discharging the duties of professorships (in both instances first of moral philosophy and then of theology) and of public lecturers; both taking a leading part in the public questions and interests of the land; both in arms against ecclesiastical abuses, and in opposition to Government in defence of the inherent privileges and the right constitution of the Church. Each was greeted as *facile princeps* in his own country, and was pushed to the front when a controversy arose on any grand and vital matter. Both were zealous adherents of the Reformed creed as opposed to all that is Romanising or Puseyite. Both were essentially philosophers and literary, and displayed the same singular ability in the conduct of any cause that fell to their care. Yet how different the results in the two cases, and how different their behaviour when the crisis summoned to go forward and suffer, or yield and give back!²

The latter part of the eighteenth century and the first

¹ This refers to the famous saying of Lessing: "If God were to hold out all truth shut up in his right hand, and doubt, the impulse to seek truth, in his left, even at the risk of wandering for ever and ever, and gave him the choice between the two, he would grasp his left hand, and ask to be left to doubt, saying, 'Father, give me this; pure truth belongs to thee only'"—a sentence which Dr. Duncan, Professor of Hebrew, capped with the racy saying, that it is the "essence of devilry."

² Yet our parallel does not so much concern the two individuals, but is rather the concrete exhibition of the course of the two rival principles as they come to view and manifest themselves in the higher stages of life, to aid the judgment in the questions that most affect humanity and eternity.

decennium of the present show the rankest luxuriance of the infidel principle throughout Europe, and Scotland was by no means exempted from the general pest. Indeed, no one could have determined from appearances whether Scotland or Germany would suffer most from the all-pervading calamity. We hesitate not to say that there was at that time a far more virulent distaste and hostility to the gospel in Scotland than in Germany. When we pass in review the names of Principal Robertson, Hume, Lord Kames, Playfair, Adam Smith, Dr. Thomas Brown, all leagued in heart at least against evangelical truth, and take in the *Edinburgh Review* at its first start, we see as formidable a phalanx on the side of irreligion as the world has yet produced. We find, accordingly, that Chalmers in early life was imbued with a more vehement dislike to evangelical sentiments than Schleiermacher himself. It was from Scottish sources, the works of Hume and others surreptitiously procured, that Schleiermacher was inoculated with that scepticism which ruled his life. It might have been supposed that the latter, situated in the bosom of the chief Moravian seminary, with all around soliciting him to the one article of their creed, love to Him who died for us on the cross, was in more favourable circumstances than the other for coming to decision for Christ. There was, however, one point of distinction in favour of the Scottish youth,—even when cast forth from the paternal roof on the cold charities of the then University life, he carried with him, what most then got with them from home, an unbroken reverence for the law and word of God in the Scriptures. If the pupil of the Moravians could not go wholly and fully with the system, if he failed to attain to that life of grace and of intimate fellowship with Christ which some have and all must profess, he had nothing to go back upon. Schleiermacher tried hard to please his parents and teachers, and for a time employed all the phraseology of a converted person, but it was merely taken on, and proved at last a constraint too irksome to be borne, so, breaking loose from the Moravians, he found himself afloat in life with nothing but certain vague maxims of piety and morality to guide him. That in Scotland the rising tide of religious scepticism was turned, while in Germany it was suffered to overspread the land, we attribute in the first instance to Divine

grace, but we remark that this grace was manifested to a people that still as a whole, even when a large class had strayed, occupied the pristine ground of the Divine testimony. It is an invaluable blessing to have had a good beginning : "I planted thee wholly a right seed." And the blessing was to be anew conveyed simply by charging a chosen vessel with a fuller acquaintance with the sense and power of these testimonies, and making him the agent for opening the floodgates to send the fertilising stream of truth abroad over the length and breadth of the land.

The fundamental divergency between these two men in their life's work, as well as the secret of the so different results, is to be found in the different relation in which they stood to revealed truth. Chalmers was never wearied in strengthening the outworks of Christianity, thereby showing his high appreciation of its inward economy. His conviction of the verbal inspiration of Scripture was given in one of those axiomatic sayings that the memory never loses, that "either the words of the writers were suggested by the Spirit, and *therefore* they were the best, or God permitted their own words, *because* they were the best." The German theologian made no further account of the record than of any other composition, reminds us that Christianity was a power in the world before the New Testament existed, says upon occasion that he could afford to want more than one book of the canon, and actually admits that it would be no heart-grief to him though all the books that ever were written perished, with exception, perhaps, of Homer and Plato. His conception of Christianity was as of the highest stage of civilisation to which human nature has been raised ; and that too, simply by the life and doctrine of Christ, which we may know without any such inspiration as the Church has supposed. The word of the penmen of the Bible is only inspired in the same manner as the mass of Christian authorship that commends the Christian life.

It is plain that these two theories go as far apart as the east from the west. It cannot be too well weighed that the distinction between those who hold to a real inspiration and those who only receive certain grand facts is eventually the distinction between real life and a romance. It cannot be too emphatically set forth that as it is possible for the romancer

dealing with the salient points of life to busk up a fabric far more showy, and working with greater charm upon our sympathies, than what is commonly found in the hard and monotonous course of reality, so it is possible for the preacher who converses with nothing but some of the sublimer features of the gospel to work up lucubrations full of fine sentiment, and exercising a certain higher power of attraction than when men are guided to take the Word as a lamp and light in the path of appointed sanctification and mortification of sin. This may explain the insidious character of much of the German sermonising in this century, which fails to insist on the necessity of trying and ruling the life by the inspired Word. Such preaching may delight men, and it may even benefit believers, but it will neither convert nor save unless supplemented from other sources. It may please and stimulate like a romance, but it never grows into a true life, nourished by that Word which is "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." We are persuaded that there is no one danger against which men need more to guard in our day than the danger of confounding romance and life in religion, and that no one is more blameworthy in this respect than Schleiermacher, just because he was more successful in leading his people to slight the divinely prepared paths in which alone the sinful heart may be led to that holiness without which none pleases God.

Chalmers's zeal for the Evidences of Christianity, on which he spent so much of his strength, was homage to that right hand of the Almighty, into which he delivered himself as a little child to be conducted to an acquaintance with the unfathomable riches of the contained truth. It was clear to him that the Eternal God has set his imprint upon the Scriptures, that the Word is the rod of his power, before which every intelligence is to bow, and that it must be submitted to and experienced before it is comprehended. He revels in the evidences of Divine majesty with which it is encompassed, and goes forth to meet opponents like a strong man glorying in his might. The objections the world conjures up against the Scriptures are to him so many phantoms, like the tricks of the magicians in presence of the rod of Moses, and require only to

be firmly grasped to disappear. Where Hume was supposed by his celebrated sophism to have bound the right hand of the Almighty and made it impossible to prove a miracle, as involving in every case a competition between the proverbially variable testimony of man and the unchangeably stable testimony of nature, Chalmers not only meets Hume, but elicits the grand fact that there are laws of the moral world which have higher validity and certainty than the sequences of the material, and that there is testimony of a peculiar kind, like that of the apostles, which stands more firmly than the very framework of nature. When the facts which the nascent science of geology laid bare were turned to undermine the authority of the Bible, and common minds trembled for the consequences, Chalmers went confidently to the record, assured that it would disclose the true method of reconciling the works and the word of God. Having first pointed out the fact that the Bible makes no profession of determining the antiquity of the globe, he turns to seize the deliverances of geology, and converts them, with the proof they afford of successive destructive catastrophes, into a demonstration that the world cannot have been from eternity, but must have been originally stocked with the existing genera and species by the fiat of the Creator. Chalmers's example is a brilliant illustration of the fact that in the appropriation of the truth delivered by God's right hand, a man has not less but more scope for all the energy, and for the freest exercise of the intellect with which God has endowed him, and that this occupation is, both in respect of the exercise itself and its results, as surely to be preferred above the vain roaming of the sceptic after that shadow he calls truth, as the life of cultivated humanity is above that of the savage whose poor existence is divided between the chase of the wild beast and degrading sloth and starvation.

Let us turn to the contrast in Schleiermacher, and consider for a moment one of his first essays in Biblical criticism, which was directed to discredit the First Epistle to Timothy. He had made up his mind to reject that noble Epistle on the ground of its non-Pauline authorship, and it is interesting to contemplate what an amount of argument and proof a fertile mind can accumulate against the best of causes, for it is as well

to preface that his closest followers (Strauss and Schenkel) have found against him in this instance. While Schleiermacher's proof goes to show that 1st Timothy is the work of some later plagiarist, who makes a bungling compilation (he uses stronger language still) out of 2d Timothy and Titus, his own school have decided that 1st Timothy must have the same author as the other two Epistles; yet our critic in his wilful pursuit of truth, as he supposes, has reared a demonstration which would put to shame the flimsy objections that some men have lately produced with so much ostentation against the Books of Moses. He cannot deny that the external evidence for 1st Timothy is of the first class, though even here he essays an insinuation that only discloses his evil animus; but, passing from that, he sets to work in earnest. He discovers no fewer than ninety-four words or phrases that are either non-Pauline, or not Greek, or *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα*, or apocryphal. He maintains that the notice about Hymenæus and Alexander contradicts that in 2d Timothy about these individuals, that the sentence in 1 Tim. i. 20 must be understood as being to be put in execution by Timothy during the short time he was in Ephesus after Paul, and that Paul cannot be supposed to devolve such a burden on so young a man; that chapters iii. 2 and v. 9 can only be taken of prohibition of a second marriage, which is a sentiment foreign to Paul's system, and proves that the writer of the Epistle lived between Paul's epoch and that in which the marriage of the clergy was wholly eschewed; that the "double honour" due to elders (chap. v. 17) can only mean "double pay,"—a motive which Paul certainly never placed before spiritual men; that the mention of Pontius Pilate (chap. vi. 13) in so singular a manner indicates a date for the Epistle after the Apostles' Creed, in which that individual is so prominent, had come into common use, along with a host of other objections that might suffice to overwhelm any one ignorant of the animus that was urging the criticism, and casting wholly into the shade the weak talk and utterly false assertions about priests and Levites, and the universal priesthood of which Israel knew nothing, which have been employed to justify the effort to set aside the claim of Moses to that law which inspired voices have ever called by his name. All this pretentious argumentation has been long ago disowned

by his closest followers as utterly baseless, showing that it had not emanated from clear impartial judgment, but from zeal for some oblique theory. Neither need we go far to discover the cause of this laborious obliquity. This is a fair illustration of the method by which some men have professed by mere philosophical tact and on subjective grounds to determine authorship. Those who knew the man as he disclosed his esoteric system to De Wette, Lücke, and Brinkemann, so different from that which he publicly professed, will see that the distinct teaching of this Epistle, going in the teeth of his favourite tenets, made it insufferably distasteful to him. The great truths, ch. iii. 16, "Great is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh;" the designation of Christ's incarnation as a spontaneous self-dedication, ch. i. 16; the assertion, ch. ii. 6, "he *gave* himself a ransom for us;" the statements, ch. ii. 13-15, confirming the Old Testament account of the creation and fall as historical facts; the frequent appeals to a living God, who rules in wisdom and justice, taking cognisance of sin and hasting to judgment, all so adverse to his pantheistic creed, as well as the separate mention of the Father, the Son, and elect angels as having part in that judgment of which he would know nothing, ch. v. 20, vi. 13; the adoring mention of electing grace and confession for Paul himself as "chief of sinners;" worse than all, the upholding of the *law* as having a definite function in the Divine economy, in contradistinction to Schleiermacher, who will allow of no law but that within in the conscience, and who insists under the head of Christ's obedience that he fulfilled the will of God, but not the law; finally the warnings against false philosophy, and the explicit injunctions to adhere to the faith and the duties that had been transmitted in the Church—all this was just as if the Epistle had been specially addressed to confute the novelties by which Schleiermacher was revolutionising the age in which his lot was cast. We have dwelt on this instance, as perhaps the most striking example of the audacity as well as of the failure of that rationalistic spirit, that profanely disports itself within the limits of the canon of Scripture as if on unconsecrated ground—that seeks among ourselves to place Deuteronomy, for example, towards the close and not at the outstart of Israel's national life, as the work of some impostor

who assumes the name of Moses, as the outcome, and not as God declares its design, as the source of the people's life, amounting in fact to a denial of its true and real inspiration, as the authors of the theory themselves very well know. Such an example as this discovers to us whence this spirit comes, and whither it tends, and should be a warning to those who are in danger of being carried off their feet by the German critics and their Scotch followers, not to attach too much weight to "scholars," and those who have "a name in the world of letters," in religious questions, when we find a man like Schleiermacher so far left to himself as to heap all the terms of a scornful and opprobrious criticism upon a work which the whole Church ever has held as being a genuine production of God's holy, wise, and perfect Spirit.¹

We turn to examine the influence which the principles they embraced had on the formation of the characters of these two great men. Chalmers's career is a proof that energetic acceptance of the truths from God's right hand finds not less, but more, scope for the freest exercise of the intellect.

The Church in Germany was as much at fault as the individual in originating that scepticism which shot up to such a height, in having almost from its cradle fostered the belief that the acceptance of certain theological positions is identical with the truth and the life of truth. When Arndt lifted his protest in the beginning of the seventeenth century, Christian life *versus* Creed, he found the whole Church against him. When Lessing refers to truth from God's right hand, he has in view those theological enunciations enforced by authority over the domain of the churches he was acquainted with—he knew of no others. In opposition to this system he proposed to himself to find some rival formula on the field of philosophy which would better satisfy the craving intellect.

There was a period in Chalmers's life reaching to his thirtieth

¹ Some would persuade their neighbours that Deuteronomy might still be canonical, although discovered to be a forgery of a later prophet in the name of Moses. Those who believe this like to have dust cast into their eyes. It is interesting to hear how Schleiermacher judges of the supposed author of 1st Timothy after having finished the proof that it is not Paul's. He says, "The author has evidently been guilty of a falsehood, as it was his design to make that to appear to be Paul's which was not so. If we then receive it, that in canonical writings the author must be inspired, or at least of an unblemished character, we cannot allow this work to make a part in the canon."—Schleiermacher, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. i. (Berlin, 1836).

year when his views were not far apart from Schleiermacher's. When he answered his father's expostulation about a more exclusive attention to the high duties of the ministry by saying that he visited his people and the sick as much as his neighbours, defied any one to point out a part of his duty that was omitted, and boasted that after satisfying his parochial work he could have five days in the week for scientific pursuits, we may parallel Schleiermacher's plea with his father, that he has sufficient motives for all duty in his own mind independent of those peculiar doctrines of the gospel which his father considered essential, adding that he did all that would be required of him, and that "God does not require perfection, but only that we should be striving after it" (here Lessing's disciple!). Even then, however, there was the cardinal distinction between them, that Chalmers had the law of God before him, from which he never for a moment withdrew his homage—an aid which the other never had even in the years when he was doing his best to conform to the Moravians, as the law of God is theoretically annulled in that body. For a long time, however, Chalmers had almost no perception of the substance of truth in the law which he revered. We see him address himself to the Divine law with the intention of fulfilling it, and with the conviction that such fulfilment was neither impracticable nor very difficult. He passed through the experience known in divinity as being alive without the law, and of dying when the law revived. It was his sincere purpose to observe every duty and avoid every transgression. He himself declares the old and ever new experience of all who wait upon God's right hand till it reveal the truth to them. "It (the law) still kept ahead of him with a kind of overmatching superiority to all his efforts. His attempt to scale the heights of perfection, to quell the remonstrances of a challenging and not yet appeased commandment, was like the laborious ascent of him who, having so wasted his strength that he can do no more, finds that some precipice still remains to be overcome, some mountain brow that scorns his enterprise and threatens to overwhelm him." In view of that high and heavenly morality which the law required he found himself "a helpless defaulter from the first and greatest of its commandments;" and this was no momentary flash of conviction,

continued the permanent tone of his judgment all his life long. Compare these breathings of the soul after a divinely set standard with the self-appreciation on the other side, where there is never a surmise of anything faulty, where men follow their own manner of thinking and acting the rule for others, and when, following them as we may through the meshes of correspondence, not a trace appears that, living as they do, self-indulgent, secular, lazy, and carnal lives, their souls are ever visited by the suspicion that they have offended against either the first or second table. There can surely be no question on which of the two sides truth was doing its work. Those who had chosen to seek the truth for themselves had never found it, nor perceived its first *γνώθη* *τρον*. In the second last year of his life Schleiermacher told his friend that he had never had aught heathenish about himself, i.e. that his life had been ever conformable to the Christian standard. This is closely connected with the “sinlessness” (*Unsündlichkeit*) which he describes as the benefit communicated by Christ—to a more particular definition of which neither he nor his commentators condescend, but which gives the best illustration of the meaning of his celebrated conversion to positive Christianity, and of the adroitness with which he attached the specious outside of orthodox phraseology to counteract the most deadly soul-poison. This “*Unsündlichkeit*” is justification by faith, but the thing most opposed to it. “Sinlessness” as a gift of Christ sounds very like the truth, for Christians are, in a sense, free from sin by union with Christ. Schleiermacher knows of no law, consequently of no transgression, no satisfaction of Christ for sinners, and no justification. He knows only of sin as a natural evil to which men are subject, and from which we are delivered by the manifestation of Christ, in virtue of which we are enabled to live a life of civilized and Christian civilisation. The ability to live justly and morally under the gospel, which Christian preachers have ever warned us not to make a ground of righteousness, is, according to this system, the benefit that Christ communicates. Under this term the error which the human heart most naturally generates, and against which Scripture constantly warns, is most plausibly concealed, and sanctioned with authority to the heart. Many before him

had contended fiercely against imputed righteousness. It remained for him to dress up the opposite error so as to give it the nearest resemblance to the truth. If then it be the devil's work to adulterate, to make error so resemble truth that men, all things considered, are more easily led to the former, this artifice of Schleiermacher is, according to Dr. Duncan's expression, "essence of devilry." This delusion has overspread the land, satisfying men that if they have the name of Christ they need nothing more than a measure of outward decency, and then they turn and tread on the name in which this has been propounded to them. If they who receive Christ obtain power to become sons of God, those who embrace Schleiermacher's "sinlessness" receive power to quash conscience, and become children of the world and the devil.

Schleiermacher comes forth with the grand fallacy of his life in the enunciation that religion has nothing to do with truth, that truth is the province of philosophy, while that of religion is devout feeling. This shows that he had never come into the most distant contact with truth, for had it touched his conscience, and like Ithuriel's spear made him take his real shape before his own eye, it would have made him own its power to bring him in guilty before God. Not the sportsman-life of the speculative philosopher, nor the dazzling evolutions in syllogisms and grand views, but the stern school of truth that puts conscience and heart and will and soul and mind through the crucible of her inexorable discipline, is to qualify for the high vocation of king and priest in the life of eternity. It was thus that Chalmers was impelled onward; he had abundance of devotional feeling, but truth continued to wave her torch over it, discovering it to be dark and short of that region of light and harmony where she dwells with her children. It is beautiful here to observe what a profound horror he displays of being made the captive of any human system: the higher principle preserved him from such blind devotion to Calvin or Edwards as Schleiermacher pays to the "outcast saint" Spinoza. One thing more, he ever declares without reserve the views by which his mind is influenced. At no period of his life could he have listened to such advice as Schleiermacher got from his father, to preach the doctrine which was acceptable to the people when his own

convictions were different. Schleiermacher could not inveigh more strongly against vicarious atonement than Chalmers after he had been years in the ministry. Thus in 1829: "In what particular manner the death of our Redeemer effected the remission of our sins, or rather why that death was made a condition of this remission, seems to be an unrevealed point in Scripture. Perhaps the God of nature meant to illustrate the purity of his perfections to the children of men; perhaps it was efficacious in promoting the improvement and confirming the virtues of other orders of being. The tenets of those whose *unenlarged minds* are apt to imagine that the Author of nature required the death of Jesus merely for the reparation of violated justice, are rejected by all free and rational inquirers. . . . Let him (the Christian) allow himself to be guided by the instructions of our mystical theologians, and all will be enveloped in gloom and obscurity." All this time Chalmers was looking with all submissiveness to the utterances of the inspired Word, zealous for God as Paul when he persecuted Jesus, unwearied in discharge of every known duty. But here comes in truth's great lesson, that she teaches in a sovereign manner by the life, that no man ever attains her aim by mere thinking, that she humbles in the dust those who are to be raised up, and that inevitably the innate pride of the fallen heart must be mortified and buried. Led through deep sorrow, when the sickness and death of his nearest brought him into converse with the realities of eternity, he made the discovery that the principles on which he had counted failed to yield a satisfactory foundation under the last trials of sinful humanity. When he had thus come into that lowly frame which welcomes the draught of truth by whatever ministry, the great saving mystery which none of the princes of this world can know was revealed to him not by any intenser effort of his mighty understanding, not from the tomes of a Calvin or Turretin, but through the writings of a simple Christian layman. The truth of old Scotch theology that under Christ we work not for life but from life, that Christ for us is antecedent in nature if not in time to Christ in us, that the righteousness of Christ without works, imputed by free grace and embraced by faith, gives a full and indefeasible right to all the privileges and benefits of the covenant of redemption, including repentance and all grace

— all this, which Chalmers had long taught children from the Catechism, but never comprehended, lay at once upon his heart like beams from the Sun of Righteousness, enabling him to say for himself, "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord."

Now should have been the time, according to the axioms of scepticism, when this lofty spirit submitted itself to the formulae of orthodoxy, to see the fire of genius quenched and intellect dulled and smothered up in ascetic duties, or mystic contemplation. Nothing less! From the hour of this new and highest baptism he is beheld going forth with enhanced energy on every field of enterprise. Previously his genius had been contriving openings for itself, much in the same way as the spirit of Samson was moved in the camp of Dan before he realised his call, craving for worthy enterprise, and perhaps Chalmers then saw nothing higher to grasp than a Professor's chair; now we see him strike out for himself enterprises of the most novel and beneficial kind, grappling in the might of Christian hope with the social and spiritual evils under which the masses lay crushed, setting his face against the abuses in the Church that crippled its efficiency and polluted its life, shaking himself loose from political friends and parties to take up the gauntlet for religious freedom, and, when thwarted by a short-sighted Government, going forth out of the struggle at the head of a fully organised establishment of God's own kind, which Government was impotent to assail, and going higher still, the lamp of spiritual zeal burning brighter as nature failed, spending the dregs of his strength in exhibiting the solution of the problem how the most degraded classes may be gained by personal intercourse, leaving it as his legacy to the world, that the church on earth has aught to boast of till the gospel is carried to every family and homestead in her domain.

Before going further, we refer to the influence of one grand principle which these two men held in common, as a remarkable example on what different paths the mind disciplined by Divine law, and the mind for which this law was absolutely non-existent, are borne under the influence of the same intellectual convictions. We refer to the doctrine of philosophical necessity, the influence of which on Chalmers's mind is thus described by his biographer: "Planting his foot on the truth

demonstrated, as it seemed to him, so irresistibly by Edwards, that fixed, unalterable links bind together the whole series of events in the spiritual as well as in the material universe, he rose to that sublime conception of the Godhead as that eternal, all-pervading energy by which this vast and firmly-knit succession was originated and sustained; and into a very rapture of admiration and delight his spirit was upborne," etc. A similar intellectual conviction left Schleiermacher in contact with a Deity, who, according to his own definition, is nothing more than "*natura naturans*" acting from inherent forces and qualities, but destitute of any holy and righteous will, so that, as his critic Chalybæus says, it is of so little importance in his system as almost to fall out of sight. The divergency is a moral one. Chalmers, under God's law, had been trained to moral conceptions; Schleiermacher knows them not. Here is revealed the whole grandeur of the law of God and its pedagogic results. In that law not only the authority of the Almighty, but the very knowledge of his being and attributes is rooted. The law, the truth from God's right hand, training the moral sense, waking the dormant feeling of guilt and self-judgment, resurrectionising the sentiments of righteousness and truth inwrought in the framework of the heart, making final judgment certain and inevitable, reveals the Deity, in whose name it speaks, as invested with the attributes of justice, holiness, mercy, and truth. It is this moral work in the soul that prevents its being overborne by the view of another law, demonstrated by the understanding, of invincible necessity, binding together all events and acts in infallible sequence. When this moral work is lacking, the spirit infallibly succumbs to Pantheism, and is content with a God that has no righteous and holy will, that can neither be loved, nor trusted, nor feared; as a necessary consequence, man, fashioned like the God he professes, turns, like a ship without rudder, whither the impulses of his wayward, finite, foolish spirit carry him. We say the divergence is a moral one, as paralysing and perverting man solely on the domain of moral responsibilities. It is proved on the field of our everyday existence that the reality of life and its urgent demands break through all regard to preordination and uniformity, and regardlessly wield all means for the indispensable end: and it is the same in the

life of morality and religion where men are equally bent on attaining to the life of justification and acceptance with God. In this case they will and do set in motion all disposable influences with as much greater intention, as the object is higher and more commanding. This same moral discipline sees all the frivolous objections scattered to the wind before it, that are directed to discredit miracles and other aids from heaven, including the inspired Word, whereby its high end of reconciliation with God is to be attained and improved. The man, seeing one of the two great families that have filled the world, that which was ever eminent for all good, going before him in the use of these means, and reaping the fruit of decision in the foretaste of spiritual and eternal life, follows strenuously in their wake. The difference between the two is not in the intellect but in the acceptance or rejection of the truth from heaven. It is a striking fact Schleiermacher relates of himself, that, as a boy, he doubted the facts of history; and he never came to see that there is a species of testimony, such as that of the Passover, for the wonders at the Exodus, which is God's own monument and not man's, and that of the Apostles for the resurrection, which we may not impugn without doing violence to our whole moral being, which is as much higher than the usual course of nature as the moral world is above the material.

These views could not but occasion very opposite convictions on the cardinal question of prayer. Prayer, according to Schleiermacher, was only an essential article of ecclesiastical order in which the devout feeling of the Church finds its expression in the liturgy. His repugnance to private and social prayer reminds us only of the abhorrence Claverhouse had at the psalm-singing of the Covenanters. "A for those," he says, "who pretend that they can continue long in prayer, that they are not weary of pleading with God for one or another object, they are still remote from the true fear of God. . . . Much as they may talk of their high frames in prayer, I am convinced there is no true devout feeling in their whole proceedings. At some times they plead their wants before God; their prayer is like other petty performances, a part of the order of their day; and immediately after they turn to other works and amusement."

without a trace of devotion being apparent in all these *N.B.*—His experience was among the Moravians!), and in the same manner they pass from their business, their works, their joking, to prayer, with their hearts stuffed with mere earthly concerns. Is this an evidence of a heart habitually conversing with God? They may asseverate as they please about the blessing in their hearts which such prayer produces, but it will be only casual and temporary emotions. Don't they always utter the same expressions and phrases? Don't they mostly pray in thoughts they have got from others? We all know how little effect such can really have upon the mind itself. It is truly no loss to Christianity if such habits decline. No! it would be with a light heart I would look forward to the entire disappearance of all these hours of prayer and observances." These sentiments he never retracted nor revoked. From his voluminous correspondence we have no indication that he ever prayed in his life. We meet with frequent invocation of the gods, of heaven, even of the devil (*Der Teufel hole . . .*), but never, not even on his deathbed, any cry or petition addressed as from a needy, finite, sinful soul to the Creator and Redeemer. In his theology he allows an expression of the consciousness of the Church, "prayer in the name of Jesus," but this refers only to public worship. It is necessary to exhibit the whole irreconcilable difference between the man who receives the truth of God and him who receives only the truth discovered by his own mind. From Chalmers's diary it appears on every page that while neglecting none of the diligence requisite to secure success in his work, his chief dependence was ever on that blessing which descends from a prayer-hearing God on them who ask it. His instruction to his students was to pray as if all depended on God, and labour as if all depended on themselves. It is a fact well worthy of study that the stiffest predestinarians, as the Puritans and Covenanters, have been the men of most prayer, as it is an anomaly of equal magnitude on the field of common life, which Mosheim records with a moral shake of the head as an insoluble riddle, that, contrary to all the prognostics of ethical science, the countries where belief in predestination prevailed have been those most eminent for a strict regard to morality and good behaviour.

be re-assumed as the domain of philosophy, be it that educated or uneducated, while religion was to be removed into a sombre seclusion, in which men might indulge cultivate what remained of devotional feeling, chiefly in consideration of women and those whose minds were undeveloped. This was the consistent outcome of his answer to his father, that he had sufficient motives for duty apart from those doctrines of the faith with which he was imbued. This is the doctrine that rules the press and the author, the centres of opinion in Germany, dissociating men's minds from the faith, and regarding Jews, heathens, Papists, and Protestants as all on the same footing in respect of the faith. That the world should overlook the grand truth of Christianity, that the tree must be good ere the fruit be good, and that there be no act nor thought radically good but when the act is rooted in Christ, is conceivable enough; but we have to deal with a theologian whose positions have controlled a great part of the Church for half a century. Should it be surprising that such bastard religion, which allows men to lift their centres of self-moved centres of moral excellence, and is called Christianity, diffuse a lying consecration around birth, marriage, and death, becomes contemptible? Accordingly, the press even its most respectable representatives requires preachers to preach the doctrines of the gospel and secure themselves with

of a true Baconian mind is that philosophy which would lead us to cast down all our antecedent conceptions, and to sit down with the docility of little children at the feet of a communication from heaven, provided that its authenticity has been established."

We are able to study how these two majestic spirits severally comport themselves in the tread-mill, as some might term it, of parochial work in country parishes. Schleiermacher's letters from Stolpe ever complain of isolation from the literary and congenial society of the capital, and his only resource seems to be in more exuberant outpourings of heart towards his female Jewish friends there. Doubtless his sermons even then testified of the intellectual power and depth with which all his writings are stamped, but he has the feeling that not more than one or two of his audience, at the most, understand him. We remember Coleridge relates that he had under his hands four samples of different creeds,—a Jew, a Swedenborgian, a Roman Catholic, and some other, whom he was *experimenting upon*. This we may suppose pretty much the aim of Schleiermacher, to try how far he could get his ideas into men. But Chalmers having a hold, though an imperfect one, of truth from heaven, had a sense of responsibility to the souls of men to give them what he could, and he came down to their comprehension. He delivered fervid, extempore expostulations against stealing, lying, and backbiting, and pressed reformation in respect of honour, truth, integrity, and all moral duties. It was the difference between the truth ardently grasped, and the truth perseveringly pursued but never reached, for even then the mind of the one apprehended the truth of an Almighty Judge and an Avenger of sin. Schleiermacher was capable of intense satisfaction from imparting his views to men capable of comprehending them, and the lack of such in his country parish despoiled his labour of all interest. Chalmers, even at his lowest, had a message from God that concerned the illiterate peasant as much as the wisest on earth. After his conversion, when he got hold of the mystery of a gratuitous salvation offered to every creature under heaven, he gave a concrete exemplification of the truth of heaven going forth in its power on earth. And, as this truth showed its Divine virtue in the sluggish minds of his parishioners, and those who had been

clay-cold under his moral tirades, woke up to serve themselves heirs of immortality, tasting of that meat which solaced the fainting spirit of the Master at the well of Sychar, all the hours of the day were too narrow for the ardour of his spirit. He catechised in the family, kept a class for young men, to which they came from the remotest distance, visited the sick, dying, and bereaved, and made as faithful preparation for preaching to these illiterate assemblies as ever after for the most polished city audiences. Schleiermacher only came forth in his full strength after he was transplanted to Berlin. In that intellectual centre he found the stimulus his mind needed, and he rose to the occasion. When he saw literary men, men in high station, officers, and even crowds of Jews gathering round his pulpit, he poured forth the riches and grace of his eloquence.

From the outset he drew wondering crowds, that listened to his stately paragraphs and mysterious paralogisms; for poor human souls, ready to stagnate in the monotony of everyday life, are ready to find in every voice that strikes an unusual chord the angel that has come down to stir the pool of healing virtue. But, though startled to a moment's thought by such sentences as "It is in some cases better to have religion without a God than with one;" "First identify yourselves and your being with the great All, and then come and inquire further about the immortality of the soul;" "Rise above the rules of conventional morality and confide in the unsophisticated promptings of the heart," the hearers carried away little but an unbounded admiration of the speaker. We hear of no similar case in Berlin to that of the two youths who met after a sermon of Chalmers's in a neighbouring plantation, confessed to each other that their eyes had been opened to know themselves sinners, and began a concert for prayer for the Divine blessing, which made them friends for life in the pilgrimage to Zion. Later in life Schleiermacher grasped the person of Christ as his ideal, transcending all that appeared on the field of history, and, presenting it with all the force and ardour of his genius, induced many who had concluded that Christ and his gospel were effete, to inquire anew, and thus many, as is known, who received the first impression from Schleiermacher, obtained worthier views than their teacher.

But he himself knew nothing of a Redeemer from sin, and wrought nothing but a vague adoration. His magniloquent platitudes that "every man is by his very being in the image of God" fired some to such a degree that one of his hearers records that if "but for that one utterance, he could have worshipped him." But Chalmers's faith was very earnest, he knew himself in possession of the instrument that could renew man in the image of his Maker, a consciousness which led to the restless consideration and employment of all appliances to secure the result in as many cases as possible. Let us follow him, too, after he was called to the largest city in his native country, as he gathered around him, by his commanding genius, crowds of sympathetic hearers.

Turning from the admiring multitudes who were quickened and made blessed by his word, he considered street upon street, and house upon house, in the great city, teeming with families fortified by spiritual inertia against common motives, and, like a man who was aware of having a blessing in his hand, sufficient to rescue all from the spiritual ruin in which they were buried, he formed the project of parcelling and subdividing the huge masses of poverty and ignorance into manageable sections, and by himself, or his aides-de-camp, visiting from house to house, and getting the message of salvation carried to every human ear! What but a vital possession of truth could have shown itself capable of such enterprise? The truth is from God and for man, and knows no respect of persons. The same man who could hold the highest circles entranced was equally at home among the mechanics who met in a cotton-mill or workshop with their greasy jackets and unwashed countenances, and the grateful response of the lower classes testified that the word from God was equally for them. Different from that truth which the philosopher has in view, the truth from heaven can be implanted in the tender hearts of children never to be eradicated; and we see this servant of God set on foot agencies to go after children and draw them within the circle of the gospel's beneficent operation, following high and low, learned and unlearned, young and old, and manifesting by his zeal as much as by his talent the value of the boon he commended to them. It was possible for Schleiermacher to go

serenely, after the labour of composition or of the desk was discharged, to spend the evening in recreation in a circle of friends or in the saloons of the great, to the recruiting of mind and body. He never breathes a syllable indicating that the moral wastes of Berlin caused him a heart-break. How should the philosophic sceptic care for the illiterate or for children? He has nothing to give them. It was Jesus, and only he who said, "Suffer little children to come to me," and who had compassion on the multitudes. The recreation of the sceptic will be in consistency with the rest of his system. Compare Spinoza, when he fattened spiders with large flies, and then took pleasure in making them fight and tear each other to pieces, with the Christian philanthropist, who, after he had done his part well in the loftier intellectual regions of society, turned to scheme and mine in the more obdurate recesses of human ignorance and ungodliness, the Howard, on the spiritual side, in ceaseless endeavours to make the treasure that had gladdened his own heart available for the most forlorn and desolate of the species.

Who would not rejoice to see such men thrust forward, out of the rut of professional and literary life, to give proof of themselves in the political arena on some grand question of national life? Accordingly we find both called to cast their votes into the scale in the question affecting classes struggling under social disabilities; the Roman Catholics in England, and the Jews in Germany. *A priori*, we would be disposed to expect that the Freethinker would be foremost to sweep away all such arbitrary shackles laid upon men on the ground of name or dissent or opinion. Not so fast! Hobbes and Hegel both ended in advocating tyranny on the one side and servility on the other in the state. Chalmers at once took an uncompromising position as the champion of civil freedom apart from religious considerations. He held truth too high to require the support of a statute-book, and invited Protestants to renounce all weapons but those spiritual ones with which Christianity had originally prevailed, and trusted by according Roman Catholics equal participation in the politics of the realm to despoil error of a factitious advantage as persecuted. We think Chalmers was wrong in overlooking the fact that Popery is by no means a purely religious sect, but a

mighty political league, with its ramifications in every country under heaven engaged in a conspiracy to bring all *per fas et nefas* under the yoke of the Romish priest-king; but yet the part he took is a valuable evidence how the spirit of truth carries man above all prejudices, and all regard to the objections of those associated with him when it concerns the interests of those whom he supposes to be wronged. This was very different from Voltaire's argument for toleration, which treats all Christians alike as fools. There it is the truth with open eyes pleading for the supposed rights of a fanatical sect, whose dangerous character it at the same time knows and owns. Let us turn to Schleiermacher and the Jews. In 1799 a number of Jewish fathers of families in Berlin drew up an address to Probst Teller praying for information as to what steps should be taken for the incorporation of the Jewish people in the Christian Church! Who can but dwell on this moment with interest: for the reception of the Jews in Berlin would have been a signal for all the Jews in the world turning to the gospel. Teller was an extreme rationalist, but in such esteem with his contemporaries that in his funeral sermon the preacher said if such men as Jesus, Luther, and Teller, were to arise all would soon be in order in religion. Teller would have been inclined to make all kinds of concessions to the petitioners. But Schleiermacher came before the public with a pamphlet against the reception of the Jews, where he appears in a more favourable light than usual, treating the proposal for making concessions in Christianity with the severest sarcasm. But what were his reasons? None other than the fear that if the Jews entered the Christian Church in numbers they would add strength to the Pharisaic or positive side that adhered to the letter of the Scriptures. Not believing in conversion, he supposed the Jews would under the Christian name only be what they were before. On the other hand, he came forward in favour of a measure to confer upon the Jews unlimited social emancipation *with the one proviso*, that they renounced the hope of the Messiah! As if Protestants had assented to Roman Catholic emancipation on condition that Romanists renounced all connection with the Pope.

Schleiermacher appears in his greatest strength and greatest weakness in the part he took in the Church revolution which

gave birth to the Evangelical Church of Prussia in its present form. Frederick-William the Third had gained the persuasion that the moment was near for effecting the long-desired union of the Lutherans and the Reformed, and making one Protestant Church throughout his dominions. It seemed as if the most had, under the Rationalist era, lost all concern for the points of difference, and that the measure needed only to be proposed to be accepted. Schleiermacher cast himself with his whole soul into the scheme for remodelling the Church, as the prospect was held out of getting it freed from the despotism of consistories, and constituted in presbyteries and synods after the pattern of the early Church. In a presbytery or synod he had the assurance that he, as Reformed, could hold his own, and more. It was a rare faculty which enabled him, educated in German Erastianism, to embrace this scheme on the ground of its intrinsic truth. He was originally Reformed as contrary to Lutheran, and difficult as it was in his early days for such to get on against predominant Lutheranism, he never deserted his colours. All was going on smoothly, and Prussia would have been under his auspices a Presbyterian country, when the "rebuff of an opposing cloud," such as sent Satan back from the abysses of chaos, shelved the scheme. The murder of Kotzebue by a democratic student furnished Austria with a pretext for interference, and, with the zealous co-operation of our Wellington, she put her veto on such a church constitution as a too great concession on the side of liberty. The result was the present Prussian State Church, in which the servants of Government, including the clergy, exert a quiet but effective pressure upon every remonstrance of the popular will. But that was not all ! The king proceeded to prescribe of his own proper authority, as "summus episcopus," an Agende or Liturgy for the whole church, which was to be neither Lutheran nor Reformed, but an amalgamation of both. Naturally this compound was offensive to both. The Reformed took offence at lighted tapers by noonday, kneeling before the altar, chanting of the clergy from the altar, and that the priest, as the Lutherans call him, turned his face to the crucifix and his back to the congregation ; while the Lutherans were displeased that the expressions in the Communion, and many other things, were

modified in the sense of the Reformed. Schleiermacher's Reformed convictions were deeply wounded ; he declared that he never would turn his back to the congregation and his face to the crucifix, and went so far—it required courage in those days (1820-30)—as to write a pseudonymous pamphlet, showing that the right the King claimed in matters of “cultus” had no legal standing in the Protestant Church. Nevertheless, he at last gave way. After enduring some persecution, he accepted an amended liturgy, with the resolve to use it as much and as little as he pleased. On condition of indulgence for himself, he gave up the principle for the Church, and even advised others to comply, hinting that they did not need to believe the words they officially employed. It was opinion, a human ideal in his case, and not faith in Christ living and ruling in his church. Such opinions will never overcome the world. It was Erasmus over again. Hundeshagen says : “ Literati and philosophers are the last men in the world to assail the powers that be, unless they see themselves backed by some power of equal authority.” Schleiermacher had sufficient intellectual energy to give the church at once a new constitution, to sweep away mountains of traditionary rubbish, and to make no account of the gulf of prejudices which others think they must leave to time. He even *thought in the extremity of setting up a Free Church* ; a church freed from State control would have delighted his sense of the right and beautiful. We must confess to a certain admiration of this great man, as an unflinching adherent of the persecuted Reformed symbol, and of the Free Church before it existed. What was his defect ? Simply this : with him the whole was æsthetical predilection, and not faith in that Lord Jesus Christ who came forth conquering and to conquer. The Church controversy in Scotland, which Chalmers conducted, was not a battle for an ideal, but, from beginning to end, a sad but sternly resolute progress towards an uncertain issue at the instance of truth. It began under the conviction that the Church in which Christ rules by his Word and Spirit has certain inherent privileges which may not be sacrificed to any power under heaven. There was not a breath of the democratic element in Chalmers's complexion, nor did he anticipate great things to be achieved by a church separate from the

Stata. On the contrary, he believed that an Established Church was right when all was adjusted with regard to the Word of God, and that it was the only instrument adequate to provide ordinances for the whole land. In his testimony and contention for the essential rights of Christ and his people, he was casting to the winds the fondest hopes and a great part of the labours of his life, and the only consolation in breaking with men and parties, with whom he had been honourably associated, was the "we cannot but" of the apostles. Hence the slowness to contemplate the last calamity, the prolonging of negotiations, the catching at every shadow of accommodation, the touching appeals of the Church from one law-instance to another, at last to the Parliament and the Crown : but hence also the firm repudiation of all proposals that went to palliate without removing the aggression on the liberties of Christ's Church, the sad but resolute preparation for the hour of decision, so that, to the amazement of the world and the actors themselves, the tragedy was turned into a victory, and instead of a few baffled protesters claiming sympathy as unfortunates, there stood forth a Church fully equipped, with her face set to the task of missions at home and abroad, a man-child born of the truth, sealed and owned before the world, and caught up to God and his throne.

The Free Church was a striking evidence to a materialistic age that the same faith exists that history tells of, enabling men and ministers to risk and sacrifice all for their convictions; but it soon appeared that marvellous as such phenomenon was, it would not avail to solve the problem of a thorough and universal evangelisation of the land. We know not if anything grander can be produced in the history of the Church than the behaviour of Chalmers in this case, bending to the will of God, owning the defect of the Free Church, which might be called in a way his "own creation" when in the prime of her glory, and turning to seek an effective spread of the gospel from a combination of all evangelical denominations. It was thus he threw himself with his whole soul into the formation of the Evangelical Alliance, as he hoped thus by the united efforts of all the wise and good in the land to make more thorough exertions for overtaking the myriads of immortals who were perishing because neglected

in the great towns and other outfields of the country. It is thus that the truth leads on from one height to another. After Schleiermacher was baffled in his hopes for the church of his country, his only resource was to retire within the sphere of his literary pursuits and professional duties. He had the mortification to see the swell of religious ardour, which he would gladly have conducted into another channel, go over into a reaction in favour of rigid Lutheranism, which proceeded to fill the land with the same barren orthodoxy which gave rationalism its first advantage, when professors and teachers dazzled all nations with productions of a high-wrought philosophico-theological sentimentality, which left the people to sink from one depth to another of spiritual indigence, till the classes that make and measure the life of the people are by the most competent testimony utterly fallen from the gospel. For this state of things Schleiermacher knew of no remedy. After Chalmers had brought the struggle for the true constitution of the Church to a successful issue, and effected all possible combinations for carrying the gospel abroad upon society as widely as possible, there was still one thing he found he could do—and he did it with the last of his strength—he could give in his own neighbourhood such an example as, if generally followed, would certainly convert the moral waste everywhere to a garden of the Lord. When he chose the worst district in the city of his abode, gathered a circle of fellow-labourers around him, divided it into twenty districts of twenty families each, brought individual care to bear upon each family, got teachers and visitors, and had a church and schoolroom reared where men had been living without any to care for their souls, he exhibited more than in the days of his palmiest oratory the pattern of Him who called the demoniac to his feet, clothed and in his right mind.

It is a gratuitous assumption that the men of scepticism, though not working directly for the truth, give a fresh stimulus to thought which could not otherwise have come, and secure for religion a deeper root and more robust growth. Hurricanes, whether natural or moral, are in their nature desolating, spreading death and destruction, and though they may be in certain climates the lesser evil, and may be the delight of painters and poets that contemplate them from a distance, yet

we prefer those countries where the processes of nature go forward without such outbursts. Perpetual or periodical hurricane, as in France since 1789, is the awful issue to which they tend. The false prophet is never presented in Scripture, not even when clothed with the grandeur of old Balaam, as a benefit, but as a warning. It has appeared in this parallel, that possession of the truth conveys far higher power in life, a result to be expected, as the intellectual multiplied by the moral must infinitely exceed that which is simply intellectual. We can institute no comparison between the metaphysical systems of Chalmers and Schleiermacher such as is wont to be made between the latter and Fichte or Hegel, for the simple reason that Chalmers, by virtue of his distinction between the "knowable" and "unknowable," eschewed all researches in the regions beyond the limits of the human understanding. He is confessedly the wiser man who perceives *a priori* that it is as vain as it is a profane thing to seek to comprise the being of the Deity in a definition of the finite understanding, or even to comprehend the metaphysical essence of the world. The popular sense discovers the "bathos" in which these speculations landed when it represents the Hegelian as found with folded hands turned inward to himself, and, when questioned, answering, "I worship myself;" and caricatures Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity as "*the sense of dependence*," by the inference that the dog is the best Christian. The example of Chalmers shows that the soul that subjects itself to revealed truth needs not yield to any in the ardour with which true science is prosecuted. Had Chalmers never been converted he would probably have lived and died in the service of science, and would have lent his lucubrations a not inferior charm to that which chains us in Schleiermacher's works. His devotion to religion, instead of quenching the scientific zeal, discovered new provinces for its exercise. In one of his public appeals he administers rebuke to the vulgar prejudice on this head:

"Oh, my brethren, I am afraid that upon this subject there has been most unmanly surrender of Christianity . . . that so much authority has been given to the conceptions of a narrow and ignorant bigotry as to have laid open our religion to the scorn of philosophers, and to have brought down upon her the scorn and disgust of the upper classes of society. . .

! are we to be told that in behalf of Christianity nothing can be done up either in the way of argument or illustration to compel the age and to school the superciliousness of these men? Are we in truck-compliance with the humours of a baseless fanaticism to strip away all learning and cultivation, . . . as so many unseemly appendages, from the dress of the priesthood? Are we to let down the defences of our faith and to withdraw from it the labours of the understanding, and to mar any of its legitimate recommendations, and to proclaim in the hearing of the world that instead of being all things to all men, our men of science and scholarship are altogether beyond the range of its artillery, that they may remain in their halls and sit in the conscious superiority of reason above the pretensions of their homely and unlettered superstition?"

This appeal might have been designed for Schleiermacher himself—who on his part indignantly protests that religion should no longer profess to come before men on the ground of *truth*, but as a matter of feeling, incapable of demonstration, and occupying its seat in the devout sense of the church! We think Solomon's two women, and the proof which was the true mother of the child.

It would have been interesting to cast more than a passing glance on the moral side of the picture in both cases, specially in relation to public questions. There are virtues which the philosopher claims for his own, objecting that Christianity allows no scope for patriotism or friendship. Schleiermacher was a patriot and took deeply to heart the degradation of his country under the heel of Napoleon, entering into all the calculations for organising a revolt without regard to personal interest. But there never was a heartier patriot than Chalmers, or more wedded to his country and its whole noble constitution. As we identify patriotism with the indiscriminate eulogising of worthless kings with Hume, or the hatching of anarchy with Voltaire, we will see a patriotism of a far higher kind in him who was ready, Cincinnatus-like, every moment to sacrifice private ease for the welfare of the people, ceaselessly to work to ameliorate the social or the moral condition of every class in the nation. Schleiermacher had many friends, a genial man as he was, made himself the delight of the literary and scientific circles of Berlin. We will not dwell on it that many of his friendships were of a questionable character. But let any man read Chalmers's correspondence with James Anderson, Robert Edie, Alexander Paterson, and Thomas Smith, and judge what such a man must have been

among his equals, and own that the truth from God, which can knit the man of highest science so intimately with the comparatively uneducated, soul to soul, casts men in a finer and nobler mould, making them capable of a friendship as much higher and more durable than that of the world as Christ is above the world and its interests and ties.

The genius of Schleiermacher was of a destructive character, that of Chalmers out-and-out conservative; yet here we see the conservative, when the truth was at stake, ruthlessly cut himself loose from all his moorings, while the other could compromise to have private indulgence. As a boy, Schleiermacher doubted historical fact; Chalmers built on trustworthy testimony as on a rock, and on the first bruit of the Irvingite miraculous tongues, declared himself ready to believe all that was credibly attested. Chalmers had a childlike veneration for all the great and good before him, and could not pronounce the names of Augustine or Bacon, or "Sir Isaac" or Bishop Newton, or Pascal, or Halyburton, without special emphasis. Schleiermacher's overweening confidence in the resources of his own mind led him to perceive little else than the defects of others, and he confesses to admiration for none other than Plato and Homer, so that we must think he has lost sight of Paul and John (Isaiah he seems not to know!). Chalmers held so high the substance of the gospel, that he could overlook all incongruities in the men or institutions that were loyal to it. Schleiermacher felt a resistless impulse to assail whatever could yield shelter to an abuse as outwork or defence; and the supranaturalists who professed to receive revelation because its contents were agreeable to reason were no less the butts of his scorn, than the rationalists who seemed to show regard to the substance of Christianity, while making havoc of all its facts and evidences. Chalmers was forced to be a reformer from zeal to brush away all that dimmed the lustre of the gospel. Sincere Calvinist as he was in all the five resolutions of Dort, he had frequent tirades against that buckram Calvinism that would stint the full and free offer to the sinner. The one inconsistency that Schleiermacher's disciples find in him is that he makes the Christ, from whom the Church's salvation emanates, a historical person rather than an ideal. It will be easily admitted that it gave Schleiermacher an advantage

with the more aspiring of his contemporaries that he appeared to produce a novel gospel on the ruins of that teaching which had proved effete, and that Chalmers had the more arduous task to invest with a new charm what all knew to be the old doctrines that had been from the beginning. The Bible record was with Schleiermacher a subordinate thing, and he mainly gave currency to the treacherous phrase that revelation existed before the Scriptures, separating Bible and Revelation. To Chalmers the Word of God in the Bible was the revelation of Divine love and truth for the redemption of a lost race, a scheme which the mind, blinded by sin, ever inclines to misconceive, over the purity and perfection of which the teacher has to watch with ceaseless assiduity. Schleiermacher projected a union, founded on general indifference, whereby Lutherans and Reformed were to lay aside concern about those weighty truths that had severed them. Chalmers led the way to a permanent union by persuading Christians, while holding high every tittle that is revealed in the conscience, to look above and beyond this to the grand verities that are represented in their common name.

The lamentable aberrations of the great German, whose life was a searching after truth which he never found, are to be traced to the same root as those of the apostle of the Gentiles before his conversion—ignorance of the law. For this we must hold the Moravians, among whom he was educated, in great measure responsible. Their aversion to the law is the explanation of the abounding of the phraseology of grace, in combination, in many cases, with a worldly and unsanctified life, such as makes it possible for the aristocracy to delight in the connexion. It is, however, a fierce and systematic antagonism that Schleiermacher discovers to the law of God; so, while accommodating himself in general to orthodox phrases, he will not suffer it to be said that Christ fulfilled the law for us. But the law is God's schoolmaster to bring to Christ. The vision of Christ would have availed Paul nothing, unless the law, applied by the Spirit, had "come" inwardly, as the result of which "coming" the apostle tells us, "I died." Without this all the grand things Schleiermacher saw and taught of Christ were in vain—for Christ is a Saviour from sin, or nothing. Those who are not judged by the law in conscience must and

will cast it off. We are told of Spinoza that he was in the habit of prayer, till one evening, when going over the alphabetical confession of sin *more Rabbinico*, the thought occurred, "But why confess murder, stealing, lying, etc., when you were never guilty of any of these?" The alternative before this age is the law leading to Christ, or the discarding the Divine gift, and returning to a pantheistic life with the tinsel of Christian phrase and circumstance.

The hollow nature of the Christianity Schleiermacher taught comes to light in the doctrine of his disciples. They teach that the pre-eminence of Jesus over other men is only so long to be recognised till such advances be made in civilisation, that the Messiah of progress be outstripped by those of a maturer age. To our view, he was as clearly the false prophet of the nineteenth century, as Mahomet was of the seventh. As the latter, looking round, saw all religion in danger of being swallowed up by a luxuriant polytheism, Schleiermacher, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, saw this province of humanity in danger of disappearing under the wild hand of rationalism, and thought himself called to undertake the work of reconstruction. The one had as much honesty of purpose as the other. Schleiermacher does not profess to have revelations;—that is not his style, but he does, in one place, lay claim to have a gift of divining, and we think it could be proved that he considered himself the vehicle of Divine inspiration, when he consciously, and with the best conscience, remoulded the religion of Christ, so as to accommodate it to the temper and complexion of the age in which he lived. This religion of Schleiermacher is spreading like a snare over the nations, undermining and subverting truth and leading men to content themselves with a vague devotion or profession, which is evacuated of the substance and power of the truth from heaven. God lifts up voices to wake men like that of the Jewish poet, Heinrich Heine, in our own day who, after entertaining Paris and all Europe with genial blasphemies, had the confession wrung from him, in the paroxysms of his fearful disease, that, to be an infidel, men need to be in health, to be rich, and in comfortable circumstances; but men go comfortably and carelessly forward in their godless speculation. For Chalmers, Jesus Christ was the Son of David,

the promised Seed that bruised the serpent's head, and his Church *one* from Abel downward, whose "neck is like the tower of David builded for an armoury, whereon there hang a thousand bucklers, all shields of mighty men." For all this Schleiermacher had no comprehension; for him the Jewish revelation was but a higher level than that of the heathen; and the inference was at the door, if he did not draw it, that the future may show a stage of illumination higher still than that which is introduced by Christ.

DANIEL EDWARD.

ART. V.—*Professor Robertson Smith on the Pentateuch.*¹

PROFESSOR ROBERTSON SMITH tells us on p. 216 of his recently published lectures on Biblical Criticism,² that "the discrepancy between the traditional view of the Pentateuch and the plain statements of the historical books and the Prophets is marked and fundamental." This view is accordingly discarded by him and another commended to us as representing "the growing conviction of an overwhelming weight of the most earnest and sober scholarship." He asks us to believe that Deuteronomy made its first appearance in the reign of Josiah, and that the Levitical law was not in existence until the time of Ezra.

The hypothesis which the Professor has undertaken to unfold and to defend has only very recently attracted any serious attention. Professor Reuss of Strasburg claims the credit of having given the original impulse to this newest school of Pentateuch criticism, by propounding this view in his lectures as early as 1833. His pupil, K. H. Graf, elaborated it more fully in his treatise, "De Templo Silensi," in 1855; in his "Prophet Jeremiah" (1862); and in his "Geschichtliche Bücher des Alten Testaments" (1866). As proposed by him, however, it was burdened with fatal inconsistencies which

¹ From the *Presbyterian Review*.

² "The Old Testament in the Jewish Church." Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism, by W. Robertson Smith, M.A. New York, 1881. 12mo, pp. 441.

were speedily pointed out by its antagonists. The divisive critics, who parcelled out the Pentateuch among different writers, had previously conducted their analysis and based their conclusions upon literary considerations chiefly, the style and diction and quality of thought and acquaintance shown with other parts of the work. Graf drew his arguments from legislative considerations, the supposed development of laws, and the order in which successive enactments may be thought to have been made. And conceiving the legislation of Deuteronomy to be simpler and more primitive, and that of Leviticus to be more complicated and developed, he inferred, contrary to the prevailing sentiment of preceding critics, that Deuteronomy is of earlier date than Leviticus, and belongs to a prior stage in the history of the people. Meanwhile he allowed the conclusions of the critics in relation to the narratives of the Pentateuch to remain undisturbed, conceding a higher antiquity to the Elohist portion which is in the closest affinity with Leviticus than to the Jehovistic portion to which Deuteronomy attaches itself. This self-contradiction Kuenen undertook to remove by reversing the relation of the Elohist and the Jehovist, thus boldly challenging the position which all preceding critical investigations had been supposed to settle beyond peradventure.

To disinterested spectators of these hostile critical camps, this looks very like a fresh demonstration of the precarious and inconclusive nature of their entire process of argument. Experiments without number have been made of running the dissecting knife through the Pentateuch; and each fresh operator has pronounced, with the utmost positiveness, upon the various age of its several portions, and has pointed out influences under which each was written and the condition of affairs when it was produced. And now everything has been thrown into a fresh jumble again; the whole order of production, confidently insisted upon before, is suddenly declared to be a mistake; everything must be reconstructed on a new basis. In the midst of this jargon of voices, clamouring on the one hand for the priority of the Elohist, and on the other for the priority of the Jehovist, it may be safe to wait a while before attaching ourselves to either party. Possibly the next critical discovery may be that they were contemporaneous.

We cannot deny to the authors of this latest hypothesis the praise of a high degree of ingenuity in its construction, of consummate dexterity in adapting it to the emergencies of the case, and in marshalling all available materials for its support, and of unflinching intrepidity, or rather a veritable audacity, in pushing it to its last results, so that it is absolutely beyond the reach of the *reductio ad absurdum* argument; for the most preposterous conclusions are accepted without hesitation, and paraded as genuine discoveries. Kuenen and Wellhausen have shown us by what clever tricks of legerdemain they can construct castles in the air and produce histories which have positively no basis whatever but their own exuberant fancy; while Lagarde makes the practical application of their principles by demanding the overthrow of the Christian Church and its institutions as the mere outgrowth of Pharisaical superstition. The temporary applause which has followed upon the performance of these novel feats is no augury of its abiding popularity, much less of its assured success. The boastful claims of its advocates will not disturb the equanimity of those who remember with what rapidity hypothesis has succeeded hypothesis, and one phase of criticism has grown up after another in the fruitful soil of German speculation.

It is substantially a revival of ideas which were almost simultaneously suggested by Vatke, George, and Von Bohlen, in 1835, but which then fell utterly flat. De Wette,¹ in his review of these "three young critics," dryly suggested that there was a reason for this hypothesis coming to the surface, inasmuch as the criticism of the Pentateuch could only thus complete the entire round of possible assumptions. And he said of the reconstruction of the Israelitish history upon the basis proposed, that "the only thing lacking to make it attractive is truth;" "whether from a dread of individualism inspired by the Hegelian philosophy, a predilection for development and self-impelled struggles upward, or a love of paradox, they have linked the history of Hebraism not with the fixed point of the grand creations of Moses, but have suspended its beginnings upon airy nothing." Hupfeld² repudiated in the strongest terms the distinctive principle of their hypothesis (as of Graf's

¹ "Studien und Kritiken" for 1837, pp. 955, 981.

² "De Primitiva Fæstorum Ratione," 1851, p. 1.

and Kuenen's) that Deuteronomy is the earliest instead of the latest portion of the Pentateuch, calling it "a monstrous error that turned everything topsy-turvy and perverted and entangled the questions at issue, but did not solve them." Riehm,¹ in 1854, considered it "a critical or rather uncritical view," which was already "antiquated" and unworthy of attention. And there is little likelihood that this hypothesis, even in its most recent phase, will win its way to universal favour, when critics such as Riehm, Dillmann, Kleinert, Marti, Delitzsch, Klostermann, Bredekamp, and D. Hoffmann² have pronounced against it, not to speak of the assaults made upon it from the rear by those who charge it with a timid conservatism and with not being thoroughgoing enough in the work of demolition. It is apparent that this hypothesis affords us no firm footing were we to embrace it. If all that has thus far been asked were to be conceded, no guarantee is, or can be, given against fresh demands in the same direction. It is only the arbitrary pleasure of the critics and nothing in the nature of the case which leads them, with their principles and methods, to stop where they do.

In five passages in the Pentateuch (Ex. xvii. 14; xxiv. 4; xxxiv. 27; Num. xxxiii. 2; Deut. xxxi. 9, 22, 24), as Professor Smith correctly informs us, Moses is said to have written down certain things. The express statement of his authorship in these cases does not exclude it in others any more than it follows from Isa. viii. 1 and xxx. 8, that Isaiah wrote nothing but what is referred to in those verses. The natural presumption, on the contrary, is that if he wrote those scraps of the history and those sections of the law, he also wrote others which it was quite as important to have recorded. These recognitions of the fact that whatever was memorable should be committed to writing for safe preservation, and that Moses

¹ "Die Gesetzgebung Moses im Lande Moab, Vorrede."

² Riehm reviewed Graf's positions in the "Studien und Kritiken," 1868 and 1872; Dillmann, "Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus," 1880; Kleinert, "Das Deuteronomium und der Deuteronomiker," 1872; Marti, "Traces of the so-called Grundschrift of the Hexateuch in the Pre-prophets of the Old Testament," in the "Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie," 1880; Delitzsch, a series of articles in Luthardt's "Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Leben," 1880; Klostermann, in the "Zeitschrift für Lutherische Theologie und Kirche," 1877; Bredekamp, "Gesetz und Propheten," 1881; D. Hoffmann, "Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums," 1876-80.

was the proper person to write it, would rather lead us to expect that Moses would record the history and the legislation in which he bore so prominent a part, and incline us to believe that "the book," to which reference is made, Ex. xvii. 14 (*Heb.*), is such a comprehensive work upon which he was then already engaged, or which at least he intended to prepare.

But we shall lay no stress upon presumptions. We shall concern ourselves simply with duly certified facts; and as the discussion of Professor Smith relates merely to the laws of the Pentateuch, we shall confine ourselves to these. And here we adopt the appropriate division which he gives us, pp. 316 ff., into "three principal groups of laws or ritual observances in addition to the Ten Commandments," viz.: 1. The collection Ex. xxi.-xxiii.; 2. The Deuteronomic code, Deut. xii.-xxvi., as distinguished from what is purely hortatory and historical in the book; 3. The Levitical legislation, which does not form a compact code like the preceding, but is scattered through several parts of Exodus and the books of Leviticus and Numbers. Three of the passages above adduced speak of Moses as writing laws. In Ex. xxiv. 4 he is said to have written "all the words of the LORD." This Professor Smith, p. 331, would restrict to the Ten Commandments. But after God had uttered these by His own voice, and the terrified people had asked that Moses should henceforth speak with them and not God, the LORD gave them His commands through Moses, Ex. xx. 22 ff., including a body of judgments or ordinances, ch. xxi.-xxiii. Then (xxiv. 3) Moses came and told the people all the words of the LORD, of course not merely the ten words which they had themselves heard Him speak, but all that God had charged him to say to them, and particularly "the judgments," which are therefore separately specified. "And all the people answered with one voice and said, All the words which the LORD hath said will we do." Now, unless any one is prepared to maintain that the people here promised obedience to the Ten Commandments only, and not to the judgments which Moses had just repeated to them from the mouth of God, he must admit that both are included in the words of the Lord, which the very next verse declares that Moses wrote, and which (verse 8) entered into the covenant then formed between Jehovah and Israel. It could not be more explicitly stated

than it is, that this first collection of laws dates from the time immediately following the exodus. It was then reduced to writing, formally read in the audience of the people, their submission to it pledged, and the covenant of God with Israel ratified on the basis of it with appropriate ceremonies. It even claims priority to the tables of the law deposited in the ark, whose authenticity and antiquity are vouched for in the most unimpeachable manner, and are not disputed by Professor Smith.

Again, at the renewal of the covenant after the sin of the golden calf, Moses is directed to write certain words, which are not "expressly identified with the ten words on the tables of stone," but are, on the contrary, expressly distinguished from them (Ex. xxxiv. 27, 28). The ambiguity arising from the omission of the subject of the verb in the last clause of verse 28, is removed by a comparison of verse 1. It was the LORD, not Moses, who wrote the Ten Commandments upon the tables, which were carried to the summit of Sinai for this purpose. Moses wrote upon some material not indicated the words contained in Ex. xxxiv. 10-26, which is substantially repeated from the book of the covenant (Ex. xx. 23 ; xxiii. 12-33), being the specifications there given respecting the service of God, and the pledge on His part to subdue the Canaanites before them. They had grossly violated their duty to God, which wrought a forfeiture of His pledge to them. Hence these portions of the covenant are singled out and enforced upon the people afresh. The rewriting of these extracts is an additional confirmation of the existence of the code from which they were taken, and is equivalent to a new assertion of its Mosaic origin.

In Deut. xxxi. 9 we read, "Moses wrote this law": and verses 24-26, "When Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book until they were finished, Moses commanded the Levites . . . saying, Take this book of the law and put it in the side of the ark." If it is possible for words to convey the idea that the entire code of laws here spoken of, which cannot be less than Deut. xii.-xxvi., was written by Moses, this idea is here expressed. And no amount of arguing about the various extent of meaning that may be given to the term "law" can make it different. The fact that "all the

words of this law" were to be written on plastered stones on Mount Ebal (Deut. xxvii. 3), can create no difficulty. This statement finds abundant illustration in the walls of tombs and temples in Egypt, and its numerous monuments written all over with hieroglyphical legends. And it surely requires no great effort to believe it feasible to trace these laws in plaster as a symbolic declaration that they were thenceforth the laws of the land. Written in letters five times the size of those in ordinary Hebrew Bibles, they could all be embraced in the space of eight feet by three. The famous Behistûn inscription of Darius in its triple form is twice as long as this entire code, besides being carved in bold characters in the solid rock, and in a position difficult of access on the mountain side.

And the whole book of Deuteronomy purports to be a series of discourses delivered by Moses to the people in the plains of Moab, inculcating and enforcing this law. Professor Smith reminds us that these were not "taken down by a shorthand reporter." And he queries whether it is certainly the meaning of Deut. xxxi. 24, that we have this body of laws "word for word" as it was written down by Moses. But under cover of this regard for absolute precision, it will not do to fritter away the entire record. That Moses in his oral discourse uttered in every case exactly the words reported to us, just those and neither less nor more, we are not concerned to affirm; but that he did deliver such discourses, and that they are here preserved in their substantial import, is fully certified unless the credibility of the book can be impeached. And this code of laws is substantially as it came from the pen of Moses, if any reliance can be placed upon the record.

So, too, the Mosaic origin of the Levitical law is abundantly declared by the formulas with which they are introduced, and which recur over and over again: The LORD spake unto Moses, or The LORD spake unto Moses and Aaron; and the formulas, by which they are often followed, *e.g.*, Lev. vii. 37, 38; xxiii. 44; xxvi. 46; xxvii. 34. The occasion is recited upon which particular laws were delivered; and the circumstances connected with these enactments are inseparably united with the historical narrative of the time.

Now as to the origin of these several codes of laws there

can be no possibility of mistake. It is not merely affirmed in a credible history, of whose truth we have abundant guarantee; but the nature of the case precludes falsehood or error. An accepted system of legislation, whose authority is confessed and submitted to, has, in that fact, the strongest possible proof of its genuineness. No forged body of laws could ever be imposed upon any people. No supposititious code, issued in the name of Moses in a subsequent age, could have been accepted without inquiry, and installed as the law of the land. It is indeed supposable that the current laws and usages of any given period might be popularly supposed to be more ancient than they really were. But this is not what we are asked to believe. We are told that the first that is known of the book of Deuteronomy is that it was found in the temple in the days of Josiah. It claims to be the work of Moses, but it never emanated from him. Its enactments had never been in force before. No such laws were known at any time during the history of the people. They were not in harmony with existing customs or with prevailing ideas, but were in some essential points directly antagonistic to them. It was prepared with the view of inaugurating a new departure, of carrying into effect reforms which Hezekiah had made a vigorous attempt to introduce, but had failed. Such was the hostility of the masses, and such the influence of parties interested in opposing them, that "a violent and bloody reaction" followed under Manasseh, and "in Josiah's time the whole work had to be done again from the beginning" (p. 244). And yet this newly-found book, purporting to be the law of Moses, but which "had no external credentials" (p. 351), and which, if the facts be as alleged, every one must have known was not what it claimed to be, was at once accepted by Josiah, "to whom it was of no consequence to know the exact date and authorship of the book" (p. 363). One at least of its provisions was unwelcome to the priests (p. 362), but they raised no question as to the origin of a code so mysteriously discovered. And under its potent influence, regulations were readily carried into effect, which had been so stubbornly resisted before. And Ezra, it seems, met with similar success in introducing the Levitical code after the exile. If Mr. Gladstone could but find some law-book in Dublin which had never been

of before, how easily and amicably the whole Irish on might be settled !

t this use of the name of Moses, we are told, is simply gal fiction ; " in Israel all law was held to be derived the teaching of Moses " (p. 385). Such a notion could have arisen unless Moses really was the great legislator of nation, and something more than the ten commandments directly traceable to him. This of itself creates a pre-
 aption in favour of the Mosaic origin of the codes ascribed him, unless there be good reason to the contrary. The in-
 nces which are adduced to show that customs or statutes of
 later date were imputed to Moses admit of no such inter-
 station, and could only be distorted to this end by one
 sent upon making out a case.¹

¹ Professor Smith says (p. 387) : " A peculiarly clear case of this occurs the law of war. According to 1 Sam. xxx. 24, 25, the standing law of Israel as to the distribution of booty was enacted by David, and goes back ally to a precedent in his war with the Amalekites who burned Ziklag. In the priestly legislation the same law is given as a Mosaic precedent from the war with Midian (Num. xxxi. 27)." The fact is that Moses gave no law upon the subject whatever. It is simply related, as one of the incidents of the battle with Midian, that the prey was divided into two parts between them who went out to battle and all the congregation. The circumstances were peculiar, and it was not made a general rule. David did not divide the booty into two equal parts, but ordered that the 200 who guarded the baggage should individually have like shares with the 400 who engaged in the conflict ; and the division was not, as Moses directed, between the army on the one hand and the people on the other, but between the two divisions of his little army, while to the people at large he simply sent presents. A more exact precedent is found in Josh. xxii. 8, though even in that instance no law was enacted. David made the first statute in relation to the matter ; though some critic may be able to discover that even this is only a " legal fiction," that being attributed to David which was really originated by Judas Maccabeus, who gave an equal share of the spoils of the enemy to the feeble and needy classes (2 Macc. viii. 28, 30). In Ezra ix. 11, " where the law of the Pentateuch is cited as an ordinance of the prophets " (p. 310), the prophets are inclusive of Moses (Deut. xviii. 18 ; Hos. xii. 13), not distinguished from him.

It is further alleged (pp. 319, 432) that there are conflicting statements respecting the position of the tabernacle with respect to the camp of Israel, only one of which can be true history,—the other must be later law veiled in historic form. But this apparent discrepancy is due to the interpreter, not the text. It is brought about by the fashionable method of dissecting the Pentateuch, and then viewing the separate paragraphs in their isolation, and without regard to their connection, or only so much regard to it as will loose variance where that is possible in preference to harmony. We protest against the entire procedure, notwithstanding the eminence and ability of those who indulge in it. It opens a boundless field for the display of the critic's ingenuity, but it is not rational interpretation, and would as
 silly create the semblance of self-contradiction in any author to whom it

The style in which the laws are framed, and the terms in which they are drawn up, point to the sojourn in the wilderness, prior to the occupation of Canaan, as the time when both the Levitical and the Deuteronomic codes were produced (Lev. xviii. 3; Deut. xii. 9). The standing designation of Canaan is, The land which the LORD giveth thee to possess it (Deut. xv. 4, 7; xxi. 1, 23). The laws look forward to the time "when thou art come into the land, etc., and shalt possess it"¹ (Deut. xvii. 14; Lev. xiv. 34; xix. 23; xxv. 2), or "when the LORD hath cut off these nations and thou

should be applied. If a meaning be given to Ex. xxxiii. 7-11, which it cannot bear in the connection in which it is found, but which it is assumed that it might have had in some other imaginable connection, and especially if, with Dillmann, the sense of vv. 1-6 be altered by leaving out words or clauses *ad libitum*, it may be made to appear that according to this passage and a few others, the sacred tent stood outside of the camp; whereas it is elsewhere spoken of as pitched in the centre of the camp. But if we discard imaginary possibilities, and give to these verses their obvious sense as they stand, the alleged discrepancy disappears. Immediately after the ratification of God's covenant with Israel, Moses went up into the mount and received direction to make a sanctuary in which God might dwell among his people. The sin of the golden calf ruptured the covenant and put an end to all proceedings under it. Without going on to construct the tabernacle according to the specifications given him, he set before the eyes of the people a visible sign of their altered relation to the Lord by pitching a provisional tabernacle outside of the camp, and at a distance from it, to signify that God would not remain in the midst of them (Ex. xxxiii. 3). It is called "*the tabernacle*," ver. 7, because it is definitely conceived by the writer as the one used for the purpose, and which was well remembered by him and by his readers. (Comp. the use of the Heb. article in Ex. ii. 15; Num. xi. 27; Hab. ii. 2.) In Num. xi. 24, 26, 30; xii. 4, 5, persons are said to go out of the camp unto the tabernacle, and out of the tabernacle into the camp; but this does not prove the tabernacle to have been outside of the camp. If a gentleman goes out of his yard into his house, it does not follow that his house is not in his yard. So that all that the Professor tells us about early sanctuaries being outside of cities, and Ezekiel paving the way for the sanctuary being located in the midst of the people, is quite irrelevant. Num. x. 33 is adduced to prove that the sanctuary was outside the camp when the people were on the march, but it makes no mention of the sanctuary; it simply says that the ark went before them, when they left Sinai, as their guide. And this is not in conflict with ver. 21: comp. iv. 15-21. To suppose such a contradiction within the compass of a few verses is to impute the most extraordinary heedlessness to the writer, or, if any prefer, the compiler of the book. While the tabernacle and the sacred vessels had their place assigned them between the tribes as they moved forward, the ark, which was the symbol and the seat of God's presence, was singled out, as we are expressly told, to lead the way.

¹ This is the case even in Deut. xix. 14, where the last clause of the verse makes it apparent that the setting of the landmarks did not precede the enacting of the law. The Hebrew for "they of old time" means simply "first," and is applicable to those who originally marked the boundary at whatever date.

succeedest them and dwellest in their cities" (Deut. xix. 1), as the period when they are to come into full operation (Deut. xii. 1). The place of sacrifice is not where Jehovah has fixed His habitation, but "the place which Jehovah shall choose to place His name there" (Deut. xii. 5, 10 ff.; xiv. 23 ff.; xvi. 2, 6 ff.). Israel is contemplated as occupying a camp (Lev. xiii. 46; xiv. 3; xvii. 3; Num. v. 2-4; xii. 14, 15) and living in tents (Lev. xiv. 8; Deut. xvi. 7). All this, and much more of the same sort, we must suppose to be "legal fiction;" but it would be too "artificial" (p. 321), in the Professor's view, to imagine that Moses could speak of himself in the third person, as Isaiah (vii. 3 ff.), Jeremiah (xxxvi. 4 ff.), Hosea (i. 2 ff.), and the evangelists Matthew (ix. 9) and John (xiii. 23) have done.

But suppose that we yield our assent to this notion that the Israelites had the singular custom of issuing all their laws in the name of Moses, and that they continued to do so down to the time of Josiah and after the exile, still expressing them as though Israel were encamped in the wilderness of Sinai or on the plains of Moab. It is true that no instance of the kind is recorded in any historical book of the Old Testament. David, and Solomon, and Jehoshaphat, and Hezekiah issue their orders and enforce their regulations in their own name and by their own authority. Ezekiel, who, we are told, represents an intermediate stage between Deuteronomy and Leviticus, makes no pretence of Mosaic authority in all that he says respecting the temple and its worship and the Holy Land. The idea of a legal fiction never dawned upon the author of the books of Kings, who records the finding of the law in the temple, but has no suspicion of its recent origin. Let us, however, waive all objection on this ground. But the further insuperable difficulty remains, that by the hypothesis under consideration laws are attributed to a period for which they have no meaning or fitness. Legislation, as Professor Smith himself insists—and this is, in fact, the basis on which his whole argument professedly rests—legislation must be adapted to the times in which it is issued. Its aim is practical; it concerns matters of present obligation, and its statutes are enacted with the view of being enforced and obeyed. Laws are never issued to regulate a state of things which had passed away ages before and could

by no possibility be revived. What are we to think, then, of a hypothesis which assigns the code of Deuteronomy to the reign of Josiah, or shortly before it, when its injunction to exterminate the Canaanites (xx. 16-18) and the Amalekites (xxv. 17-19), who had long since disappeared, would be as utterly out of date as a law in New Jersey at the present time offering a bounty for killing wolves and bears, or a royal proclamation in Great Britain ordering the expulsion of the Danes? A law contemplating foreign conquests (xx. 10-15) would have been absurd when the urgent question was whether Judah could maintain its own existence against the encroachments of Babylon and Egypt. A law discriminating against Ammon and Moab (xxiii. 3, 4) in favour of Edom (vv. 7, 8) had its warrant in the Mosaic period, but not in the time of the later kings. Jeremiah discriminates precisely the other way, promising a future restoration to Moab (xlviii. 47) and Ammon (xlix. 6), which he denies to Edom (xlix. 17, 18), who is also to Joel (iii. 19), Obadiah, and Isaiah (lxiii. 1-6), the representative foe of the people of God. The special injunction to show no unfriendliness to Egyptians (Deut. xxiii. 7) is insupposable in a code issued under prophetic influence at a time when the prophets were doing everything in their power to dissuade the people from alliance or association with them (Isa. xxx. 1 ff; xxxi. 1; Jer. ii. 18, 36). The allusions to Egypt imply familiarity with and recent residence in that land; an impressive argument for obedience is drawn from the memory of bondage in Egypt (Deut. xxiv. 18, 22; comp. ver. 15), or of deliverance from it (Deut. xiii. 5, 10; xx. 1; Lev. xix. 36; xxvi. 13; Num. xv. 41); warnings are pointed by a reference to the diseases of Egypt (Deut. vii. 15; xxviii. 60). And how can a code belong to the time of Josiah, which, while it contemplates the possible selection of a king in the future (Deut. xvii. 14 ff.), nowhere implies an actual regal government, but vests the supreme central authority in a judge and the priesthood (xvii. 8, 12; xix. 7); which lays special stress on the requirements that the king must be a native and not a foreigner (xvii. 15), when the undisputed line of succession had for ages been fixed in the family of David, and that he must not "cause the people to return to Egypt" (ver. 16), as they seemed ready to do on every grievance in the days of Moses?

(Num. xiv. 4), but which no one ever dreamed of doing after they were fairly established in Canaan?¹

And it is quite as incongruous to place the Levitical law after the exile. Professor Dillmann, though he conceives that "the book of the law did not receive its final form and arrangement until after the exile, and in the time of Ezra," nevertheless protests against the hypothesis as "irrational" that "the priestly laws and those of the cultus were first committed to writing, or actually first framed, in the exile or in Babylonia, where no cultus whatever existed."² And then there are detailed accounts of the Mosaic tabernacle, reciting the contribution of materials for its construction,³ with minute specifications of the number and dimensions of its boards, their sockets, and tenons, and bars; of its various coverings, and the mode of their preparation, and how they are to be joined by loops and taches; of its various articles of furniture, and the instruments of the service, and precise directions as to the

¹ It would not be surprising, even on natural principles, for Moses to have anticipated that the people might some time desire a king, and to prohibit, in that event, the display and luxurious indulgence which characterise Oriental courts. That Samuel disapproved of the people's hankering after a king under circumstances which implied an untimely setting aside of himself and a want of confidence in God (1 Sam. viii. 7, 8; x. 18, 19) does not imply that the law in Deuteronomy was unknown to him. On the contrary, the author of the book of Samuel plainly shows that it was then in existence, or that he believed that it was, by the allusions to it, or the adoption of its language, in this very narrative—e.g. 1 Sam. viii. 3, "took bribes and perverted judgment" (comp. Deut. xvi. 19); ver. 5, "make us a king . . . like all the nations" (comp. Deut. xvii. 14); x. 24, "him whom the LORD hath chosen" (comp. Deut. xvii. 15); xii. 14, "obey his voice and not rebel against the commandment of the LORD" (Deut. ~~x. 20~~ i. 43). The Hebrew expressions in these several passages are identical, even where the English version varies. Solomon's violation of the law only shows how men may, and do, transgress known law under strong temptation. And he may have palliated his offence as not contravening the real spirit and intent of the statute. His numerous alliances gave stability to his kingdom, and assurance of peace with surrounding nations, and he could surely avoid the snare of their idolatry. He amassed silver and gold, but he spent vast sums on the temple. He multiplied horses for the sake of adding to his military strength, but he had no thought of taking the people back to Egypt. Comp. Isaiah's description of a like state of things under Uzziah (Isa. ii. 6, 7).

² "Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus," Vorwort, p. viii.

³ Delitzsch, in his preface to Professor Curtiss's valuable treatise on "The Levitical Priests," notes the interesting circumstance that the original words for "fine linen, purple, and scarlet," which reappear so often in the Mosaic description of the sanctuary, are the ancient Hebrew terms, and not their Aramaic equivalents, which are found in writings after the exile.

manner in which they should be wrapped, and by whom they should be carried, and what place they should have in the ranks during the journeyings through the wilderness. All this is stated with the utmost precision, and every particular insisted upon as of real consequence. And we are asked to believe that this is all a fiction of the time of Ezra and of the second temple, when it could serve no imaginable purpose. Professor Smith tells us (p. 357), "It is very noteworthy, and on the traditional view quite inexplicable, that the Mosaic sanctuary of the ark is never mentioned in the Deuteronomic code." It is mentioned in Deut. x. 1-8, not to speak of xxxi. 9, 25, 26; and by the common consent of critics, the whole book of Deuteronomy is one in its language, its character, and its aims. But why any one should expect the ark to be mentioned in a code which had no occasion to speak of it, we are not informed. It is, however, much more inexplicable, on the Professor's own hypothesis, that the ark is described in such detail and such prominence given to it in the Levitical code (Ex. xxv. 10-22, etc., etc.), if this was prepared for the guidance of the priests and the conduct of the ritual in the days of Ezra; whereas the ark perished in the destruction of the first temple, and was not reproduced subsequently. And why should directions be given about the Urim and Thummim (Ex. xxviii. 30; Num. xxvii. 21) which had ceased to be of any practical account (Ezra ii. 63; Neh. vii. 65)?

Now, what is there to hinder us from believing the laws of the Pentateuch to be the production of Moses, as they claim to be, and as their style and contents declare them to be? Professor Smith enlightens us upon this point (page 333):—

"It is a very remarkable fact, to begin with, that all the sacred law of Israel is comprised in the Pentateuch, and that, apart from the Levitical legislation, it is presented in codified form. On the traditional view three successive bodies of law were given to Israel within forty years. Within that short time many ordinances were modified, and the whole law of Sinai recast on the plains of Moab. But from the days of Moses there was no change. With his death the Israelites entered on a new career, which transformed the nomads of Goshen into the civilised inhabitants of vineyard land and cities in Canaan. But the Divine laws given them beyond Jordan were to remain unmodified through all the long centuries of development in Canaan, an absolute and immutable code. I say, with all reverence, that this is impossible."

The idea of development is in the air ; and yet it is possible that it may be applied to some things that do not call for it and will not admit of it. The "nomads of Goshen" had been settled for more than four centuries under the government of the most highly civilised and the most thoroughly organised empire in the ancient world. They were employed in building treasure cities for Pharaoh (Ex. i. 11), in the manufacture of brick (Ex. v. 7 ff.), in masonry, and in all manner of service in the field (Ex. i. 14). They were skilled in working metals, carving wood, and engraving gems (Ex. xxxi. 2 ff. ; xxxv. 30 ff.), in spinning, weaving, and embroidery (Ex. xxxv. 25, 26). Their familiarity with the cultivation of the soil is attested not only by such statements as Num. xi. 5, xx. 5, Deut. xi. 10, but by the express provisions of what Professor Smith himself regards as their oldest extant code of laws (Ex. xxii. 5, 6), including the regulations respecting first-fruits (xxii. 29 ; xxiii. 19), the weekly Sabbath (xxiii. 12 ; xxxiv. 21), the sabbatical year (xxiii. 10, 11), the festivals of the harvest and the ingathering (xxiii. 15, 16), not to speak of the requirement of the shew-bread and of the meat and drink offerings. The Israel of the exodus could not, therefore, have been at so great a remove from "the civilised inhabitants of the vineyard land and cities in Canaan." Even though the Mosaic tabernacle were to be remanded to the region of fable, it would still be true that tradition attributed the arts employed in its construction to the generation that left Egypt, and the monuments of that land lend this abundant corroboration. But enough besides remains to rivet our conclusion, which even the wildest criticism must respect, unless it would destroy the whole basis on which it can rest itself, and deny that there is any certainty as to the condition of the Israelites under Moses, in which case the entire objection is admitted to be groundless.

And where habits and manners remain fixed, as they proverbially do in the East, there could be little reason for change in the laws of the simple agricultural population of Palestine, eschewing as they did all foreign trade or travel, and holding so limited intercourse with other nations. Through all changes, even in the national government, the tribal organisation continued at least until the time of the exile, the usages of society underwent little alteration, and the affairs of each

community were managed very much in the same manner from age to age.

But the objection is completely neutralised when we consider further that the Mosaic code leaves abundant room for all the modifications that could be demanded by the progressive life of the people. It is not, and was not intended to be, a complete system of political institutions; and objections have been made to it on this very ground of its lack of completeness, urging that it could never have been put in actual operation without the supply of some important gaps in the legislation. The fact is, that the Mosaic regulations presuppose and were superinduced upon an already existing political constitution, and customs that had the force of laws. The aim of Moses simply was to establish and perpetuate the covenant relation between Israel and Jehovah. It was not to give fixity to one particular system of civil administration, but to incorporate and express religious ideas in the national life. Hence some of his laws are purely ethical, and were not intended to be enforced by the magistrate (Ex. xxii. 21-24; xxiii. 2, 3, 9; Deut. xv. 5, 6; xvi. 20; xix. 8, 9; xxiv. 13, 15). The specific regulations which they contain were adopted or modified, as the case might be, from pre-existing usages. And all that was not expressly ordained by divine sanction was left free either to remain as it was, or to shape itself as circumstances might require, or as the principles of the Mosaic religion and constitution might suggest. There was abundant flexibility here, and all the opportunity for development that could be desired. Thus submission to rulers is inculcated (Ex. xxii. 28) without prescribing any definite form of government. The authority of elders (Num. xi. 16), princes (Num. xxxii. 2; xxxvi. 1), and other existing officials is recognised, but there is nothing to require that public functionaries should preserve this unvarying type. A monarchy was contemplated in the future, but was not enjoined; it was left entirely to the wishes of the people and the course of events and when the time arrived, the transition was made without jar. Moses acting under a present necessity, created judges and based his appointment on a decimal division of the people (Ex. xviii. 21, 22); but this particular form of organisation not once mentioned in his codes of laws, much less perpetuate

press divine sanction. In Ex. xxi. 6 ; xxii. 8, 9, to come the legitimate tribunal is to come before God ; but who is to be clothed with judicial functions, and how these are to be exercised, is not specified. The Deuteronomic code states that there shall be judges in every city (xvi. 18), and that the ultimate decision of controversies should lie with the king, and the judge at the religious centre of the nation (Deut. 17. 8-12) ; but the terms are general, and Jehoshaphat was ordered from enlarging the judiciary in accordance with the needs of his own time (2 Chron. xix. 5, 8).

If the three codes of law above mentioned belong, it is claimed, to three different periods in Israel's history and represent distinct stages of social culture and development, and particularly successive stages in their religious advancement. Professor Smith states that "in the first legislation the question of correct procedure has little prominence" (p. 343), and it "presupposes a plurality of sanctuaries" (p. 352). The law of Deuteronomy, on the other hand, is "a law for the abolition of the local sanctuaries as they are recognised by the first legislation" (p. 353). The first legislation has no law of priesthood, no provision as to priestly dues." It "assumes the right of laymen to offer sacrifice," and "presupposes a priesthood, whose business lies not with sacrifice than with the divine Torah which they administer in the sanctuary as successors of Moses ; for the sanctuary is the seat of judgment." This priesthood consisted of the entire body of the Levites, who were "priests of local sanctuaries" throughout the whole land (pp. 358-9). "Deuteronomy also knows no Levites who cannot be priests, and no Levites who are not Levites;" and in abolishing the local sanctuaries it makes provision for the priests who had previously ministered in them (p. 360). But "Deuteronomy knows nothing of a sacrificial priestly Torah" (p. 371), such as the Levitical code. According to this hypothesis, then, these three codes severally represent three periods in the religion of Israel.

The first sanctions various local sanctuaries where laymen offer sacrifice, and where the Levites, who are indistinctly clothed with priestly prerogatives, administer judgment.

Deuteronomy, which belongs to a later time, restricts sacrifice to one sanctuary, whose priests consequently rise to pre-eminence, while the Levites previously ministering else-

where are now thrown out of occupation, and in the need to which they are reduced, special provision must be made for their support. The fully developed ritual of Leviticus belongs to a period later still.

This is about as rational as though some critic were to deal with the Constitution of the United States in a similar manner, erecting its several articles into distinct codes, assigning them to different periods of the national history, and inferring from them that different forms of government have successively prevailed. The article upon the Executive treats only of a President and Vice-President as intrusted with power, and seems to represent a sort of elective monarchy, in which rude tribes summon one of their chieftains to the supreme command. Then the article upon the Judiciary places control in a body of judges, who hold office during life or good behaviour, and thus represents a later aristocratic stage. And finally, the article which confers legislative authority upon Congress must have originated at a still later date, when popular ideas came into vogue, and the government was lodged with representatives elected by the people. This method of treating a system of laws, whose different parts are mutually supplementary, as though they were distinct and independent codes, can only lead to distortion and misconception.

It is the fashion now to ridicule the harmonistic treatment of the Mosaic laws; and the development theory is all the rage. Nevertheless every one must concede that if upon any fair interpretation of their language these laws can be shown to be mutually consistent and harmonious, this is entitled to the preference over any view which represents them as incompatible and conflicting. And even where the law has been changed in any of its provisions and a later statute abrogates or modifies another given previously, this may still be consistent with the Mosaic record, provided it admits of a satisfactory explanation from the different times and circumstances under which the law was given and the different ends which it was intended to subserve. Unless variations should be found which it is impossible to account for in any other way, it is gratuitous and unwarrantable to assume that any of the laws ascribed to Moses are really of later date.

To prove that a plurality of sanctuaries is presupposed in

the first legislation, appeal is made to Ex. xx. 24, 25 and to xxii. 30. The former of these passages can only afford an argument by putting a sense upon it which the words do not require, which is at variance with every other utterance of Hebrew law upon the subject, and which disregards the circumstances under which these words were spoken. It is the primary law of the Hebrew altar, given at Sinai, before the tabernacle was built, as preliminary to concluding the covenant between Jehovah and Israel (Ex. xxiv. 4). It directs the erection of an altar of earth or stone, and promises God's presence and blessing, not wherever they might choose to erect such an altar, but in every place¹ where God should record His name, that is, make a manifestation of His being (comp. Deut. xii. 5, etc.). This was their warrant for building an altar at Sinai, where He had so conspicuously manifested Himself, and at every future place of supernatural revelation, including the tabernacle which they carried with them in their journeyings through the wilderness: for the wooden frame described Ex. xxvii. 1 ff. took its name from the altar of earth which it enclosed. It is not co-existing sanctuaries in Canaan, but altars successively reared at different places in the wilderness, that are contemplated by the passage under consideration. Unless it can be shown that God "recorded his name" in various places at once, no sanction is here given to a multiplicity of altars. It was so even in the patriarchal days in the Holy Land itself. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob built altars and offered sacrifices at their successive places of abode; but they did not establish rival sanctuaries to be simultaneously occupied.

And Ex. xxii. 30 is quite as little to the purpose; the first-ling of ox or sheep "shall be seven days with his dam: on the eighth day thou shalt give it me." This is commonly understood to mean that it was sufficiently mature for sacrifice by its eighth day (Lev. xxii. 27). Its presentation at the sanctuary, though admissible on that day, may have been postponed to one of the annual feasts, perhaps the passover, with which it is associated in Ex. xxxiv. 18-20, which is uni-

¹ The plural form in the A. V. (Ex. xx. 24) "in all places," which might seem to lend some colour to plurality of sanctuaries, does not accurately represent the Hebrew.

versally admitted to belong to the most ancient legislation. The law before us will then be substantially identical with that in Deut. xv. 20, which enjoins that it should be eaten at the sanctuary year by year. If, however, this very natural explanation be rejected, and it be insisted that the first legislation differs from Deuteronomy in requiring that the firstling should be sacrificed on its eighth day, still there is no need of supposing a reference to local sanctuaries in Palestine, accessible to every neighbourhood. The law was given at Sinai, and regulated the presentation of the first-born in the wilderness, where all Israel was encamped in the vicinity of the tabernacle. When they were about to enter Canaan the old law was replaced by one in Deuteronomy, adapted to the changed circumstances. And while there is nothing in the first legislation implying a plurality of sanctuaries, the three annual pilgrimages enjoined to "the house of the LORD" (Ex. xxiii. 17, 19) on the contrary very decidedly imply its unity.¹

It is further charged that there is a serious discrepancy between Deuteronomy and the Levitical law in respect to the priesthood; that according to the former all Levites are priests, and have an equal right to perform priestly functions and share the priestly revenues (pp. 360, 436), while in the latter none are priests but Aaron and his sons, and the Levites are servants or attendants upon the priests. All that is plausible in this representation arises from the assumption that Deuteronomy is a body of laws complete in itself; whereas it is really attached to, and co-ordinated with, the legislation of the preceding books. The mutual relations of priests and Levites, and the special functions of each, are developed at length in the Levitical law, which made it unnecessary to repeat this again in Deuteronomy. Professor Smith freely concedes the difference in subject and aim between these two bodies of legislation.² All that specially

¹ The allegation that "the asylum for the man-slayer in Ex. xxi. 12-14, is Jehovah's altar," whereas "under the law of Deuteronomy, there are to be three fixed cities of refuge," can hardly be seriously meant in the face of the distinct reference to the future appointment of cities of refuge in the passage in Exodus.

² "The first legislation and the code of Deuteronomy take the land of Canaan as their basis. They give directions for the life of Jehovah's people in the land He gives them. The Levitical legislation starts from the

relates to the ordinances of worship and the ministers of religion finds its place in the former rather than in the latter.

In matters of this description Deuteronomy makes explicit reference to pre-existing laws. In xxiv. 8, 9, there is direct allusion to the law of leprosy previously given (Lev. xiii., xiv.) with an injunction to obey it, and mention of the case of Miriam which had arisen under it (Num. xii.) The introductory portion of Deuteronomy is filled with arguments and earnest exhortations based upon the antecedent history of Israel, which find their only illustration in the preceding books. Deut. x. 8, 9; xviii. 1, 2 speak of duties previously assigned and support allotted to the tribe of Levi, with specific reference in each case to former declarations on the subject and a verbal quotation from Num. xviii. 20, the context of which clearly defines the relative status of priests and Levites. Deut. xi. 6 appeals to the overthrow of Dathan and Abiram (Num. xvi.), which the critics have not yet succeeded in disentangling from the uprising of the Levite Korah against the special prerogatives of the Aaronic priesthood. The removal (Deut. xii. 15) of the restriction requiring every animal slain for food to be presented at the sanctuary is a plain allusion to the law (Lev. xvii. 3 ff.) which could only have been enacted in the wilderness, as its very terms imply, and was an important safeguard against idolatry as the people were then situated. It was obviously impracticable in Canaan,¹ however, and is therefore formally abrogated before their entrance into the promised land. The blessing of Levi (Deut. xxxiii. 7-10) abounds in allusions to the preceding history and enactments. Deuteronomy thus, by its own express statements, recognises the existence and binding authority of a more detailed antecedent legislation respecting matters to which it only alludes in a brief and summary manner.

It is to be observed further that Deuteronomy does dis-sanctuary and the priesthood. Its object is to develop the theory of a religious life which has its centre in the sanctuary, and is ruled by principles of holiness radiating forth from Jehovah's dwelling-place. The first two legislations deal with Israel as a nation: in the third Israel is a church, and as such is habitually addressed as a 'Congregation' (*edah*), a word characteristic of the Levitical law" (p. 318).

¹ Even the local sanctuaries, by which Professor Smith seeks to account for it, would not render it tolerable.

tinguish between priests and Levites. In xviii. 1, "all the tribe of Levi" is a superfluous addition to the standing phrase, "the priests the Levites," if it is simply co-extensive in signification (comp. Neh. xi. 20: "Israel, the priests, the Levites.") The intention manifestly is to affirm, both of the priests and of the entire tribe to which they belong, that they are without inheritance. Accordingly in the following verses statements are made respecting first the priest (vv. 3-5), then the Levite (vv. 6-8). And throughout the entire book, wherever priests are spoken of, the functions ascribed to them are either those assigned to the priests in the Levitical law, or are entirely consistent with them; while, on the contrary, the Levite is in repeated passages (*e.g.* xiv. 29) associated with needy or dependent classes as with them an object of generous beneficence. The distinction between Levitical priests and Levites generally is also made in xxvii. 9, 12, 14. The priests of this book, as all admit, are those of the tribe of Levi who discharge priestly functions, and are distinguished from those Levites who do not. But who in the tribe are privileged to be priests! Deut. x. 6 tells us that Aaron was priest, and his son succeeded him. The Levitical law declares that the priesthood was limited to Aaron's family. The critics infer from Deut. xviii. 6, that any Levite, who is disposed to do so, may become a priest by presenting himself at the sanctuary and claiming the right to exercise priestly functions. We think it more reasonable to understand the verse in a manner which is equally consistent with its language, and is, moreover, in harmony with the Levitical law, *viz.*: that any Levite, whether belonging to the seed of Aaron or not, is privileged to go to the sanctuary and perform such ministrations as are allowed to Levites of the same grade; if of priestly stock, he may act as priest; if not, he may perform those subordinate offices which are allowed to Levites.¹

The characteristic expression for the priests in the book of Deuteronomy is "the priests the Levites," or rather, as the words should be rendered, "the Levitical priests" (xvii. 9, 18; xviii. 1; xxiv. 8; xxvii. 9). In Leviticus and Numbers this phrase is never employed, but we find instead "the priests, the

¹ Ministering to the LORD was a function of the Levites as well as the priests (1 Chron. xv. 2; see also 1 Sam. ii. 11, 18; iii. 1).

sons of Aaron" (Lev. i. 5, 8, 11; ii. 2; iii. 2; xiii. 2; xxi. 1; Num. iii. 3; x. 8). This striking difference, however, involves no real discrepancy, for the sons of Aaron were of course Levites; and "Levitical priests" no more proves that priests and Levites are convertible terms than "Egyptian priests" would imply that all Egyptians were, or, if they chose, might be, priests. This expression is, moreover, found in books where the distinctions of the Levitical law are plainly recognised.¹ The occurrence in the preceding books of the Pentateuch of the expression "the priests the sons of Aaron," along with such phrases as "Aaron the priest," "the sons of Aaron the priest," "Eleazar the priest," etc., is altogether natural, because these were the persons who filled the office at the time, and to whom the divine directions were immediately given; just as we read in later times of Eli the priest, the sons of Eli the priest, etc. (1 Sam. i. 1, 3, 9), when these are the persons intended. But in Deuteronomy, which gives no personal directions to individuals, but contemplates the priest of the future as a body, a general designation, such as Levitical priests, was more appropriate.

That priestly functions should be attributed to the tribe of Levi² (x. 8; xxxiii. 8, 10), because they were intrusted to a

¹ Thus Josh. iii. 3; viii. 33, comp. xxi. 4 ff.: "the children of Aaron the priest which were of the Levites;" also 2 Chron. v. 5 (where Prof. Smith accepts the reading, "the Levite priests" in preference to that in the parallel passage 1 Kings viii. 4, "the priests and the Levites," p. 436), xxx. 27, where the sense plainly shows the insertion of "and" to be inadmissible.

² The Professor is mistaken in saying (p. 437) that according to "Deut. xviii. 1 *seq.* the whole tribe of Levi has a claim on the altar gifts, the first-fruits, and other priestly offerings." This belongs to the priests, as explicitly appears from vv. 3-5: the Levites have a share in the LORD's inheritance (ver. 1). What this embraces is not defined here, but is assumed as known from the Levitical law. When the LORD promises to be their inheritance, He surely does not design that the only subsistence of the entire tribe, except those who were on duty at the sanctuary, should be such occasional invitations as they might receive to religious festivals (Deut. xvi. 14; xxvi. 11, 12). This necessarily implies the Levitical tithe, of which Professor Smith says "Deuteronomy knows nothing;" and "the patrimony" referred to in verse 8 implies the Levitical cities, notwithstanding the fact that at the date to which he has seen fit to assign Deuteronomy, they "lay outside the kingdom of Judah." The list given of these cities in Josh. xxi., the Professor tells us, is "really part of the Levitical law," which on his theory is post-exilic; only he does not explain the puzzle that thirty-five cities are assigned to the Levites, and but thirteen to the priests, though, as he informs us in another place (p. 383), "on the return from captivity very few Levites, in comparison with the full priests, cared to attach themselves to the temple" (Neh. vii. 39, *seq.*). That Gezer, though assigned to the

particular family in that tribe, is by the same familiar use of language, as in Gen. xlix. 10 the sceptre is ascribed to Judah because wielded by the royal line of David, or as we might speak of the house of Hanover as reigning in England because a member of that family is seated on the throne, or of the American troops at the siege of Yorktown, without naming the particular colonies which were represented there.

"The increased provision for the priesthood," which, we are told (p. 400), is "one of the chief innovations of the ritual law," is a sheer creation of the critics. If by one section of a law a given officer is allowed certain fees for specific services, and another section assigns him a regular salary, critics of the modern school would infer that these sections are separate laws, which were in operation at different periods; and that the latter belongs to a time when these officials were more generously dealt with than they had been previously. The proper legal provision for the priests and Levites is fully stated in the Levitical law. Deuteronomy does not deal with this subject in any professed or formal way; it only incidentally makes mention of certain perquisites which they should receive, or attentions which should be shown them.¹

Levites, was not conquered till the time of Solomon (p. 441) only shows, what appears equally from other cases, that the entire land was divided among the tribes before all of it had been wrested from the Canaanites. That citizens of other tribes were joint occupants of some of these cities with the Levites merely proves that the latter were not numerous enough to fill all the places allotted to them. That Abiathar could own a field in Anathoth, and Jeremiah buy one, is no infraction of law (p. 428), whether a plot of ground in the city is meant (Lev. xxv. 33), or a field in the suburbs, which could not indeed be sold so as to be even temporarily alienated from the tribe (ver. 34), but may, for all that we know, have been to a greater or less extent parcelled amongst individual owners.

¹ It is not surprising if we find it difficult to adjust some of the particulars in a system of legislation belonging to so remote a period, and to a state of things so different from our own. Jurists are sometimes in doubt as to the precise meaning of legislators in modern times; but in such cases they never admit a discrepancy, if there is any rational way of avoiding it. If critics would adopt the same rule, which is a simple dictate of common sense, they would find fewer perplexities. In Num. xviii. 18 the flesh of the firstlings is the priests'; in Deut. xv. 19, 20, the offerer is to eat it before the Lord with his household, "the priest of course receiving," as Professor Smith correctly suggests, "the usual share of each victim." In this class of victims the priest receives the whole; but why might he not return to the offerer all that was needed for his sacrificial meal? The direction to the offerer to hold such a festival is an injunction to the priests to supply him with what was requisite for the purpose. There is a difference, however, which, in the Professor's judgment, "cannot be explained away,

And he who can find a discrepancy in this must have a very keen critical sense. But it is alleged that there are no traces of the Pentateuchal law in the historical and other books of the Old Testament until ages after the death of Moses; and that both the facts of the history and the statements of the sacred writers are inconsistent with the existence of Deuteronomy before Josiah or of the Levitical law before Ezra. Of course if this is so, the Mosaic authorship of the law must be abandoned. But, on the other hand, if that law is distinctly traceable through all the post-Mosaic history and writings, its genuineness is completely vindicated.

How then stands the evidence? The Professor begins his investigation by summarily ruling out two important witnesses (p. 218): "I exclude the book of Joshua because it in all its parts hangs closely together with the Pentateuch." It is our only source of information respecting the period immediately succeeding the life of Moses; but as it carries the "legal fiction" through another generation, it is untrustworthy and

for according to Deut. xiv. 24, the firstlings might be turned into money, and materials of a feast bought with them. But in Num. xviii. 17, it is forbidden to redeem any firstling fit for sacrifice." But the thing prohibited and the thing allowed are quite distinct. The owner would "redeem" his firstling, if he paid an estimated sum and retained the animal himself; this might be a temptation to cupidity, to cheapen the estimate, and thus pay an inadequate sum. But where the distance from the sanctuary was so great as to make literal transportation of the animal thither impossible or onerous, its alienation by an honest sale freed the owner from any selfish temptation, and the consecration of its equivalent in money fulfilled the spirit of the statute. The alleged discrepancy in tithes is removed by observing that the tithe spoken of in Deuteronomy is quite distinct from that in Leviticus and Numbers. It was additional to it, and was appropriated to a different purpose. The Jews paid both tithes, as there is abundant evidence—a burden which they would not have submitted to, if this had not been believed to be the meaning of the law, whether it was enacted after the exile or was ordained by Moses. "The priest's share of a sacrifice in Deuteronomy consists of inferior parts." But this, so far from conflicting with the more ample provision made for them in the Levitical law, necessarily implies the existence of that provision. The distinguished position assigned to priests in Deuteronomy as the LORD's ministers, and the highest judicial authority in the land, forbids the idea that a miserable pittance was doled out for their support. The perquisite in Deut. xviii. 3, is a special allowance from every animal slain for sacred purposes; the phrase rendered "offer a sacrifice" has a broader meaning than the regular sacrifices properly so called, and has even been supposed by some to embrace all animals slain for food. It is probably intended to indemnify the priests for the change made (Deut. xii. 15) in the law of sacrifice, as a substitute for what they received as their due when no animal was allowed to be slain even for domestic purposes elsewhere than at the sanctuary.

must be abandoned. "And, on the other hand, I exclude for the present the narrative of Chronicles, which was written long after the reformation of Ezra, and has not the character of a primary source for the earlier history." It claims to be based on early contemporary records, which Professor Smith admits to be the case with the "historical books from Judges to Kings." It names its sources, which were still accessible to its readers, and appeals to them in verification of its statements; so that its acceptance under these circumstances as a reliable history, and especially its admission to the canon, assure us that there has been no tampering with the facts. Chronicles, written after the exile, when the people were zealously engaged in restoring the institutions of their fathers, concerns itself largely with the history of worship. Samuel and Kings, though covering the same period of the history, were written with a different aim, and omit much upon this subject which Chronicles records. Does the silence of the former outweigh the positive declarations of the latter, and justify their being set aside as pure invention or as Levitical sermonising¹ (p. 420)?

However, let Joshua and Chronicles be excluded; what is the testimony of the remaining books? And first let us inquire respecting the period immediately succeeding Joshua, that of the Judges. In Judg. xix. 18, the Levite says, "I am going," not to one of the houses of the LORD, but "to the house of the LORD," as if he knew of but one, and this was near his residence "in the recesses of Mount Ephraim." From xviii. 31 we learn more definitely that "the house of God was in Shiloh," where "the tabernacle of the congregation" had been set up in the time of Joshua (Josh. xviii. 1, xix. 51), and where it had accordingly continued since. It is not here stated with exactness how much longer it remained there; other passages give information upon this point; but that it was a considerable period, appears from its measuring the duration of the worship of Micah's graven image in Dan. "The feast of the LORD" was

¹ We cannot here turn aside to answer the specific objections made to the truth and reliability of Chronicles further than to say that they all rest on the unproved assumption that the only sources accessible to the writer were the books of Samuel and Kings; so that everything additional to, or varying from, their statements falls under the suspicion of being inference, conjecture, or pure invention.

also annually observed in Shiloh (xxi. 19).¹ The people came to the ark to inquire of the LORD (Judg. xx. 27; comp. Ex. xxv. 22). This most sacred article of the Mosaic tabernacle (Ex. xxv. 10 ff.) is called by its ancient name "the ark of the covenant" (Num. x. 33; xiv. 44), implying that it contained the tables of the covenant (Ex. xxxiv. 28), as Moses had directed (Ex. xxv. 21; Deut. x. 1-5). It had been taken to Bethel (wrongly translated "the house of God") (Judg. xx. 18, 26, 31; xxi. 2) temporarily, as appears from ver. 27, that it might be near the scene of conflict at Gibeah (ver. 31), as was done in later times in the battle with the Philistines (1 Sam. iv. 3), in the hope that the words of Moses (Num. x. 35) might be verified in their experience. The ark was in priestly custody, as the law required; and the priest who "stood before" it (Deut. x. 8) was Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron. Sacrifices were freely offered in the presence of the ark, though Bethel was only a provisional place of worship *pro hac vice*; hence it was necessary to build an altar for the

¹ Interpreters have not been agreed whether this was the passover or the feast of tabernacles. Professor Smith says of it (p. 257): "This appears to have been a vintage feast, like the Pentateuchal Feast of Tabernacles, for it was accompanied by dances in the vineyards (Judg. xxi. 21), and according to the correct rendering of 1 Sam. i. 20, 21, it took place when the new year came in, that is, at the close of the agricultural year, which ended with the ingathering of the vintage (Ex. xxxiv. 22)." If the considerations which he adduces have any force, it was so very "like the Pentateuchal feast" as to be identical with it. The characteristic expression borrowed from Ex. xxxiv. 22 implies acquaintance with that law of the three Mosaic festivals, and makes it strange that the Professor should say in the very same paragraph that Shiloh was visited, "not three times a year according to the Pentateuchal law, but at an annual feast." Especially as on a subsequent page (p. 341) he affirms in evidence of the existence and operation of the first legislation at this very time: "The annual feasts—at least that of the autumn, which seems to have been best observed—are often alluded to. . . . The proof that this law was known and acknowledged in all its leading provisions is as complete as the proof that the Levitical law was still unheard of." We think it is a great deal more complete. But let that pass. The first legislation enjoins the three annual feasts (Ex. xxiv. 14 ff.) as explicitly and emphatically as the law of Deuteronomy and Leviticus. Either the three festivals were observed at this time, and then his suggestion of a departure from Pentateuchal law is gratuitous. Or the neglect of some of the festivals on his own admission does not disprove the existence of the law requiring them. The Professor may choose either alternative. When he says of the feast of Shiloh, "It had not a strictly national character, for in Judg. xxi. 19, it appears to be only locally known, and to have the character of a village festival," all the seeming plausibility of his remark arises from an inaccuracy in the Authorised Version:—"There is a feast of the LORD" should be "The feast of the LORD is," etc. The idolatrous parallel in Shechem (Judg. ix. 27) is nothing to the purpose.

purpose (Judg. xxi. 4), and as soon as the war was ended the camp was removed to Shiloh (ver. 12).¹

The events recorded Judg. xvii.-xxi. belong, as is universally allowed, to the early part of the period of the Judges. And then, as we have seen, there was but one house of God and there was an Aaronic priesthood. The opening chapters of Samuel will tell us how it was at the close of that period. "The house of the LORD" (1 Sam. i. 7, 24) was still in Shiloh.² In it was the lamp of God (iii. 3), which burned nightly

¹ The failure to exterminate the Canaanites, with its natural result of alliances with them and the worship of their gods, to which all the troubles of the period are traced in the book of Judges, was an offence against both the first legislation and the law of Deuteronomy, to both of which there are many verbal allusions. The historical references are also frequent: see particularly Judg. xi. 13 ff. Technical expressions also occur, borrowed from the language of the law. The term for the "Congregation" gathered for the sacred war against Gibeah (Judg. xx. 1; xxi. 10, 13) is the one Professor Smith tells us (p. 318) is "characteristic of the Levitical law"; another equally characteristic is rendered "lewdness" (Judg. xx. 6; see Lev. xviii. 17; xix. 29, where it is translated "wickedness"). The phrase "put away evil from Israel" (Judg. xx. 13), is frequent in Deuteronomy and peculiar to it (Deut. xiii. 5; xvii. 12, etc. etc.), and the punishment of Gibeah for its gross crime was in obedience to Deut. xiii. 12 ff. "Wrought folly in Israel" (Judg. xx. 6, 10; xix. 23, 24) is from Deut. xxii. 21; Judg. xxi. 17 alludes to Deut. xxv. 6, not only in thought, but with a verbal correspondence that does not appear in the English Bible; so Judg. x. 14 to Deut. xxxii. 37, 38. The law of the Nazarite (Num. vi. 1-5) was in force (Judg. xiii. 4, 5, 14; xvi. 17; 1 Sam. i. 11); the vow of irremedial destruction (Judg. i. 17; xxi. 11; comp. Deut. xx. 17; Lev. xxvii. 29) and the irrevocable character of a vow (Judg. xi. 35, 36; comp. Deut. xxiii. 21-23).

² But, says Professor Smith (p. 258), "We find glaring departures from the very principles of the Pentateuchal sanctuary. The ark stood, not in the tabernacle, but in a temple with door-posts and folding doors, which were thrown open during the day (1 Sam. i. 9; iii. 15). Access to the temple was not guarded on rules of Levitical sanctity." And this in the face of ii. 22, where the Shiloh sanctuary is called "the tabernacle of the congregation," identifying it with the old Mosaic tent of meeting (Ex. xxix. 4), and of 2 Sam. vii. 6, where God says to David, "I have not dwelt in any house since the time that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt, even to this day, but have walked in a tent and in a tabernacle." The Mosaic tent had been the sole sanctuary throughout this entire period, until the ark was removed to Zion. During its long abode at Shiloh, more solid structures would naturally be erected in and about the court for the accommodation of the resident priests, the reception of offerings, and other purposes of convenience, like the chambers subsequently in the temple (1 Kings vi. 5; Jer. xxxv. 2, 4). The doors and door-posts were no doubt those of the court or the entire sacred enclosure. To throw open the innermost part of the temple to public view would be an inconceivable profanation, not only to Israelitish, but to pagan ideas. Because Samuel slept in the temple where the ark of God was—slept, that is, in one of the chambers already adverted to—the Professor seems to think that he made a bedroom of the holy of holies. If he were told of some servant who blacked boots in the

(Ex. xxvii. 20 ; xxx. 8), and the ark with its cherubim (1 Sam. iv. 4). Thither Elkanah went up yearly to worship and sacrifice (i. 3). Shiloh was visited with this view, not, as the Professor tells us (p. 257), "by pilgrims from the surrounding country of Ephraim," but by all Israel (ii. 14, 22, 29). This was the one prescribed place of sacrifice (ii. 29.)¹ Here there was an Aaronic priesthood, Eli and his sons (i. 3) being descended from Ithamar, the son of Aaron (1 Chron. xxiv. 3 ; 1 Sam. xxii. 20 ; 1 Kings ii. 27). And this was the only lawful priesthood ; for God says (1 Sam. ii. 27, 28) of his father Aaron, to whom He had appeared in Egypt, in Pharaoh's house, "I chose him out of all the tribes of Israel to be my priest, to offer upon mine altar, to burn incense, to wear an ephod before me ; and I gave unto the house of thy father all the offerings made by fire of the children of Israel." And no other priesthood than that of Aaron is recognised at any subsequent time under the Old Testament ; not a priest is named who was not descended from Aaron ; and no other can be shown to have performed any priestly function at the sanctuary. The position of the Levites in the time of the Judges is also that which is assigned to them by the law. They are spoken of as sojourners (Judg. xvii. 7-9 ; xix. 1), because they had no inheritance like other tribes. They took down the ark of the Lord,² when sent back by the Philistines (1 Sam. vi. 15), while

manaion where President Garfield lay sick, we suppose he would straightway infer that this menial occupation was carried on by the President's bedside. And upon the basis of such perversions as this he concludes, "These things strike at the root of the Levitical system of access to God."

¹ This passage flatly contradicts the extraordinary comment which the Professor makes (p. 288) upon Jer. vii. 22 : "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the traditional theory that the Levitical system was enacted in the wilderness." He might as well quote Luke xiv. 26 in proof that the Gospel prohibits filial affection.

² Professor Smith (p. 427) finds an "irregularity" in the fact that "according to the Levitical law, it is the function of the Levites to carry the ark ; in the history, the ark is borne by the priests (Josh. iii. 3 ; vi. 6 ; viii. 33 ; 1 Kings viii. 3)." But this is no "irregularity" whatever. The priests, being themselves Levites, had of course a legal right to do whatever was performed by the latter. Hence on occasions of special solemnity priests were bearers of the ark ; while on all ordinary occasions the Levites were competent. Accordingly 2 Sam. xv. 24, 29 where "the Levites aid the chief priests in carrying the ark" does not need for its explanation the unfounded suggestion "that before Ezekiel priests and Levites are not two separate classes." Conveying the ark in a cart (2 Sam. vi. 3) was in violation of the law, and led to a disastrous issue (vv. 6, 7) ; this was recognised and corrected (ver. 13).

the men who looked at the ark were smitten by a great slaughter (ver. 19), and Uzzah was smitten for presuming to take hold of it (2 Sam. vi. 7; comp. Num. iv. 15, 20). Bethshemesh being a priestly city (Josh. xxi. 16) must have contained those who could rightfully offer sacrifices on the arrival of the ark. Samuel, who was a Levite¹ (1 Chron. vi. 28), notwithstanding the fact that his father is called an Ephrathite (1 Sam. i. 1) in consequence of his residing within the bounds of Ephraim (comp. Judg. xvii. 7), performed subordinate ministries at the tabernacle (1 Sam. ii. 11; comp. Num. viii. 22).

The alleged departures from the ritual law at Shiloh were not really such. Eli's sons "made irregular exactions, and, in particular, would not burn the fat of the sacrifice till they had secured a portion of uncooked meat (1 Sam. ii. 12 *seq.*). Under the Levitical ordinance this claim was perfectly regular . . . (Lev. vii. 30 *seq.*; x. 15). But at Shiloh the claim was viewed as illegal and highly wicked" (p. 258). The sin of Eli's sons, and that which so disgusted the worshippers, was, that they forcibly insisted on having their share before the LORD had His; and further, they claimed over and above what the law allowed. Their legal portion was a matter of course, and is not particularly spoken of; but when the servant, with his fleshhook, seized upon whatever he could get without leave or licence, this was both offensive and unauthorised. And when the priestly perquisite was demanded before the fat was given to God upon the altar, and violence was threatened if this was not conceded, the worship of Jehovah was plainly subordinated to priestly gain. The abominable character of the proceedings cannot be glossed over by any reference to the Levitical regulations.² Resistance to such impiety and selfish greed is not fitly spoken of as "attaching importance to details."

¹ Samuel did not become a priest, as Professor Smith affirms (p. 258). The ephod which he wore is not that "which the law confines to the high priest," for it was a "linen ephod" (1 Sam. ii. 18), while that of the high priest (Ex. xxviii. 6) was of more costly materials. Nor is it true that he wore "the high-priestly mantle." One article of the high-priest's dress was a mantle (A. V., robe) made as is described (Ex. xxviii. 31 ff.). But other besides priests wore mantles; so that when Samuel's mother made him little one (A. V., coat) year by year, she did not invade the high-priest's prerogative. Thus "the startling irregularities" after all amount to nothing.

² The ritual of the peace-offering as given (Lev. iii. 1 ff.) required the presentation of the victim, laying on of hands, slaying the animal, removing the fat and burning it upon the altar as a sweet savour unto the LORD.

But what is to be thought of the sacrifices offered elsewhere than at the sanctuary in the period of the Judges and by others than priests the sons of Aaron? Two facts are obvious upon the surface which regulate this whole matter. The first is, that there is no mention in the entire book of Judges, from beginning to end, of any legitimate sanctuary but that at Shiloh, or any lawful priest not descended from Aaron. In every instance of reputed irregularity it appears by the record that there was no stated or continuous departure from Levitical rules, but only a deviation strictly limited to the occasion which called it forth. A second fact, equally apparent, is, that these deviations are invariably linked with immediate Divine manifestations. In the lamentable condition to which the people were reduced, Jehovah, or the angel of Jehovah, appeared from time to time on their behalf. In every such instance sacrifices were offered on the spot by those to whom the Lord thus appeared; and in the absence of such a theophany, sacrifices were never offered except at Shiloh or in the presence of the ark, and by priests of the house of Aaron. Wherever God appears, the place becomes, for that moment, holy ground (*Ex. iii. 5*; *Josh. v. 15*; *2 Sam. xxiv. 16, 18*). It possesses, for the time, the sanctity of the tabernacle. And the law that restricts sacrificial worship, in ordinary times, to the place where God statedly manifests Himself, cannot forbid due worship being paid to Him in any other place which He may make the scene of an extraordinary revelation. To this extent only *Ex. xx. 24* authorises altars elsewhere than at the sanctuary. Similarly, the divinely-appointed priests alone were authorised ordinarily to draw near to God and officiate at His altar. Other men could approach Him acceptably only through their intervention. But if God himself sees fit, in any case, to dispense with sacerdotal mediation, the man to whom He comes near by an immediate gracious manifestation, is thereby warranted to present his homage directly to Him in whose presence he stands.

Thus (*Judg. ii. 1-5*) the angel of the LORD appeared to the supplemental law (*vii. 28 ff.*) specifies the portion to be given to the priests and the religious ceremonies to be observed in connection with it; but it affords no justification for the atrocious claim that the priestly portion should have precedence over that which was destined to the altar, or that these should ever be ranked on a par.

people at Bochim, and they sacrificed there unto the LORD; so to Gideon, with a like result (vi. 20-22); a second appearance to Gideon, with explicit directions which he obeys (vv. 25 ff.); a supernatural manifestation to Manoah and a sacrifice (xiii. 16 ff.). And these are positively all the instances of irregular sacrifice in the book of Judges which are not distinctly stigmatised as idolatrous. No one of these places was subsequently a place of sacrifice; and Gideon and Manoah are nowhere said to have sacrificed again. The altar of Gideon, said to be still remaining in Ophrah (Judg. vi. 24), was, in all likelihood, a monumental altar, as Ex. xvii. 15; Josh. xxii. 26 ff. It does not appear that Gideon ever offered upon it; when directed to make a sacrifice immediately after (ver. 25), he built another altar. Much less does it appear that it was used for sacrifice after his time. If a writer were to tell us that the fort of Ticonderoga is there to this day, we need not infer that the ancient hostilities are still continued. Judg. xi. 11, "Jephthah uttered all his words before the LORD in Mizpeh," east of the Jordan, and (xx. 1) "the congregation was gathered together unto the LORD in Mizpeh," west of Jordan; these statements do not imply that either Mizpeh was a sanctuary. There is no allusion to sacrifices in either instance. "Before the LORD" simply implies a solemn recognition of God's presence (Gen. xiii. 13; xxvii. 7; 1 Sam. xxvi. 19; Ps. cxvi. 9). That they who bring a sacrifice are said to "offer" it (Judg. xxi. 4; 1 Sam. ii. 13) does not imply that every one could perform priestly functions; for like expressions are used in the Levitical law itself (Lev. xix. 5). We do not suppose that the Professor will dispute the reality of the Divine appearances recorded in Judges; but if he did, this would not disturb our argument. For the theophanies and the sacrifices are firmly linked together; and if there is no evidence that the former took place, there is none that the latter were offered.

But the Professor tells us (p. 256) that

—"all God's acts of grace mentioned in the book of Judges, all his calls to repentance, and all the ways in which He appears from time to time to support His people . . . are connected with this same local worship. The call to repentance is never a call to put aside the local sanctuaries, and worship only before the ark at Shiloh. . . . If the Pentateuchal programme of worship, and the rules which it lays down for the administration of it

dispensation of grace, existed in these days, they were at least absolutely suspended. It was not according to the law that Jehovah administered His grace to Israel during the period of the Judges."

There were no "local sanctuaries," as we have seen, except the idolatrous shrines; and every call to forsake Baal and Ashtoreth and return to Jehovah was a summons to abandon them and worship in Shiloh; and their cries unto the Lord (Judg. iii. 9; iv. 3, etc.) doubtless found expression at the altar and the sanctuary. The infrequent mention of the sanctuary in Shiloh in the course of this period can throw no doubt upon its continuity; for we find it at the end of the period just where and as it was at the beginning, and as it had been from the days of Joshua. The regular operation of established institutions is taken for granted by historians, and seems to demand no special record. And the writer of Judges professedly devotes himself to reciting the instances of apostasy, punishment, and deliverance (ii. 11-19), while the intervals of rest and pious obedience are passed over with a simple mention of their existence (iii. 11-30; viii. 28, etc.) But if Shiloh was the religious centre of the true worshippers of Jehovah, why was it not the fountain-head of religious power, the spring of every religious movement? Why did not the trumpet-call to repentance issue from its priests, and each recurring revival spread from Shiloh outward? Why this seeming paralysis of the regularly instituted ordinances and means of grace, and of the duly authorised ministers of religion? the Church may well ask, and hang her head in shame. With all the deduction for the unrecorded influence that emanated from the sanctuary, and this was doubtless great at this as at every epoch, it must still be confessed that things are not altogether as on theory might have been expected. Nor were they when the Redeemer came to His own and His own received Him not. Nor were they at the reformation of Luther.

But how does this discredit the existence of a central sanctuary and an Aaronic priesthood? The body is nourished and strengthened by its ordinary food; and nothing more might seem requisite when it is in a healthy condition; and yet remedies may become necessary which are quite aside from the regularly prescribed diet. The people had no other

medium of acceptable approach to God, of expressing their homage or obtaining His saving help, than by the established ordinances of worship. But God was not limited to these in His dealings with His people; His grace is broader than the channels through which it ordinarily flows. Special divine influences were not restricted to the sanctuary even in the days of Moses (Num. xi. 26-29). The Romish error of an external Church as the sole dispenser of grace finds no sanction under the Old Testament more than under the New.

And no exposition of the Levitical institutions, which places regularity of ritual observance upon a par with the spirit it was designed to express, can make them tally with the history of Israel, the devout breathings of the psalmists, or the teachings of the prophets. The ritualism of the law may be emphasised to such a degree as to bring Leviticus into disharmony with the abundant inculcations of spiritual obedience in Deuteronomy; to make it antagonistic to the declarations of Isaiah i. 11 ff., Amos v. 21 ff., and Micah vi. 8 (p. 287); and to represent it as the grand essential of a religious reformation under the law "to re-establish the stated burnt-offering, and the due atoning ritual before the ark in the hands of the legitimate priesthood, and on the pattern of the service in the wilderness" (p. 263). And then the fact may be established that no such system is traceable in Israel before the rise of post-exilic Pharisaism. But the question will recur, Is it Leviticus that is at fault, or the wrong interpretation which has been foisted upon it? Is Leviticus post-exilic, or has Professor Smith simply misconceived the spirit of the law and the method of its administration? He tells us (p. 213), "The Israelite had no right to draw a distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law." He was obliged to do this on numberless occasions. David and his men, in danger of perishing with hunger, ate the shewbread. The priests in the temple profaned the Sabbath and were blameless. The rites of burial were defiling. Ezekiel threatens Israel that they shall be compelled to eat defiled bread among the Gentiles. Aaron, in his grief, burned the sin-offering instead of eating it in the holy place, and was justified in so doing (Lev. x. 19, 20). Hezekiah prayed (2 Chron. xxx. 19) that the good LORD would pardon every one that prepareth his heart to seek God, the LORD God of his fathers, though he be not cleansed according

to the purification of the sanctuary. The law, whose fundamental tenets are (Lev. xix. 2), "Ye shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy," and (ver. 18), "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," not only makes the spiritual meaning the essential thing in every rite, but puts that spiritual meaning above any external rite whatever. Samuel is a true interpreter of it when he says (1 Sam. xv. 22), "Hath the LORD as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams."

When Israel sinned with the golden calf and broke their covenant with God which had just been ratified, the offence was not atoned, nor the breach repaired by any ritual. On the contrary, the tabernacle was removed outside of the camp (Ex. xxxiii. 7). There was no demand of sacrifice or lustration, but only of repentance and humiliation (vv. 4 ff.). The people were sorely punished (xxxii. 27, 35), but at Moses's earnest intercession they were forgiven (vv. 30 ff.). When they sinned at Kadesh by refusing to go into the promised land, not a word was said of sacrificial expiation or of greater zeal in the ceremonial. The tabernacle and the altar and the ritual drop out of sight as completely as if they did not exist. It was upon Moses's fervent intercession (Num. xiv. 11 ff.) that the people were spared from instant destruction, though still condemned to perish in the wilderness; and as appears from Josh. v. 5 ff., the rite of circumcision was suspended, the breakers of the covenant being deprived of its seal. According to Lev. xxvi. and Deut. xxviii. the transgression of the people will be visited by ever-increasing judgments, culminating in exile from the LORD's land; and the return of God's favour is suspended (Lev. xxvi. 40 ff.; Deut. iv. 29), not upon a punctilious observance of rites and ceremonies, but upon confession of their iniquity and the humbling of their uncircumcised hearts.

The principles thus outlined in the law itself govern the book of Judges. It records the inflictions by which the Lord from time to time recalled the offending people to a sense of their duty and their need of Divine help. These were enforced by communications from "the angel of the LORD" (Judg. ii. 1 ff., etc.), as promised (Ex. xxiii. 20 ff.), and by prophets (Judg. iv. 4; vi. 8, etc. See Deut. xviii. 15 ff.). It was not to be expected that the leaders raised up to judge and to deliver

the people would be from the sacerdotal tribe; Moses's own successor was from the tribe of Ephraim. That Gideon and Samson were called to their extraordinary mission not by a summons from the sanctuary, but by an immediate Divine manifestation at their homes, is in accordance with the analogy of the call of Moses. And yet neither these judgments nor these leaders effected a genuine and thorough reformation. The people were gradually sinking from the days of Joshua and the elders that overlived him (Judg. ii. 7) to the time of Jephthah and Samson; and the priesthood, it must be added, fell from the level of Phinehas, the grandson of Aaron, to that of his namesake, the son of Eli. The first effective measures for a true religious reform had their source in Shiloh; they were the work of Samuel, who was trained at the sanctuary.

But the Professor tells us (p. 263): "Samuel did not know of a systematic and exclusive system of sacrificial ritual confined to the sanctuary of the ark;" (p. 261), "he continued to sacrifice at a variety of shrines; and his yearly circuit to Bethel, Gilgal, and Mizpeh, returning to Ramah, involved the recognition of all these altars." The Lord declares through Jeremiah (vii. 12, 14; xxvi. 6), that He has abandoned Shiloh, where He set His name at the first, on account of the wickedness of His people Israel, and He will do the same to His house in Jerusalem, "which is called by His name." Ps. lxxviii. 60, 68: "He forsook the tabernacle of Shiloh," and "chose Mount Zion." The prophet and the psalmist know of but two sanctuaries in Israel, successively sanctioned by the Lord, Shiloh and Zion. As the tabernacle was removed from the midst of the camp in consequence of the idolatry at Sinai (Ex. xxxiii. 7), so, for a like reason, Israel was bereft of the ark, which was sent into captivity in the land of the Philistines (1 Sam. iv. 11). God had no sanctuary in Israel from that day forward. The ark was restored again by the discomfited Philistines. But the slaughter of the men in the priestly city of Beth-shemesh showed that Israel was not prepared to have Jehovah fix His residence among them; and it was an embarrassing question how to dispose of the ark, which only spread terror in Israel as it had done among the uncircumcised. It was finally placed provisionally in the obscurity of a private house, and guarded, so far as appears, by a pious layman (1 Sam. vii. 1).

Here is a novel and most extraordinary state of affairs. The ark, which, as the symbol and pledge of Jehovah's presence, has always hitherto been the confidence and the glory of Israel, is now a source of alarm. It was not taken back to Shiloh, nor was it taken to Nob, when the tabernacle was carried thither (1 Sam. xxi. 1, 6). It was not put in any sanctuary. It was simply sheltered in the dwelling of an ordinary Israelite. No priest or Levite ministered before it. No sacrifices were offered where it was. No pilgrimages were made to it (1 Chron. xiii. 3¹). And during its long abode in Kirjath-jearim, "all the house of Israel lamented after the LORD" (1 Sam. vii. 2). The covenant between Jehovah and Israel was severed, and they knew it. The Lord no longer had a dwelling-place in the midst of them.

Now the one purpose of Samuel's life was to bring Israel back to God, and thus restore these ruptured relations. And absolutely the Professor thinks (pp. 262-3), that the thing for him to have done was to have taken the ark to Nob, "for the distance between these towns is only a forenoon's walk," and to have set up the Levitical service under the conduct of the Aaronic priesthood! And because he did not do this, the Levitical law could not have been in existence! Such reasoning betrays the most astounding misconception of the relation between Jehovah and Israel, and of the ritual institutions by which that relation was expressed and maintained. Outward regularity in the prescribed ceremonial had nothing in it that was acceptable, so long as the hearts of the people were alienated from God. Leaving the people in their profound but salutary grief at the loss of the sanctuary, and of God's visible presence among them, he sought "to have them return unto the LORD with all their hearts," "to prepare their hearts unto the LORD and serve him only" (1 Sam. vii. 3). The worship which he conducted was sacrificial, of course; that was the symbolic form by which penitence and consecration were expressed. But the sacrifice was without a sanctuary and without a priesthood. Samuel officiated, not because he was a regular priest, for he was not; nor by virtue of his being

¹ In 1 Sam. xiv. 18, as Professor Smith correctly informs us (p. 94), there seems to be an error in the Hebrew text; and there is much to recommend the reading of the LXX., which substitutes "ephod" for "ark."

a Levite, which would have given him no legal right to offer sacrifice; but in his prophetic character as God's ambassador and representative. But that this function was an extraordinary one appears from the fact that it was limited to Samuel alone (1 Sam. ix. 13). There is, from the time that the ark was laid up at Kirjath-jearim till David removed it to Zion, scarcely a recorded instance of sacrifice when Samuel¹ was not present, except the rash and luckless act of Saul, which brought upon him Samuel's stern reprobation and the loss of his kingdom, in spite of his apology that he was forced to do as he did by the unavoidable pressure of circumstances (1 Sam. xiii. 8-14). Samuel is plainly the centre of the religious life of the period. The presence of God, so far as its gracious manifestation to Israel is concerned, is for the time linked with the prophet, not with the ark.

The new religious fervour awakened by the ministry of Samuel found expression as it could. In the absence of any divinely authorised sanctuary we read of men going up to God to Bethel (x. 3), where God had met with Jacob; of a high place at Gibeah (x. 5), visited by a company of prophets, and established probably on account of its proximity to their residence; of a yearly sacrifice of David's family (xx. 6), at their home in Bethlehem. These are the only instances of the sort which are mentioned except the sacrifices conducted by Samuel himself. All the ado made about "local sanctuaries" prior to the reign of David dwindles down to this; and in it there is no departure even from the strict letter of the law (1 Kings iii. 2).²

¹ In 1 Sam. vii. 9, 17; ix. 12, 13; x. 8; xi. 14, 15; xvi. 2-5, Samuel is distinctly named as the offerer, or at least sanctioned the sacrifice by his presence and participation. Saul built an altar (xiv. 35), and he spoke (xv. 15, 21) of the people's proposing to sacrifice the spoils of the Amalekites in Gilgal; but he cannot have thought of offering in the absence of Samuel after the rebuff which he had already received.

² What is said of David's want of orthodoxy (p. 264) seems for the most part captious. David did not wear "the priestly ephod" (2 Sam. vi. 14), but a linen ephod, which was worn by priests, but was no part of their prescribed dress; and, as shown by this instance and that of Samuel when a child (1 Sam. ii. 18), might be worn by others on sacred occasions. "He offered sacrifices in person" (ver. 13), and so Professor Smith tells us (p. 248): "Solomon officiated at the altar in person (1 Kings ix. 25);" and by a like principle of interpretation it might have been added that he built the altar with his own hands. If Solomon really "offered two and twenty thousand oxen and a hundred and twenty thousand sheep" in person, at one time, he must have had a weary task (1 Kings viii. 63). "He blessed the people as a priest in the name of Jehovah" (ver. 18), where "as a

The worship in high places was irregular and illegal after the temple was built. But the fact that high places were tolerated by pious princes, who contented themselves with abolishing the emblems and practices of idolatry found there, only shows that they did not do their whole duty; not that the law which had ruled ever since the days of Moses did not exist. They may very easily have persuaded themselves that the spirit of the law was maintained if only the abuses were rectified; that if God was sincerely and piously worshipped in these local sanctuaries, there could not be much harm in suffering them to remain. How much of the New Testament must have been written after the Reformation of Luther, if the habitual disregard of its teachings is to be accepted as evidence against their existence! and especially if the "popular religion" is made the measure of primitive Christianity! How plain is it upon these principles that the doctrine of justification by faith could never have been formulated by the apostle Paul, if it was not apprehended in its integrity by the early fathers and the theologians of the Middle Ages? Hezekiah's admitted reform (2 Kings xviii. 4) recognised the binding obligation of the Deuteronomic law a century before the book was found in the temple. That book, according to the explicit testimony of the author of Kings, was no recent production of the reign of Josiah. It was "the book of the law" (2 Kings xxii. 8), *i.e.* the well-known volume so designated (comp. Josh. i. 7, 8;

priest" is without any warrant in the text. "David's sons were priests (2 Sam. viii. 18);" but though this is the usual sense of the word, it must have a different meaning here, since the priests properly so called had already been named in the verse preceding. In 1 Chron. xviii. 17 it is paraphrased "chief about the king," which is justified by the primary sense of the term, and perhaps by the consideration that this high and confidential office was commonly intrusted to priests (comp. *eunuch*, Gen. xxxix. 1, not in its proper sense, but as an official title). That he weakly allowed Absalom to visit Hebron under pretence of a sacrificial vow, may be justified by 1 Kings iii. 2. His marriage with a princess of Geshur (2 Sam. iii. 3), is not a violation of the letter of the law, but offends as much against the spirit of the first legislation (Ex. xxxiv. 15, 16), as against that of Deuteronomy; and, as this was Absalom's mother, the history records the dreadful penalty he incurred. "Solomon building new shrines for the gods of his wives" (p. 248), could not plead ignorance of the law, on the Professor's own theory (Ex. xxii. 20; xxiii. 24). Professor Smith further proves that the priest received his consecration not from Jehovah, but from the people, by the case of Micah (Judg. xvii. 5, 12), the idolater, who stole his mother's money (ver. 2), and by the case of Eleazer, son of Abinadab (1 Sam. viii. 1), who was not a priest at all (p. 264).

viii. 31 ; xxiv. 26), which was found "in the house of the LORD," just where it might have been expected to be (Deut. xxxi. 9, 26). It is further characterised as "the law of Moses" (2 Kin. xxiii. 24, 25), and is, as Professor Smith acknowledges, the standard of judgment which the writer of the book of Kings applies to all preceding reigns. The people and their rulers do right, or do evil in the sight of the LORD, as they heed or disregard its injunctions. This law is expressly referred to (2 Kings xxi. 7-9), as known and disobeyed by Manasseh, and in fact as enjoined by the LORD upon David and Solomon ; also as obeyed by Hezekiah (xviii. 6), and by Joash (xiv. 6), where the very words of the statute are quoted from Deut. xxiv. 16. "The testimony" given to Joash at his coronation (2 Kings xi. 12) was a copy of the written law as directed by Deut. xvii. 18, comp. Ps. xix. 7 ; lxxviii. 5. It is appealed to by Solomon in his prayer at the dedication of the temple (1 Kings viii. 53, 56), as well as implied throughout in the language of his supplication ; and is commended by David to Solomon for the rule of his life (ii. 3). It is represented as equally binding on the ten tribes as upon Judah, and their transgression of the covenant of the LORD and the commandments of Moses led to their overthrow (2 Kings xviii. 12). The idolatrous corruptions of the northern kingdom, which Professor Smith is at great pains to show (p. 230), were "not a mere innovation due to the schism of Jeroboam," are expressly and in detail imputed to him (1 Kings xii. 26 ff. ; xiii. 33 ; xiv. 9), so that his standing designation is "Jeroboam the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin" (2 Kings x. 29, etc. etc.) And what the Professor persists in calling "traditional worship," under which term he heaps together all the idolatries and glaring violations of the Mosaic law that are recorded at various times, the sacred historians with one voice denounce as defections from the true worship of their covenant God, and as due to criminal association with the nations around them. If they are not to be trusted in so fundamental a point as this, they are not to be trusted in anything. It would be better to remand the entire history of Israel to the region of fable, and to confess that we have no positive knowledge about it, than to attempt this revolutionary process of reconstruction, which is professedly based upon authorities that are perpetually discredited.

But if historians may have incorporated their own ideas with their narrative, and committed the mistake of transferring the institutions of their own day to antecedent periods, contemporaneous writings will be free from this error, and represent truly the state of things in which they were produced. Let us turn then to these. The book of Psalms, as the Professor with all his distrust of their titles confesses, contains some ancient songs. He admits that tradition, in imputing the first portion of the Psalter (Ps. i.-xli.) almost without exception to David, "doubtless expresses the fact that these are the oldest Psalms, belonging to the early ages of Hebrew psalmody from David downward" (p. 202). Now, in all these Psalms, as in the entire collection in fact, Zion is God's earthly dwelling-place; no other is once alluded to. The Professor does not indicate which Psalms in particular are to be accounted David's. Hitzig, that prince of doubters, regards Ps. iii.-xix. as the genuine Davidic kernel, with the exception of Ps. v., vi., xiv. Professor Smith excepts to Ps. ix., x. Suppose that we content ourselves with the modest residuum. We still find that Jehovah's abode is in His holy hill (iii. 4), His tabernacle (xv. 1), His temple or palace which applies to the sacred Tent as the residence of the great King (xi. 4; xviii. 6); and mention is made of the winged cherub attached to His throne (xviii. 10), also of Jehovah's law (xix. 7-10), and His judgments and statutes (xviii. 22), with expressions in Ps. xv. and xix. borrowed from legal phrases and ideas, not to speak of the historical allusion in Ps. xi. 6, and the abundant references to the Pentateuch in Ps. xviii.

We do not know what the Professor thinks of Ps. xl. It is in its title ascribed to David. But Smend—to whose commentary he refers us (p. 377) for "the detailed proof that in every point Ezekiel's Torah prepares the way for the Levitical law, but represents a more elementary ritual"—remarks on Ezek. xl. 39, "Sin-offerings and trespass-offerings are here mentioned for the first time outside of the Priest-codex." If Ezekiel is the inventor of sin-offerings, Ps. xl. 6¹ must have borrowed them from him or from the Levitical law, which he pioneered. Such language, when found in Micah vi. 8, Jer.

¹ "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire, . . . burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required."

vii. 22, is interpreted (p. 288) as affirming that "Jehovah has not enjoined sacrifice," that He has, in fact, given no law upon the subject; the Levitical law was consequently still unknown. But, if Ps. xl. 6 can speak thus after Ezekiel's law or the Levitical law had been announced, Micah and Jeremiah could do the same; and then, for all that appears, the Levitical law may antedate their utterances.¹ Or if Ps. xl. was prior to the time of Ezekiel, the sin-offering was not introduced by him; though not mentioned elsewhere, it was part of the pre-exilic ritual, and Moses may have ordained it after all. And then still further, the Psalmist speaks (ver. 7) of all this as written in a book-roll, which he identifies (ver. 8) with the law of God; a written law respecting peace-offering and meat-offering, burnt-offering and sin-offering, which lays its supreme stress

¹ This conclusion cannot be evaded by imputing to Ps. xl. 6 a sense which the Professor (p. 416) follows Hitzig in attributing to Ps. li. 16, 17: "At present, says the Psalmist, God desires no material sacrifice. . . . But does the Psalmist then mean to say, absolutely and in general, that sacrifice is a superseded thing? No; for he adds that when Jerusalem is rebuilt the sacrifice of Israel (not merely his own sacrifice) will be pleasing to God. He lives, therefore, in a time when the fall of Jerusalem has temporarily suspended the sacrificial ordinances." Hitzig thinks Ps. xl. to be pre-exilic, and ascribes it to Jeremiah. Olshausen, who is for sweeping everything into the Maccabean period, places it during the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, when the temple-worship was interdicted. But these passages in the Psalms, as well as Ps. l. 8-15, are so clearly akin to Hos. vi. 6; Isa. i. 11 ff., etc., that they must be interpreted on the same principles. If, as is confessed, there is no absolute discarding of sacrifice in Ps. li., neither is there in Ps. xl., nor in those passages of the prophets which are quoted to show that sacrifice, if not actually disapproved, was yet in itself a matter of indifference. And the Psalmists declare, just as plainly as the prophets, God's permanent attitude towards sacrifice. There is nothing in the language of Ps. li. to suggest the thought, which it is proposed to put into it, viz., that sacrifices are not required "at present," because providentially rendered impossible. And the prayer in the last two verses of the Psalm, "that God will build the walls of Jerusalem," does not refer so manifestly to the period of the "captivity" as the Professor seems to suppose. Nebuchadnezzar could speak (Dan. iv. 30) of "this great Babylon, which I have built," without its being necessary for us to suppose that it did not exist or was in ruins when his reign began. To "build" a city, in Scripture phrase, is not merely to construct it *ab initio*, but to strengthen or enlarge it (Josh. xix. 50; 1 Kings xii. 25; xv. 17; 2 Kings xiv. 22; 2 Chron. viii. 2; Mic. iii. 10; Hab. ii. 12, etc. etc.) Solomon built "the wall of Jerusalem round about" (1 Kings iii. 1; ix. 15), though his father had not left it defenceless and no victorious foe had dismantled it; and, as Delitzsch suggests, David's prayers found in this a partial accomplishment. There is no reason, therefore, for setting aside the title of this Psalm, which at least represents a very ancient and credible tradition of its origin. And no person, surely, who is untrammelled by a hypothesis, would ever dream of dating the grateful thanksgiving for divine benefits in Ps. xl. 1-5, from either the Babylonish captivity or the Syrian persecution.

pon the presentation of the animal required, but upon the order to God of the person of the offerer. The Professor tells us (p. 364), and we preserve his italics, "The old elite *consecrated himself* before a sacrifice." By an "old elite" he plainly means in the connection one who lived before "the first legislation" and prior to the time of Isaiah. The author of this Psalm was then an "old Israelite," and it may have been David, as the title declares. And, accordingly, David, or the "old Israelite," had a written law embracing precisely the forms of sacrifice included in Leviticus; moreover, he understood it in a very different sense from the rigid legalism which Professor Smith insists upon finding there.

From the Psalms we turn to the Prophets. Hosea and Amos are among the earliest from whom we have any writings. They prophesied in the northern kingdom, which had been severed from Judah for nearly 200 years. In casting off subjection to the house of David, the ten tribes had abandoned the temple at Jerusalem, its priesthood, and its worship. The separatist worship of the calves, the Professor tells us, was regarded by the people as perfectly legitimate. "They still believed themselves loyal to Jehovah" (p. 231). They were simply maintaining their old ancestral forms. The law, which they are charged with violating, had as yet no existence in Judah; and the ten tribes went into exile long before it was enacted. The prophets were the real innovators. Leaving out of view that Israel's idolatrous worship was in open violation, not only of the Deuteronomic and Levitical codes, but likewise of the ten commandments, which are admitted to be Mosaic, and the basis of Jehovah's covenant with his people, in violation, too, of the first legislation (Ex. xx. 23), which even on the theory of Professor Smith, antedated this period, what do the prophets say about it?

Hosea constantly sets forth the relation between Jehovah and Israel under the emblem of a marriage-covenant (ii. 19, 20), a form of representation borrowed from the books of Moses (Ex. xx. 5; xxxiv. 15, 16; Lev. xvii. 7; xx. 5, 6; Num. xiv. 33). His ever reiterated charge is that Israel is an unfaithful wife, who had responded to her Lord in former days, when she came up out of Egypt (ii. 15), but had since abandoned him for other lovers (i.-iii., etc.), Baal and the calves (xiii. 1, 2).

She has broken her covenant, has dealt treacherously (v. 7; vi. 7), has backslidden (iv. 16; xi. 7; xiv. 4), is repeating the atrocity of Gibeah (ix. 9; x. 9). The prevalent sacrificing on the hills and under shady trees is a shameless and criminal desertion of her lawful husband for a base and profligate prostitution (iv. 13). Nothing certainly can be further from the prophet's conception, than that this was Israel's original and hereditary worship. If the Professor is right, Hosea is radically mistaken. His language is not that of one who is seeking to lift a people to purer and more spiritual ideas from gross and degrading superstitions, in which they have always been involved. His effort is to reclaim those who have apostatised from God's true service to the standing from which they have fallen. The "knowledge of God," whose absence he deplores (iv. 1), is not a theoretical apprehension of His being and attributes, as though his hearers had never been instructed about Him; but, as appears from its concomitants, that practical acquaintance with the Most High, which is synonymous with true piety, and which had well-nigh vanished from the land.

It appears from Hos. viii. 12,¹ that Israel had a written law

¹ Professor Smith translates this verse hypothetically, as is done by several critics and commentators, who seek thus to evade its explicit testimony. To this there are serious objections. But even thus it would establish the existence of a detailed and copious law embracing the subject of sacrifice, and which the prophet held to be from God, and charged both priests and people with neglecting. "Though I wrote to him the ten thousand precepts of my Torah" (not "my Torah in ten thousand precepts," as Professor Smith has it) by the very hypothesis avers that there is such a law to write. But the past tense of the verb in the second clause stands in the way of the hypothetical construction, and makes it, if not absolutely certain, yet highly probable on grammatical grounds alone that it is historical, and that the future in the first clause is to be explained as in Ps. ciii. 7. To this add the incongruities which attend the hypothetical explanation. Why speak of imposing *ten thousand* requirements, as though these would be more likely to secure obedience than a smaller number? and why of *writing* instead of enjoining or declaring the law? The very mode of putting the hypothesis implies that written law was a familiar idea, that law to have its highest validity should be in written form; and such a notion could only be begotten of usage. So that Smend gives up the hypothetical construction as untenable ("Moses apud Prophetas," p. 13): "The words of Hosea prove that the Ephraimites had many written laws in the eighth century, which, whether contained in one or more books, although they were neglected by a large part of the people, were yet known to all, and in the judgment of the prophet demanded the obedience of all, since they were of divine obligation, as much so as if written by Jehovah himself." Nowack, one of the most recent commentators on Hosea, confesses that this

to a considerable extent; this must have related in part, as connection implies, to altars and sacrifices, and no doubt included the duties which the people are elsewhere charged with violating (comp. also Hos. iv. 6; viii. 1; Am. ii. 4). We learn from Hos. ii. 11; ix. 5; xii. 9; Am. v. 21; viii. 5, that the annual feasts, new moons, Sabbaths, and festive assemblies were observed in Israel and held in high esteem, and that they occupied a prominent place in the life of the people, so that their abolition would be reckoned a serious disaster. We read also (Am. v. 22; Hos. viii. 13) of burnt-offerings, grain-offerings, peace-offerings; (Am. iv. 5) thank-offerings, drink-offerings; (Hos. ix. 4) drink-offerings; (Am. iv. 4) daily morning sacrifice; Hos. iv. 8 alludes to the law of clean-offering; Hos. ix. 3, 4 to the law of clean and unclean. Instead of the simplicity of worship, which the Prophets represented in the first legislation and in Deuteronomy, and which he would have us believe prevailed until the Babylonian exile, they must have had an elaborate ritual corresponding to the Levitical institutions. So that he himself says ("Moses apud Prophetas," p. 75): "It is entirely evident that the cultus of Jehovah, as it existed in the time of the earlier prophets, and doubtless long before, is in no means at variance with the character of Leviticus. Every judgment may be formed of the age of this book, and opinions hitherto entertained of the birth, growth, and maturity of the religion of Israel will undergo no change."

Hos. vi. 6, "I desired mercy and not sacrifice," the very clause shows that the negation is not absolute, "and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings."¹ This affords a

not hypothetical, but seeks to bend it to the views of the latest school, by giving to the first verb a progressive sense, *I am writing*, implying that the legislation was not given at one time in the age of Moses but was gradually produced from that time forward. Perhaps he borrows the "*creating*" in Isa. xlii. 5, that in the prophet's estimation, the work of creation was still progressing, and that he thus anticipated the development hypothesis.

It is remarkable how many allusions to the Deuteronomic and Levitical laws there are in Hosea and Amos, and even striking coincidences of language.

In addition to those already cited in the text, the following may be mentioned as among the most obvious. The law of the unity of the Lord is presupposed in charging them with sin for multiplying altars (Hos. xiii. 11; xii. 11); the prohibition of removing landmarks (Deut. xix. 17) is referred to, Hos. v. 10; iv. 4, the final reference of causes to the priest, refusal to hear whom was a capital offence (Deut.

very simple key to the passages with which the Professor confronts us on p. 287, and which he interprets to mean that in the judgment of the prophets "sacrifice is not necessary to acceptable religion." "Amos proves God's indifference to ritual by reminding the people that they offered no sacrifice and offerings to Him in the wilderness during those forty years of wandering which he elsewhere cites as a special proof of Jehovah's covenant grace (Am. ii. 10; v. 25). Micah declares that Jehovah does not require sacrifice; He asks nothing of His people but 'to do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with their God' (Mic. vi. 8). And Jeremiah (vii. 21, *seq.*) says in express words, etc. etc." (Comp. also Isa. i. 11, *seq.*; Am. v. 21, *seq.*); Am. v. 25 is a greatly disputed passage and has been very variously understood. It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of its meaning here. If we accept the sense which the Professor puts upon its terms, it will simply mean that the Mosaic system of sacrifice did not go into full and developed operation in the wilderness; a fact of which we have hints elsewhere (*e.g.* Deut. xii. 8, 9), and which is implied in the

xvii. 12; viii. 13; ix. 3), penalty of a return to Egypt (Deut. xxviii. 68; ix. 4), defilement from the dead (Num. xix. 14, 22; Deut. xxvi. 14; ix. 10). Baal-peor (Num. xxv. 3, 5, which is a Levitical passage (p. 433); x. 11, comp. Deut. xxv. 4), the ox not to be muzzled when treading out corn (vi. 11; Am. ix. 14), "return the captivity" (Deut. xxx. 3). Amos, though delivering his message in Bethel, knows but one sanctuary, that in Zion (i. 2; ii. 7), the law of incest (Lev. xx. 11; Deut. xxii. 30; ii. 11, 12), Nazarites (Num. vi. 2, 3), and prophets (Deut. xviii. 15; iv. 4), triennial tithes (Deut. xiv. 28; xxvi. 12, for which in their excess of zeal they may substitute tithes every three days, viii. 5), falsifying the ephah, shekel, and balances (Lev. xix. 36; Deut. xxv. 13, ff.; ii. 7), "to profane my holy name" (Lev. xx. 3; ii. 9, comp. Num. xiii. 32, 33; v. 11; ix. 14, comp. Deut. xxviii. 30, 39; vi. 14), "entering in of Hamath" (Num. xxxiv. 8; ix. 13, comp. Lev. xxvi. 5). Professor Smith deduces from Hos. iii. 4, the inference (p. 226) that "sacrifice and *masséba*, ephod and teraphim, were recognised as the necessary forms and instruments of the worship of Jehovah." This finds its sufficient reply in his own note upon this passage (p. 423), according to which Jehovah "breaks off all intercourse between Israel and the Baalim" as well as between Israel and himself. That teraphim are spoken of in connection with Jacob, and were found in David's house, only shows that their wives were not free from superstitious practices. That Micah had them in his idolatrous sanctuary (Judg. xviii. 14, ff.) can surely create no embarrassment. And if Micah's Levite, as he adds in the same connection (p. 227), was really a "grandson of Moses," this is no more damaging to the great legislator than it is to Luther that his descendants have deserted the Protestant faith, or than it is to Isaiah that he once summoned the priest Urijah as a witness to certify a fact (viii. 2), (whence the Professor dignifies him [p. 253] with the title of Isaiah's "friend"), though he had "co-operated with King Ahaz" in a change of altars.

language of several of the laws themselves (Ex. xii. 25 ; xxxiv. 12 ; Lev. xiv. 34 ; xxiii. 10 ; xxv. 2, etc. etc.). But the Professor's deduction from these passages is too sweeping for his own theory. If they are irreconcilable with the idea that any divine law of sacrifice then existed, they will not only abolish Leviticus, as he contends, but the first legislation as well (Ex. xxii. 30 ; xxiii. 14-18 ; xxxiv. 19, 25), and Deuteronomy (xii. 6, 11, 27 ; xv. 19 ; xvi. 2, etc.), of which Jeremiah is the acknowledged champion, some adventurous critics having actually claimed that he wrote it himself ; and even nullify the plea which the Lord directed Moses to urge with Pharaoh as a reason for leaving Egypt, "that we may sacrifice to the LORD our God" (Ex. iii. 18), which is not classed among the Levitical passages (p. 432).

Our space will not permit us to trace the Mosaic codes through the rest of the prophets. But one view is common to them all : Jehovah's seat is in Zion¹ (Joel ii. 15, ff. ; iii. 21 ; Mic. iv. 1, ff.). Isaiah leaves us in no doubt as to the place of Jehovah's sanctuary. Not only in the reign of Hezekiah, to whose reform he doubtless contributed, but from the outset of his ministry under Uzziah he declares his mind on this subject in unambiguous language. Zion is the mountain of the LORD, which shall be so conspicuously exalted, and shall be the resort of all nations, and from which God's law shall go forth (ii. 2, 3). It is upon Zion that He shall create a cloud and smoke by day, and a flaming fire by night, a glory and a defence (iv. 5). In the year that King Uzziah died he had the sublime vision of Jehovah, whom he saw in the temple, and his lips were purged by a coal from the altar (vi. 1, ff.). It was when Sennacherib presumed to shake his hand against the mount of the daughter of Zion that his doom was sealed (x. 32 ; comp. 2 Kings xix. 34). Zion is "the city of our solemn-

¹ The sole prophetic utterance, which bears the semblance of approving a plurality of sanctuaries, is the complaint of Elijah, "They have thrown down thine altars" (1 Kin. xix. 10). But in the anomalous condition of the northern kingdom, cut off from access to the temple at Jerusalem, it is not surprising if the fearers of Jehovah maintained His worship in local sanctuaries. And the hostility to Jehovah's service, which overthrew these altars, was not palliated by the fact that from a strictly legal point of view they were unauthorised. We might be indignant at an infidel government for suppressing the Roman Catholic worship, without approving of the celebration of the mass. Elijah's own sacrifice at Carmel was by immediate divine direction (1 Kings xviii. 36).

ties" whose protection is secured by the presence of Jehovah (xxxiii. 20). He repudiates a plurality of altars (xvii. 8), which with him has only idolatrous associations; such an altar has no sacredness beyond mere chalk-stones (xxvii. 9). He predicts the time when there shall be "an altar to Jehovah in the midst of the land of Egypt" (xix. 19), as a symbol that this land shall be as truly as Canaan the Lord's land, and its people the Lord's people. Like Mal. i. 11, it is one of the prophetic intimations of the passing away of the local and national restrictions of the former dispensation. But that Isaiah had no thought of a separatist worship appears from ii. 4, where the same truth is clothed in the more strictly Old Testament form of all nations making their pilgrimages to Zion. The Lord cannot tolerate ritual observances as an offset to wicked lives (i. 11, ff.); but He has the same disgust for prayer (i. 15) and the language of the lips (xxix. 13) similarly offered. There is no depreciation of sacrificial worship in this, for the acceptable service that Egypt will one day render unto God is described by saying, "They shall do sacrifice and oblation; they shall vow a vow and perform it," xix. 21.

But does not Isaiah in the same connection predict "a pillar" (*maṣṣēba*) in the land of Egypt, the very symbol which Deut. xvi. 22 forbids? "This passage," says Professor Smith (p. 354), "gives us a superior limit for the date of the Deuteronomic code." "Isaiah could not refer to a forbidden symbol as a *maṣṣēba* to Jehovah." There is a slight confusion of ideas here. In the first place, it proves too much. This symbol was prohibited likewise by the first legislation (Ex. xxiii. 24; xxxiv. 13, for "images" read "pillars"), which required the destruction of Canaanitish altars and pillars, not their purification and re-dedication to the service of God. Secondly, the thing forbidden was the erection of pillars in the neighbourhood of altars with the view of worshipping them (Lev. xxvi. 1; Deut. xvi. 21, 22). Moses himself had set up twelve pillars about the altar at the ratification of the covenant with Jehovah (Ex. xxiv. 4), each tribe as it were erecting its memorial on that solemn occasion. Stone monuments to commemorate God's goodness or to mark signal events were repeatedly erected in post-Mosaic times. When this was done with no view to sacrifice or adoration, it was no violation of the Pentateuchal

statute. The monumental pillar, of which the prophet speaks, at the border of Egypt, had no connection with the altar which was to be in the midst of the land. It simply marked the sacred character of Egypt, and was not intended for any idolatrous purpose.

But Ezekiel is the great stronghold of the hypothesis which we are considering. Here we are told we can see the very process of the formation of the Levitical law. The prophet is convinced by the failure of all his predecessors to reclaim the wayward people, that a new departure must be made. A barrier must be erected to shut out heathen influence, and to confine Israel rigidly to the service of Jehovah. Acting on this idea he lays down (Ch. xl.-xlviii.) a ritual to be observed on the return from exile, in which the worship which had hitherto been spontaneous and free is reduced to a fixed and unvarying form, and all the ceremonies are described in minute detail. This scheme of the cultus at the sanctuary was enlarged and modified by Ezra, and thus arose the Levitical law which he brought forward in its completed form, and which thenceforth became the law of Israel's worship. Ezekiel's projected system represents a stage between the simplicity of the former cultus and the greater complexity of the Levitical legislation.

These closing chapters of Ezekiel, where it is proposed to find the key to the origin of the middle books of the Pentateuch, have always been a puzzle to commentators. And a hypothesis which professes to relieve them of all mystery (p. 374), to accept them in their most obvious sense, and to suggest a sufficient reason for those various regulations and an important purpose to be answered by them, thus converting what has seemed like a barren waste into a fruitful field, can scarcely fail to attract attention if it has the slightest plausibility. Some perplexities, however, force themselves upon us in advance.

1. There are items in Ezekiel's description of the sanctuary, the worship and the holy land of the future, which can scarcely have been intended to be literally understood, but seem to have been introduced for the sake of giving an ideal character to the entire section. Zion could not possibly be called "a very high mountain" (xl. 2), unless with a view to the exalta-

tion promised (Isa. ii. 2) and assumed (Ezek. xvii 22, 23). Its utmost extent could not afford a site for a sacred enclosure measuring 500 reeds, or 3000 cubits, *i.e.* nearly a mile on each of its four sides (xlii. 16 ff.) The critics have been at great pains to correct "reeds" into "cubits" in order to bring it within some reasonable probability; but this is directly in the face of the repeated statements of the text. The entrance of Jehovah's glory into the house represents a spiritual fact, not an occurrence in the form exhibited in the vision (xliii. 2-4). The stream flowing from the sanctuary (xlvi. 1-12), swelling as it advanced, and carrying life, fertility, and healing even to the desert and the Dead Sea, is manifestly symbolical, and can no more represent an actual river than its counterpart in Rev. xxii. 1 ff. The symmetrical division of the land parcelled among the tribes in parallel strips, with a holy oblation unto the Lord in the centre, is as unpractical as possible, and, in the case of the tribes located to the south, assumes a complete reclaiming of the arid desert. It is as plainly ideal as the uniform numbers of the tribes in Rev. vii. 5 ff., or as the resurrection of the dry bones (Ezek. xxxvii. 1 ff.) and the destruction of Gog (xxxix. 9 ff.), which are preliminary to these closing chapters.

2. These directions of Ezekiel were not in fact obeyed by the returning exiles, which shows that their intention as understood by those immediately addressed was not to guide the present, but to forecast the future. The temple of Zerubabel was not built by Ezekiel's plan; nor did its cultus or the partition of the land correspond with the model sketched by him.

3. If the Levitical law was based upon that of Ezekiel, why did it not adopt the regulations given by him, instead of departing from them so often and so capriciously as it would seem? Why, for example, was the burnt-offering of seven bullocks and seven rams prescribed by Ezekiel (xlv. 23-25) for each of the seven days of passover, and of the feast of tabernacles, converted into two bullocks, one ram, and seven lambs daily at the passover (Num. xxviii. 19-24), and thirteen bullocks, two rams, and fourteen lambs on the first day of tabernacles, to be repeated from day to day with a gradually diminishing number of bullocks to the end? We can under-

stand how a prophet, speaking in the name of God and presaging the Church of the future, could freely modify the established Mosaic ritual for the very purpose of intimating that the forms of the old law were not immutable and would one day suffer change. But this recent hypothesis is quite incomprehensible ; that, after Ezekiel had with divine authority proclaimed a new and elaborate ritual, it should have been altered and added to and subtracted from by the priesthood in numberless particulars before it was set in operation.

4. It is not very clear that the time when the ceremonial had been for the present providentially abolished was the one for doing what by the hypothesis had never been done so long as the temple stood and the priests were performing its daily service, viz., to prepare a complete formulary for its worship. One would think that there were more practical and pressing needs of the exiles than this. But if Ezekiel did undertake to do it, it is strange that the larger part of his scheme is occupied with an utterly abortive, though most minute description of a temple, which did not so differ from the plan of Solomon's as to further any important end. And stranger still, the Levitical law, which was meant as an improvement upon Ezekiel, instead of giving the exiles intelligible directions for the rebuilding of their temple, substitutes an almost interminable account of the tabernacle in the wilderness, which is a pure fancy sketch of a structure that never existed.

5. The so-called Torah of Ezekiel was issued with his own name as revealed to himself. There was no "legal fiction" in the case, and no pretence of being from Moses ; which is an additional warrant for believing that any other law published at that time or subsequently by competent authority would not have appeared under an assumed name, but have frankly and honestly announced the authority from which it proceeded, and on which it rested its claim to be obeyed.

6. And we are still further puzzled to understand how the new ritual could have been gotten into operation under the circumstances. By the hypothesis it was a totally new departure made under false pretences. Every one knew that it was not only not Mosaic, but was diametrically opposed to the Mosaic system. All the prejudices that clung to the ancient ritual were opposed to it. So were the class interests of the

priests, who, it is alleged, were now degraded from their former prerogatives to the inferior rôle of Levites; and the attachments to local sanctuaries, which it is supposed were now summarily abolished. And when we remember the persistence with which open idolaters faced Jeremiah, and even carried their point in spite of his remonstrances (Jer. xliii. 2 ff.; xliv. 15 ff.), the opposition from these various quarters could not have been slight. The new law could not have gained prevalence from the authority of Ezekiel, for it freely deviates from the law which he had given. It ran directly counter to the instructions of Jeremiah, as these are interpreted to us by the advocates of the new hypothesis, for "he knew no divine law of sacrifice under the first temple" (p. 374); counter also to Isa. lxvi. 1-3, which, on the Professor's critical principles, was by a prophet of the captivity later even than Ezekiel, in which, upon the same method of interpretation, Jehovah repudiates all earthly sanctuaries and sacrificial rites. And yet, in spite of all these elements of a formidable opposition, the Levitical law was no sooner brought forward by Ezra than it was at once accepted and submitted to as "the law of Moses, which the LORD had commanded to Israel" (Neh. viii. 1, 14; x. 29), and that, too, as distinguished from post-Mosaic enactments (xii. 45).

But waiving these difficulties of a general nature, how is it with those particulars in the Torah of Ezekiel which, recent critics affirm, must have preceded the law of Leviticus? We quote from Professor Smith (p. 374):—

"The first that strikes us is the degradation of the Levites. The ministers of the old Temple, he (Ezekiel) tells us, were uncircumcised foreigners,¹

¹ The allegation that "uncircumcised foreigners" were employed to "keep the ward of the sanctuary" "as long as Solomon's temple stood" (p. 250), is based on an extraordinary series of *non sequiturs*. David's bodyguard of Kerethim and Pelethim has been conjectured to be "Cretans and Philistines" on the basis of a doubtful etymology, which was not accepted by Gesenius, and has not been by the subsequent editors of his Lexicon. The mention of "Carians," either in 2 Sam. xx. 23 or 2 Kings xi. 4, is much more doubtful and improbable still. The men "who were clad in foreign garb, and leaped over the threshold" (Zeph. i. 8, 9), has nothing in the world to do with "Philistines" or "foreign janissaries." So that the inference that these imaginary foreign guards "are unquestionably identical with the uncircumcised foreigners whom Ezekiel found in the temple" rests merely upon a series of positive, but unfounded, assertions. The unlawful presence of uncircumcised foreigners in the temple is of a piece with the open prac-

whose presence was an insult to Jehovah's sanctuary. Such men shall no more enter the house, but in their place shall come the Levites not of the house of Zadok, who are to be degraded from the priesthood because they officiated in old Israel before the idolatrous shrines (xliv. 5 *seq.*) This one point is sufficient to fix the date of the Levitical law as later than Ezekiel. In all the earlier history, and in the code of Deuteronomy, a Levite is a priest, or at least qualified to assume priestly functions; and even in Josiah's reformation the Levite priests of the high places received a modified priestly status at Jerusalem. Ezekiel knows that it has been so in the past; but he declares that it shall be otherwise in the future, as a punishment for the offence of ministering at the idolatrous altars. He knows nothing of an earlier law, in which priests and Levites are already distinguished, in which the office of Levite is itself a high privilege."

The distinction of priests and Levites, though rarely alluded to in the pre-exilic history, since there was no occasion so to do,¹ is yet explicitly recognised in 1 Sam. vi. 15; 2 Sam. xv. 24; 1 Kings viii. 4. Upon the first return of the exiles under Zerubbabel, ninety years before the alleged date of the Levitical law, we not only find priests and Levites sharply distinguished and separately enumerated, but distinctions are made among the Levites themselves, who are variously classed, as by hereditary descent, singers, porters, etc. (Ezra ii. 36 ff.; Neh. vii. 39 ff.; xii. 1-9); comp. also the account of the first inhabitants of Jerusalem after the exile (1 Chron. ix. 1). The same thing recurs upon the going up of Ezra, fourteen years before the supposed origin of the Levitical law (Ezra vii. 7, 24; viii. 15 ff.) These distinctions cannot have been introduced by Ezekiel's Torah; they could not have arisen in the exile, when there was no temple service and no occasion for singers and porters. They must, of necessity, have been transmitted from the period before the exile, and represent the distribution of functions then made among those that were employed at the sanctuary. Priests and Levites must, therefore, have had separate duties, and formed distinct classes while Solomon's temple still stood. But further, the subdivisions of the Levites

tice of idolatrous rites within those sacred precincts (Ezek. viii. 3 ff.; 2 Kings xxi. 4 ff.) This shameless violation of law is no proof that the law was not in existence. The Nethinim (Ezra viii. 20) and children of Solomon's servants (ii. 58) do not fall under the same condemnation (Neh. x. 28, 29). They were, no doubt, circumcised, and performed such menial services for the Levites as were permissible for proselyted foreigners (Josh. ix. 27).

¹ The distinction is not even made in Malachi (see ii. 4-8; iii. 3), though he could not, on any critical hypothesis, have been ignorant of its existence

above referred to are also unknown to the Levitical law, which apportions them in quite a different manner, having no possible relation to post-exilic times, but only to the wandering in the wilderness, viz., the functions which they severally performed in the transportation of the tabernacle and its furniture (Num. ch. iv.)

Again, that the Levitical law of the priesthood was prior to Ezekiel, and not *vice versa*, appears from the nature of the case. While the former limits the priesthood to the family of Aaron, Ezekiel goes still further, and restricts it for cause to the line of Zadok, one of his descendants.¹ While the Levitical law does not define the sanctuary duties of the Levites, but leaves them, as they might naturally be left at the outset, to perform such services as the priest might require of them (Num. xviii. 2); long usage gradually assigned to them specific tasks, as the charge of the gates, slaying the sacrifices, boiling their flesh, etc. (2 Chron. xxiii. 4; xxx. 17; xxxv. 13). And this is what Ezekiel expects them to do (xliv. 11; xlv. 24). Indeed, Ezekiel seems to make allusion to the Levitical law in the very passage under discussion. He calls the employment of the uncircumcised foreigners in the temple a breach of God's covenant (xliv. 7). It was, therefore, in his eyes, the violation of a positive divine statute, which can only be Numbers xviii. 4, where any "stranger," i.e. non-Levite, is prohibited from doing the work assigned to Levites. And if Levite had always, prior to the time of Ezekiel, been synonymous with "priest," or at least denoted one who is "qualified to assume priestly functions," it is remarkable that he should employ it as he does without any modifying epithet (xlvi. 11-13), in contrast with priests, and in the sense of those who are disqualified from assuming priestly functions.

"A second point in Ezekiel's law is a provision for stated and regular sacrifices." Nehemiah engages the people to "a

¹ It has, indeed, been denied that Zadok (1 Kings ii. 35) was of the seed of Aaron. But such a groundless denial of what is explicitly settled by his genealogy (1 Chron. vi. 8, 53; xxiv. 3; xxvii. 17), is fitly characterised by Delitzsch as "manufacturing history." And how the Levitical regulation could, in that case, have been built upon that of Ezekiel, and the restriction of the priesthood to the family of Zadok could have led to its restriction to another family of quite different descent, becomes still more inexplicable.

voluntary charge of a third of a shekel for this purpose (Neh. x. 32)." "In Ex. xxx. 16 the service of the tabernacle was defrayed by the fixed tribute of half a shekel." If this "refers to the continual sacrifices," it differed from Nehemiah's rate plainly enough, but it does not follow that "this law," which bears no evidence of being a permanently obligatory precept, "was still unknown to Nehemiah, and must be a late addition to the Pentateuch." And, on the other hand, if it does not refer to them, it is a rash and unwarranted conclusion on the part of the Professor that stated offerings were ordained with no provision for supplying them.

"A third point in Ezekiel's law," and the last which Professor Smith insists upon, "is the prominence given to the sin-offering and atoning ritual. The altar must be purged with sin-offerings for seven consecutive days before burnt sacrifices are acceptably offered on it (xliii. 18 *seq.*) The Levitical law (Ex. xxix. 36, 37) prescribes a similar ceremony, but with more costly victims. At the dedication of Solomon's Temple, on the contrary (1 Kings viii. 62), the altar is at once assumed to be fit for use, in accordance with Ex. xx. 24, and with all the early cases of altar-building outside the Pentateuch. But, besides this first expiatory ceremonial, Ezekiel appoints two atoning services yearly, at the beginning of the first and the seventh month (xlv. 19, 20, LXX.), to purge the house. This is the first appearance, outside of the Levitical code, of anything corresponding to the great day of atonement in the seventh month, and it is plain that the simple service in Ezekiel is still far short of that solemn ceremony. The day of atonement was also a fast day. Now, in Zech. vii. 5, viii. 19, the fast of the seventh month is alluded to as one of the four fasts commemorating the destruction of Jerusalem, which had been practised for the last seventy years. The fast of the seventh month was not yet united with the 'purging of the house,' ordained by Ezekiel. Even in the great convocation of Neh. viii.-x., where we have a record of proceedings from the first day of the seventh month onwards to the twenty-fourth, there is no mention of the day of expiation on the tenth, which thus appears as the very last stone in the ritual edifice."

Professor Smith affirms that there were no expiatory rites for cleansing the altar of Solomon's temple; but the sacred historian in explicit terms declares the very reverse. In the summary account of the transaction given in Kings the order of the ceremonial is not particularly stated, except that the services were continued "seven days and seven days." This of itself suggests a distinction between these two periods, and implies that there was a week preliminary to the proper week of the annual feast; and the most obvious purpose of such a

week is that of sacrificial purgation. This very natural presumption is confirmed by the express language of 2 Chron. vii. 9: "they kept the dedication of the altar seven days, and the feast seven days."

The day of atonement, it is true, is not mentioned by Ezekiel, but his silence does not prove that he knew nothing of it. For he likewise makes no allusion to the feast of weeks, which belonged even to the first legislation (Ex. xxiii. 16; xxxiv. 22), and this though he speaks of passover and tabernacles (Ezek. xlv. 21, 25). He does not allude to the daily evening sacrifice (1 Kings xviii. 29, 36; 2 Kings xvi. 15; see Ezek. xlvi. 13 ff.); nor to the high-priest (2 Kings xii. 7, 10; xxii. 4; xxiii. 4); nor to the priestly dues enjoined in Deut. xviii. 3; see xlv. 28 ff. It is also true that no mention is made of its observance in the Old Testament history, nor in fact for a long time after. The earliest allusion¹ to it is by Josephus (Ant. xiv. 16. 4), who tells us that Herod took Jerusalem (B.C. 37) on the solemnity of the fast, as Pompey had done twenty-seven years before. The feast of weeks is spoken of but once between Moses and the exile (1 Kin. ix. 25; 2 Chron. viii. 13). The Sabbatical year is not mentioned until the period of the Maccabees (1 Macc. vi. 53). The fast of the seventh month, alluded to by Zechariah, in commemoration of the murder of Gedaliah (2 Kin. xxv. 25), was entirely distinct from the annual humiliation for sin. The Professor seems to think that the day of atonement was not instituted for some years after the Levitical law was brought out by Ezra. This will involve him in fresh difficulties; for, as Delitzsch remarks, it will be necessary to exclude from Ezra's law not only Lev. xvi., where the services of the day are described in detail, but also all the allusions to it elsewhere, as Ex. xxx. 10, which speaks of one annual atonement; Lev. xxiii. 26-32; xxv. 9; Num. xviii. 7, which speaks of a priestly duty within the veil; Num. xxix. 7-11; and all passages containing the name given to the lid of the ark in consequence of the expiation effected there, "the mercy-seat;" and it would be very extraordinary, if the ritual of the day of atonement, in which the mercy-seat

¹ It is perhaps referred to, though this is not certain, in Josephus, Ant. xiii. 10. 3, where the high-priest Hyrcanus is spoken of as alone in the temple, offering incense.

occupies so conspicuous a place, dated from a time when the ark and mercy-seat had ceased to exist.

It is a significant fact also that Ezekiel's Torah was revealed to him (xl. 1) "in the beginning of the year, in the tenth day of the month;" if the tenth of Tisri, the first of the civil year, be meant, this was the day of atonement, and likewise the day on which the trumpet was blown to usher in the year of jubilee. The combination of this day with the release of prisoners is clearly shown by Isa. lviii. 6, and that the prophet was acquainted with the law (Lev. xxv. 8-10) is shown by his allusion to its terms (Isa. lxi. 1 ff.). Ezekiel was acquainted with the year of jubilee, and speaks of it as well known, which consequently involves a knowledge of the day of atonement, with which it began.

We have now completed our task. And as we lay down our pen, may we not say of this latest critical attempt to roll the Pentateuch off its old foundations, that it has not achieved success? It has enveloped Mount Blanc in a cloud of mist, and proclaimed that its giant cliffs had for ever disappeared. But, lo! the mist blows away, and the everlasting hills are still in place.

W. HENRY GREEN.

ART. VI.—*The Sacrificial Aspect of Christ's Death.*¹

THE question, "How shall man be just with God?" which perplexed the upright Job in that dim era before Abraham appeared as the crowning example of the faith which is imputed for righteousness, has been the chief agitating theme of all the ages. Around it have circled controversies, and out of it have grown systems, which are familiar to every reader of theology. During considerable periods there have seemed to be settlements of the cardinal points, and substantial agreement upon what is termed "the Catholic Doctrine." Again the matter would be opened and a revision demanded, followed by a general acquiescence, with the old views substantially re-established, modified by such changes of phase or

¹ From the *New Englander*.

phrase as progressive culture make inevitable upon every subject of knowledge, for amid all the agitations the Author and Giver of salvation has maintained His own unswerving position, and imparted His unchanging truth. Notwithstanding occasional aberrations of sects or schools, and individual rejections ("wandering stars for whom the blackness of darkness is reserved"), none not avowedly atheistic fail to claim recognition in the grand chorus of ascription to Him who should be always and everywhere "called Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins."

Within the present generation there has occurred one of these re-openings of the subject and demands for revision of specific statement, and an opportunity offers for serious discussion among those who are in essentials united, in non-essentials charitable. The movement is just now stirring the air of churches and pulpits and divinity schools, producing increasing freshness of thought and utterance in many quarters, or, as some fear, circulating malarious influence. Out of it have already come such books as those of Bushnell and Smeaton and Dale, Maurice and Robertson, reminding students of the old works of Anselm and Abelard, Aquinas and Scotus.

In attempting a slight contribution to the discussion, the title of this article will indicate the particular line pursued. The death of Christ had, undeniably, a sacrificial aspect. Was that real or only apparent? Did He, in His death, actually offer Himself as a sacrifice in any proper sense? If so, in what sense? and what place did His sacrifice occupy in the work of redemption which His earthly career fulfilled?

In seeking answers to these questions the method proposed is not the rationalistic, constructing out of the supposed requirements of fallen human nature an *a priori* scheme; nor even out of the elements of revelation a theory which reason will accept as satisfying all its inquiries; but rather, after the manner and in the spirit of the ancient motto of the schoolmen, "Faith seeking Knowledge," the aim will be to collate a few of the easily verified facts made known by revelation and history; and from them to formulate the doctrine which proves to be most intelligible to reason and most acceptable to conscience.

I. The first of these is the fact that God has, from the beginning, put into men's minds, and made universal, the idea of

propitiation by sacrifice, and caused it to be the basis of their faith of acceptance with Him. Very near the opening of history, under the first intimation of man's effort toward peace with Him after the fall, we encounter this. The two sons of Adam are represented at their altars with their offerings; one is trustful, obedient, and accepted; the other unbelieving, disobedient, and condemned. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the key to their conduct and its result is given. By that faith which is "assurance of things hoped for, a conviction (or proving) of things not seen," which to rationalism is blindness, but which "wrought with his works and by works was made perfect," faith in God's requirement and promise, Abel made the acceptable offering to which God had respect. It cannot, indeed, be claimed as entirely clear, that this was a sin-offering rather than a thank-offering; but, judged in the light of similar transactions under positive appointment, the inference that it was so is legitimate. The language of God to Cain, which is often quoted as verifying the supposition, is not so interpreted by the best expositors. "If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door"; *i.e.* not a sin-offering is at hand—a lamb by whose offering, like that of Abel, thou mayest yet be forgiven and reinstated, but rather "sin," the power of evil, personified as a malignant enemy, "croucheth close to thee." It is a warning against impenitence, not an offer to faith. If thou persistest impenitently in ill-doing, sin will permanently master thee. "His desire is unto thee now, but thou shouldst subdue him and rule over him." If, thus warned and encouraged, Cain had subdued the evil which threatened to control his life, and turned with penitence to God, he would surely have offered a sacrifice like in substance, as well as in spirit, to that of Abel, and God would have had equal respect unto it. But however we may interpret these words, the supposition in regard to the accepted offering, that it was designed as a sacrifice of propitiation, stands at least in strong probability. It is the first recorded in an uninterrupted series through the ages. If so, whence came the conception and the practice in this original family of earth, whose then living head had been in closest communion with the Creator? The notion that it was merely the self-moved and unwarranted act of the natural mind feeling after God and peace, or a fanciful suggestion from the

observed tendency of inanimate objects (as "it was the way of the smoke to go heavenward, giving them a natural hint to make it the vehicle of religion—sending up their cloud of homage by offering in fire upon their altars"), is a very inadequate explanation. Even if in any degree it accounts for that part of the offering which expended itself in the burning, what bearing has it upon the bloody part of their chief sacrificial transactions upon which, though not mentioned in this first instance, yet in all the continued history of religion such supreme stress was laid? Moreover, upon the assumption that it was a self-prompted, natural movement of the human mind, if it proves to be a movement from the beginning and practically uniform, it must be classed among those intuitive moral conceptions which are the developments of the Divine Creator's mind, wrought into the constitution of the creature; essentially a revelation, or equivalent to it. "A law unto themselves," because "the work of the law written in their hearts." So unavoidable is this judgment, that Dr. Bushnell (though with an object contrary to that intended in this Article) declares, "Sacrifices are not the mere spontaneous contrivances of men, but contrivings impelled and guided by God; just as truly appointed by Him as if ordered by some vocal utterance from heaven."

Passing, however, beyond the first recorded case, we come to another still clearer. We find Noah coming forth from the ark to his act of sacrifice. There the distinction between clean and unclean animals is already recognised, typical of the cleansing from sin and consequent holiness required in the worshipper, and equally of the demand for such offerings as God would accept for the purpose of securing from Him such cleansing. The distinction was more fully developed afterward, when even the allowance of the things which they might eat suggested, by its strictness, to every Israelite their moral relations to Him, and that there could be no sound daily living, as well as no spiritual life, until peace was established with Him. No happiness nor holiness without pardon first. So, as Noah with whatever foretokenings of "the law of the beasts, to make a difference between the clean and the unclean," was given to the antediluvian world, approached the altar, he took with him such as "a young calf for a sin-offering, and a kid of the goats

for a sin-offering, and a bullock and a ram for peace-offerings." The Divine response manifested both the propitiatory object and the propitiative effect, for "the Lord smelled a sweet savour, and said in His heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake."

Still keeping within the remote period preceding Moses, we read of Job, who "rose up early in the morning and offered burnt-offerings according to the number of his sons; for he said, It may be that my sons have sinned and cursed God in their hearts. Thus did Job continually." No doubt there of the design of the sacrifices. And again we ask, How did such men, the righteous Abel, the just Noah, the perfect and upright Job, come to such thoughts and practices, with such purposes and assurances and results, except through more than native instincts, through direct communication with Him who evidently conversed with them and taught them habitually concerning His will? It is a strange perversion, much like arrogance, to imagine otherwise; especially to attribute the whole system to the distorted, misguided operation of crude minds in the childhood of the race.

II. The second fact, more fully manifested in the process of development under Moses and the prophets, is that the sacrificial system has been evidently settled as the one essential method of salvation for all time. It is not necessary to reduce this statement to specifications by referring to the multiplied instances which fill the Scriptural record. It is sufficient to say that, as this well-established "common" law of religion, which had held sway over the race branching in every direction from the dispersion, became perverted, God tabulated it into positive statutes for His representative people. It is incredible that He should have done so if the original idea had been only a human invention, and a monstrous imputation upon His wisdom and holiness to intimate that He adopted it from heathen corruptions, to fasten it authoritatively upon His chosen nation for 1500 years. "The law and the prophets" proclaim His unqualified sanction of the principle. The sacrifices of the former period were confirmed, and others added. They were required and made available for each generation and each person. There were variations of detail for specified purposes and cases; some were for social ends, collective or

separative, some for individual correction or stimulus; they bore upon every phase of wrongfulness, whether of ignorance, inadvertence, presumption, or guilt, and were carried out in every degree of love, excellence, or devotion consequent upon acceptance, but underneath them all lay the vital idea of expiation and propitiation. In the opening verses of Leviticus this fact is indicated. "If any man would bring an offering to the Lord of his own voluntary will," he must "put his hand upon the head of the offering" (the symbolic act by which in penitent faith he transferred the burden of his sins to the victim), and "it should be accepted for him to make atonement for him." Thus atonement preceded thanksgiving and consecration, as a prerequisite involved in every possibility of Divine favour. No gift presented to God, from the simplest fruit of the tree or soil to the choicest of the flock, would have been received if sin had not been first expiated. To repudiate the necessity was the error of Cain, as it has been the error of self-righteousness ever since. The principle was always assumed when not expressly stated. The altar to which the gift was brought was a blood-sprinkled altar, and the worshipper must have "a heart sprinkled from an evil conscience." The principle ran also through the current life of the Israelite. The great annual day of atonement in the first month of the year, on which expiation was made for the sins both of priest and people, taught its profound lesson and sent on its hallowed influence for every day of the year, to be renewed by a multitude of minor trespass-offerings as occasion might require. "According to the law, I may almost say, *all things are cleansed with blood*, and apart from shedding of blood there is no remission." (Heb. ix. 22.)

But while the law was thus making its immediate requisitions and giving its immediate satisfactions, its symbols were always suggesting something to come. The prophecies also which began with the law and kept pace with it, from Eden onward, pointed distinctly or obscurely to the same—"a sacrifice of richer blood and nobler name"—which in its turn pointed back to the former for its illustration and interpretation. There is the continual interweaving of one illuminating thought from the beginning of revelation to the end; proving the unity of design and unity of method in the entire scheme

of salvation : several dispensations, corresponding to changing civilisations and advancing Providence, but one economy of grace.

Now, if the former sacrifices, which passed away when "He was manifested at the end of the ages who put away sins by the sacrifice of Himself once," were, as is claimed, only types and shadows of that, the question is pertinent and sharp, What did they signify? They were types and shadows of what? A type supposes a reality as its antitype; a shadow a reality as its substance. Were these shadows of something which in its turn is only a shadow? Were these prefigures of something which in its turn is only a figure of speech? Was the theology of the first sacrifices only a fancy, operating on the superstitions, and is the theology of the one great Sacrifice equally a fancy, operating alike, only more potently, on the superstitions of believers? Is the "theology of the feelings," by which, as well as by the "theology of the intellect," the language of inspiration from Genesis to Revelation is to be expounded, the theology of faith, and is not the theology of faith the theology of facts? If not, the legitimate inference is that it is a delusion all the way through. By an express Divine arrangement, repeated thousands of times, and reiterated through scores of inspired teachers, a long line of delusions pointed to one grand delusion, which is to continue to the end of the world and to be re-echoed in the jubilations of heaven! It is difficult to conceive how a sound "moral impression" can be made by such a gigantic fiction. How can there be a "moral view of the atonement" if there be no *real* atonement? What is "the spiritual significance of sacrifice" if there was no actual sacrifice in Christ's "offering of Himself through the eternal Spirit, once for ever and once for all, by which He entered, through His own blood, into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us"? No theory of types and shadows can stand a moment in logical thought which does not assume the positive, substantial reality of that which was typified and shadowed. The declaration that "the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins," nor "the law make them perfect that drew nigh with their continual offerings," is no valid objection to this assertion. The evident meaning is that they had no virtue or power in themselves to these ends; but the faith

of the worshippers, exercised through the ordinances, had such power. In every case, when employed in faith, the promise concerning sin, of whatever kind, was "It *shall* be forgiven," and it undoubtedly *was* forgiven. Through such faith the offerers "year by year" were undoubtedly made (in the Scriptural sense) "perfect"—not by virtue of the blood of the imperfect victim, but by the grace of the Divine Sovereign, who associated those sacrifices, in His own purposes and promises, with the One perfect sacrifice reserved for every believer. He "had no pleasure in them" and "would not have" their continuance, as compared with the pleasure which He had in that which was to come, and abolished them to make way for it. They "had no glory by reason of the glory which excelleth," but in their time they were the glory and the salvation of millions.

III. We reach thus the third fact in the series. Coming down to Christ, we find His position standing out definitely under the same representation. In the new dispensation of the one economy the "ministry of reconciliation" is, that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses," because "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin in our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in him." "While we were yet sinners Christ died for us." "We were reconciled to God through the death of his Son."

What is this "reconciliation"? The simple and proper meaning of the word is, harmony. Moreover, it is not here a term of feeling, but a term of relation. The appeal, "Be reconciled to God," is not merely that we should be in right feeling toward Him, but primarily in right relation to Him and that relation must be established on both sides. In order to it the first condition is that the *offended* party, against whom wrong has been committed, should be placated. As between men, Christ distinctly expressed this in the direction, "If thy brother hath aught *against thee*, go and be reconciled to thy brother." And thus, also, man is reconciled to God, or brought into harmony of relation with Him, when that which God has against man is taken out of the way. When, therefore, He is represented as "reconciling the world unto himself," it is not first by appeals to the world's feelings a-

placating them, but "by the death of his Son," as first removing the obstacle out of His own way—the obstacle which justice and mercy recognised—that, "being justified (or set right before Him) by the blood of his Son, we shall be saved from the wrath of God by him."

There can be no doubt that all this is after the manner, as it is under the forms, and is meant to be received in the exact sense, of the sacrifices and conciliations, the justifications through blood and death, the sin-offerings and salvations of every former period. It is "the righteousness which has been witnessed by the law and the prophets—the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith, by his blood, to show his righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done *aforetime*, in the forbearance of God—for the showing of his righteousness at the *present* time." It is the redemption to which Paul summons Abraham and David to testify, and the blessing which he says was pronounced upon Jew and Gentile, circumcision and uncircumcision. It was intended and extended from the beginning to the end of time. John saw in the Apocalypse its application to "those whose names had been written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain" (as he explains the phrases in the thirteenth chapter by their repetition in the seventeenth). The book was prepared and its record commenced then, when we may hope that repentant Adam and Eve head the list, to be filled up out of every tribe and kindred and tongue; but their salvation was always by the Lamb that has been slain, "the Lamb of God that taketh away—or beareth—the sin of the world." And again the question arises, Is all this a figure or a reality, a fiction or a fact?

IV. So we pass to the fourth fact to be noted, viz., the effect of His sacrificial position and suffering indicated. Under this head, also, much specification is forbidden by necessary brevity. A concise generalisation is all that can be attempted. The intimations given in the Scriptures, by language already quoted, lead to the conviction that their effect toward God depends on the truth as to three points—*first*, what sin is; *second*, what is the bearing of God's holiness upon sin; and *third*, what is His attitude toward sinners.

If sin is only deflection from righteousness or a negative absence of rightness, and so an error and misfortune; if God's holiness is only the criterion of His sentiment concerning such deflection—a measuring-line by which to estimate it—producing in a rectilinear nature a passive disapprobation or, at the utmost, regret and pity; if His attitude is only that of a Father, sympathising with His offspring who have gone wrong and desiring their recovery, then the way of reconciliation is easy. Then the effect of Christ's sacrificial position and suffering, as toward God (if indeed they have any effect—if they be not themselves wholly an effect, the projecting of God's mind before itself and the universe, vicariously, in self-moved and self-moving benevolence—a view well styled “Platonic Sabelianism”), must be only that of impression upon His personal feeling. In that sense they might placate or propitiate Him, and the result might be to put within the control of His Son, as a matter of the Father's favour, induced by the Son's holy vicarious sufferings in love, the right to bestow the Father's pardon and grace upon those in whose behalf the sacrifice was made. And this again is a sort of high Arianism.

But if sin is transgression of law and positive rebellion against the law-giver; if God's holiness is the principle in His being which demands righteousness in His realm, guards His sovereignty, and is outraged by rebellion; if His attitude towards sinners is that of a sovereign, the integrity of whose rule must be maintained even at the cost of His fatherly affection, while that fatherly affection also prompts to His utmost measures for bringing the rebellious into happy allegiance, then evidently the way of reconciliation is, of necessity, by some kind of propitiation to His *position* rather than to His feeling. In other words, it is propitiation of His *righteousness*, or rightness, which is not, in this use of the term, an attribute of His nature but an attitude of His being, the product of all His perfections. It is thus the apostle uses it when he says that “God set forth Jesus Christ to be a propitiation for the showing of His righteousness—that He might be just (or right), and the justifier (or righter) of him that hath faith in (or is of the faith of) Jesus.”

It is commonly said that *our idea* of redemption depends upon our *ideas* on these points. But more than that must be

asserted, viz., that the *fact* of redemption depends upon the *facts* on these points. What the facts are can be ascertained, not by subjecting ideas to the test of each inquirer's habits of speculation or constitutional preferences, but to the surer test of the current tenor of God's Word. In regard to that, it suffices here to say that the statements in the second group of propositions is that which this essay is designed to maintain. Those are the facts concerning sin, holiness, and God, which are most patent in the Bible, and in accordance with which the sacrifice of Christ is revealed.

It must be remarked, however, that in seeking the contents of that one great sacrifice—within which, as has been shown, the saving effects of all other sacrificial transactions are included—we are led into a region of representations where considerable latitude of explanation is allowable. One supreme fact is distinctly announced—that its office was somehow that of substitution. He stood before God and the law in the place of the sinner. His suffering was in place of theirs. He assumed liabilities in place of theirs. Accepting this central conception, there may be considerable variety in the positions from which it is regarded and in the interpretation of language. An intelligent and devout Unitarian avowed, “I have no expectation of God's favour on account of my righteousness. I know that I can do nothing to earn it. I cannot shape the doctrine of atonement as you do, but I believe that Jesus Christ did *something* in my behalf, on account of which God can justly pardon and accept me, though I know not what it was. On that I rely. My conformity to the moral principles of Christianity will not save me. I want a personal Saviour in whom to trust.” Though an Arian in creed and Socinian in connection, this confession of faith certainly put him well over the line into the bounds of evangelical religion. It is not the purpose of the present writing to analyse much further than that. Christ a *substitute* for sinners, to do *for* them, *toward* God, what they could not do unto salvation; that is surely, *so far*, the scriptural formula of His sacrificial work.

It may be desirable to add some statement as to His fitness for such a position—the ground of His right, as well as readiness, to assume it. It is found in His double relation. *First*, His relation to God as the appointed Judge of men. The

Father, who has "given all judgment to the Son," has thus assigned to Him a position regulative as to law and appeasive as to the condemned. In this relation He is specially qualified for the work of mediation on the Divine side. It is He above all others in the universe who might fitly propose and produce whatever alternative for the sentence of the law is possible to justice and adapted to mercy—referring all, as Judge, to the ultimate decision of the Sovereign. *Second*, His relation to men is *essentially* representative, *i.e.* not by authoritative selection, nor by compact, as a "federal head," which would be arbitrary—but by His original connection, as the actual root of the race, in the order of creation. In this sense He is styled "the First-born of every creature (or of the whole creation)," *i.e.* as having both priority to creation and a normal unity with it. "For in him were all things created—unto him and for him—and in him all things consist." Pre-eminently is this the case in reference to humanity, the crown and object of all creation within earth limits, and His incarnation is thus to be regarded, not as an arbitrary, unnatural assumption, but rather as the complete expression, for the furtherance of His mediation, of what was inherent in His state "from the beginning of the creation of God." As such, He could, with a strict fitness, beyond that even of Divine appointment, *stand for* the race (His own race), before God, to suffer for it, obey for it, live, die, rise, and intercede for it, to magnify, and make honourable before Sovereign and subject the law dishonoured by it, and thus obtain eternal redemption for it—harmonising both parties in His own body, "so making peace." Into any other "mystical unity" we need not attempt to penetrate, but this representative unity, growing out of original relation, is sufficiently intelligible, and sufficiently justifies the ways of God to man in atonement.

If a correct solution of the effect of the sacrifice toward God has been reached, its effect *toward man*, the other party in the reconciliation, is easily apprehended, and can be stated in few words. As a "propitiation set forth" by God, its first designed effect must certainly be persuasive, through the natural principle of impression upon the mental and moral faculties. To this extent the "moral view of the atonement" is unobjectionable, and not only so, but necessary to a complete

exhibition of the facts of atonement. God does not work out salvation for sinners, through the great Sacrifice, as a result accomplished, without any participation on their part; and that participation is secured by means of the impression which the truth of the Sacrifice is intended and adapted to make upon them. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me;" and He draws them "with bands of love, with cords of a man." The only supposable exception to this rule is in the case of those saved to whom He had not been presented, or who were incapable of impression by Him on earth. Yet, correctly understood, they may form no exception; for, even in their case, before their salvation really occurs, by their exemption from the penalty of the law at the tribunal of the Judge of quick and dead, there may be such a "setting forth of the propitiation" to them also (not in any second probation, but in the awaking after death)¹ that its due impression will equally be made upon them, as the basis of their acceptance of it—being already essentially or incipiently in a believing condition—by a penitence and faith appropriate to their condition. From first to last, and universally, salvation will thus be only through faith in Jesus Christ produced by an apprehension of Him as "the Lamb that was slain, and that did purchase unto God with His blood men of every tribe and tongue and people and nation."

The necessary qualification and caveat, therefore, to the "moral scheme," so called, is the reiteration of what has been already urged, that it must find its foundation of reason in the *reality* of the sacrifice, upon whose impression it relies. Without that it is equally void of meaning and of saving efficacy. We adopt the words of Professor Shedd upon a kindred topic: "The objective work of Christ on Calvary must become the subjective experience and rejoicing of the soul itself." "Protestantism," he says, "unites in a living synthesis, the objective atonement with the subjective faith in it."

It remains only to mention in condensed sentences, that the *place* of the sacrificial aspect of Christ's death in the work of redemption is absolutely central. That work, whether viewed systematically in theology or practically by faith,

¹ This of course is mere speculation, and is intended to meet the case of children dying in infancy, etc.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

undoubtedly includes all that He was and did as Mediator, everything that lies "between the two eternities" of His existence. But we must guard against the idea that His death was only the culmination or rounding out of the earthly part of it. Whatever might have been the case if he had, for any other purpose, apart from sin and salvation, taken upon Himself humanity, His actual entrance upon it was for this one distinct purpose, out of which sprang the whole Divine scheme, wrought into completeness through the personalities of the Godhead. The Sacrifice of the Son of God was the very core of His incarnation. Everything that He was and did in the world developed from that vital centre and gathered around it, to form in His life the perfect fruitage of Divine mercy—God's "unspeakable gift" to men under the double name Immanuel and Jesus.

It is a matter of utmost importance that this be borne in mind both in the teaching and the receiving of the gospel. Dr. Dale, in the opening of his admirable lectures on the atonement (in which, as well as in the volumes of Professor Smeaton and Principal Cunningham, some of the foregoing points are strongly argued) quotes the language of Turretin, who declares the sacrifice of Christ as we have now described it to be "the chief part of our salvation, the anchor of Faith, the refuge of Hope, the rule of Charity, the true foundation of the Christian religion and the richest treasure of the Christian Church." The assertion is not too strong. The tendency sometimes to deny or ignore it has always been followed by a lowering of the quality of preaching, and a corresponding lowering of the quality of piety in the Churches. Sentimentalism has taken the place of spirituality. The sense of Divine holiness and veracity, and of the righteousness of Divine requirements, which is essential to the most vigorous religious life, has been dulled by an inordinate conception of His paternal clemency, and fidelity has been supplanted by sensibility. With individual exceptions, largely due to a previous experience of the truth which subsequent departure has not wholly suppressed, such has been the drift and steady backward sweep in some of the otherwise evangelical portions of the Church. It accounts, in part at least, for the manifest spiritual ebb-tide of late in various quarters. We are persuaded that a general reviving of faith in "the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered

himself without blemish unto God," would "cleanse our consciences from dead works to serve the living God." It would produce a reviving of the "ministry of reconciliation which is committed to us." It would answer a question recently discussed concerning "the relation of evangelical doctrine to the formation of character," showing it to be, under such revived ministry, with such a revived faith, the link of highest union to the immaculate Lord, and of widest uplifting connection with fallen man. In a word, the genuine sacrifice of Christ crucified is "the power of God and the wisdom of God unto them that are called." Believing it and proclaiming it, we may confidently say, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ."

H. B. ELLIOT.

ART. VII.—*Current Literature.*

MESSRS. T. and T. Clark have issued two more volumes in continuation of the Meyer series of Commentaries, viz., Huther's *Pastoral Epistles* and *Epistles of Peter and Jude* (1). We must confess that continuations, as a rule, are somewhat unfortunate; comparisons are constantly suggested, and one sighs for the vanished master-hand. Nor have we been without this feeling as we have perused the later volumes in this series of Commentaries: Meyer has gone, and has left no one quite fit to fill his peculiar place. But, though this is so, these volumes of Huther are admirable; and those who desire to be "thoroughly furnished" in their study of the Epistles commented upon would do well to have them. The exposition of the *Pastoral Epistles* is preceded in true German style by a lengthened introduction, and Huther discusses with great elaboration the date of these Epistles, and the place from which each was written. Readers will understand his position with regard to these matters if we quote his general conclusion—" (1) that all three Epistles belong to one and the same period of the apostle's life, and (2) that this period does not fall into that portion of the apostle's life with which

(1) *The Pastoral Epistles*, by J. E. Huther, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. *The Epistles of Peter and Jude*, by same author. Same Publishers.

we are more closely acquainted through Acts and the other Pauline Epistles." In the commentary proper, while we find no special brilliancy, there is much to praise; it is characterised by minuteness of criticism, ability, and suggestiveness; and the wide view of differing opinions upon the text which Huther gives will help the intelligent student to a clear understanding of its meaning. We have formed a like impression regarding the volume upon First and Second Peter and Jude; it is lucid and learned, but not destined to take a first place. And we must say that whilst it is a distinct virtue, as we have said, to have a comprehensive review of differing opinions, the usefulness of the whole is much marred by heaping pages with names of commentators as is done here,—names which are little known save to a very few. We think that in translation some discretion might wisely be used in the reproduction of these. We are bound also to say that the well-known ignorance of German scholars in regard to commentators who are not German is so prominent here as somewhat to offend our national pride, and also to limit the otherwise very considerable value of these Commentaries. The discussion of the authorship of Second Peter gives a very good *résumé* of the various theories advanced in Germany regarding it; but the author, while tending apparently towards a non-Petrine authorship, has been able to come to no definite conclusion upon the point.

The third volume of Hagenbach's *History of Doctrines* (2) brings down this history to the most recent period. As now completed, it is really a splendid handbook for the student; indeed no one who would be at home in Church History should be without it. A thorough acquaintance with this one volume would mean a wide acquaintance with the theology of the last two centuries; and one special virtue which it has is the eminent impartiality with which each writer's theories are stated—a virtue which shines all the more when we remember how strong is the temptation to glide from *Dogmengeschichte* to *Dogmatik*. The supplementary notes upon the history of English theological thought are excellent, and give a great additional value to the work.

(2) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

One more very valuable volume the same enterprising publishers have recently given us in Martensen's *Special Ethics* (3). It is enough to make us long for a time when in our theological colleges, Christian Ethics will have a special place: for the training afforded by such discussions as those in this book is one which finds a place neither in the ordinary moral philosophy classes nor in our theological colleges as at present constituted. The plan followed includes a view of the inner life of the individual in all its aspects; and, while primarily designed for the student, it will interest all thoughtful readers, as well as help them in the spiritual life. It does for the enlightened conscience what the old casuists tried but failed to do: it analyses man's moral system, and supplies him with principles by which he may test himself and settle "cases of conscience." Such chapters as those upon "Prayer," and upon "The Sin against the Holy Spirit" may be instanced as remarkably powerful. If we were searching for blots in the book, we could doubtless find them: there are *Lutheranisms*, for instance, here and there that do not please us. But we cannot, and shall not grumble; the work is of too rare excellence to allow us to do otherwise than cordially commend it.

Two additional volumes of Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.'s *Pulpit Commentary* (4) demand a special notice at our hands. The volume upon Leviticus is enriched by a very full and able essay upon "The Levitical Sacrifices literally considered," from the pen of Principal Cave, a writer well known to readers of this Review, and one who may be said to have made this subject peculiarly his own. He first gives a classification of these sacrifices, and then states the "Scriptural principles applicable" to their elucidation, following up these with an application of them to the whole scheme of Levitical sacrifice, showing how it is characterised by a "profound recognition of the wants of man, and a response to his deepest needs." A brief section is added tracing the relations between the Patriarchal and the Levitical sacrifice, another upon the relation of the latter to the Christian sacrifice; and Principal

(3) Martensen's *Christian Ethics*, vol. i.; *Special Ethics*. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

(4) *The Pulpit Commentary: Leviticus*, with Introductions by the Revs. R. Collins and Professor A. Cave; *J. Kings*, Exposition and Homiletics by Rev. Joseph Hammond. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.

Cave's treatise—for it is nothing less—ends with a bibliography of the subject. His treatment of the subject is itself so compact that it would be vain to attempt to give any condensed idea of it: enough to say that it gives a splendid key-note to the exposition and homiletics which follow. The homiletical treatment of the book is admirable, and seems to show what a rich mine of spiritual and moral truth lies in what some superficial people think the "dry" details of the Mosaic ritual. The expository and general homiletical section is by Preb. Meyrick, and the separate homilies are from the pens of Professor Redford and the Revs. R. M. Edgar, W. Clarkson, J. A. Macdonald, and S. R. Aldridge. The volume upon First Kings is all that could be desired. The Rev. Joseph Hammond gives the exposition and homiletics, while the special homilies are given by Dr. Pressensé and the Revs. J. Waite, A. Rowland, J. A. Macdonald, and J. Urquhart. Mr. Rowland's homilies strike us as peculiarly good. His method is generally the propositional, giving the seeds of thought in the form of leading sentences; and his work consists thus of *outlines*, not *skeletons*. This method, in the hands of a competent preacher, is always interesting and instructive, whilst it has the virtue of originating thought in the listener, as well as supplying it. As we look at these two volumes, we think of the admirable variety which they offer to the preacher; the one leading to perhaps more abstract thought and doctrinal upbuilding, the other to the illustration of life in all its aspects, as looked at under Divine light.

When one speaks of Dr. Bushnell's writings, one must always make the proviso that one "is not to be held responsible for every sentiment expressed." But Bushnell's was a profoundly spiritual nature, and though he "followed not with us," nor indeed with anybody, everybody may be the better for coming in contact with such a mind. The two first essays of this book, upon "Pulpit Talent" (5) and "The Pulpit Manward" are fitted to give all preachers an impulse toward the formation of a higher ideal, and a deeper sense of the preparations needed for ministerial work. We do not discuss the other essays in this volume, which lie more apart from our present subject: but we specially mention them.

(5) *Pulpit Talent*, &c., by Horace Bushnell, D.D. London: Dickinson.

elaborate and characteristic essay on "The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth" as alike showing the lines along which Bushnell came to standing ground upon this mysterious yet blessedly real doctrine, and offering a strong help to others who may as yet be but seeking their ground.

And now we come to two volumes of *Sermons* (6), concrete examples of what preaching may be—shall we not say?—at its best. These *Sermons* of Enoch Mellor and W. M. Punshon have a tender interest from the reminder that the speakers are no longer with us; and they afford ample evidence of how much was lost to the Church of Christ when they departed. Looked at together, these volumes make us think of the words, "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." Mellor and Punshon were both men sound in the faith, men with the genuine evangelical ring about them; they were both great preachers; but these sermons show them to have been most diverse in their gifts. In Mellor's discourses the reader discerns a man who is specially a teacher. Sometimes, as in the sermon on "Time for the Lord to Work" he is declamatory; at other times, as in that upon "The Empty Place," or "The Uses of Sickness," he is tender; but all through he is the teacher. His people must have come to be educated; and he went to his pulpit to educate them. There is no "small talk" in these sermons, no playfulness; and though he speaks always as a man to men, with a strong sense of brotherhood, he never comes down from his rightful place. A man with great staying power in him was this man; one not to grow threadbare with time; and we can understand how it was of the very nature of his mind and soul to settle in one place, and there to build. For somehow, though he did tarry a time at Liverpool, he was throughout, as it were, Enoch Mellor of Halifax. Now Punshon's power was different. Like the other, he ever maintained the dignity of the pulpit; but what he did in the pulpit was different work. He was distinctively an orator, and this is manifest in these sermons; as you read his burning sentences, and follow his striking illustrative passages, you always catch yourself saying, What must it have been to have heard Punshon *deliver* that! Another

(6) *The Hem of Christ's Garment, and other Sermons*, by Enoch Mellor, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Sermons, by W. Morley Punshon, LL.D. London: T. Woolmer.

mark of his preaching, as we think it is illustrated here, is, that each sermon stood by itself: it was not a link in an educational chain: it was, above all things, one definite gospel appeal. And thus the stranger who heard him for the first time was perhaps almost as much at home with him as those who had heard him often. In this way he was—and we say it not disparagingly, but far otherwise—a preacher for the crowd. Yet let it be understood he did not hold his audiences by any rhetorical trifling: he was simple and strong: he was earnest and very human: he was imaginative and impassioned. These are the qualities which we think the reader will find in Punshon; and what these qualities meant to those who were privileged to hear him has been recalled to us as we have looked into this volume.

Our time cannot be said to be poor in books on Prophecy, but “the cry is still, They come!” Here is one more, and a very able and interesting book it is, bearing the title, *The Great Prophecies concerning the Gentiles, the Jews, and the Church of God* (7). The author, Mr. Pember, writes with great clearness: his method of arrangement is distinct: and throughout he seems to us to write with more attention to logical rules than writers in this department sometimes do. Not the least of his merits is the modesty and lack of tendency to dogmatise upon mysterious subjects which mark his book. Mr. Pember is a futurist, and one of the distinctive features of his futurism is the equally clear prominence which he gives to the place of the Papacy as “hitherto the masterpiece of Satan, and the great enemy of the true Church,” and to the “secular power even more wicked and terrible,” which is to overthrow and succeed it. His plan divides his theme into three parts, and he endeavours to expound God’s revealed purpose toward (1) the Gentiles, (2) the Jews, (3) the Church of God. In regard to the first, he appears to conjecture that the currents of Socialism, Nihilism, etc., which are setting in, may represent the human powers which are to swamp what he designates “Ecclesiasticism” (by which, we suppose, he means mainly Romanism), before the great secular power begins its triumph. As to this last, the “Napoleonic theory” seems to have some fascination for him. Not to mention other points, we may say

(7) By G. H. Pember, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

that his view of the destiny of the Church is mainly based (1) upon the theory that the parables in Matt. xiii. represent a regular historical development, and (2) upon an allegorical interpretation of the references to the seven churches in the Apocalypse. We cannot attempt here to discuss Mr. Pember's theories: if we were to speak of the last mentioned, we should say that we think it very doubtful in its combination of allegory and literalism. And we must add the remark, that, upon the whole matter, cautious and non-dogmatic as our author is in his deductions regarding the manner of the "times of the end," our caution and hesitancy lags considerably behind even his. But his work is well worthy of careful perusal by all students of Prophecy.

Mr. W. R. Sorley has made a substantial contribution to early Church History in his *Hulsean Dissertation upon Jewish Christians and Judaism* (8). He makes some deep dents in the armour of Baur and his followers, and shows with much skill and ingenuity, and with evidence from hard historical fact, how little standing-ground there is for the theory that Christianity was nothing more than a mere outgrowth of Judaism, a sort of Christianised Judaism in fact, and how truly "the new religion so surpassed and transcended the system in which it originated as to make Jewish Christianity almost a contradiction in terms." Probably Mr. Sorley would dissent from our view of the rise of Christianity in several points, as his reference in the very words we have quoted to a "new religion" and "the system in which it originated" would seem to show: none the less he has done good service against the fallacies of a certain class of "historical criticism" by this able essay, which, we must add, gives high promise of future work from Mr. Sorley in this department.

A very different stage of Church History is dealt with by Mr. W. J. Townsend in his *Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages* (9). The author feels that in our recoil from the error and darkness of those ages, we have habitually done scant justice to the "doctors;" and this book is an attempt to place them before us in a better light. The "schoolmen" treated

(8) *Jewish Christians and Judaism*, by W. R. Sorley, Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Co.

(9) London: Hodder and Stoughton.

of are, amongst others, John Scotus Erigena, Anselm, Abelard, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, etc. Mr. Townsend has evidently made very wide and careful study of these men, and the result is a book very interesting in style, and fitted, we think, to give the ordinary reader a fair idea of the thought of those times. Nor do we think that he is altogether wrong in his main idea that the schoolmen, if once vastly overrated, are now underrated. It cannot be that they were mere pedants: we are rather inclined to think, of some of them at least, as men of high devotion as well as of keen thought: but we must be content here, without committing ourselves to the author's somewhat enthusiastic championship, to recommend readers to read what he has to say of them with care, and, of course, with discrimination.

The Oxford University Press has recently issued a little book entitled *The Very Words of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* (10). This idea is simple and novel. All our Lord's words are printed in the body of the book as they stand in the Authorised Version, while in the margin emendations from the Revised Version are noted where they appear important. Of course there is the manifest objection to such an attempt thus to group our Lord's words that they often lose their meaning without the context: but as a basis for Bible-Reading conversations, this little book might be very useful.

The Rev. James Wells, who has long ago proved his power as a writer to the young, has laid them under a new debt by his recently-published *Bible Images* (11). In this volume, which consists of twenty sermons to children, practical and easily-understood lessons are drawn from the figures used in Scripture, such as "The Lighted Lamp," "The Sun," "The Schoolmaster," etc. Each "image" is treated in a vigorous and interesting manner, and we should expect that, especially amongst elder children, these sermons will be greatly appreciated. Teachers will also get many hints from them.

Miss Havergal's *Swiss Letters* (12) are delightful, and, whilst they will be enjoyed by all who read them, they will be specially welcome to those who have themselves visited

(10) *The Very Words of our Lord Jesus Christ*. London: Bagster.

(11) London: James Nisbet and Co.

(12) *Swiss Letters*, by Frances Ridley Havergal. London: Nisbet.

Alpine heights. No one who has visited the fair land of mountain and snow will fail to recall its scenes as they read these letters; and Miss Havergal's bright story of her travel will make those who have not seen Switzerland long to go. It must not be thought, however, that Miss Havergal gave her friends mere descriptions of scenery: her letters are full of descriptions of people whom she met, of thoughts which occurred to her, and of incidents occurring during her journeyings. Altogether this is a very *sunny* book; and it helps to fill in lines in that beautiful life in which sunshine and shadow were so remarkably and finely blended.

Dr. Marshall Lang's studies upon *The Last Supper of Our Lord*, which form the most recent volume in the "Household Library of Exposition" (13), are very devotional in character, and may well form a companion to quiet meditation. They embrace not only the story of the Supper itself, but also our Lord's Farewell Discourse and Intercessory Prayer; and their style, as befits their subject, is simple and tender: the thought traverses regions of lofty spiritual feeling; and the reader cannot fail, as he reads with devout heart, to commune with the Lord Himself.

Although the Apocryphal books have no canonical authority, they are worthy of more attention than they have received. The unwarrantable claims advanced by some in their behalf have naturally enough produced an equally unwarranted contempt. Accepting them as uninspired writings, we shall find, on careful examination, that they afford valuable aid in the study of an obscure period in the history of Jewish action and thought. As indicating the trend and development of extra-Palestinian philosophy, the *Book of Wisdom* (14) is pre-eminently interesting and suggestive. It is evidently of Alexandrine origin, and has been variously assigned to periods ranging from 200 to 50 B.C. In the handsome edition issued from the Clarendon Press, Mr. Deane has made a noteworthy contribution to our knowledge of its contents. His commentary is scholarly and judicious throughout; and his intro-

(13) Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace.

(14) *The Book of Wisdom*. With an Introduction, Critical Apparatus, and a Commentary. By William J. Deane, M.A., Oriel College, Oxford; Rector of Asken, Essex. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

ductory sketch of the progress of Greek philosophy as bearing on Jewish-Alexandrine speculations is an admirable specimen of careful criticism and fairly-balanced judgment.

We welcome with no common pleasure a volume of sermons from the pen of Mr. Nixon (15). We had begun to fear that the eminent preacher from whom they came, and whose rare gift of preaching has been long appreciated in Scotland, was about to pass away without leaving any collection of his sermons made by his own hand. This volume of his discourses contains sermons which are in many respects models, and it is a most valuable addition to our religious literature. The more immediate object which he had before him was to place in the hands of his congregation a summary of the great truths which he had commended to their acceptance. The title gives a clear enough view of the contents of the volume—CHRIST ALL AND IN ALL. The selection of topics is admirable, according to that leading scheme of thought, and takes in every great prominent idea included in the vast subject of Christology. Nor does the writer fail to exhibit in all its bearings the great Scottish doctrine of national subjection to Christ.

The peculiarities of this distinguished preacher will be at once apprehended by a perusal of the volume. For amplitude of view, freshness of delineation, and, above all, for a deeply spiritual tone, this volume entitles the author to be placed in a high rank among the English preachers in any epoch. We have culture and unction united. There is deep thought and transparent clearness and felicity of expression. As Burke said of Townsend, that he struck the house between wind and water, so may we say of Mr. Nixon's happy style of address for all classes of mind.

But while the discourses are couched in a style which is fully on a level with the literary culture of the age, and against which a fastidious taste has nothing to object, there is one peculiarity in them which is rarely, if anywhere, so fully developed. There is a singularly felicitous use of Scripture language, which reminds us of an Ainsworth, a Brown of Wamphray, and the late Principal Lee, and which gives a singular charm to the diction, especially to minds familiar with the Scriptures. In

(15) *Christ All and in All: the Relations of Christ as God, Creator, and Redeemer*, by Rev. W. Nixon, formerly at Montrose. Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter, and Co. 1882.

reference to this, Mr. Nixon says in his preface, "It was always his aim to express these truths of the Bible as much as possible in its own language." We have no doubt the Christian community, far beyond the circle of the congregation to which these discourses were primarily addressed, will hail them as precious expositions of all the great truths connected with Christ's person, work, and mediatorial rule.

It is generally believed that there are few countries concerning which we have fuller information than Egypt, and yet Mr. Oliphant (16), by travelling a few miles out of the ordinary tourist-track, has produced one of the freshest and most interesting books of travel that have appeared during the present season. The Fayoum district, which he has explored, has so many and so varied attractions that in future, we may safely predict, it will not be left unvisited. Our readers will, however, be most interested, and perhaps also most surprised, to learn that in this land, which has been searched so often, there are countless treasure-mounds that have not yet been touched. Mr. Oliphant's own words are: "The more one sees of the country, the more one is amazed at the extent of the remains which still exist, awaiting a thorough examination."

Like many others, we have found our early impressions of Siberia, gained by a perusal of a well-known juvenile classic, somewhat persistent. The name of that vast territory has conjured up visions of hopeless toil and suffering, aggravated by the horrors of a severe climate. Mr. Lansdell's book (17) breaks the spell, and makes these visions for the future impossible. We confess that we were not prepared for the revelations contained in these two volumes. While not indisposed to make allowance for exaggeration in the harrowing descriptions of exile-life with which we have been familiarised, we certainly did not expect to learn that "if a Russian exile behaves himself decently well, he may, in Siberia, be more comfortable than in many, and as comfortable as in most, of the prisons of the world." At all events the Siberians, judging from the following paragraph, have no reason to complain of the dearth of provisions:—

(16) *The Land of Khemi*, by Laurence Oliphant. With Illustrations. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.

(17) *Through Siberia*, by Henry Lansdell. With Illustrations and Maps. 2 vols. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington.

"In Western Siberia, about Tomak, a sheep can be bought for 2s. I am told that Russians in general abhor mutton, and my informant's housekeeper wonders the English can eat it, for *she* would as willingly eat cat, dog, or rat as such 'garbage.' Game and fish were surprisingly plentiful. I bought in the streets at Nikolaefsk a capercailzie (called *glukhar*, or deaf bird) for 10d., which was thought by no means cheap; and a blackcock was offered for a similar price. The cost of salmon, however, was most surprising. Up to the 20th August, salmon trout, weighing from 10 to 12 lb., cost as much as 5d. each, but they were then said to be *dear*. On the 15th August a large salmon, the first fish of the season, and weighing perhaps 15 lb., was offered to me for 7½d., but this was considered quite 'a fancy price.' From the 1st September to the 17th, during which period the large fish are caught, weighing from 15 lb. to 25 lb., they may be bought for 10s. per hundred, or 1d. each!"

Perhaps the most painful picture fixed in our memory was that of men and women toiling in the quicksilver mines while their bones were being surely, though secretly, necrosed by the poisonous action of the metal. Mr. Lansdell assures us that he has failed to find any evidence that these quicksilver mines ever existed! We cannot pretend, within our limits, to do justice to this book. Suffice it to say that Mr. Lansdell had exceptional advantages in his explorations of Siberian prisons, and he writes evidently without partiality or prejudice. His volumes consequently have a permanent value. We ought to add that Mr. Lansdell was no less a missionary than a traveller. Wherever he went he distributed scriptures and tracts (in all more than 50,000), from which good seed, we trust, there may spring no scanty harvest.

Volumes, at once thoughtful and devout, on topics of experimental religion are not too numerous. We have pleasure, therefore, in giving welcome to a helpful little book on *The Blessed Life of Fellowship with the Son of God* (18). It is divided into thirty-one readings, one for each day of the month. We turn to that for the twenty-seventh day, on the words, "In Him is no sin. Whosoever abideth in Him sinneth not." From the following quotation our readers may form a just conception of the volume:—

"How is it possible that a believer, having sin in him—sin of such intense vitality and such terrible power as we know the flesh to have,—that a believer, *having sin*, should yet *not be doing sin*? The answer is, 'In Him is no sin. He that abideth in Him sinneth not.' When the abiding in Christ becomes close and unbroken, so that the soul lives from moment to moment in the perfect union with the Lord its keeper, He does, indeed,

(18) *Abide in Christ: Thoughts on the Blessed Life of Fellowship with the Son of God*, by A. M. London: James Nisbet and Co.

keep down the power of the old nature, so that it does not regain dominion over the soul. We have seen that there are degrees in the abiding. With most Christians the abiding is so feeble and intermittent that sin continually obtains the ascendancy, and brings the soul into subjection. The Divine promise given to faith is: 'Sin shall not have dominion over you.' But with the promise is the command: 'Let not sin reign in your mortal body.' The believer who claims the promise in full faith has the power to obey the command, and sin is kept from asserting its supremacy; ignorance of the promise, or unbelief, or unwatchfulness, opens the door for sin to reign. And so the life of many believers is a course of continual stumbling and sinning. But when the believer seeks full admission into, and a permanent abode in Jesus, the sinless One, then the life of Christ keeps from actual transgression. 'In Him is no sin. He that abideth in Him sinneth not.' Jesus does indeed save him from his sin,—not by the removal of his sinful nature, but by keeping him from yielding to it."

We give this extract as a fair specimen of the tone and teaching of the volume. It commends itself to our approval no less by the vigour of its thought than by the spirituality of its purpose.

Mr. Lorimer's *Bible Studies* (19) are thoroughly unconventional. They are eminently distinguished by independence and closeness of thought. While not forgetting the leading truth in the texts which he discusses, he exhibits a rare faculty of discernment and descriptive power in presenting with pre-Raphaelitic care correlate truths that are generally missed or neglected. His analysis of friendship in chapter v. is one of the most masterly and suggestive we have ever read. Perhaps, however, we can best commend this stimulating book by quoting the introductory paragraph of the discourse on "The Attitude of the Cross to Human Criticism." The text is 1 Cor. i. 22-24:—

"We have here a bold declaration by the apostle of the uncompromising relation which the gospel of Christ crucified holds to the different spirits of inquiry in which it is dealt with by men. It refuses to submit itself to human dictation, and to satisfy those demands which man may prescribe as the condition of his acceptance of it. Yet of this same gospel it is true that those who have accepted it have done so, because it has approved itself to them as the power and wisdom of God. *They have found in it those very qualities which men are eager to ascertain by their own tests, and whose existence they have denied when these have been disallowed.*"

We have taken the liberty of putting the last pregnant sentence into italics for the purpose of indicating that it forms the *proposition* which thereafter throughout the discourse is argued and illustrated with a philosophic clearness of insight and practicalness of purpose rarely combined.

(19) *Bible Studies in Life and Truth*, by the Rev. Robert Lorimer, M.A. Edinburgh: David Douglas.

Notwithstanding the numerous volumes in which the theory of preaching has been discussed, the subject has not been exhausted. Homiletic methods adapted to the peculiarities of former generations fail to meet the necessities of the present time. Even within the present generation there has been a remarkable change in the ministrations of the pulpit. Sermons that were effective enough thirty or forty years ago would produce very little impression to-day. Truth does not change; but the forms in which it can be made acceptable seem to have their varying fashions. Consequently any treatise on preaching, if it is to possess present practical value, must in great measure be based on a careful study of the discourses that are admittedly most successful in winning attention and producing fruitful results among our contemporaries. Dr. Austin Phelps, whose forty lectures on preaching (20) have been republished in this country, has not neglected that fact. While he has not failed to make himself familiar with the history of the art, he has mainly sought to investigate principles and to supply illustrations that may prove helpful to preachers under present circumstances. His book, therefore, is of real value to the student. Indeed, it is one of the most *practical* books on the *theory* of preaching with which we are acquainted. Written by an American for Americans, there are some counsels in it not quite adapted to our latitude. But even these are suggestive. His treatment of the subject is throughout marked by strong common sense and sagacity. We venture to give a somewhat lengthy extract from his concluding lecture, not only as a specimen of the author's style, but also as an interesting contribution to a subject of present importance:—

“In Great Britain the fact is attracting more attention every year, that the clergy and the people are drifting asunder, and, I repeat, it makes no difference which is anchored, if the other is moving. The religious press of England and Scotland confesses the sundering. Infidel critics triumph over it. The *Westminster Review* discusses the fact as one which candid men will not dispute. The *Times* and the *Saturday Review* explicitly affirm that the clergy are no longer leaders of the religious thought of England. Reformers and statesmen are looking about them for other agencies than those of the Church and the pulpit to elevate the degraded and control the ‘dangerous’ classes. Is it not an ominous event that, in a country which Christianity has civilised for a thousand years, vast masses

(20) *The Theory of Preaching: Lectures on Homiletics*. By Austin Phelps, D.D. London: Richard D. Dickinson.

of society should be so brutal as to be classified in the national mind by that title 'dangerous'? They are no longer thought of by statesmen as objects of hope, scarcely even of compassion, but simply as a threat hanging over the safety of the rest. They are given up to the police.

"In our own country, with the advantages of our voluntary system in the support of the gospel, the same widening of the distance between the Protestant ministry and the masses is palpable. Politicians accept the fact and act upon it. The secular press, to a great extent, treats it flippantly. Meanwhile what are our churches and ministry doing about it? Much that is cheering, but somewhat that is not so.

"In the Episcopal Church it is frequently claimed, by a minority, I am glad to believe, that it is the mission peculiar to that branch of the Church to reach the cultivated strata of society. Many times have graduates of this seminary who possessed more than the average of gentlemanly address and familiarity with cultivated society been told that they had too much culture to waste themselves in the charge of missionary churches. In some cases the gilded bait has been caught at. Worldly wisdom charges upon churches of Puritan origin that they have in them the elements of low life; that their historical antecedents are not respectable; that their founders were low-born and low-bred; that their social affinities are not those of culture and refinement; and that therefore a reaction from them is periodically inevitable. From such argument one might reasonably infer that the chief glory of a church is to gather to its bosom the *élite* of cultivated life, to minister to the masses by churchly authority rather than by sympathy, and to rescue from low-bred sects the 'martyrs of disgust.'

"Yet in our own churches, and in the whole Presbyterian group, the present drift of things is, to a considerable extent, in the same direction. The under-current may still be right in the main, but many of the surface-currents and certain local currents are not so. Our craving for artistic music, worldly views of what constitutes ministerial success, and, more than all else, the principle of elective affinity in the gathering of churches, by which identity of social rank is made to mark practically the outline of church-membership, and still more sharply that of Christian fellowship,—are all tending the same way. It is not difficult to see whither.

"Yet the complaint is universal among us, that a less proportion of the uneducated masses of American birth is to be found in Calvinistic churches than was found there thirty years ago. Christian men are innocently wondering, and inquiring, 'Why is this?' We are entering upon an era of experiments for remedying the evil. I have not a word to say against those experiments. They may all be excellent in their way. They are all welcome, as evidence that good men are feeling after the right way. But this fact is observable in them thus far, that, to a large extent,—not entirely,—they either leave the clergy out of the question, or assign to them a false position. We are creating vast organisations of lay-labourers, Sabbath-schools, mission-schools, mission-chapels, young men's Christian associations, colporteurs, Bible-readers, etc., to reach the masses of the people, because of the admitted fact that our pulpit, as administered to our own wants and tastes, does not reach them. We are working, in great part, upon a system which takes it for granted that our own clergy, in our own churches, cannot reach them. In some cases, the avowal is whispered that we do not want to reach them there.

"We are looking more and more to Divine interposition in raising up men of exceptional zeal and tact as evangelists, at whose feet our scholarly and learned clergy sit for instruction, given not always in even grammatical English. That was a most humiliating circumstance to the cultivated clergy of one of our Atlantic cities, that the chairman of a meeting assembled to devise plans for the continuance of special services and other efforts for a

revival of religion, told the audience that the evangelist who had been labouring there would bring to them certain clergymen and other helpers from abroad, who would be *qualified* to carry on the work. As if the corps of pastors of all denominations with which that city was blessed—admitted to be unsurpassed in culture and in training for the pulpit—were incompetent for such a service, and exceptional men, clerical and laical, must be sought out and brought from afar. This surely is an abnormal state of things. It ought to have set every thoughtful man to searching below the surface for the causes and the remedy.

"Even in the Methodist churches, the boast of which, from the time of John Wesley, has been their apostolic adaptation to the lower classes of society, the same complaint begins to be heard. Recent Methodist authorities say that they are losing in some degree their ancient hold upon the lower orders of the people. They affirm that the spirit of their denomination is rising in the direction of refinement, of education, of social position, and pecuniary beneficence; but they are not lifting the masses with them: they are simply soaring overhead. The ideal of an educated ministry being of recent origin in the Methodist Church, many earnest friends of culture there think they see that the work of clerical education is not wholly a gain. They acknowledge, that, as their ministers become more highly cultivated, their tendency is to work away from those portions of the people which are not so. Like seeks its like. The danger is that nature will outweigh grace. Their educated preachers and their humble classes are in peril of parting company, because they are in peril of losing sympathy.

"In view of these facts, it is not strange if the whole question of clerical education undergoes revision. It must not be wondered at if many Christian laymen infer that our process of cultivation is a destructive one. It is not unnatural that one of them should say, as he did, 'Our ministers are educated to death;' or that another should write, 'They are so trained as to make it difficult for the churches to support them with their expensive tastes;' or that a third should believe that 'they are so cultivated as to indispose them to become pastors of rural churches;' or that a fourth should affirm that 'they are so made over by ten years of scholastic seclusion as to wither their godly sympathy with the people everywhere.' All this, and much more, is said by laymen in their conversations and correspondence on the subject. You perceive inklings of it now and then in the reports of public assemblies.

"I do not indorse these criticisms; far from it. Indeed, so far as my observation goes, the men who make them do not express in them their own personal wants, but what they suppose to be the wants of others. I have yet to find the first layman, with intelligence enough to have a reasonable opinion on such a subject, who wants any other than the first order of intellect and the most perfect culture in the person of his own pastor. Still, such criticisms contain a truth; and they may become wholly true, unless the clergy prevent that result, each in his own experience. The youthful clergy have a special responsibility respecting it. . . .

"I wish, therefore, to commit these homiletic discussions to you with the most solemn charge that you receive them with a spirit of *practical good sense and of practical piety*. These two things are the substance of the whole matter. I have tried to proportion the theory of preaching as symmetrically as I could. But in a thousand applications of it you must do the work of adjusting its proportions. You must qualify rules. You must balance principles. You must interpret precepts in the light of circumstances. You must judge when it is a use, and when it is an abuse, of any truth you may have heard here, to apply it to your own practice. Good sense and piety should shape your applications of it, as of all knowledge, and

always should so shape them as to *make* your pulpit reach the masses of the people.

"I tell you frankly that no theory of preaching is worth a farthing which cannot be worked practically to that result. No theory of ministerial culture is either scriptural, or philosophical, or sensible which cannot bridge the gulf between the clergy and the masses. The pulpit never can accomplish its mission on any such theory—never.

"The methods of lay labour which are so popular at present for the evangelising of the masses, and which, in the main, are so hopeful a sign of our times, are defective, and will fail, just so far as they assume to confine to laymen the duty of personal contact with the lower orders, and to exalt the clergy into an upper layer of influence, in which they shall simply be preachers to select hearers, and teachers of teachers, reaching the people only by proxy. No preacher can afford that kind of seclusion. Such an adjustment of powers in the Church is hierarchical. The philosophy of it is priestly. It is a return to the genius of Judaism and of Paganism. **Nothing** could doom the clergy to a wasted life more fatally.

"If I could be persuaded that the theory of ministerial culture which I have tried to represent to you could result legitimately in any such drifting **asunder** of the pulpit and the lower orders of society, I would abandon the whole of it. I would drop it as I would a viper. A preacher had better **work** in the dark, with nothing but mother-wit, a quickened conscience, and a Saxon Bible to teach him what to do and how to do it, than to vault into an aerial ministry in which only the upper classes shall know or care **anything** about him. . . . Make your ministry reach the people; in the forms of purest culture if you can, but reach the people; with elaborate doctrine if possible, but reach the people; with classic speech if it may be, but reach the people. The great problem of life to an educated ministry is to **make** their culture a power instead of a luxury. Our temptations are all one way: our mission is all the other way.

"It is not, then, less education that our clergy need. It is inconceivable to me how any educated man can see relief from our present dangers, or from any dangers, in that direction. Ignorance is a remedy for nothing. Imperfection of culture is always a misfortune. . . . If this world is ever to be converted to Christ by other than highly educated agencies, it must be by the aid of miraculous agencies. Nothing short of inspiration and miracle ever has made ignorance and low culture successful in the propagation of Christianity on any large scale and for a long period of time; and nothing short of such powers ever can do it. But miracle and inspiration we cannot look for. In place of them we must look for consecration of culture. This is the thing which the world is blindly craving. We need subjection of the personal tastes, which high culture creates, to apostolic and Christ-like motive. We need contentment under the limitations of culture, which the necessities of labour in our profession demand. We need to revise our theories and moderate our desires respecting pecuniary support. Are we right, are we apostolic, in the conviction that we must live in such a style that we cannot obey a call of God and of his Church to the humblest fields of pastoral usefulness? Does not this conviction imply a mistake in our self-adjustments to the work of Christ?

"Above all, we need faith in the Christian ideal of culture, which measures its value by its use, its dignity by its lowliness, its height in character by its depth of reach after souls below it. This was Christ's own ideal of culture. He possessed no other; he respected no other: he denounced every other most fearfully. . . .

"Our guard against the peril here indicated, then, is spiritual, as distinct from intellectual, in its nature. The cry should be, not 'Less intellect, less study, less culture,' but simply, 'More heart, more prayer, more

godliness, more subjection of culture to the salvation of those who have little or none of it.'

"I beg you to ponder the subject in this spirit, and to begin your ministry with a bold rejection of everything that implies your personal seclusion from the poor and the ignorant classes. Reject every theory of preaching which contemplates that seclusion as a necessity. Rectify the proportions of any theory which, though true in its parts, yet, as a whole, blocks your way to the hearts of the people. Prune down any theory which, for reasons yet unknown to you, you cannot work to advantage, so as to make your way to the hearts of the people. Stretch your theory to the facts of your life's work, be they what they may. Hold no theory for a day which is not elastic enough to compass the necessities of your position. I have failed in my endeavours to help you, if you have derived from my words any such theory.

"Esteem no institution sacred which sets you above and aloof from the commonalty. Revere no clerical usages, no laws of etiquette, no guards of your reputation, no proprietary claims which require you to hold back from personal labour with the humblest or the most guilty. Yield to no churchly sentiments, or whispered arrangements, or tacit understandings, or unuttered disgusts, through which churches shall be gathered by the law of social affinity, instead of the law of benevolence; so that their pastors cannot get at the poor and the degraded, because there are none such within hearing.

"Refuse to be pastors of such churches, if they insist upon their exclusiveness. Accept rather the calls of the 'low-born and low-bred.' Accept the 'plain living and high thinking,' if they are necessary to give you access to the low grounds of society, unless you can clearly justify to your own conscience your right and duty to do otherwise. Let it be said of you, 'This man eateth with publicans and sinners,' unless you can give a reason to ministering angels and to God for choosing rather to eat with princes and magnates of the earth. Refuse to be tempted by churches in which pageantry of architecture, pomp of worship, operatic music, patrician caste, sumptuous dress, and other forms of unchristian luxury will conspire against you, making it impossible for the poor to be there if they would, and making them unwilling to be there if they could. The man was never born who could long carry the load of such a church as that with a Christ-like love of souls in his heart.

"The spirit which should lead you anywhere into Christian work should be that which we commonly laud as the missionary spirit. That type of character and that habit of mind which time has clothed with romance in the persons of Henry Martyn, and William Carey, and Alexander Duff, are the same which should carry any man anywhere as a preacher of Christ. In no other spirit is a man called to preach at all.

"Begin, I pray you, begin your work with faith in the practicability of this. Believe that you can go to your metropolitan pulpit in Boston or New York with the same Christ-like mind with which you would expect to go to Beyroot or to the Zulus. There is no difference between the two. The call of God which summons you to the pulpit means the same thing everywhere. . . . That is the true ideal of a Christian minister. He should be able to go, without a ripple of difference in his sense of personal distinction, to the Fiji Islands or to the Fifth Avenue in New York. Pass on to your work, brethren, in that spirit of profound consecration and repose of conscience. Get down to those deep soundings of the sea of the life that is with God; then God will make your life a song to you."

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY 1882.

ART. I.—*Christianity according to Christ.*¹

IT is a true instinct that has led the Church of Christ to select the Lord's Prayer from the New Testament and place it side by side with the Ten Commandments from the Old, to be imprinted on the memory, impressed upon the heart, and treasured as a "form of sound words" beyond all price. For it is much more than a prayer-model. It teaches us not only how to pray, but what to pray for; and, inasmuch as prayer is the lifting up of the desires of the heart, and "out of it are the issues of life," by teaching us what the desires of our hearts should be, it shows us what our life should be; so that in these few memorable words we have our Lord's own presentment of the Christian life in its leading outlines and proportions. Here, in fact, we have an authoritative presentation of practical Christianity. The Lord's Prayer exhibits Christianity according to Christ.

Considering the importance which has always been attached by Christian people to this compendium, one would think that it must represent the Christianity of Christians as well as of Christ: their ideal at least, if not their actual life. However far short they might fall in attainment, one would expect that

¹ Annual Sermon for London Missionary Society, May 1882.

they would surely reach out towards the state of mind and heart represented by a prayer which most of them are offering day by day continually. But has it been so as a rule? We think not. We question if the majority of even earnest Christians have steadily set before them this ideal.

There are three classes of desires represented in the prayer: desires relating to God and His cause, desires for the supply of bodily wants, and desires for the supply of spiritual wants. Of these different classes of desires the place of supreme prominence and importance is given to the first, the earlier half of the prayer being wholly occupied with them, while the latter half is devoted to personal wants, being divided between the body and the spirit in the proportion of one to two. Now, it would seem that the great majority of Christians are content to dwell in the second and lower hemisphere, with only an occasional visit to the first. They do honestly try to subordinate temporal to spiritual wants; they do honestly try to attach at least double the importance to salvation from sin which they do to matters of bread; but their strength and zeal are almost all absorbed in this endeavour. They have only a fraction of energy left, if any, for the other and Sunward hemisphere of the Christian life. The great struggle seems to be to reach a life corresponding to a prayer like this: "Our Father, which art in heaven, Forgive us our sins, and lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil; give us a comfortable living; and may Thy kingdom come."

All this is the more remarkable from the fact that the summary of the Ten Commandments which our Lord has given us follows the same order, and accentuates quite as much the superior importance of the Godward hemisphere. Just as in the Lord's Prayer we have the soul first lifted up to God *once* and again, and again,—"*Thy name,*" "*Thy kingdom,*" "*Thy will,*"—so in the summary of the law "*the first and great commandment*" is, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind.*" And again, in the Lord's Prayer, after having poured out our hearts in longings for the Divine glory, when we come down to our own wants, we are taught to give our neighbour an equal share in each petition: "*Give us,*" "*for give us,*" "*lead us,*" "*deliver us;*" thus following in the second

part of it the second great commandment of the law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Thus the commandments and the Lord's Prayer mutually confirm each other in regard to the relative proportions of the Godward and selfward sides of the Christian life.

We have spoken of the two parts of the prayer as two hemispheres, the two together making up a full-orbed Christianity. Perhaps a better idea of their mutual relations may be had by changing the figure. It is evident that in the first part and in the second part of the prayer we are in entirely different regions; similarly in the first and in the second great commandments of the law. The former in each case may be regarded as the heavens, the latter as the earth of the Christian life. In calling upon us first to love the Lord our God supremely, and then our neighbour as ourselves; likewise in asking us to pray first for the Divine glory, and then for our own and our neighbour's good, our Lord sets before us "a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness;" first a new heavens, and then a new earth; first a new heavens in order that there may be a new earth; for it is only through the heavenly love that we can reach the earthly love and life to which our Saviour calls us. And yet how many are there who, though they do honestly try to live the Christian life, yet occupy themselves almost exclusively with the earthly part of it, only occasionally mounting up with wings as eagles, only now and then extending the horizon of their vision beyond the limited sphere of their personal and family interests. They dwell habitually in the lower regions; they only on rare occasions visit the heights.

It will of course be understood that it is only Christians who are called to set their hearts first on the cause of God; it is only those who have learned to say "Our Father," who are taught to make their first petition, "Hallowed be Thy name." The very first thing for a sinner is, of course, to be "reconciled to God." To him Christianity must first be a personal matter, a personal coming to Christ for pardon and "newness of life." In this personal acceptance of Christ he learns his primary lesson; so that he is able to join with all who, like him, have been reconciled to God in saying, "Our Father, which art in heaven." But now he is a child of God; his sins have been

forgiven. He still will need cleansing from the stains contracted in his pilgrimage; but he no longer needs to seek salvation as one who is lost—no longer needs to seek bare life as one who is “dead in trespasses and sins.” He no longer needs to make his own personal salvation his first care; he may now enjoy

“A heart at leisure from itself.”

Now that he has given himself to Christ, he may forget himself, “deny himself,” for Christ; and thus he will be free to set his heart, above all other things, on the hallowing of the Divine name, the coming of the Divine kingdom, the doing of the Divine will on earth as it is in heaven.

But some may be inclined to question whether the order of this prayer should be the order of Christian endeavour: ‘Is it not, after all, the true way to begin with that which is easier, and proceed by degrees to that which is more difficult? and, inasmuch as it is a great deal easier to subordinate temporal to spiritual blessings, than to subordinate both to a desire for the Divine glory, is not that the more natural and the more practicable course which Christian people seem to be in the habit of taking? So long as we do not lose sight of the first half altogether, there surely cannot be any harm in putting our main strength into the second half until we have attained it; and after we have measurably attained it, after we have fairly learnt to put the spiritual before the temporal, then it will be time not only to give some place in our thoughts and lives to the first three petitions, but to try to give them the place of prominence which we acknowledge to be their proper place in a fully developed Christian life.’ Now all this would be reasonable enough, if attainments in the Christian life were to be had on precisely the same conditions as attainments in other departments,—scholarship, for instance. If it were simply a question of our native powers *plus* our own personal efforts, then it would be only reasonable to take the easier first, and postpone the more difficult for later and more mature effort. But it is not so. We cannot accomplish even the easiest part of it by our own efforts. We need the Holy Spirit to teach us even to cry “Abba, Father.” We need the Holy Spirit to enable us to seek the higher in preference to

the lower blessings for ourselves. And seeing that without the Holy Spirit nothing can be done, and with Him all can be accomplished, the question of relative ease or difficulty is not an influential element in the case, and is certainly no sufficient reason for departing from the order our Lord has Himself marked out for us. It is in vain for us to enter on the struggle without the Holy Spirit; and with Him we need not fear to set before us the highest ideal. It is the very work of the Spirit to take of the things of Christ, and show them to us; and can any one suppose that He will be more willing to respond to our call if we invite Him to begin to help us in the second part of the Lord's Prayer, with the implication that if He only help us well through that, we shall then proceed to the first part of it? No, no; that is not the way to honour the Spirit; it is not the way to honour Christ. Let us take the ideal our Lord Himself has given us, in all its fulness, in all its grand proportions; and remembering His promise of the Holy Spirit to all who ask, and not forgetting that the Spirit is able and willing to "help our infirmities" in great things as well as small, let us by all means, from the very outset, aim at nothing short of a life which will embrace in it all the glory of the heavens, as well as all the gladness of the earth: which will put "Thou," "Thine," "Thee," in the first place; "we," "ours," "us," in the second; while from beginning to end "I," "mine," "me," is out of sight, being lost in God in the first, and merged in man in the second.

In proceeding now to look more closely into the heart of the prayer, it will of course be impossible to attempt anything like an exposition of the separate petitions. All I propose to do is to bring out and enforce those considerations which will serve the main object before us, namely, to vindicate the claim of what may be called the missionary petitions to the first place in every Christian heart.

The illustration already used may help to such a comprehensive treatment as may suit our purpose. We have spoken of the first three petitions as "the heavens" of the Lord's Prayer; but we must not forget that these heavens bend all around the earth, and touch it at every point, and that the interest of these petitions for us, and the possibility of a healthy

and sustained enthusiasm on our part, will depend on our keeping this in mind. If we allow our thoughts to wander away off into a distant heaven,—away off, as it were, into the cold and atmosphereless heaven of the interplanetary and interstellar spaces,—there will be no warmth in our hearts and no life in our prayer. The need of this caution will appear when we consider that there has been a constant tendency to remove each of these three petitions from the range of the present and practical to that of the distant and impalpable.

In regard to the first petition, it has often been forgotten that it is the "*name*" of God which is spoken of, and not God Himself; and hence a great deal that has been said and written in the old theologies as to making the glory of God the chief end of man has been unreal and intangible. When Christian people, guided by these representations, wished to test themselves on the question whether they were supremely desirous for the Divine glory, the test was apt to take the form of some severe abstraction, as, for instance, in the oft-raised question, 'Have I such a supreme regard for the Divine glory that I would be willing to be lost for ever if that were to promote it?' Can anything be imagined more futile and unnatural than this?

The Name of God is that by which He has made Himself known to us, specially in the course of revelation; above all, the two great names of "Jehovah" in the Old Testament and "Jesus" in the New. As to the name "Jehovah," it has been rationalised away into the thinnest and coldest abstraction, through the influence of Alexandrian philosophy, which is chiefly to blame for the association of the abstract and empty idea of self-existence and absolute being with a name which was intended to be full of love, and pity, and tenderness. Then as to the name of "Jesus," while the sweetness has never been squeezed out of it, as it has been out of the rich and precious Old Testament name, yet it has not been so closely identified with the Divine Being as it ought to have been. In their zeal for personal distinctions in the Holy Trinity, theologians have been too often tempted to forget such passages as these—"No man cometh unto the Father but by Me," "I and my Father are One," "I am the Truth," etc.; and so they have attempted to unfold a knowledge of God apart

from His Son Christ Jesus ; that is to say, a knowledge of God apart from that Name by which He has made Himself known to us. The consequence has been that Christian people have not been fully taught to think of Christ when they pray, "Hallowed be thy Name." The name of "Jehovah" they may think of ; but they are apt to think of it after the fashion of the translators of the Septuagint rather than after the fashion of saints of old, whose souls were thrilled with rapture as they thought of it, leading them to break forth in such a song of praise as this : "Behold, God is my salvation ; I will trust, and not be afraid ; for Jehovah, Jehovah, is my strength and my song ; He also is become my salvation." The name of Jesus, it is sometimes said, does not occur in the prayer at all ; whereas if we would think of what Christ has Himself said as to His relation to the Father, we could not fail to see that when we pray, "Our Father, which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy Name," we are praying for the glory of Christ.

The substance of the name "Jehovah" in the Old Testament is Love ; the substance of the name "Jesus" in the New Testament is Love ; and when the apostle John says "God is Love," he is summing up the name of God as revealed both in the Old Testament and the New, and verifying what had been said of old, when the richness of its meaning was first unfolded : "This is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations." And when we pray, "Hallowed be thy Name," we pray that God may be known to all men as a loving Father ; that He may be known as revealed in "Jehovah, Jehovah God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty ;" that He may be known as revealed in Christ as the Father, Friend, Helper, Comforter, Saviour of mankind. Who that has learned to know Him in this blessed character could fail to be filled with enthusiasm for so grand an object ? Observe how real and tangible it is. All around us there are those who think of God in no other light than as mere Force, or stern Law, or abstract Essence ; or, again, as an arbitrary Ruler, or a cruel Tyrant, or an omnipresent Eye ; . . . and far away there are those who have never heard the

name of Christ at all, and have never had any opportunity of becoming acquainted with a Father in heaven. Oh! surely it should make our hearts burn within us to think how our loving Father is misrepresented and misunderstood, how He is traduced and maligned, how He is disowned and denied all around us, and how many there are that do not know His blessed name at all; and when we think of all this, it is with no effort that we struggle up as after some abstract or intangible good, which we ought to desire, but cannot realise, but with a resistless enthusiasm which carries our whole nature with it as we pray, "Our Father, Hallowed be thy Name."

And this is the best channel in which personal enthusiasm for God and for Christ may flow. We would say nothing to disparage such outpourings of personal devotion as find expression, for instance, in Faber's beautiful hymns; and yet there is a danger of being carried away in the direction of something like sentimentalism, by which we mean the outflow of feeling without consequent action. The form of this petition guards us against any danger there may lie in this direction. "Hallowed be thy Name" does not translate itself nearly so readily into utterances of personal endearment as it does into such a grand and manly enthusiasm as that of "the sweet singer of Israel" when he cried: "His name shall endure for ever; His name shall be continued as long as the sun; and men shall be blessed in Him; all nations shall call Him blessed. Blessed be the Lord God, the God of Israel, who only doeth wondrous things; and blessed be His glorious name for ever; and let the whole earth be filled with His glory. Amen and Amen." This first petition should by all means have all its animating spirit intense personal enthusiasm for Christ but this fervour will not narrow itself to the mere personal relation of the saint to his Saviour, but will go out, with a grand sweep of missionary enthusiasm, to the very ends of the earth, according to the true suggestion of the paraphrast—

"For ever hallowed be thy Name
By all beneath the skies."

The second petition has suffered somewhat in the same way as the first. Some think of "the kingdom of heaven," of which our Saviour is so constantly speaking, as if he meant a king-

dom ~~in~~ heaven, whereas He makes it as plain as language can make it that He is speaking of a kingdom which He has come to establish on the earth ; the expression "of heaven" referring not to its geography, but to its heavenly nature. And others, though recognising that the reference is to the earth, have nevertheless allowed themselves the habit of looking forward to some grand demonstration in the future, forgetting what our Lord was so careful to teach, that the kingdom of heaven of which He spoke came not with observation, and that instead of looking for it hither and thither, His disciples should recognise it as already established, and having its sphere in the hearts of men. When our Saviour teaches us to pray "Thy kingdom come," He is not leading our thoughts away from the present, away from the sphere of our own proper activity and hourly interest ; He is teaching us to pray for a kingdom which is as much a present reality, and as little *in nubibus*, or *in prospectu*, as the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and whose concerns are as much within the range of practical politics, those of Christianity we mean, as any question affecting the present interests of our country. It is a prayer the answer to which we should watch for day by day and hour by hour, not only in the subjection of our own wills to the blessed sway of the "King of kings," but in the growing consecration of believers, in the conversion of sinners, in the overthrow of tyranny and all iniquity, in the amelioration of human sorrow and suffering, in the progress of enlightenment amongst the people, in the dissipation of the fogs of doubt and the darkness of infidelity, and above all in the progress of "the Gospel of the kingdom" in all lands. True indeed, the eye of the Christian's hope should always be fixed upon the goal ; we should look through all confusions of the present to the great future, when Christ Himself shall come in the clouds of glory ; but while our eye is fixed upon that point in the future, our thoughts and our energies should be occupied ("Occupy till I come") with present duties, present interests, present progress ; and so our prayer will not only be a missionary prayer, but an impelling motive to a truly missionary life, the devotion of heart, and soul, and strength, and property to the advancement of "the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

The third petition is not essentially different from the second, as the second is substantially equivalent to the first. They all express desires for the glory of God upon the earth ; but though, so far as the main thought is concerned, there is a threefold repetition, it is no vain repetition, it is an intentional repetition, a repetition which teaches us what a Christian man's first desire and prayer should be, and what his life and highest ambition should be. Besides, there is a manifest order and progress of thought. The three petitions represent a continuous process, leading on to the regeneration of universal society. To this great and blessed end it is necessary, first, that the Name of the Father, of " God in Christ," be known and hallowed. The result of this will be His enthronement in human hearts, *i.e.* the coming of His kingdom. And as the result of His enthronement in human hearts there will be universal obedience in human life, and so the will of God be done on earth as it is in heaven. The first is a prayer that the blessed " Sun of Righteousness " may shine on all mankind ; the second, that under His shining life may everywhere spring up ; the third, that this life may reach its full maturity on earth as in heaven, where the Sun of Righteousness is never darkened and never sets. Nor is it a mere fancy that recognises an implicit reference to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the threefold prayer for the Divine glory. In the first petition we think of the Father, revealed in Christ indeed, for no man cometh to the Father but by Him ; still it is of the Father especially that we think. In the second petition we think more directly of the Son, whose work it was to establish the kingdom of the Father on the earth. In the third petition we think of the Holy Ghost, whose special work it is to influence human wills, and bring them into accord with the will of the Father. And in the threefold prayer we have the full response of the believing heart to the celestial anthem, " Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, among men of goodwill."

But here, again, we find a remarkable disposition to divert this third petition from its proper object. In the first place, there is the same tendency that we have already observed to relegate it to another and future sphere of existence. There is a disposition to despair of the earth as a place where it is all possible that the will of God can be done ; to surrender

practically as it is to "the god of this world," comforting ourselves the while with the reflection that we shall soon be out of it, and then by and by it will be burnt up, and in its place will come heaven; so that, instead of praying to have the will of God done on earth as it is in heaven, we rather look forward to the abolition of earth, and the substitution of heaven, as the only hope for the future. Surely this is not a faithful use of the Lord's Prayer, especially of this third petition, which so expressly specifies the earth as the place where God's will is to be done.

And where the prayer is rescued from the devouring future, and made a matter of real present interest, we find a tendency to narrow it down in a most unwarrantable manner. In one of the most admirable of our many modern collections of spiritual songs, by an editor whose name is a guarantee for the highest excellence of work, there is a series of hymns founded on the Lord's Prayer; and of all the hymns, in number twenty-four, set under the third petition, there is not one which has the slightest reference to the main substance of the petition. They are all hymns of personal resignation; the pronouns which run through them all are "I," "mine," "me;" the prayers in them all are for personal blessings; there is not a single reference to the earth at large. I would not think it proper to refer to this if it were a solitary or an exceptional instance; but I do so because it is an indication of a common tendency of Christian people to turn this grand universal petition for blessing to the earth on which we live, into a matter of personal religion merely. For once that the sacred words "Thy will be done" are used in Christian language for a missionary aspiration, they are probably used a hundred times in reference to circumstances of personal history which call for resignation. This is probably to be accounted for by the influence of our Saviour's memorable words in the garden, "Not My will, but Thine, be done." There we have our great lesson in resignation. There we have a passage which will serve as a sufficient inspiration for one of the sweetest and most difficult of the Christian graces. By all means let the sacred words be used for this sacred purpose, and let hymns be written on the touching theme to guide and cheer the troubled souls of God's afflicted ones. But when there is

so lovely and perfect a text for the important subject of Christian resignation (and there is no scarcity of similar texts throughout the Bible), why should an inroad be made upon the Lord's Prayer for another? why should this wide and grand petition be robbed of the grandeur of its meaning as a missionary prayer, and made a mere duplicate of another text, however beautiful and precious that text may be? It is true, indeed, that the grace of resignation is *implied* in this third petition. When we say "Thy will be done on earth," we of course include the few inches of the earth on which we stand. But it is one thing to remember that personal matters are included in the grand whole, and quite another to make personal matters the "be-all and end-all" of a petition which manifestly was intended to soar far above and stretch far beyond all mere personal considerations, and take the whole world in its wide embrace.

To illustrate the practical difference between the plain and obvious sense of the petitions, and these other things which too often take their place in the thoughts of Christian people, let us look at it in relation to missionary funds. A man may pray for God's glory in the abstract, day after day, and year after year, without it costing him anything. How can the glory of Him, who "dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto," be either advanced or hindered by any effort or sacrifice of mine? Similarly a man may pray for the coming of Christ in the clouds without his prayer disturbing the clasp of his purse. What can money do to bring Christ down again from above? And for the same reason it need not cost him anything to sigh and long for the holiness of the heavenly country; and as for resignation to the troubles of life, though it is one of the most difficult of all Christian duties, it does not tax any financial resources. But let a man pray that God's name may be hallowed by all beneath the skies; that Christ's kingdom may come here and now, all around him, and to the uttermost ends of the earth; that holiness may prevail among the men that are his own contemporaries; and, unless he be a hypocrite, and deceiving himself, he will be constrained to give, give, give—to give for the proclamation of that Gospel which makes known the blessed name; to give for the heralding of the

good news of the kingdom to all the nations of mankind ; to **give** for the making known to all men of the presence and **grace** of the Holy Spirit, who alone can bring it about, and who **certainly** can bring it about in His own time, that the will of **God** shall be done on earth as it is in heaven. In the one case **there** is an impulse to the exercise of grace undoubtedly, but it is **the** passive grace of contemplation, adoration, or submission ; in **the** other case there is a mighty impulse, as well, to the **highest** and most devoted activity, to the consecration of all we **are** and all we have to that great cause which is enthroned in **our** hearts. The life to which the one points is like that beautiful ideal in Thomas à Kempis ; the life to which the **other** points is that quite as beautiful and far grander life of the apostle Paul, who could say in a far higher sense than the other, "To me to live is Christ."

We have seen that it is necessary, for the sake of the heavenly part of the Lord's Prayer, that its relation to the earth should be remembered ; that the heavens of our thought should not belong to "a happy land, far, far away," but to this very **earth** on which we live. The next thing will be to notice that as **the** heavens cannot do without the earth, neither can the **earth** do without the heavens. If the heavens must have the **earth** beneath to make them our heavens, the earth must have the **heavens** above it to make it habitable and enjoyable. And **accordingly** we shall find that when the first three petitions of the **Lord's** Prayer are given their proper place of prominence, the **last** three, far from being hindered, are very much helped **thereby**.

This is sufficiently obvious in regard to the fourth petition. As long as a man is living for himself, without any very great **enthusiasm**, without any very wide horizon around him, it is **very** hard to persuade him to be contented with daily bread. **When** an army officer is living in London he is as particular as **any** other subject of the Queen as to his quarters, and surroundings, and style of living. But let him set out on service in **the** field, and he scorns these things. He is willing to sleep, if **need** be, on the bare ground ; to live on the homeliest of fare, and to submit to hardship and privations of all kinds. So **will** it be in the service of Christ. So long as our thoughts

are confined to the narrow sphere of our personal life, we shall find it hard to restrain the desire for more and more comforts, conveniences, and luxuries; and only after these growing demands have been fully satisfied shall we be ready to take into consideration the claims of the world at large. But let us realise that we are not now living quietly at home, that we are out on service in the field, and therefore that loyalty to our Sovereign ("Hallowed be thy Name"), patriotic devotion to our country ("Thy Kingdom come"), and thorough consecration to the enterprise before us ("Thy Will be done on earth"),—that these are the claims which take precedence of all others; then shall we scorn to seek our own ease or pleasure; then shall we be contented with the humblest fare, with the barest surroundings, with scanty rations, if need be, if only success attend our efforts in the great campaign. We should feel the soldier spirit rise within us, as it did in Uriah when, in answer to a suggestion addressed to his natural love of ease and pleasure, he said, "The ark, and Israel, and Judah abide in tents; and my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open fields; shall I then go into mine house to eat and to drink? . . . As thou livest, and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing." Give me only, day by day, my daily bread, and I will find my satisfaction, my luxury, my life, in the service of my King and country in the field.

There can be no doubt whatever that the growing luxury of the time is one great reason why there is so little enthusiasm for the cause of God. If we would be content with "bread" (by which we do not suppose that barest necessities are meant, but only such a moderate provision for daily wants as does not involve our making it the main object of life to secure it), if we were content with a scale of living anything like as humble as that which satisfied our King when He was here on earth, how much energy, how much time, how much money would be at once set free from the mere ministration to the wants of the body, for the proclamation of the Name, for the advancement of the Kingdom, for the accomplishment of the Divine Will upon the earth!

The evil of the growth of luxury has been long recognised among Christian people, and much zeal has been shown in the endeavour to stem the tide; but it is doubtful if the zeal has been, for the most part, wisely directed. It has generally taken

the form of denunciation and condemnation. But the difficulty has always been to draw any line that the common Christian conscience would or could approve. The complex conception of worldliness has been an indefinite and uncertain aggregate of many particulars, most of them of such a kind that they cannot be condemned as in themselves wrong; and the result has been that, as is generally the case, people have given the benefit of the doubt to that side to which they have been most inclined; and so the appeals of the Puritan have not really reached the conscience of the Cavalier. But the question comes whether there is not, in the order of the Lord's Prayer, the suggestion of a more effectual method of counteracting the evil. We generally think in this way,—If we could only cure the worldliness of the Church, what an impulse would be given to the cause of Missions! But what if the better and more hopeful order be rather this,—If we could only stir a proper enthusiasm for the cause of Missions, for the glory of God, for the advancement of His kingdom, for the doing of His will on earth as it is done in heaven, would not worldliness cure itself? Let Christian people first learn from the heart to pray, "Hallowed be Thy name; Thy kingdom come; Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven;" and the result will be that their souls will have been so filled with these higher longings that when they reach the lower plain of the fourth petition, they will be under no temptation to exceed its modest limits. It is the old cure of the Gospel, which, under the designation of "the expulsive power of a new affection," Chalmers showed to be the power of God unto the salvation of the lost, and which is equally applicable for the purpose of saving the Church from the blight of worldliness, the almost universal hankering for so very much more than can be fairly thought of when we pray, "Give us this day our daily bread."

And the same considerations are manifestly applicable to the fifth and sixth petitions, and the spiritual wants of a personal kind which they express. It is a great mistake to think that personal piety will suffer by allowing it to fall into the place which has been assigned it in the Lord's Prayer. The principle which our Lord laid down so often and in such absolute terms is just as applicable in the spiritual sphere as anywhere else: "He that will save his life shall lose it; and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." What was the reason

that the life of the anchorites and hermits of old proved so conspicuous a failure? How was it that with all their consuming earnestness, with all their fastings, with all their prayers and their rigid self-denial, they had so very hard a battle to fight with the depravity of their own hearts? Simply because they left out or quite misunderstood the first half of the Lord's Prayer. They were contented with "daily bread" in the barest sense. Never did the cry, "Forgive us our sins," ascend from more earnest hearts than theirs. And never was there more strenuous effort to live in the spirit of the prayer, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." And yet what did it amount to?

"Lord, I have fasted, I have prayed,
And sackcloth has my girdle been ;
To purge my soul I have essayed
With hunger blank, and vigil keen ;
O God of mercy, why am I
Still haunted by the self I fly !"

The trouble was, they were not really flying self. They were pursuing it. They were occupying themselves wholly with it. Their great error was the abandoning of the field of the world, giving up as hopeless the idea of God's name being hallowed, His kingdom coming, or His will being done upon the earth. They were in effect, though not in intention, deserters. In a spiritual as well as in a literal sense they lived in caves, away from the blessed sunlight of the heaven, alike of nature and of grace, which bends over this earth of ours ; and living in the dark, of course they were always stumbling, and often falling, and had no real experience of the light and the liberty of the children of God.

And if those conspicuously failed who made a beginning from the fourth petition, why should we expect success if we begin with the fifth, if we make it our first concern to cultivate our own spiritual life? This is certainly a much more lofty ambition than the life which is devoted to the satisfaction of bodily wants, or even to the gratification of the intellect and the taste ; and there is unquestionably a nobility in the lives of those who make this their great ambition, which is to be admired, and which, so far as it goes, is worthy of imitation. But while we do not deny the superiority of such lives to

those of the common run of men, we do not regard them as satisfying the Christian ideal; we believe that the Lord's Prayer shows unto us "a more excellent way;" more excellent, not only because it is more noble to "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness" than our own perfection, but also because it is more effectual for the very purpose of self-development. Let us not forget the element of unconsciousness in all growth. When once the seed has been sown, and committed to the earth beneath and the living powers of the heaven which bends above it, the cultivator has nothing to do but to clear away hindrances, to remove obstacles out of the way, and leave the development to the heavenly powers. So is it in spiritual husbandry. And hence the wisdom of what at first sight may seem strange,—the negative look of those parts of the Lord's Prayer which deal directly with the spiritual life: "*Forgive us our sins, and lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.*" Why not also a petition for the positive graces of the Christian character? Not certainly because they are unimportant, but because they will grow up of themselves as a matter of course in the soul that habitually has a Godward look. The first part of the Lord's Prayer secures that "looking unto Jesus," which is equivalent to abiding in the sunlight of heaven, and under the rains which water the thirsty ground, and when we come to the personal part, it is enough to make sure that "every weight (the *impedimenta* of which the fourth petition will disencumber us as well as the burden of guilt of which the fifth petition will relieve us) and the sin which doth so easily beset us" be laid aside. "If any man will come after me," says Christ, "let him deny himself," put self in the background altogether, and so may he most effectually secure his own growth in grace.

We may not undervalue the importance of the caution, "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." As long as we remember the last petition we cannot forget the need of watchfulness; but that watchfulness will avail very little if we omit or pass lightly over the petitions which have gone before. To refer once more to the illustration of the heavens and the earth: it is plain that though when one is walking in the dark very great watchfulness may keep him from stumbling, yet even a less degree of watchfulness will give a much greater

degree of security to one walking in the light. As a matter of fact we are not really less watchful when we are walking in daylight, only our watchfulness is less conscious. When we come to a rising ground or a depression, a step up or a step down, a stone in our way or a hole in the road, we make the necessary allowance for it, exactly as we would do if we were groping our way with a stick; only when we are walking in the daylight these precautions do not occupy our thoughts; we can prosecute our journey with scarcely any consciousness of the obstacles in our path, and with scarcely any diminution of speed on the most uneven road. And so is it in the Christian life. Let us walk in the light of true loyalty to Christ, enthusiasm for His kingdom, consecration to His work; and not only shall we be more easily satisfied with our ration, but we shall be able, with greater safety and much greater speed, to "run the race that is set before us." Thus we find that not only for the sake of the grand interests of the earlier petitions, but even for the sake of the lesser interests involved in the later ones, it is desirable, nay necessary, to preserve the order and proportions of the Lord's Prayer, setting before us as it does practical Christianity according to Christ.

We shall conclude by endeavouring to sum up the bearing of what has been advanced upon the progress of the Kingdom of Christ. The direct bearing of it is sufficiently obvious. If all Christian people, or even any considerable proportion of them, were only to begin honestly to try to seek the kingdom of God first, the Missionary cause would receive an impulse altogether unprecedented. From the day that the Church began to pray the Lord's Prayer as it is, without reservation, suppression, or reconstruction, the difficulties of the Missionary Societies, so far as men and means are concerned, would altogether cease.

The indirect effect would, I believe, be even greater. There would at once appear all over the Church a nobler type of Christianity, less vitiated by selfishness, less disfigured by self-consciousness. And the spirit of sect would perish from the Church. Men would learn to distinguish between "my denomination" and "Thy Name," "our church" and "Thy Kingdom," "our ideas" and "Thy Will."

And then all the objections of modern culture, some of them well enough taken as against much of the current Christianity, would fall to the ground. Our critics could no longer, with any colour of truth, represent Christianity as a "baptized selfishness," which makes it a man's chief end to seek the salvation of his own little soul; they could no longer, with any colour of truth, speak of Christians as narrow people, quite too pious and heavenly-minded to take much interest in the great public questions of the day; they could no longer charge us with replacing the vice of worldliness with that other one of "other-worldliness," belittling the actual living present, and reserving for some future world, of which we know little or nothing, the best of those energies which were manifestly given for present use. There is some colour for these criticisms, as things are; but there is not a shadow of foundation for one of them in the Christianity of the Lord's Prayer,—not a shadow of foundation for one of them in Christianity according to Christ. And when our keen critics, after inveighing against the selfishness of Christianity, turn round and inveigh against its unselfishness, its "altruism," as they call it, they will find themselves equally at fault. Here, indeed, especially when we remember that this objection of the impracticability of Christian altruism has been advanced in the name of the infant science of sociology, we can scarcely help being reminded of the "children in the market-place" "piping" in the one breath, and "mourning" in the next, and of those likened to them, who said of Christ, "He is a gluttonous man," and of John, "He hath a devil;" for it is often the very same people who first accuse Christianity of the gluttony of selfishness, and then of the lunacy of pure altruism. "But wisdom is justified of her children," those of them at all events whose Christianity is that of Christ. And if our critics would only remember that the altruism of the New Testament is not pure altruism, but is modified by the important fact that it is the first duty of the Christian to "seek the kingdom of God," they would see that there is here a sufficient safeguard against any folly of altruism such as would lead us to give our money to every beggar on the street, or to surrender our rights to every scoundrel who chose to impose on Christian benevolence and non-resistance. Our

Lord, knowing the native selfishness of the human heart, uses strong and often unqualified language to set before us the claims of our neighbour ; but it is manifest that we are not dealing intelligently and honestly with such instructions if we do not carry with us through them all the remembrance that our first and paramount duty is to the Lord our God ; that our first care must be the " hallowing of the Divine name," our second the " coming of the Divine kingdom," our third the " doing of the Divine will ;" and if only these be first secured, we may carry our altruism to any length without any injury either to ourselves, our neighbour, or society at large. The best way to answer the objections of modern culture is to hold aloft Christianity according to Christ, to take the Lord's Prayer for our guide, and especially to elevate to its proper place that grand enthusiasm which teaches us to seek, far above all else, the promotion of the Divine glory over all the earth.

Finally, it is no small matter, in view of the change of mind that has come over the majority of Christian people since the days when the entire heathen world was regarded as hopelessly doomed to everlasting misery, to observe that the missionary enthusiasm, which so fills and inspires the Lord's Prayer, is quite independent of any views as to the future condition of the unevangelised heathen. It has been too much the habit of Christian people, in looking abroad upon the heathen world, to regard it not so much in the light of a kingdom to be conquered for Christ, but rather as a great seething sea of drowning men, a few of whom might be rescued from the general wreck by those whom the Church would send out on her gallant lifeboat service ; and of course as soon as the idea gained currency that the peril might not be so great or so universal as was once supposed, the enthusiasm which had rested entirely on that view of the case was necessarily affected. But the missionary enthusiasm which finds its inspiration and expression in the Lord's Prayer is liable to no such variation. The idea it sets before us is not the salvation of a few Indians, and Chinamen, and Africans, and South Sea Islanders in the next world : it is the salvation here and now of all India, all China, all Africa, all the islands of the sea, all the nations of the earth ; and this alone ought to be sufficient to stir the spirits of all right-hearted men, even if there were no impend-

ing danger in the next world, which undoubtedly there is, whatever we may think as to its nature and extent; for to say that the heathen will be judged according to their light is not equivalent to saying that they will not be judged at all.

And this is the conception of the missionary work, not only in the Lord's Prayer, but all through the Bible. What was the Gospel in Eden? Was it the salvation of a certain number of individuals? No. It is the triumph of a great cause—the seed of the woman bruising the head of the serpent. What was the Gospel as preached to Abraham? “In thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed.” What was the grandest of all the promises to Moses? “As I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord.” When were the prayers of David, the son of Jesse, ended? After he had reached the height of holiest longing in earnest prayer for the fulfilment of that same promise: “Let the whole earth be filled with his glory.” How was it in the days of the later prophets? “Thus saith the Lord: It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.” So is it all through the Old Testament. And when Christ came He kept still the same grand ideas, the same far-reaching aims, the same “enthusiasm of humanity,” as we may call it, before the minds of men. He “went everywhere preaching the Gospel *of the kingdom*.” We do find Him on occasion making the solemn appeal, “What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” But for once that He speaks about the saving of the soul, He speaks fifty times about “the kingdom.” And then, having begun His ministry with the call, “Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand,” He closes it with the great commission, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature.”

It is not only the Lord's Prayer, but the entire Bible, Old Testament and New, which claims for missionary enthusiasm the first place, the throne, in the renewed heart. Is it, then, too much to say that the great want of the times, so far as the Church of Christ is concerned, is a revival, not of religion in what may be called the popular sense, but of Christianity

according to Christ ; a Christianity which shall indeed "seek first the kingdom of God ;" a Christianity which shall, in actual fact, begin with the petitions, "Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven;" and, after humbly asking for daily bread, daily pardon, and daily grace, shall be irresistibly impelled, by a Divine attraction, to soar again to its native heavens with these old words of adoring praise, "For Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen."

J. MONRO GIBSON.

ART. II.—*The Catacombs of Rome.*¹

THE knowledge of the Catacombs of Rome is one of the conquests of that modern erudition which has changed the face of history on so many points. The ideas entertained, only a few years ago, about these monuments of Christian piety were vague or false. It was believed that the early Christians had made use of the quarries, whence were drawn the materials employed in erecting the Roman edifices, to celebrate their worship in secret, and to bury the remains of their martyrs. It was on the faith of this tradition that travellers pushed their curiosity so far as to descend into these vaults. De Brosse does not appear to have had, or cared to have, any knowledge of them, but the painter Hubert Robert ventured down, lost himself, and became the hero of the celebrated episode in the poem "Imagination ;"

"Il ne voit que la nuit, n'entend que le silence."

A few savans also, at different epochs, directed their attention to the Catacombs, but without comprehending or vivifying them, so to speak, for want of the broad yet rigorous methods which distinguish the science of our age. The history of these crypts is curious. After having been made use of for several centuries, received millions of corpses, and been honoured to be the burial-place of the witnesses of the faith, they had been forgotten. Their use had naturally diminished, when, in Constantine's time, people began to bury in the cathedrals, and

¹ Translated, with the author's permission, from *Le Temps*, by C. DE FAYE.

it had entirely come to an end at the beginning of the fifth century, when the barbarians invaded Rome.

The Popes, it is true, had continued to care for, restore, ornament them ; but they were themselves the cause of the forgetfulness into which the Catacombs fell, by carrying away their most celebrated relics to enrich the churches. As these souvenirs of the heroic times of Christianity formed the principal interest of the crypts, the faithful ceased to descend into them when they ceased to find in them aliment for their piety or their superstition. It came to be only at long intervals of time that these stranger pilgrims were seen, whose names engraved on the walls (*grafitti*) still give proof of their visits, and whose itineraries have not been useless to modern researches ; still, after the tenth and eleventh centuries the neglect becomes even more marked. In order to bring these holy places again into prominence, erudition had to take the place left vacant by piety. Bosio, who has justly been called the Christopher Columbus of the Catacombs, while quite young, seized with enthusiasm on this subject, embraced in his researches all the cemeteries that he could discover ; he marked their topography, made a collection of the monuments, had them engraved, and left a posthumous work which forms the starting-point of all posterior labours (1632). Bosio, however, was only an archæologist, and it was simply in the interests of archæology that the eighteenth century took up the epigraphic and chronological study of subterranean tombs. "The historical sense," as M. Roller well remarks, "was not yet born." Indeed such was still almost the case when, in our own day, Séroux d'Agincourt, Raoul Rochette, and Perret pursued the traces of Christian art in the Catacombs. The true founder of the history of subterranean Rome is Jean Baptiste de Rossi. He has renewed this study by the patience, the exactitude, and the sagacity with which he has pursued it. The rigour of his method has been rewarded by the happiest results ; the ingenuity of a judgment sharpened by exercise has allowed him to make the most unexpected restitutions. M. de Rossi has extended considerably the number of known cemeteries ; he has determined the topography, and reconstructed the dispositions of the monuments. He has thrown upon them all the light which traditional data, gathered with prodigious erudition,

could give; and he has at last deciphered, commented upon, and chronologically classed a host of images and inscriptions. The only reproach which can be made against him is that of "tendency," which was natural in treating such a subject, and quite explicable in the case of a savant working under the eye and the patronage of Pius IX. M. de Rossi, without making any real sacrifice of his scientific convictions, is evidently complaisant in his use of the Catholic method. He gives, or seems to give, more confidence than is meet to documents without any value and to legends without authority. In a word, there is too much desire to "solicit the text." But these defects, which were in a measure the very condition of the privileges without which the savant could not have accomplished his work, are redeemed by rare qualities. M. de Rossi, in his regard for ecclesiastical prejudices, appears often voluntarily to have conceded what he could not withhold; the orthodoxy of the conjectures is there, one would affirm, in order that the boldness of his affirmations may pass unchallenged.

M. Roller's work is of another character.¹ The author does not pretend to have made discoveries analogous to those of De Rossi; he has neither opened new catacombs nor restored ruined vaults;—to have done so would have required an official position, and the resources which are attached to it. But neither is M. Roller a mere *vulgarisateur* who confines himself to summing up the researches of others. He has spent ten years at Rome, has made himself familiar with the underground city; has given himself up to long iconographical, epigraphical, and patristic studies. He now appears, with vast and patiently gathered resources, to let us know in what state the exploration of the Catacombs is at present, and he brings to his task all the information necessary to control the results hitherto obtained. This then is the nature of the study to which he invites us. The monuments are there, but they must be interrogated; the stones speak, but their language requires interpretation. In deciphering the wreck of ages there is always room left for conjecture, and in order that the conjecture may be wise, it is not enough to have erudition, nor even

¹ *Les Catacombes de Rome, Histoire de l'Art et des Croyances religieuses pendant les premiers siècles du Christianisme, par Théophile Roller. 2 vols. in fol., avec cent planches. Paris: A. Morel et Cie. (£10.)*

sagacity ; one requires also strong reason, historical feeling, and the love of truth. M. Roller possesses these qualities. Without being sceptical, he knows how to suspend his judgment ; without sacrificing to the spirit of negation, he confesses his doubt, and, rare quality, he resigns himself not to know. The disposition of his work is a happy one. The author has skilfully combined the order of the subjects with the chronological order, and the study of the places with that of the details. It is in short what he wished it to be, a methodical and complete explanation such as we did not hitherto possess. We may add that the hundred engravings, of which the text forms the commentary, double the worth of this explanation, or rather assign to M. Roller's work a place of exceptional importance, among books devoted to the same subject. The author has shown in the execution of these engravings the same passion for exactitude as in his researches and discussions ; he has repudiated mere guesses, he has avoided the symbolisations into which his predecessors had fallen, so as to change the features in defining them ; everywhere that it was possible, he has had the subjects which he wished to reproduce photographed by the magnesium light in the crypts themselves. One can have no idea of the real effect which these engravings produce. One seems to see with one's eyes, and almost touch with one's hands, these venerable remains of the first centuries of the Church.

The study of the Catacombs is interesting in several ways. We may seek in M. Roller's beautiful book either to learn the manner in which the Christians buried their dead, or to discover the beginnings of religious art, or to ascertain the beliefs of an age near the birth of the Church, and those beliefs we find depicted to the life in their popular and spontaneous manifestation.

People discuss about the Catacombs, they visit them, but few persons are at all aware of the prodigious fact in presence of which they find themselves. To speak of a subterranean city is not saying enough, since we have here the remains of four centuries, a development of contiguous tombs for nearly 900 *kilomètres* (675 miles), containing the dead of ten generations, in four or five millions of coffins. And, even now, all the funereal galleries have not been explored : new discoveries

must be expected. This strange formation, this mortuary creation, is due to several causes, viz., the very belief of the Christians, joined to their position as a suspected or persecuted sect, and certain facilities which, nevertheless, the Roman legislation offered them. The Romans generally burned their dead bodies, but this custom was not universal, as the well-known tomb of the Scipios bears witness. The custom of incinerating became less and less common, and from the time of the Antonines gave place entirely to that of burying. In order to keep the members of one family together, they then built either outside tombs in masonry or subterraneous vaults, hewed out in the volcanic stone which forms a large part of the Roman soil. The Christians had, in this particular, given the example to the Pagans, after having themselves received it from the Orientals, and most probably from the Jews. Their faith in the resurrection of the body taught them to respect the corpse, and though this belief rested on the omnipotence of a God able to bring together again the dispersed members of the martyrs, and to reanimate even the dust scattered to the winds, an unreasoned feeling engaged the faithful to take care of these remains, which they believed were one day to be reanimated. They therefore buried their dead. The rich—for the early Church counted a certain number among its adepts—gathered together the members of their families, their freedmen, their clients, and then, from natural inclination, also the members of their spiritual family, the poor Christians, whose remains they did not know where to lay, and which religious fraternity made it an honour to welcome. The private crypt thus gave birth to the underground cemetery. Besides this, the legislation offered yet other resources to the new faith. At Rome, burial had a religious character, and was therefore inviolable, and people had besides the faculty of extending the area of the collective tomb, of annexing new grounds to it, and of thus extending to them the inviolability of the primitive sepulchre. Let us add that the privilege did not belong alone to the outside ground, and to the monument which had been erected upon it, it was attached also to the ground below, to the *hypogæum*. The Christians had thus great facilities for creating cemeteries. "Those among them," says M. Roller, "who possessed a burial-place, after having given hospitalit:

to their defunct co-religionaries, could, by will, trace out the area dedicated to these burial-grounds; they could do this without, on that account, bringing forward their character of Christians; it was a thing allowed to all." It does not appear, however, that the extension of private burial-places is sufficient to explain the development that the Catacombs had taken before the time in which the existence of the Christians was a recognised fact. It is supposed that the Christians had taken advantage, either of the immunities granted to the Jews, whose worship was tolerated at Rome, or of the rights of possession granted to corporations, or, still better, of the privileges attributed to the *funereal Colleges*. These were societies of poor people, who joined together their monthly subscriptions for the purpose of securing a decent burial. It is difficult to believe that the Church did not make use of a legislation which did not require of it any sacrifice of its belief, and did not even oblige it to articulate the particular characteristic of the Christian funereal association. This characteristic is not less real and deep. One during life, the believers wished to remain united in death—grouped together, in their struggles and trials round their spiritual chiefs, and full of enthusiasm for the heroes of the faith, they wished still in the tomb to be near their bishops and martyrs. "The grouping together," says M. Roller, "of the remains of a whole population in a cemetery or common *dormitory*, is peculiar to the Christians; it is the feeling of wide-spread association, of the fraternity of a whole people who, after having lived in the communion of the same Saviour, wished to await, in the same union, the eternal awakening."

Such, then, is the religious characteristic of the Catacombs. The material conditions of this astonishing creation may be summed up in few words. Let us say at once that the name by which the subterraneous cemeteries of Rome are designated is a wrong one, and has not even any known sense. A name has been generalised, no man knows when nor why, which was used as the denomination of a crypt on the Appian Way, which it is pretended contained the remains of the apostles Peter and Paul, and which was called *ad catacombas*, a word of doubtful etymology. However that may be, the Catacombs are all outside the city, in a space of from one to three miles.

They have been dug in preference on the heights, in the thick parts of the tableland, not in the earth, or in the *pozzuolana*, which is too friable, but in a granular tufa, at once easy to hew into, and sufficiently compact, which, without offering too great a resistance to the pick-axe of the gravedigger, secured the solidity of the galleries. The nature of this soil has contributed a great deal to the creation of the Catacombs; it is the physical condition which permitted the realisation of the religious thought, but none the less, space had to be saved. Therefore the Catacombs form very narrow galleries, which hardly reach the height of a man. When the limit of the ground at disposal had been reached, a second story, to which a flight of steps led down, was hollowed out, then a third. There is one example of five tiers of galleries one above another. A considerable amount of surface was thus obtained, and consequently, much room for the corpses, which were buried one after another in lateral niches, cut out exactly to the measure of the body. These niches were closed by tiles cemented together, sometimes by a marble tablet. It is upon this cover that the inscription, when there was one, was engraved or painted, but many tombs remained without a name, especially during early times—a symbol took the place of one. The most ancient galleries of the cemetery St. Agnes, recently studied by M. Armellini, contain eighty-six tombs out of a hundred which are absolutely anonymous, while the others almost always bear a simple name. After the third century, epitaphs become more frequent; religious formulæ, wishes, begin to appear, symbols multiply. Dates are rare before the fourth century. There is no trace of social distinction even so late as this. On the other hand, here and there, emblems recall the trade of the deceased,—the gravedigger's pickaxe, the labourer's spade, a woman's weaving-loom. All the instruments of a surgeon's case have been found engraven upon a stone. A painting in the cemetery of Priscilla represents some casks. M. Roller, with his usual good sense, supposes that the person buried in this place was probably a cooper. But it is amusing to see to what conjectures these casks have given birth. Some have seen in them a Eucharistic symbol, others an emblem of charity, because of the close union of the staves, others a souvenir of the martyrs condemned to carry water

etc. etc. It is well that our readers should see by an example the ridiculous suppositions with which the study of the Christian sepulchres is strewed, and, so to speak, choked up.

All the dead were not shut into the simple *loculus* which I have just been describing. The opening of a tomb was sometimes surmounted by an arched vault, the sides of which formed places for other bodies. These were family tombs. They even at times affected a more distinctive shape, and formed separate vaults, shut in by a door.

It is difficult to give the precise date of the Catacombs. It is probable that they go back to the first century, but there is no absolute proof of it. The origin of the inscription which is invoked in favour of so early a date is itself not certain, and it is the only one that can be alleged. On the other hand, a good number of these cemeteries are of the second, and even the beginning of that century. As regards the time when the Catacombs ceased to serve as tombs, I have said that it was from the day in which Christianity, having a recognised existence, there was no longer any reason for surrounding the obsequies of the Christians with precautions. The relics of the martyrs, being transported into the churches, the only reason which remained for the faithful to desire to be buried in these vaults disappeared, and the bodies of the Bishops of Rome being henceforth interred in the cathedrals, this custom was followed for all. Graves were dug in or around the churches; the modern cemetery had taken the place of the Catacombs.

It was formerly supposed, as we have already remarked, that the Catacombs had served the Christians to conceal the ceremonies of their worship during times of persecution. The description we have given of these places shows well enough how unfounded is this idea. The Catacombs furnished the Christians with a means, not precisely to hide their burial-places, which was neither possible nor necessary, but to withdraw public attention from them, and at the same time they afforded the means of celebrating in secret the religious rites connected with their obsequies. This is all. The disposition of the places, these narrow galleries, these vaults of small dimensions, could not be used for public worship. Excluding absolutely exceptional cases, the Christians met only for

exercises of piety in honour of the dead, or on the anniversaries of the martyrs. Want of ventilation would have been quite sufficient to prevent them from hiding in the subterraneous excavations from pursuit, or from living there for a long time and in large numbers.

The Catacombs fill up a gap in the history of art,—that which separated Latin art from that of the middle ages, and Christian art from its early commencements.

Byzantine art was known to us; the mosaics had preserved numerous monuments of it and its destinies; the traces of its influence, the types which it had hieratically consecrated could be followed down as far as the Renaissance. Latin painting, on the contrary, upon which the discoveries of Herculaneum and Pompeii had thrown an unexpected light, stopped short at the date of the catastrophe which overwhelmed these cities. It was reserved for the Catacombs to show the continuation of this art during three or four centuries later, that is to say, until the invasion of the Barbarians. In fact, the Catacombs show us a great number of painted representations, which are so much the more directly attached to the Pompeian style, as, like this one, it is essentially decorative in its uses. Christian subjects here take an emblematical character; they mix with the ornaments at times with surprising grace and liberty. We find garlands, birds, winged genii. In a fresco of the crypt of Lucina, Christ is seen hovering on the corolla of a flower. The technical means and the style are equally those of the overwhelmed cities: water-colour painting on stucco or lime, thin colours lightly applied, little variety in the tints and gradation in the shading, figures thrown in with a certain boldness, execution in masses and neglect of details, natural draperies, proportions and movements exact. In a word, these subterranean walls are a full continuation of Latin painting at the beginning of our era. It is true that the qualities of which we have just been speaking are only met with in the most ancient vaults. And the reason is very plain: the epoch of these tombs is that in which the arts were still flourishing, when artists were numerous and skilled. The decadence which is observed in the Catacombs in proportion as we reach those of the third century, but particularly from the fourth, is only an effect of the general decadence. There

was no longer room for delicate and experienced workmen in the times of trouble and suffering which fell heavy upon Italy when barbarism overwhelmed the ancient civilisation. Thus, as we descend the course of time, in the inspection of the Catacombs, instead of following a development, we follow on the traces of a degradation, and end by reaching representations of extraordinary clumsiness, not to say coarseness. After that, the merit of the painters *révives*; there are some of the seventh, and even of the ninth centuries, which surprise by the care and style to which they bear witness; but these pictures do not belong properly to the Catacombs. They are decorations executed by the Popes in honour of martyrs who had formerly been buried in the underground cemeteries, and the art employed here raises a new problem, in that it offers, in spite of a certain Byzantine character, a sort of resurrection of the Latin tradition which had seemed to go down in the great catastrophe. This tradition reappears after its long eclipse, and takes hold, on the one hand, of the frescoes of the ancient crypts, and, on the other, of the archways recently laid bare in the lower church of St. Clement.

"Two schools," says M. Roller, "have influenced Christian iconography before the Middle Age, properly so called : the one Latin, which was only known by its Pagan monuments ; the other Byzantine, to which all the Christian conceptions had been wrongly attached. The decay of art is evident in these two schools ; still it is interesting to show how it was not retarded by the introduction of Christian thought, but enriched by the new inspiration. The survival of the Latin style in painting after the death of Pagan civilisation, has been revealed in our day by the discovery or the study of some frescoes in the old Roman basilicas. Those in particular of the crypt of St. Clement have helped to show the continuation of a Latin school of painting, as far as the eleventh century, and the mixture of its creations with the Byzantine element. These discoveries have helped to connect the ancient world with the Renaissance, by making known some lost links in the chain of traditions ; but the links which preceded the Middle Age, particularly those which went before the introduction of the Byzantine style into the West, have furnished the most important revelation, and these must be sought in the Catacombs. The study of these transitions is necessary to the history of art."

The Catacombs, then, furnish us with specimens of an art which Pompeii had already made known to us, and besides this, they allow us to see the decadence of this art in the wreck of Roman civilisation. But subterranean Rome renders

us a no less signal service, in laying before our eyes the first buddings of Christian art, properly so called. There is a great surprise and a true charm in this. If the artist who belongs to the new faith has begun by being Pagan, if, at all events, he received his artistic education at the school of Paganism, and if, in consequence, bringing to his work data foreign to Christianity, he brings at the same time a particular spirit and new elements, his brush will be chaste, his ideas, derived from mythology, will draw an emblematic signification from the proscribed worship; the four seasons will figure the four ages of life. Here is Orpheus, but this Orpheus symbolises the power of the Gospel word. We see Psyche, but this Psyche, modestly clothed, has also an allegorical sense. But the most significative, in the imagery of the Catacombs, is the representation of Christ under the figure of the Good Shepherd, a representation so frequent as to induce the belief that it was current and consecrated, and at the same time it is so characteristic that we may surely see in it a true creation of Christian art. The appropriation of the ancient datum to the new faith is here doubly striking. It is so, because this Shepherd carrying his sheep upon his shoulders is a subject borrowed from real life, and Pagan art had certainly treated it more than once, and yet the evangelical idea, in laying hold of and treating it, has visibly marked it with its impress and made it its own. Further, this Christian conception is remarkable from the contrast between the feeling from which it sprang and that of the times which followed. Here the transformation which religious thought itself underwent becomes palpable in the production of art. Early Christianity, that of the Catacombs, is simple, confiding, affectionate; that which follows, during the Middle Ages, is, on the contrary, severe, ascetic, tragical. They belong to different worlds. What has come between them? The catastrophe which put an end to the ancient world? The invasion and its sufferings? The subject would be worth study, but the difference between the Good Shepherd of the crypts and the crucifix of the Middle Ages is only an indication of the different ways of seeing and feeling between the two epochs of the Church thus symbolised, and this is what remains for us to consider.

The greatest interest of the Catacombs is not the light they

throw upon the funeral customs of a persecuted sect, nor even the bond which they permit us to establish between the art of the earliest ages of our era and that of the Middle Ages. The Catacombs are, above all things, of inappreciable value for the information they give us concerning early Christian beliefs. They have, in this respect, rendered to the history of Christianity the same service which epigraphy, in our own day, has rendered to Greek and Roman archæology. They have even done more. While, as regards ancient literature, we possess in the orators, in the comic and satirical writers, all sorts of information concerning the mode of life of the contemporaries of this literature, the sources were much less abundant, the information much less direct, in regard to the modes of thought and feeling of the Christians of the three first centuries. In order to find their beliefs, and in particular the elements of their religious life, we were reduced to quotations from the Fathers, the meaning of which was arbitrarily generalised. What may perhaps have been only a local fact was taken for the vindication of a general state, and what may only have been the expression of individual feeling, for the manifestation of a common faith. The Catacombs have changed all that. These innumerable representations, these speaking and repeated testimonies, show us with equal evidence what were the religious pre-occupations of those who expressed their faith by these paintings, and what were the beliefs of later ages to which the faith of the early Christians was wanting. The *argumentum e silentio*, which is sometimes justly suspected, is of extraordinary force here. We cannot suppose that the Church of the Catacombs could have held notions upon important points of doctrine or hierarchy which should have succeeded in never betraying themselves in monuments so varied, so artless, so full of indications of every kind.

Many tombs have no distinctive mark; many, though anonymous, bear an ornament, a symbol—the dove, the olive branch, a palm. This palm long passed current as a sign of martyrdom, at the time when people represented to themselves the early Christians as having all more or less been exposed to the executioner's weapon, and the Catacombs as peopled with martyrs to the faith. But the palm was in use in Pagan burial-places, where it is found on the tombs of simple freed-

men, and in the Catacombs even it continues to be seen after the triumph of the Church, when there were no longer any martyrs. The palm may therefore very probably signify in a general way the triumph of the Christian over death through faith in the resurrection.

Many pictures in the subterranean cemeteries are, however, as we have already said, mere ornamental details, caprices of art, or even Pagan reminiscences. The most ancient specifically Christian symbols are the anchor and the fish, the latter adopted on various titles, taken in several senses, but principally as offering a pious anagram in its Greek name. The human figures which return oftenest are the *Orantes* and the Good Shepherd. *Orantes* is the name given to female figures, standing in the attitude of prayer, with their arms outstretched from the body and lifted towards heaven; prayer, kneeling with the hands joined, does not belong to this period. There are also men *Orantes* in the attitude of which we speak, but they occur more rarely. The Orans sometimes represented the defunct herself, arrived at the contemplation of God, as the proper names inscribed at the side prove; but the symbolical sense imposes itself oftenest, and the Orans, then, seem to represent the glorified soul without distinction of sex. The type of the Good Shepherd, of which we have already spoken, and in which we have pointed out a Christian artistic conception, is still more remarkable as a manifestation of religious thought. It is the first of the representations of Christ, and a representation characteristic of the faith of which it is the expression. M. Roller has seized with acuteness the sense of this image, and the feeling of which it is the product. This shepherd is Jesus, if you like, but it is neither the man nor God, in the theological acceptance of these words,—it is the Divine Master given under the traits furnished by a parable of the Master himself, and consequently in a manner in some way authentic, without any effort of the imagination, without profanation or abasement; a discovery of true feeling and of delicate tact, a type at the same time which comes near the traditions of antiquity, art, which has a decorative value, and allows the Christian artist to draw upon his models or his reminiscences.

Other representations of Christ appear by little and little in the Catacombs. In following their succession we recognise the transformation of religious feeling, the work of dogmatic

crystallisation, in which it becomes fixed, to the manifest detriment of its primitive geniality. It was also led to this by the force of circumstances. Souvenirs, in proportion as they leave the events behind them, take another physiognomy; they become history, that is to say, something fixed and enlarged. This change is visible between the beginning and the end of the third century. The symbolical proceeding becomes an historical one; the facts which furnished emblems become real scenes. Here is a baptism of Jesus, of the third century, almost anecdotal, so realistic is it: the baptized One, half-plunged in the water of the Jordan, John the Baptist holding out his hand to help him out, and a big pigeon flying above. But history, in its turn, is transformed, and becomes dogma. The Christ of the fourth century tends to the supernatural; he reigns, he judges, he takes the nimbus; decorative painting is turning into the hieratic image.

The most notable transformation of the Christian sentiment is indubitably that which is revealed in the history of the Crucifix. It was impossible for Christian faith to ignore the punishment of the cross, this bloody sacrifice which already takes so large a place in several of the apostolic Epistles. But the piety of these early times, as it manifests itself in the Catacombs, did not willingly lay hold on these souvenirs. It was too simple, too serene, and, I dare to say so, too healthy. It preferred the Master teaching and healing, or, later, the Christ reigning and triumphing, to the Victim nailed on the bloody tree. Therefore, it is a very curious fact that the cross, even as a symbol, does not appear in the Catacombs before the fourth century. It may, perhaps, be hidden in the anchor, or in the masts of Jonas's ship, but it does not form a part of Christian imagery. M. de Rossi does not hesitate to recognise this. "The monuments," says he, "which are being every day discovered in larger numbers, in reality constantly teach that the Roman cross at least was very rarely in use before the fourth century, and was only in solemn use during the fifth"—and after all he is only speaking of the recognised and symbolical signs. The crucifix, properly so called, is absolutely foreign to the Catacombs, or, what comes to the same thing, it has only been introduced as an afterthought, in later times, when Popes took their pleasure in decorating the subterranean burying-grounds, which had become objects

of veneration. The only representation of Christ on the cross which has been found is a fresco, which, says M. de Rossi, "is certainly not anterior to the seventh century."

M. Roller quotes somewhere an observation which is not out of place here :—

"The monuments of Christian art," says M. Grimouard de Saint-Laurent, "are distinguished by a central idea which gives them all a common physiognomy : that of deliverance and resurrection, of healing and immortality ; it is fundamentally an idea of triumph, beneficent triumph, the peaceful reign of Christ, victory over the world, death, and sin. Baptism, martyrdom, were even triumphs in their estimation. To represent martyrdom, those persecuted ones never chose other symbols than marvellous ones of the Divine protection and the powerlessness of the punishment ; the three young Hebrews giving thanks in the furnace ; Daniel in the lions' den. The Crucifix is the image of death ; the children of the martyrs only wished to see life. During the early ages, the death of the Saviour was recalled by the symbol of the lamb, but they would not represent this innocent victim slain, they must depict it living. The Christians were not satisfied with seeing Christ himself living, they must have him triumphant."

To meet with the Madonna as well as the Crucifix we must have recourse to the Middle Ages. The Catacombs have neither the Holy Family, nor Joseph, nor the Virgin with the nimbus ; we find the mother of Jesus with the Child in a very ancient fresco, but without any of the attributes of glory or holiness. The peculiarity of this interesting representation is the simply historical character which distinguishes it. Were it not for the prophetic star which shines above, and to which a second person is pointing with his finger, we might see nothing more than a Christian mother holding her child. In a word, we are in presence, not of a sacred picture but of a Biblical scene—thus almost all the characteristic elements of the faith of the following centuries escape us, in the critical examination of our Roman crypts. They do not know, I mean those of the first three centuries, either the Primacy of Peter, or the Invocation of the Saints, or the Intercession of the dead in favour of the living, or the Eucharist separate from the Agapè or fraternal repast. The priest, or rather the elder (for the Greek word which has been made into priest has as yet no sacerdotal character), may have another profession ; one is found to have been a physician, another was married and had been buried along with his wife. The bishop of Rome is only designated by his title of bishop ; the name as well as the idea of *Pope* is absent. This does not, however, prove that the Papacy was not

in course of formation. It was so virtually from the moment that the Church of Rome was the only Church in the West of apostolic origin, and that it united in itself besides the two eminent distinctions of tracing its foundation to the prince of the Apostles, and of sharing the glory and the destinies of the ancient capital of the world.

There are two points upon which it seems that the Catacombs ought to have been particularly eloquent,—veneration of the martyrs and Christian ideas of immortality. The martyrs before all. There was a time when it was believed that the crypts were peopled by them, when a tool could not be met with without it being looked upon as an instrument of torture, nor an *ampulla* attached to a tomb without the supposition that it had contained the blood of a martyr. People did not ask how this blood had been taken up, and taken up liquid. There was red dust at the bottom of the vase, and that was enough; most probably the vial had contained perfume or wine. Mabillon had also expressed his surprise, even more than that, his “displeasure, to see that in so great a number of inscriptions a word is never said of violent death *pro Christo*.” There is in the crypt, called that of Pope Eusebius, a very remarkable painting, which may be said to be unique of its kind. It dates from the third century, and represents the judgment of a Christian condemned, to all appearance, for having refused to sacrifice to the Emperor. But no representation of punishments is to be found either in the frescoes or in the sculptures of the first centuries. The symbol of Daniel in the lions’ den takes their place. The same feeling which prevented the early Christians from representing the crucifixion of the Master prevented them from reproducing the horrible scenes of the persecutions. Besides this, a certain time must elapse ere respect becomes transformed into devotion. Devotion to the martyrs appears only in the fourth century, and it is true that it takes at once a large place.

It is in the third century, when inscriptions are multiplying and becoming more expansive, that the expression of wishes in favour of the dead appear. It is hoped that the deceased rests “in peace,” or “in the fellowship of the saints.” His friends wish it for him; nothing more precise. No allusion to Purgatory nor Hell. What is desired for the beloved ones, from whom they have been separated, is the *Refrigerium*,

refreshment, that is—for this is the exact sense of the word—a place at the celestial banquet. As regards prayer for the dead, M. Rossi allows that he cannot yet give full and satisfactory proof that it was practised before the third century, until he has gathered up all the inscriptions relating to it. There is no doubt, however, that, by little and little, the wish became a prayer, and that prayer for the dead produced the demand for their intercession, and the invocation of the saints. At the end of the fourth century this is usual.

I cannot conclude this subject, and the study of M. Roller's book, better than by some of the reflections with which he sums up his researches upon the religious faith of which the Catacombs are the monument. We find in them the spirit of circumspection and moderation, which in an eminent degree distinguishes the whole work :—

“Between the conceptions which the paintings in the Catacombs reveal,” writes our author, “those of the three first centuries at all events, and the modern fashion of understanding, and exposing religious or ecclesiastical notions, there is a deeper distinction than a simple difference of doctrines. The Catacombs show that the current of primitive Christian thought followed quite another direction than ours does. According to the age of the underground cemeteries, the attentive observer remarks the shades of the moral state revealed by iconography, according to the periods. The first is so serene that we may call it sometimes joyous : flowers, fruits, children playing, capricious genii, a vine, pastorals and shepherds, country and aquatic scenes, creations in which simplicity predominates, which might hide a mystic thought, but which have nothing of the hideous asceticism of the Middle Ages. The symbolical mysticism of the third, the historical allegories of the fourth centuries, have as yet nothing severe nor austere. As the fifth dawns, we can trace the preludes of the Passion, and the rigours of the Cross, which it holds up as its banner, can be guessed at ; but in none of the ages of the Catacombs does Christianity clothe itself in the sombre character that it takes up in the Middle Ages. The reason is, because it came as a comforter and a liberator, not as a master and a despot. . . .

“ . . . So many powerful ideas and energetic sentiments supposed at least the elements of a doctrine as firm as it was simple, which, already in the books of doctors, was beginning to clothe itself in formulæ, and which would soon, through the decisions of Councils, find its expression fixed, thus becoming theology. By these transformations it lost somewhat of that wide view of truth, of that strength of love, which was the privilege of those who knew how to live and to sacrifice themselves, if need be, before scientifically reasoning ; but before this, by the devotedness which it inspired, this simple faith had astonished the ancient world, as its energetic charity attracted and ended by conquering it.”

E. SCHÉRRER.

ART. III.—*Have we an Ethical Substitute for Christianity?*

IN other words, suppose Christianity were to vanish away, have we any moral force to take its place? Has any principle been discovered, which, fitting into the sphere left by this once mighty religion, could undergird society, support in activity its varied life, and bear it on to higher perfection? Such is the question which is being asked by not a few thoughtful men at present. Imbued with the positivist spirit, impatient of mystery, and insisting on verification in the rigid scientific sense of every belief, they do not so much disprove Christianity as set it aside, and endeavour to carry on the world's business without its help. Whether they profess to be able to see how this can be done, or whether they dwell yet in "the Golgotha of the No, where peace is not appointed them," it is toward this they tend. And it is beyond question that of recent years hope has been rising. Evolution, with its superb generalisation, has awakened an intense scientific enthusiasm, and not only are men striving down at the boundaries of life to reduce all the phenomena of the world under the single law of mechanical development, but up at the apex they are seeking to bring moral and social life under the action of the same principle, in the faith that it will be equal in time to the full natural development of humanity.

For ourselves, we are glad that rationalism has taken this practical direction. While like Milton's angels we fight in the thin air of abstract conceptions, there is no end to our debate; but when we touch the solid ground of fact, a very complete and sufficient test of truth and error will speedily be found. This change too alters the relations of the combatants. While we may doubt, or even wholly disbelieve in, the ability of philosophers to conserve and advance by any human system of morals the higher life of man, we yet cannot quarrel with their spirit and aim. So far as the good of the world is concerned they are identical with our own. Our belief in Christianity is not a traditional or superstitious one. It is grounded in experiment and observation as truly as the strongest beliefs of science are. We are convinced that Christianity, in its own

proper character as a revelation of God, can work in the individual and in the world a moral and spiritual life which cannot otherwise be attained. The good of humanity then is paramount with us both. Having a common practical aim, we differ only as to the means. Surely then this fact should of itself import into the controversy a nobler spirit. While we certainly can never forget the magnitude of the issue and all that is involved in it, and while we believe that the soberer of those opposed to us cannot themselves anticipate the vanishing of faith for which they long without awe, and it may be trembling at the prospect of such a revolution, the conviction that in common, if diversely, we are contending honestly for the safety and welfare of the republic of humanity, should inspire mutual respect, and create a strong disposition to candour and forbearance.

We may now state the grounds on which we ask for a respectful hearing on this great question. And at once would we renounce the delusive pretension of being absolutely uncommitted on it. No more than those opposed to us do we stand at the centre of indifference. They have espoused certain positive conclusions of reason, with which, as with a mental stock-in-trade, they are working to complete results. We, on grounds of reason, have accepted a positive faith, and are seeking to realise its ideal. Both are committed equally, or, if there be any difference, their committal is the more complete, who cut and carve at human experience, refusing an honest meaning to all evidence making for the supernatural, and rigidly confining themselves within the section of human experience which admits of a naturalistic explanation. We cannot then allow that, as compared with the other side, we are less advantageously situated for a candid and free discussion of this question. For the truth's sake they are unbelievers and we believers. We both seek further truth, and cast our all on the arbitration of fact.

But over and above this we have a right to be heard, and with the utmost profit may be heard, on this theme. We are in possession of the ground which those who oppose us wish to occupy. Whatever view they take of Christianity, they cannot deny the fact that for eighteen hundred years it has been the great conserving and energising force of European society. On

the conceptions of human and Divine relations to which it gave currency, the whole framework of modern as distinguished from ancient government is built. For the most part the sanctions of law are its sanctions. Essentially, the very foundations of human order have been the principles of a changeless Divine order brought to light in God's Word. It is Christianity that has invested human nature with dignity, fired it with the spirit of liberty, and inbreathed the warm glow of an expansive charity. It provides motives which can control the commonplace millions, considerations which govern with equal accuracy of influence the gifted few. As the planets are kept in ordered motion by a force far beyond themselves, so human order and progress have ever been best secured,—have passed into most stable equilibrium,—when men have most fully acknowledged the attraction of a future life and an unseen God. This as matter of fact cannot be denied. Allowing all deductions which have to be made on account of human nature's failure through ignorance or perversity to grasp and apply Christianity, not one of these assertions can be fairly disputed. Well, then, after a practice of eighteen hundred years, may not those who have administered Christianity be supposed to know what the needs of men are, or, at least, what will be required from any moral system which undertakes in room of Christianity to sustain and feed from its own life the vast and infinitely complicated organism of human society?

But further, inasmuch as every effort to find a substitute for Christianity involves an attack upon it, which attack unsettles many who, while the substitute is undiscovered, have no other refuge, we, who as yet have a refuge for them, are bound to watch these efforts, to expose unwarranted pretensions, and to insist that if we cede our time-honoured place, we cede it only to a system that can do better for mankind than our own. This we must do in the interests of the republic of humanity, whose good we both profess to seek.

Assuming, then, this position, we now proceed to state some difficulties of a general character which hinder us from accepting as at all complete the proof led in behalf of any of the new religions of Science, and which compel us to look around for an adequate test of their sufficiency. And first, they have not yet got beyond the stage of private opinion. They exist

only on paper. And, surely, if paper constitutions for the mere civil government of a country, have again and again been found utterly unreliable, it is wise to cherish a healthy scepticism regarding all attempts at the vaster and more complicated problem of creating a moral government for the highest life of man. While affirming this, I am aware that the pure lives and elevated characters of not a few rationalists, are adduced as evidence of the moral effect of their doctrines. Yet with every disposition to be fair, and recognising gladly the excellencies to which reference is made, we do not see that the evidence is either relevant or important. These men came into a world whose moral standards were fixed hundreds of years before they were born. They have inhaled the influence of a Christian civilisation from their earliest years. They have taken their place in a web of human relationships, determined at every point by the beliefs of society. If, then, they have gained, even in a high degree, the culture of society, it is no more than what we might expect. Again, the few who inaugurate any movement are picked men, who would be higher, calmer, stronger than their fellows, whether believers or unbelievers. That, then, is no proof that these systems are able to bear the pressure of a world's needs. The most that can be allowed for them is, that they have not so militated against nobility of character as to prevent its growth. We must have individuals insulated from all other influences, and not only elect men high in intellect and cool in emotion, who take kindly to restraint, but others strong in passion and dull in intellect, and still others through whose natures runs a strain of inherited perversity and self-will, ere we can have any demonstration of the success of these systems worthy the name.

But further, we are very far from certain that these systems are stated on paper as they would work out in actual life. In iron ships the needle is being acted on, it may be, deflected, by the whole surrounding mass of metal; and it is undeniable that an analogous extraneous influence determines the peculiar development of modern Utilitarianism and the moral theories based on Evolution. Girt round by a Christianity, which has won for its ideals of self-surrender and self-sacrifice general admiration, our modern theorists have been eager to show that

they could include love and sacrifice, in the form of Altruism, in their system. But it is one thing to show that a system can admit of such a development, and quite another to prove that, uninfluenced from without, and under the pressure of human passion and necessities, it would inevitably take that course. If surmises are worth anything, it could be shown that they exist in greater force against than for this supposition. But leaving these out of account, we rest content with affirming that, as yet, sufficient tests have not been met, nor has any adequate proof been led in the case.

What, then, is to be done in such circumstances as these to bring this matter to a satisfactory issue? Seeing that direct proof is still wanting, mayhap we may light on some considerations of an indirect character, which may help us to understand the nature of the problem, and carry us some way at least toward a rational conclusion. What suggests itself to us as the most likely course is, to search for some historical parallel which may bring up the practical conditions to be satisfied more clearly than any reasoning can.

Well, is there such a parallel? We believe it will be found there is,—a most exact and complete parallel, covering the whole ground, and such as cannot fail, whatever our standpoint may be, to supply us with valuable material for decision. I refer back to the civilised world before the coming of Christ, or at least before the emergence of Christianity into Rome. Here we have a society, once believing, but which had lost its faith. It had outgrown its beliefs, as many suppose we have done. And its practical problem was that which we are now discussing, viz., Is it possible without religion to maintain in stable equilibrium and harmonious inter-relation the vast organism of civilisation? Here the great mass of cultivated men were so free from the arresting influences of an ancestral cultus, and society had so entirely ceased to be dominated by religious convictions, that the native and full effect, both on the individual and on society, of any intellectual or philosophic influence, could be exactly estimated. And such influences abounded. The age covering the period of the emergence of Christianity into Rome was as self-conscious, as literary, as manifold in its æsthetic and philosophical tendencies as our own. Indeed the close resemblance which in all intellectual respects it sustains

to the present has struck very many. As everything, however, in such a historical comparison depends on breadth and dispassionateness of view, it may be well to sustain this assertion by some proof in detail.

And here, though but in a sentence, we must refer to the political condition of the Empire, which at that time was a synonym for civilisation. In its origin, that Empire had furnished the highest example of political organisation. In its history it had displayed the vastest resources, on the side of government, which any nation had ever attained to. It touched a height of power unequalled in the ancient world. But at last even the lust of conquest was satisfied. Ambition grew weary of its burden. Men woke to the consciousness of other and higher ends. Art, literature, philosophy, drew off the finer spirits of the time. Meanwhile government, once the supreme concern, became a prize for craft and ambition. Abuses rushed in. Power was scrambled for with unblushing avarice, was used with lustful and at times diabolical caprice.

Meanwhile, "upon a hill retired," the great bulk of the nation were engrossed in intellectual pursuits. Many passionately studied an exotic art. Others, sickened with the present, turned to simpler and manlier times, and worshipped, merely with a literary enthusiasm, their heroes. Multitudes found relief in fiction, which in the form of dramatic studies of every-day life engrossed universal attention. Poetry had become almost a trade. The age of invention past, criticism of language and artistic form was a well-paid and honoured profession. Rhetoricians went from place to place gathering crowds and appropriating salaries which even our great moderns would not refuse.

But more important than all this was the influence exerted by the two great philosophic creeds of that time. Two classes of thinkers were of set purpose grappling with the very difficulty facing us, trying to provide, each along its own lines, a sufficient theory of being and doing for the practical needs of men. The one acknowledged the general name Epicurean, the others that of Stoic. At the root of the Epicurean's position, and controlling all his speculations, was a mechanical theory of the universe. All that was, was an affair of physical force. There was no purpose in nature, but only the iron sequence of

material law. Therefore man's supreme law, since there was no Being to whom he owed obedience, was his own good. Virtue was only relative—a means to good, not in itself supreme. Society was to be maintained, because it secured a larger measure of good to the individual, and eliminated possible evils. Such was the general outline of thought this system contained.

We need hardly, to complete our parallel, take up the Stoic system, inasmuch as those who, with fairness, might be classed with its followers, display as yet no confidence that they have found a succedaneum for the Christian faith. Having now then in barest outline marked the features of that age, I have to ask, Did that philosophy, helped by all these adjuncts of literature, arrest decay, infuse new life, reorganise society? The answer is patent to all. It totally failed,—as every human system in that day did fail. Nobody disputes,—the facts will not admit of dispute,—that it was a religion, Jewish in origin, that, accepted as a veritable revelation of God, effected the resuscitation of the world.

Now here at once we light on two practical questions, the answers to which should carry us far to the solution of our problem, namely, first, What were the grounds of failure in Epicureanism, and in what way are these met in modern scientific theories? and then, secondly, What were the sources of Christianity's special power in the first century, and in what way has that power ceased to be equal to the exigencies of the race? Here, I submit, we grapple with the question on cleared ground, where a conclusion may be reached.

And first let us consider the question more immediately germane to the subject in hand. And here we must say, after giving the matter some attention, that it seems to us, that we are being urged in the interests of theories of morality, to repeat on a large scale a social experiment, which has really in substance been sufficiently tried before, with results known to us all. In saying this we would not be supposed to indicate that we consider the moral systems of Epicurus and modern theorists identical, although we think the general resemblance is too obvious to be denied. Nor do we hold that the world is at the stage it occupied eighteen hundred years ago. We are perfectly prepared to give weight to everything that may be considered

distinctive in the modern position. We are quite ready to allow that, in the course of so many centuries, the stock of human nature has been enriched with new perceptions and aptitudes, throwing the weight more definitely into the scale of the higher nature. Yet this is what we cannot overcome. At the stage of moral development which the world had reached eighteen hundred years ago, society was in a far better position than it is now for being influenced by just such moral systems as Epicureanism, and those which resemble it more closely in modern times. The doctrine of individualism, which has been forced into prominence by all the events of past centuries, was then practically unknown. For centuries men were taught that the State was the supreme entity, and that the individuals were but means to securing its good, attaining their own happiness in subordination to this master end. In other words, the ancients held in their own way the very cardinal principle of Herbert Spencer's philosophy, "that the life of the social organism must as a rule rank above the lives of its units." This being so, then society was prepared for the philosophers. They had only to come in, when the older ideals were relaxing their hold, and substitute broader and more philosophic considerations to fall heirs at once to the reverence and submission of the world. Trained to subserviency, and even to self-obliteration, in the interests of empire, men would have substituted the new ideal for the old, and the business of the world would have gone on.

But here was the vice of the scientific morality of that time. It had no ideal. It could present no bond of common action. It was powerless to create enthusiasm. It killed patriotism. Men were instructed to regulate their public duties and sacrifices for their fellows purely by the standard of individual self-interest. All real liberty was denied to the will, so that the sense of responsibility, like an uprooted plant, died. The law of God, as the governing consideration of life, and as the will-centre round which men might gather, was denied any room or place. And so man himself—a mere effect of law and creation of force, as much as a flower or a star—was shut in, being gifted with consciousness for an end so mean, to the narrow stage of his own petty pleasures and conveniences. Now, man being such as he is, and as he has always been,—

what could be the issue of such teaching? Why, only what took place, namely, an acceleration of decay. This system of thought ministered to the disease it professed to cure. It is only on grounds of moral indifferentism, which, however they may be vaunted by literary and æsthetic critics, can surely never be occupied by those who aspire to be moral leaders of mankind,—it is only on these grounds that the force of this fact, worth a thousand arguments, can be evaded.

And now it will be seen that modern scientific morality comes into the field heavily weighted. It is compelled, if it would be listened to by the great mass of intelligent men, to neutralise these evil tendencies. It must point out, specifically, on what of new it bases its hopes of success and claims to allegiance. And the more earnestly it undertakes this, the greater will its difficulties appear. Substantially, the moral system of evolution stands on the foundation of Epicureanism. It is based on a mechanical theory of the universe. It gets rid, at one sweep, of all the constraint to virtue which springs from the inner absolute conviction of duty, and of the unifying influence of a single Divine Will, dominant over men. Primarily, each man's own good is that man's only law. True, he sees that for high and permanent wellbeing, as well as for avoidance of injuries, he needs association with his fellows, and so he enters into contract with them, and permits limitations of his own liberty, and even incurs partial sacrifices, in order to secure these blessings. But his own good is his standard and law.

Thus far the two systems are identical. And therefore, thus far, in ages so closely resembling each other, the moral effects must be held to be similar. And further, a more particular survey of the relative conditions of the two eras convinces us that almost every evil influence traceable to such systems in the first century would be exaggerated in the nineteenth. Whatever view of Christianity we take, we must hold that it evoked a higher reverence, aroused an intenser enthusiasm, and laid a heavier burden on conscience than ancient heathenism ever did. Destroy that reverence then, replace that enthusiasm by shame at having yielded to a delusion, break every fetter of obligation, and you will have such a rebound into licence as the world has never seen. Again, under the reign of Chris-

tianity, life has had a wide, a limitless horizon, and, under the attraction of an overhanging eternity, affections, aspirations, and courses of life, have been evolved, which need a future life for their justification and support. Can any of us, who have witnessed the action, reaction, and wild confusion of arrested motion, conceive, without awe, the probable consequences of the rigid repression of human hopes and aims within the limit of our mortal life? Cold detached individuals may school themselves into calm, but we have not to do with a handful of these, but with a whole world of eager, impulsive, and suffering men. And more: for eighteen hundred years, the governing portion of the civilised world have believed in a great Personal Centre, acting freely from love on human free wills, and that belief has called out a wondrous display of self-sacrifice. Investigate the historic origin of any beneficent institution, and you will find traces of multitudes of lives freely sacrificed, without a thought of fame, to secure that good for man. The triumph of the right, the friendship of an All-Perfect and Glorious One, and the conviction of a life to come, in which all the "long results of time" could be enjoyed, charmed them out of themselves into voluntary and enthusiastic surrender. Let that faith however vanish, let loveless, soulless, iron, natural law reign supreme, let death bring for body and soul eternal night in its train, and what a chill, as from a damped-out sun, will shiver across the world! The motive which has evoked the highest virtue will be effaced. The great moral and spiritual influence which enabled peoples to lay in blood the foundations of civil and religious liberty, will have gone utterly, as life forsakes our clay. And what shall now stem the tide of passion, and short-sighted interest and class-prejudices, when they rise up, as they always do, to throttle every reform, we cannot tell. Faith, with its God and its future, could give a life, if nought else would do, and so win its way. But what earth-bound prudence, with life in the present as its little all—what it could do, in these circumstances, has yet to be seen.

We have gone thus at length into this matter, because we deem it of the first importance. These are possible—we should say, probable—effects of the substitution of this new philosophy for the Christian faith. Yea, we go further, and affirm that,

from the unhindered action of those principles of the philosophy we have just studied, they are certain to occur. If they are not to occur then, if the crisis is to be safely passed, if the ship is to right itself immediately after the new hand is on the helm, and the new course is taken, these effects must be neutralised. To what are the teachers of this philosophy trusting for this? Surely we need specific answers on this point!

Well, I think it will be generally admitted that what, more than anything else, has awakened hope in the practical adequacy of scientific morality, has been the progress made by the doctrine of Evolution. This hypothesis,—for as yet it is nothing more,—is so vast in its sweep, including under one general law the development and differentiation of all existences from some primitive germ, that wherever it is received it must exert a powerful influence and awaken a high intellectual enthusiasm. Might not this scientific interest take the place which religion hitherto has occupied? Might not the conviction, profoundly and widely realised, that we belong to a living whole, and that we are links in a vast ascending stream of law working up through brute force, through life, and through consciousness, to some far and high future, spur us to make the good of the organism our supreme law, and thus keep us acting from high motives and to noble ends?

Now nothing is easier at this stage than to draw fanciful pictures of scientific paradises. But legislators must have some respect to the actual condition of things. Well, first, to mention perhaps the least important criticism at the outset, it is extremely doubtful whether the scientific interest can ever take the place of the religious, in dominating the thought of the world. For, notice, while duty is paramount, it is immediately central to all personal engagements and concerns. The great world moves, and man's little world moves round the axis of duty. Under the new régime, what is central in the individual is his own happiness. Knowledge only saps in from without, widening, as the intellectual faculties permit, the mind's vision, and correspondingly its idea of individual happiness; and then from a laborious calculation of what is owing to the State and to society at the hands of an intelligent selfishness, the public action of the individual

ensues. How can any one say that there is the same immediacy and imperativeness in the new force that there is in the old? Again, while the old force acted with equal power over all classes, exerting its most felt pressure on the millions, without intellectual resources, and thus securing a broad base of social order, this new force will weaken as the intellectual area of men diminishes, till at last on the floor of earth, over the working millions living immediate unreflecting lives, it will have no power at all.

But not only is this new interest more contracted in its range. As warring against fierce lusts and strong self-will, it will, so far as we can see, exert a less powerful influence than religion, even over those whom it most fully affects. For, however Christianity originated, this is certain, it took a most tremendous hold, in the cause of right, of the individual will. Let Shakespeare be our witness here. Look at Richard III., look at Hamlet's father, look at Macbeth. How they are shut in to the prison of self-condemnation, paralysed in face of duty, by the consciousness of sin! That, on one side of it, was the kind of control exerted by religion, for centuries, over the exuberant rude barbarism of Europe,—a control on the whole beneficent, if it be true that here and there the Church took on the stain of the society with which it grappled. Have our new theories of morals any resource so absolute and resistless as that, should civilisation suffer invasion of barbarism to-day, as it did in Rome at the commencement of our era? Yea, has it anything, in an intense conflict of emotions, which can present itself with the same authority as in a religious man a word of God can? No! Even to a philosopher, self-interest is nearer and stronger than any impersonal stream of law, than any dimly conceived ideal good for humanity, to which his contribution, in any act, could only be as a drop to the ocean. Before the "Thou shalt" of an omniscient God, sophistications and self-created difficulties die, but with man his own judge, his own law, and his own end, they would have unhindered play, with moral results sickening to contemplate.

Then this new scientific interest has immeasurably less to give. It denies immortality. It dethrones God from active moral government of His creatures, involving His very existence in uncertainty. And so it takes away what have been up till now the two main motives to nobility and self-sacrifice.

True, it substitutes what it thinks will yet prove stronger, as being higher motives than these, viz., an immortality of influence and the ideal of human perfection. But if you narrow the range of life, you destroy the intrinsic grandeur of it. Some sixty years of existence in a human environment, and with purely human possibilities,—what is there in that to make us forego pleasure, and endure sacrifice, to secure it for those who come after? Grant even that by intense toil along with others in sanitary, social, and political reform, we could help lift the average life to seventy years, and improve indefinitely the conditions of existence, would that be an end justifying and even necessitating our self-obliteration, so far as present enjoyment is concerned, it being always kept in view that at the end of that time extinction ensued? The question answers itself. Here the new moralists have helped themselves to a doctrine of Christ's and have run it into absurdity. If we believe that each man is made in the image of God, and is endowed with immortality, that man's life takes on an immeasurable grandeur in our eyes. His choosing the right course, his pursuing the right path to that endless and boundless good, is intrinsically a matter of immense importance. If we, having eternity to spend, could by sacrificing a portion of time, or even the whole of it, secure the upward progress of this man, it would be worth doing. But then, notice, we have an eternity of rejoicing with the man in his upward progress, and, all the time of the sacrifice, we have direct contact with the great God in whom and for whom we are doing and enduring it. That is a course of conduct we can all appreciate. It is in the highest sense prudent and wise, as well as noble. Indeed, it is just an extension into eternity, and into the highest relations of life, of the principles that govern all the noblest men here. But this conditional immortality has not a single analogy in the existing state of things, to which it can point. It would have men, in these sixty years of hard-working and tried life, which is their all, no life succeeding, forego pleasures which they could enjoy, restrict themselves from liberties they would like to indulge, —in order to preserve and hand on a good and even improved government, to those whom they shall never see, in whose happiness they can never rejoice, but who in the far future, amid better conditions, may live longer, and enjoy a less

painful and burdensome life. One has great difficulty in getting so rid of the noble associations with which Christianity has invested immortality, as to be able fully to realise what a *caput mortuum* scientific morality puts in its place.

But, again, to the man who asserts his own good—the all-round development of his own nature—as his reason for indulging in what are regarded as unlawful and debasing pleasures, a philosopher like Herbert Spencer has nothing to say. For, according to this teacher, it is what the man regards as his happiness that is to govern him, and not the opinion of another. What the effect of particular acts may be is always left to be determined by the individual will, which at the very time may be powerfully moved in one direction. Can we expect then from such a tribunal an equitable decision? It is perfectly open, for instance, for an American disciple of Spencer to say (we quote from the large extracts given by Goldwin Smith in the *Contemporary Review* of February):—

“It would be very difficult to prove that nature prefers the true to the false. Everywhere she makes the false impression first, and only after years, or thousands of years, do we become able to detect her in her lies. Nature endows almost every animal with the faculty of deceit in order to aid it in escaping from the brute force of its superiors. Why, then, should not man be endowed with the faculty of lying, when it is his interest to appear wise concerning matters of which he is ignorant?”

Spencer himself too asserts that it is difficult to lay down any practical rules in particular circumstances, and once and again he shows himself in painful suspense, where a moral sense trained in the school of religion would utter a most certain sound. To say the very least, then, have we not here a moral guide, less wide, less certain in its decisions, less imperative than that which we are asked to cast away, opening the door to possible abuses from which we are now free, and conferring no additional moral gain that can be named?

But we must go further, and show that beyond the sweep of this scientific interest there are regions of human life, in which some of the finest graces of human character have been developed, which could only be affected disastrously by the subsidence of faith. For instance, what has this new morality to say with regard to the treatment of the incurable, the insane, the lapsed, and the criminal? Its great law is that, in the

struggle for existence, the fittest must survive, and the weakest go to the wall. And, as for instance in his *Study of Sociology*, Spencer shows that he accepts the consequences of his scientific position, inveighing against modern philanthropy. According to the new theory, then, if a man be wounded beyond hope of healing, humanity has lost its interest in him. He cannot contribute to the good of the whole, but is only a drain on its energies. Since he must die sooner or later, it were better for the State if he died at once. This is the inevitable outcome of the doctrine of Evolution. The same reasoning holds with regard to those other classes just mentioned. What a drain on the energies and wealth of the world, the maintenance of the insane! Why spend time and labour on the too often thankless task of raising the sunken and criminal? Economically it does not pay. Better get rid of them, then, and more room will be left for the energetic and well-disposed. Yea, since now religious scruples are at an end, since man is an animal only specially developed, why stickle at the principle of making away with our social drags? It is the only course in keeping with evolution principles.

Yet nothing could be more abhorrent to the common feeling of the world. Some of the finest graces, some of the noblest characteristics of the human spirit, have been developed in ministering to the suffering and in raising the lapsed. Treasures of thought and character have come to us from sick-beds which the world would not let die. Again, men have been bred in the struggle to raise the fallen at home, and the savage abroad, who have become examples of fortitude and nobility to mankind. And more, only the conviction of the inalienable dignity of man as immortal and divinely created could inspire men to grapple with the task of the regeneration of the heathen. The mission enterprise is against the survival of the fittest doctrine. At least no evolutionist has looked so far ahead as to be convinced, and act on the conviction, that the moral elevation of the heathen might be for the good of the whole. Yet already civilisation has profited in an increased commerce, and in a widely extended knowledge from that enterprise.

Thus on every side would life be lowered by the exclusive predominance of this new morality. Its aims would be circumscribed. Its finest feelings would be killed. These high

and beautiful human relations that thrill the heart of man would henceforth, to say the least, have no justification of their existence. And considerations of individual and race advantage would prevail, to the obliteration of all those nobler impulses and finer blossomings of our nature, which, however they may be explained as scintillations of spirits divinely created and grander than their present environment, cannot be accounted for on utilitarian grounds, or vindicate themselves at a utilitarian tribunal.

And further, if morality based on evolution is to supersede all religions, it must find room and work for the energies and convictions that have gone to make up the religious nature. Hitherto this has been the mightiest thing in man, and has done more to mould the individual life of Europe than all other agencies combined. Any moral system that cannot contrive to draw the religious consciousness of man to its side, may fear failure. Well, have the leaders of this ethical revolution been able from their own standpoint to realise the significance of the religious factor in history and man? Have they been able to express the fundamental truths—whatever they were—which gave religion its strength, in the terms of their own system? To this we answer that so far as we know, no adequate and worthy effort of the kind has been made. The attitude towards faith has been purely hostile. Representations have been given of the doctrines of Christianity and of the motives and considerations it brings to bear on men, ludicrously aside from the truth, and in glaring contradiction to the moral effects of that faith. Now this bodes ill for the new system. Men do not gather grapes of thorns. Moral developments, which these teachers in the full light of the nineteenth century condescend to copy, and cannot even in thought advance beyond, must have had an origin worthy of themselves. And the system that cannot incorporate the forces of this development, cannot supersede the system in which these forces act. It is the fittest that survives. And the system that spontaneously grows results like those of Christianity, must conquer one which can only produce them by a kind of external galvanism applied to selfishness.

We have not, then, as yet got an ethical substitute for Christianity. The moral system which is vaunted to possess

quality has indeed really unsubdued, scarcely diminished, the defects of ancient Epicureanism, which Christianity superseded with ease, even when in its early and untried infancy. It may be of value, then, as completing our inquiry, ask in virtue of what, when all ancient philosophy failed, Christianity effect the moral regeneration of the world? Alas, we believe it was not primarily by the enunciation of moral principles, but by the revelation of a personal God entering into actual relation to men through a risen Redeemer. Was this, believed as a fact, which quickened a dead world. Was, either that revelation was a fact, or it was not a fact. If it were not a fact, then imposture has done what all the wisdom of men could not effect, has created a religion which inculcates morality to all engagements, whether divine or human,—in other words, righteousness as its fundamental requirement. But if that is a moral contradiction, it cannot be. We must therefore suppose the reality of the revelation, *i.e.* we must accept the supposition of this truth to the facts of its history, until these facts either confirm or discredit that supposition. Now this is certain, that going upon the idea of Christianity as a real communication from God, the first Christians found the facts corresponding. From causes infinitesimal to the human eye, results sprang which irresistibly suggested accompanying Divine power. Or, to put it from a different point of view, the supernatural continued to vindicate its existence in the world, as only we could expect it, in the new spiritual life it developed, in the new energy, beyond all natural agencies to produce, which it diffused through the world. And arising thus from its own centre, and for a long time by very great instrumentality, wholly outside the world of ancient thought, it grew till it commanded the gravest attention of the most philosophic; till it called off the intellect of the Roman Empire from all its old sources of interest, and engrossed them in the study and practice of its own great system; and this to such an extent that ancient literature practically dropped out of use. During all the creative period in which European communities were taking shape, and were beginning to develop and display what have since been national characteristics, it stood alone.

Well, what has happened to this superb elevating force, that it

should now leave the field? Is it betraying any sign of decay? Has it lost the power of individual regeneration? Perhaps it never displayed that power more widely than at this hour. Has it ceased, then, to evince its unequalled power in re-organising and raising decadent peoples? Why, in our time it has broken new ground, unstirred since history dawned. It is, before our eyes, working out results such as it did not attempt even in its great beginning. Grappling with sheer barbarism,—with bloodthirsty cannibals on the very borderline between man and the brute,—it has, out of that rudest and most unpromising material, already created orderly Christian commonwealths. Great civilisations, untouched by the spent wave of the apostolic outflow, are with the most wonderful rapidity being brought under its influence. And at home, in Europe, where it has been so long the great consolidating quickening force, it is displaying great vigour. The Mission enterprise, which has been so vigorously carried on, with results the vastness of which we are now beginning to see, is an outgrowth of this century. The Temperance reformation, which already has so powerfully affected the habits of the country, and which recently has risen so high in popular esteem, is a direct outcome of the Christian law of love. Then those who are not deterred by popular clamour from seeking facts, must have seen how wonderfully, not only individuals, but masses of men, have had their lives vivified and set on new planes of activity, by wave after wave of revival passing over the land. Never was there more religious zeal, and never did it take a more practical direction. But we must take a wider survey still, if we would see the irrepressible energy of Christianity in our time. Can any one doubt that it was the religion of our land which overthrew slavery? Who have been the advanced guard in all the reforms of the century but the great middle class, which of all classes in the community is most fully under the control of religion? And to-day what is the great motive force of the main reforms which, dim and vast, are brooding over us? It is Christianity. The ideas of religious and political equality, the present pleas for the abolition of privilege in Church and State, are bred of principles which Christianity has made current coin of thought.

Whence then comes the assertion, in face of such facts as

these, that "the old order changeth, yielding place to new"? It comes from the side of unbelief, which has risen to considerable proportions in our time. And further, it is an assertion based on theoretical considerations alone. Christianity, as supernatural, is contradicted by a purely naturalistic philosophy, and therefore we are told it must go. But Christianity was as fully contradicted by a materialistic philosophy at its first appearance, as it is to-day. Yet it made way. It asked to be accepted on the ground of what it could do for man. It vindicated its Divine origin to the intelligence and experience of men, by the magnitude of its results. And as we have seen, it is doing that to-day. On what does this materialistic philosophy itself, may we ask, ground its claim to acceptance? It is on this, that it gives a consistent and adequate explanation of the facts of experience. In the opinion of very many, more than materialism has ever been able to rally round its standard, Christianity, approaching the problem from a different point, gives a far more adequate explanation of things as they are, and not only so, but verifies its own reading of things as they are, by proceeding on its own lines to fill up the imperfections in the existing state of things, and to round it off into an exquisitely fit and inviting ideal, which it has given abundant earnest of being able to realise.

When materialism has given half the justification for its acceptance as a philosophy that Christianity has given for being received in its proper character as a Divine revelation, it may speak, but not till then. "But," some one says, "if it be as you hold, how can you explain the phenomenon of unbelief at such a stage in the history of the Church?" To this, we think, a real if not a complete answer can be given. And we have this initial advantage, that our answer is respectful, and to some extent, honouring to our adversaries. We are not under the necessity, as they seem to be, of ascribing to causes glaringly improbable and unworthy, the origin and maintenance of the highest and greatest moral force in the world. We are not forced to the surely unwelcome and invidious position of justifying our own reason, by convicting all past generations, whose labours we have inherited, of unreason and delusion. We are not compelled to create, by the violence of our suppositions, the suspicion that we ourselves are at sea. All this

can with great appearance of reason (and as we think, with more than appearance) be alleged against those opposed to us, but when we reverse the direction of our investigations, and place unbelief itself under the microscope, we can give an explanation of its existence, as we said, not dishonouring to it, and reassuring to the intelligent believer.

Though Christianity be, as we believe, a Divine revelation, yet it has to be wrought into the stuff of human nature, through human agents that are only growing into the knowledge of it as they propagate it. In its first manifestations, then, it must stoop to the limitations of faculties lately redeemed from heathenism; it must take shape in minds, still enswathed in the mists of debased feeling, and governed by the erroneous conceptions and ideals which till recently held sway in its teachers' souls. It is inevitable, then, that early Christianity should take on corruptions which only further realisations of its own living spirit can expel. In this way, carnal ideas of authority and rule got into the very organism of the Church. In this way too, the just claims of reason to absolute rights in its own sphere of experience, came to be overridden by dominant faith. And accordingly, in course of time, there was reaction. Reason, rightly as we think, asserted its claim. In the field of nature it must be influenced only by observation and experiment; in other fields purely by the evidence proper to them. Thus only could natural truth be discovered. But now itself has gone over to the other extreme. Reason to-day would override Faith, would deny it a separate and independent sphere. Every system antagonistic to Christianity has had its rise in this root-tendency, to find within reason, and through its activity, a complete explanation of all that is. And because of this one-sidedness has modern rationalism run its course so soon. The ancient thinkers, in the dark, and crying for light, were loyal to every side of their nature, to every aspect of things, and therefore did they rise so high, and for so long keep hold of truths that could partially, at least, sustain the life of man. Modern speculation has not been equally catholic. It has, in no one system of thought, given full and unprejudiced consideration to the religious element in history and man. It has gone upon the principle of minimising all facts making against the basis of their theories, till now it has reached the

blank of materialism, beyond which there is no way for the spirit, and from which it must seek refuge in faith.

And Christianity, purified in the fires of controversy, having learned now through sore travail, that while it dominates all spheres indirectly, its peculiar region is the will, and respecting the independent position of reason within its own sphere, is fitted to be a refuge for all that is highest and best in the culture of our time. Many of the noblest and best find it so even now. We must not forget that Christianity has never been without its trophies and ornaments in the highest walks of thought, and is not without them to-day. There is then no ground of reason against, but on the contrary, in the barrenness and insufficiency of modern speculation, every reason for, indulging the expectation that we are on the edge of a new era of faith, and that, in the enthusiasm created by fresh conquests, both in the field of the world and in the field of religious thought, unbelief will after a time suffer obscurity, reappearing mayhap further on, when fresh abuses, arising out of the as yet unreconciled human, again rise to a head, tarnishing and obscuring the faith. At all events, whether we have forecast the future in any measure aright, or no, we have to thank past and present conflicts with unbelief, for much. The Church is not holding its faith to-day as a tradition or as a transmitted creed. It has been driven back into living contact with its Divine Head. It is nearer the Apostolic standpoint than it has been for centuries. It is basing its appeal to men on what Christ has done for and in men, and can do. And yet it is not divorced from its Biblical basis and creeds; only, under stress of opposition, it has been rediscovering their spiritual significance, and rising by means of them into a fresh vision of God.

JOHN SMITH.

ART. IV.—*The Exchange of Places.*

THE juridical procurement, righteously and consistently with Divine honour, of redemption's grace to guilty and spiritually dead sinners; and the actual administration and bestowal of it; proceed upon the all-embracing and most simplifying covenant arrangement of an *exchange of places* between the Redeemer and the redeemed. It is nowhere stated, in the general theorem, as distinguished from a particular case (to use the language of geometricians), more beautifully than in 2 Cor. viii. 9 :—"For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich." The words announce to us the splendid and wonderful arrangement made for enriching us with the blessings of everlasting salvation. That arrangement proceeds upon the principle of an exchange—an exchange of places between Christ and his people. Originally Christ is rich, and ultimately his people are made rich. They are made rich by sharing Christ's riches: but the intervening process calls for adoring admiration. The holy angels indeed share in the riches of Christ; he is their Creator and their Lord, and their portion for ever. But being holy, harmless, and undefiled, they have ever since their origin been rich, directly drawing from the full riches of the Father, Son, and Spirit, having nothing but what they have received—yet receiving continually, freely, without let or hindrance, without money and without price; also without any difficulty to be overcome; without any special arrangement being needed.

It is very far otherwise with the redeemed from among men. They indeed share the riches of Christ; and ultimately they become rich even as originally he is rich. But a very peculiar arrangement was needed. Not all at once, without obstruction, and easily, as with the angels, could fallen men be adopted into the participation of the riches of God's Eternal Son. Angels are poor as creatures; men are poor as sinners. As creatures, angels are dependent; and, owning their dependence, the Lord meets them with the free, full treasures of his love and blessing and support. As sinners, men are cut off from

the fountain of holiness, and life, and blessing : and how shall the sin-hating God again admit them to his riches ?

Most blessed scheme ! Most wise and gracious arrangement ! The Son of God exchanges places with them. He assumes their place and poverty ; he transfers them into his place and riches. Though rich, he becomes poor ; they, though poor, become rich ; though rich in his own riches, he becomes poor in their poverty ; though poor in their own poverty, they become rich in his riches ; and it is through his poverty they become rich.

In the first place, we shall illustrate this arrangement in several particulars or details. The terms "rich" and "poor" are highly general : they are inclusive of a vast variety of particulars ; and the principle of this exchange may become more obvious, and faith may be aided in acting on it, if we fill up the general statement by a variety of details.

Let us say, then, that Christ was rich in Righteousness, in Life, in Blessing, in Strength, in Glory. And in these five cases let us trace the steps of the exchange.

1. Say that by riches we mean Righteousness. The corresponding poverty then is *sin* ; and then the proposition reads thus : "Though Christ was righteous, yet for our sakes he was made sin, that we might thereby be made righteous." Thus, it is but a particular case of the great principle when Paul says elsewhere, "He that knew no sin was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21).

In this respect how very rich was Christ ! how poor were we ! How poor, for our sakes, did he become ! how rich do we become in him !

He was rich in righteousness originally, as the Eternal Son of God, co-equal possessor of all the righteousness of Godhead. It is a fundamental and primary conception of God, that he is holy. There is none holy as the Lord. He is emphatically "*the Holy One*." He is "the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy" (Isa. lvii. 15). Sin is infinitely repugnant to his will, infinitely distant from his nature. Perfect, eternal, inviolable righteousness characteriseth the Godhead. Oh, with what resplendent righteousness the Sacred Three-in-One have from everlasting dealt with one

another! And when, in unity of council, they turn to deal with creation, "the Judge of all the earth cannot do but what is right" (Gen. xviii. 25). "There is no unrighteousness in him" (Ps. xcii. 15; Isa. vii. 18). The saints give thanks at the remembrance of his holiness. Of all this, the Son is co-equal possessor with the Father and the Spirit. He is the Holy One and the Just. As God, he is holy and righteous infinitely. This Divine person, our Lord Jesus Christ, is in his Godhead infinitely righteous.

Was there any unrighteousness in his becoming man, so as to render the God-man less righteous than God? Did he become less righteous by becoming man? Is Immanuel, God manifest in the flesh, less righteous than the Eternal Son? If he were, he would not be God manifest: he would be God misrepresented. Yea, he could not possibly still be God. The righteousness and holiness of this Divine person are not altered by his incarnation—not diminished or deteriorated: they are disclosed. The Holy Ghost prepared a human nature for him, itself so holy, and pure, and stainless as to be a mirror, infinitely, absolutely accurate, in which his Godhead's holiness should shine. The Eternal Son, incarnate in our flesh, the man Christ Jesus, is holy as God is holy—perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect. Immanuel is rich in a divine, unimpaired, eternal, inviolable righteousness. In this, indeed, our Lord Jesus Christ is pre-eminently rich,—"*Jesus Christ the righteous.*" For our sakes he became poor—"was made sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). The Father laid on him the iniquity of his people. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. He became the Lamb of God, bearing the sins of the world. The Father made him to be sin. Constituting him the substitute of sinners, he imputed their sins to him accordingly; and held him responsible for the dishonour they had done to God, obnoxious to the wages and penalty of sin—and the wages of sin is death.

How amazing the exchange—from highest riches to deepest poverty: from righteousness, the most glorious of all riches, to sin, the most profound and degrading possible style of poverty!

Isaiah saw him in his riches, in his holiness, upon his heavenly throne, and the myriads of the holy ones he heard crying, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord Almighty: the whole earth is full of thy glory." But the exchange takes place.

No more is he on the throne, shining glorious in holiness, but on the footstool, laden with sin ; on the altar, suffering for sin ; yea, expelled without the camp ; standing in the place of the guilty, the base, the poor.

But where is now his righteousness ? Is it gone ? Is it overborne, extinguished, annihilated by the sin ? How is it affected ? Is it diminished ? Is it absorbed ? Where are his riches of righteousness ?

Mark that though he became poor in our poverty, he was so rich in his own riches that he never became bankrupt. Ah ! if he had, how could he ever have made us rich ? In his poverty, assumed for us,—and, indeed, assumed *from* us,—he yet remained rich. He drew not on his riches : he claimed them not : he used them not. He might have drawn upon them. In his righteousness, he might have demanded the presence and services of twelve legions of angels (Matt. xxvi. 53). But he voluntarily consented to be poor : yet his riches, his righteousness, abode : and in due time the poverty, the sin, passed away, and the righteousness remained as before—righteousness eternal, infinite, invincible : proved to be so because it had withstood the *run*, the draft, the drain upon it caused by our poverty, our sin.

But mark now, how, through this poverty, we are made rich ; how, through this sin-bearing, we are made righteous. The righteousness has borne our sin, and borne it all away. The sin has not extinguished the righteousness, but the righteousness has extinguished the sin : and we, the poor, the sinful, have this righteousness now for ours. Our poverty has been his, and still he abideth rich. Our sin has been his, and still he abideth righteous. As he was poor and a sinner not in himself but *in us*, we are rich and righteous, not in ourselves, but in him : the whole arrangement is infinitely useless and foolish if now poor sinners be not rich and righteous in him.

Oh, most blessed justification, without works, freely by faith, by his grace, in the very righteousness of God ! Come, O believer, and enter afresh into all the deep perfection and precision of this exchange. Bring thy sin, else there can be no exchange at all. Bring thy sin and poverty, else thou art not profiting by this arrangement at all. Bring thy sin, and obtain freely perfect righteousness. The Lord requires thee not to bring righteousness, but to bring sin. Sin thou hast : bring

what thou hast. Righteousness thou hast not: come and receive what thou hast not. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ exempts thee from having to bring righteousness: exempts thee from being paralysed by the terror of having nothing but sin: exempts thee from the despairing task and toil of finding any righteousness of thine own: exempts thee from finding any ground of peace with God thyself: from constructing any justifying reason for peace with God thyself: from drawing up any terms or covenant of peace thyself: from extinguishing or putting away thy sin thyself: from bringing in any righteousness thyself. At one grand stroke the Lord settles all for ever. Jesus Christ, the holy One, the righteous, receiveth thee, a sinner! He puts himself in thy place: he puts thee in his: and his is a place of righteousness still, even though he be in thy place of sin: for, in thy place of sin, he puts away sin by the sacrifice of himself; abiding righteousness for thee, and thou the righteousness of God in him! Most profitable, most liberal, most gracious barter or exchange, profitable unto thee a sinner, for thou givest sin and gettest righteousness—the righteousness of God. And as the righteous God can have no quarrel with the very “righteousness of God,” God verily can have no quarrel with thee. For if the righteous God is at peace with his own righteousness, with thee also he must be at peace: “for he hath made him that knew no sin to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him” (2 Cor. v. 21).

2. Say that by riches we mean Life. The corresponding poverty then is death; the proposition then reads thus: “He who is the Living One, yet for our sakes died, that we through his death might live for ever.” Our particular poverty in this case is death, and we are released from it, and enriched with the opposite riches, even eternal life, by Christ, the Living One, dying for us.

The Godhead is the fountain of life. “With thee, O God, is the fountain of life” (Ps. xxxvi. 9). This prerogative the Eternal Son shares with the Father and the Spirit. Proceeding by eternal generation from the Father, he hath life in himself, and is a fountain of life to whomsoever he will. This life is self-existent, independent, indefectible, unalterable, unfailing. It is from all eternity. It never was not, and can never cease.

This life was not diminished or injuriously affected by his

incarnation. It was manifested : "The life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us" (1 John i. 2). The fulness and fountain of eternal life was deposited in human flesh, when the Word was made flesh. The Father gave us eternal life, and this life was in his Son. "In him was life" (John i. 4).

This Rich One became poor—for our sakes he became poor. Rich in independent possession of infinite, eternal, infallible life, he became poor unto death. He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death. He poured out his soul unto death. For "the wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi. 23), and being made sin, he shunned not the righteous doom whereby it comes to pass that by sin death enters—"Sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passes on all that are accounted sinners" (Rom. v. 12). It was our death he assumed : it was our death he died. "For if one died for all, then were all dead, and he died for all that they might not live unto themselves," which is just a species and special element of death, "but might live unto him that died for them and rose again" (2 Cor. v. 14, 15). Now consider *this* poverty and its effects upon the original riches of Christ. Was he rendered bankrupt as to life? did he fall under the power of death? God forbid. For how, then, should *we* live by him? He wholly died our death : he died it truly, he died it all : he died it once, and once for all and for ever : and he rose again. The lost, who have refused to live his life, and preferred to die their own death, are ever dying it, and it is never done. Jesus died it all. He is not dying our death now, and never will or can die again. "I am he that liveth and was dead; and, behold, I am alive for evermore" (Rev. i. 18). In death itself he was living—the Living One,—his Divine person abiding unconquerable and triumphant : in the living power of his Godhead offering himself a sacrifice in the death of his human nature,—by death destroying him that had the power of death : abiding in the field as the Eternal Life manifest and now victorious : with the field swept clean and clear of the second death for ever. That is the death of the Living One. Come, ye who are spiritually dead, arise and come. Come, for you have not far to come. Christ has

come to meet you ; and how far has he come into your place ? You have no farther to come than into your own place—recognising that Christ is in it—Christ dead and alive again. But now his life is theirs for whom he became poor in death,—not his own only now, but theirs for whose sake he died. “They are crucified with Christ ; nevertheless they live ; yet not they, but Christ liveth in them.” “Because I live,” says Jesus, “ye shall live also” (Gal. ii. 20 ; John xiv. 19). He adventured his own life against their death. He made their death his, and now his life is theirs. “He that hath the Son hath life” (1 John v. 11, 12) ; “he shall not perish, but have everlasting life.” Surely he “abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light” (2 Tim. i. 10). And this life is in himself. For “as in Adam all die, so shall all in Christ be made alive” (1 Cor. xv. 22).

Come, then, ye poor and needy—so poor as to be pining, dying, perishing ;—come, and in respect of life, life inviolable and eternal, be ye made rich in Christ. Shun not to feel your poverty pressing your soul ; shun not to feel the power of death—yea, the sentence of death—in yourself (2 Cor. i. 9). But come with it to the glorious exchange ; come ; and as Christ the Living One hath taken up his place in your place, in your person, and in your death, assume now your place in his person and in his life. Let your assumption of his life be as true, clear, resolute, business-like as his assumption of your death. There was nothing fanciful, sentimental, imaginary, shrinking, tentative, diletante, incomplete about his descent into your poverty. There was everything terrifically real in his entrance into your death. Enter then with equally intense reality into his life. He brought his life into your place, your death : and his life abolished death, and abode life undiminished,—abode, and abode *there*. Bring your death into his life : you have not far to bring it : and let it be there abolished for ever. Shun not to own yourself dead under sin, but admit with Paul, “We have the sentence of death in ourselves, that we may not trust in ourselves, but in him that quickeneth the dead” (2 Cor. i. 9). And do this actually in him : “Reckon yourselves dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God by Jesus Christ” (Rom. vi. 11). “Know ye not that as many of us as have been baptized or engrafted into Christ, have been baptized

o his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism o death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead by glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness life" (Rom. vi. 3, 4).

In the light of these thoughts, how luminous are many passages of Scripture! And to get or give any help to such ninosity is the very delight of Christian souls, and that the ore they may have been tried with and have suffered from ritual darkness. How true, for instance, is that wonderful ord—"To me to live is Christ"—with all its intensity and ophthegmatic brevity: a kind of watchword at the gates of ath. And again, in this light,—

"I shall not die, but live, and shall
The works of God discover;
The Lord hath me chastised sore,
But not to death given over."

ow literally true, also, it is in the case of all believers, that is none less than the very "life of Jesus that is made manifest in their mortal body" (2 Cor. iv. 11). And how reviving it that "the last Adam is a quickening spirit"! (1 Cor. 45.) Yes; we see how the "Son quickeneth whom he l" (John v. 21). Is he not the bread of life also? and precious the discourse in which he took occasion of that ore of speech to put on record for us John vi. 30-40! And ng he became life to us by exchange of places, even unto th, even the death of the cross, the death of juridical sacrifice, intelligible are even those verses, John vi. 52-58!

Say that by riches we mean Blessing. The corresponding erty is the curse; and the wondrous theorem of exchange then is, "He, though he was the Blessed One, for our sakes was le a curse, that we might thereby receive the blessing." a particular element of detail in our poverty is, in this case, curse of God: and we are relieved from it, and enriched h the corresponding and contrary riches, namely, the blessing by Christ the Blessed One being subjected to our curse. as it is but another case of the same great general fact when al says: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the v, being made a curse for us, that the blessing of Abraham ght come upon us" (Gal. iii. 13). Here again is the principle the exchange. In this element, then, in this particular

variety of his riches, how rich was Christ ! How poor were we ! It is essential to our conceptions of the persons of the Godhead to regard them as blessed, infinitely blessed. "Blessed art thou, O Lord ; teach me thy statutes" (Ps. cxix. 12) ; "Jehovah is the blessed and only Potentate" (1 Tim. iv. 15). Of this infinite blessedness the Son is the co-equal sharer with the Father and the Spirit ; and besides his possession of the fulness of the Godhead, his relation and intercourse, in the Spirit, with the Father as the Eternal Son, must be necessarily replete with fathomless and inexpressible blessedness. He is God's only-begotten Son (John i. 14, 18 ; 1 John iv. 9 ; John iii. 16, 18) : he is the Son of his love (Col. i. 13). Again and again the Father bore testimony to him :—"This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5 ; Mark i. 11, ix. 7 ; Luke iii. 22, ix. 35 ; 2 Pet. i. 17). Oh, who can enter into the boundless depths of joy in the fellowship of the Eternal Father and the Eternal Son in the Eternal Spirit ! We hear the Son himself essaying to put us in possession of some idea of his infinite blessedness in the bosom of the Father, ere yet the worlds were :—"The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth ; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled ; before the hills was I brought forth. While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens, I was there : when he set a compass on the face of the depth, when he established the clouds above : when he strengthened the fountains of the deep : when he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment : when he appointed the foundations of the earth : *then* I was by him, as one brought up with him : I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him ; rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth ; and my delights were with the sons of men" (Prov. viii. 22-31). Oh the blessedness of God's dear Son, basking in the eternal sunshine and joy of his Father's blessing ! "I was by him as one brought up with him. I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him."

How happy preachers of the gospel ought to be ! Yes, and

how happy they really are, if they truly preach this Christ ! And how careful the Church ought to be in maintaining the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship ! How much that truth has fallen out of sight ! How neglected Treffrey's glorious book has become ! How otherwise could Dr. R. S. Candlish's volume on the "Fatherhood of God" have been so much misunderstood ? The title, no doubt, was not well chosen ; the book might better have been called, "On Adoption,"—a specially favourite topic of Dr. Candlish's very rich and gracious ministry. But it was a degenerating age, surely, that had so little thanks to give him for it. It was an age not familiar with Treffrey's glorious and immortal work. How shall Christ's blessedness ever be rightly estimated, if his Eternal Sonship be forgotten ? "Daily his Father's delight," eternally in his Father's bosom, not properly leaving it—(a most miserable but common idea)—even when made flesh and born in Bethlehem. Always from eternity to eternity *there*, how near to the Father ! What an inconceivably glorious reconciler ! And what an unfathomable necessity there was that our salvation should take the form of a "reconciliation" !

For, while *He* is eternally in the bosom of the Father ; as for *us*,—each of *us* was as one cut off from him ; cast out from his presence, wrapt up in his own curse. Even thus poor did Immanuel become for us ; thus cursed did the Blessed One submit to be. For into our place, though it was ominously distinguished as the dwelling-place of the curse, Jesus, in his love, consented to come ; and his Father's wrath became then his portion. Then he became "acquainted with grief" (Isa. liii. 3). The Blessed One became "a man of sorrows." Anxieties, cares, hunger, thirst, wounds, stripes, agony, bloodshed, a cursed death, accrued unto him. His Father, far from helping him : concealing his love from him : hiding his countenance : appearing against him, armed with an offended Judge's indignation : forsaking him to the malignity of men and the onset of principalities and powers of darkness : drawing against him the sword of justice : calling on the sword to awake and smite and slay him (Zech. xiii. 17) :—such was the inexpressible exchange which Jesus made when he took our curse upon him to bear it. "He indeed *suffered* for sins, the just for the unjust" (1 Pet. iii. 18).

Most marvellous exchange! Who can tell the joy and felicity of the Blessed One? But who can tell the sorrows of the curse? "Behold, and see, was there ever sorrow like unto my sorrow?" (Lam. i. 12.) His soul was in the curse of travail (Isa. liii. 11). His body was crucified in the curse upon the tree.

Now, *surely* for our sakes he thus became poor. "Surely he hath borne *our* griefs and carried *our* sorrows: . . . he was wounded for *our* transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him: and with his stripes we are healed" (Isa. liii. 4). And how gloriously are we healed! How fully are we blessed! Come again, and exchange with Jesus. He receives your curse, and renders back to you the blessing. For though he bare the curse, the blessing was never injured. He remained the Blessed One, even when the curse lay heavily upon him. The curse was *on* him, but the blessing was *in* him. Yea, he was the blessing, and the Blessed One. "Therefore did his Father love him, because he was laying down his life for the sheep" (John x. 17). Therefore did his Father rejoice over him, as one who was his infinite delight, even in the very instant when he was bearing sin and abolishing the curse. And the curse—our curse—being now gone, oh how blessed may we be in Christ! Yea, "in thee, and in thy seed, shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xii. 3; Ps. lxxii. 17; Jer. iv. 2). "He hath redeemed us from the curse, that the blessing of Abraham might come upon us" (Gal. iii. 13, 14).

Again I say, How blessed this exchange for us! Cursed and outcast we enter into this most marvellous arrangement; and we find it never fails us. In terms of its glorious procedure we are blessed and accepted of the Lord. We find grace in his sight: we have acceptance in the Beloved (Eph. i. 6). We are God's dear sons (Eph. v. 1); we are daily his delight (Isa. lxii. 4); rejoicing always before him (Deut. xii. 12). For into Christ's riches of nearness to the Father, of joy with the Father, and of the Father's joy and love in him,—into all this we are adopted: in all this we are enriched:—"blessed with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, according to the riches of his grace" (Eph. i. 3).

4. Say that by riches we mean Strength or Power. The

corresponding poverty then is weakness ; and the particular case of this intensely gracious arrangement is,—“ He, though he was strong, yet for our sakes became weak, that we through his weakness might be made strong.”

Here also how profound and amazing was the exchange Jesus made with us ! How rich is he in strength ! How poor and weak did he become ! He is indeed “ the strength of Israel ” (1 Sam. xvii. 20). “ Who among the sons of the mighty can be likened unto the Lord ? ” (Ps. lxxxix. 6.) “ O Lord God of hosts, who is a strong Lord like unto thee ? ” (Ps. lxxxix. 8.) “ Thou hast a mighty arm ; strong is thy hand, and high is thy right hand.” Is anything too hard for the Lord ? With God all things are possible. “ The Lord strong and mighty ; the Lord mighty in battle ” (Ps. xxiv. 8). By God’s dear Son—whose grace this marvellous exchange demonstrates—were all things made, whether they be things in heaven, or things on earth, or things under the earth. By him do all things consist : upholding all things by the word of his power. Meditate upon the strength of the everlasting hills, upon the power of the angry ocean, upon the weight of the solid globe which by his hand he hath hung upon nothing, upon the might of the Lord, so great that it bringeth Orion in his season, and that it guideth Arcturus with his sons, and by which not one of heaven’s countless multitudes of suns and systems faileth, for that he is strong in power, and calleth them all by names, in the greatness of his might. And bear in mind that these are but limited effects of Immanuel’s power, which itself is limitless and infinite. And you may have some impression of the truth that he was rich in power. Yet for our sakes he became weak. Weak ! I should say so :—a frail babe in Mary’s arms : a wearied man on Jacob’s well : a prostrate sufferer stretched upon the ground in the garden of his agony : anon fainting beneath the weight of the cross on which he was about to suffer : crucified (the Holy Spirit tells us) in weakness. Ah ! how very poor in this respect did he become ! How deeply self-denying, as he refrained from drawing on his Divine Almighty power : himself the mighty God all the while ; yet in no respect drawing on his omnipotence as God while suffering in weakness as a man—for that would have been to counteract and renounce his incarnation. Not merely that his human

nature was weak—that is plain. But *He*, this Divine Person, was weak : and the weakness of God was stronger than man ; and by his very weakness, to the infinite shame of mighty principalities and powers, he spoiled them on the cross in the depth of his utmost weakness. He made a show of them openly, when they put forth all their power, by wholly eschewing his own, and consenting to be crucified in weakness.

It was “for our sakes” he thus became weak—for he stood in our place, and it was one of weakness indeed. Ours was indeed a weak position. We were emphatically “without strength,” when, “in due time, Christ died for the ungodly” (Rom. v. 6). We were “not sufficient even to think one thought as of ourselves” (2 Cor. iii. 5). We were helpless as an infant cast out into the field, “in his blood to the loathing of his person” (Ezek. xvi. 5). But through His weakness, we are now made strong. We bring our weakness to his weakness, and join on the one to the other. And well we may bring ours to his—for his was just ours, assumed by him in his love. And as, in union with him, and with our weakness identified with his, we see his pass away, and leave his strength unimpaired, it is *our* weakness that thereby doth pass away—all pass away—and we abide strong in the Lord, and in the glory of his power. “My strength,” says Jesus, “is made perfect in weakness” (2 Cor. xii. 9). How intensely, how singularly, how profoundly true ! “I can do all things, through Christ that strengtheneth me” (Phil. iv. 15). “They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isa. xl. 31, xli. 1).

5. Say that by riches we mean Glory. The corresponding poverty then is shame ; and the noble theology of the exchange then reads thus : “Ye know the grace of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who though he was glorious, yet for our sakes he was clothed with shame, that we through his shame might attain to glory.”

Who shall speak of his original glory,—the glory which he had with the Father before the world was ? What is all the excellence and grandeur of created things ? What is all the moral loveliness of the ten thousand times ten thousand of the stainless seraphim to the infinite glory of the living God ? “Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised ; and his greatness is unsearchable.” “I will speak of the glorious honour

of his majesty. Honour and majesty are before him, strength and beauty are in his sanctuary." Not an attribute of God-head but is a source of glory and excellency infinite; and the infinitely excellent and perfect combination of them all constitutes the inconceivable glory of the Lord.

This glorious God in our Immanuel stooped to suffer shame. It is his own testimony: "For thy sake I have borne reproach; shame hath covered my face" (Ps. lxxix. 7). It is his holy protestation of the willingness with which he suffered shame for his people; "I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting" (Isa. l. 6). "Thou hast known my reproach, and my shame, and my dishonour; reproach hath broken my heart" (Ps. lxxix. 20). Again and again we are told he was dealt with as a shame-covered man. "He was despised:"—think of it,—the God of glory!—the rich become exceeding poor!—"He was despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; and we hid as it were our faces from him: he was despised, and we esteemed him not" (Isa. liii. 3). Remember the scene of his trial. "Then did they spit in his face, and buffeted him; and others smote him with the palms of their hands, saying, Prophecy unto us, thou Christ, who it is that smote thee" (Matt. xxvi. 67). And yet again, "They stripped him, and put on him a scarlet robe. And when they had platted a crown of thorns, they put it upon his head, and a reed in his right hand: and they bowed the knee before him, and mocked him, saying, Hail, king of the Jews!" (Matt. xxvii. 28, 29.) Remember how he was overwhelmed with insult, with calumny, with charges of blasphemy, rebellion, imposture, conspiracy with devils. They said, "He casteth out devils through the prince of the devils" (Luke iv. 15). Remember how he was crucified between two thieves, and even one of them railed upon him, as if he had sunk to a lower depth than they, and even thieves might afford to look down upon him. Think of it! The Lord of glory, laden, clothed, broken in heart with shame!

And this was "for our sakes:" for he came into our position, and ours was a shameful position. The position of a sinner is full of shame. Shame followed sin into the world immediately (Gen. iii. 8). And till redemption is absolutely

perfect in glory, shame still abideth. Even the body of the redeemed, regenerated man is sown in dishonour. It shall indeed be raised in glory, while the wicked shall arise to shame and everlasting contempt.

But he that believeth shall not be ashamed. United with Christ, his shame shall be lost and swallowed up in Christ's shame, which was itself lost and swallowed up in glory. For "he despised the shame:" bearing it all, till it passed away, and his glory again shone out. In this sense, while exclaiming, "I hid not my face from shame and spitting," the suffering, humbled Saviour also adds: "The Lord God will help me; therefore I shall not be confounded: therefore have I set my face like a flint: and I know that I shall not be ashamed" (Isa. l. 7). No; the glory broke forth in its resistless splendour. The vindication came, like as the sun shineth in his strength. And it is now a shame-destroying glory in which his people are glorified with him. He gives them pure raiment, clean and white, that the shame of their nakedness appear not (Rev. iii. 8). He clothes them with beauty and with glory, with excellency and with comeliness. He says to his engrafted members,—'Your shame be mine! The dishonour done to me, Immanuel, the Lord of glory,—let that be reckoned for your shame, and that being now passed away, my glory now be yours.' "Father, I have given them the glory which thou gavest me" (John xvii. 22). "Since thou wast precious in my sight, and I loved thee, thou hast been honourable" (Is. xlii. 4). "The king's daughter is all glorious, her clothing is of wrought gold" (Ps. xlv. 13). "And beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, we shall be transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord" (2 Cor. iii. 18).

Behold then the unsearchable riches of Christ in righteousness, life, blessing, strength, and glory! Behold how for our sakes he becomes poor,—made sin, subjected to death, loaded with the curse, crucified in weakness, clothed in shame; and all in order that we guilty, dead, cursed, weak, and shameful sinners might have righteousness, life, blessing, strength, and glory. In all these particulars, and in every other in which he was rich and we poor, he who was rich for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich.

It then shall we say of this grace of Jesus? "Ye know the love of our Lord Jesus Christ, who," etc. What love! Condescending!—the love of him who was so rich. How sacrificing!—the love of him who became so poor. How generous and free!—to us who were ourselves so poor in our-

How fruitful and advantageous!—making us so rich

Herein is love! Herein is the matchless and exceeding love of Jesus.

great gospel duties are suggested and enforced by this argument. *First*, the duty of being poor in spirit. *Second*, the duty of being rich in Christ.

The duty of being poor in spirit. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 3). "To whom will I look, even to him that is poor." "I am poor and needy, yet the Lord thinketh upon me." "I will leave in the midst of her a poor and afflicted people, and they shall call the name of the Lord." "The Lord heareth the poor." "O God, hast prepared of thy goodness for the poor." "The Lord will satisfy the poor with bread" (Ps. cxxxii. 15). In Scripture, it is the poor whom the Lord encourages—the poor in spirit.

It is not difficult to see why it should be so. The poor have a spirit suitable to the truth. They are poor in destitute of righteousness, life, blessing, strength, and plunged in guilt, death, curse, helplessness, and shame. They are poor in fact—and if not poor in spirit, they are of a proud spirit, a spirit which denies the reality of their condition. All pride is falsehood,—anti-fact. God desireth truth in every part. Oh how far off the unhumbled spirit is from God! "Thou sayest, I am rich, and increased in goods, and have need of nothing, and knowest not that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked" (ii. 17).

Am I in danger of falling into this terrible falsehood? Am I inclined to fancy I am rich? The Lord points me to Jesus who was truly and infinitely rich, and shows me how infinitely poor he became, and—O wonder!—he became poorer than I. And in that poverty of the Rich One, let me see my destitution. For I cannot be left to feel in

myself, unrelieved, all my own poverty, without collapsing and sinking for ever under the terrible experience. The Lord, in his mercy, does not suffer me to learn my own poverty by forsaking me to discover or experience all its depths. Of his great forbearance he does not suffer my guilt, my death, my curse, my helplessness, my shame, to overwhelm me. He stays his hand : he stays his rough wind : he deals with me in measure : he is long-suffering. He does not strip me bare and leave me destitute. And therefore,—alas ! therefore,—I am in danger of abusing his long-suffering, and saying, “I am rich.” Did he leave me to reap, and learn all the destitution of my position, I would know that I was poor ; but I would sink eternally under the discovery. But he points me to Jesus. He tells me that *he* took my position and my poverty, and in *him* I may learn what my position and poverty are. He showed no long-suffering to him. Sheer and exact, unrelieved, my position and poverty did Jesus take. In my own person God forbeareth and is long-suffering ; and I abuse this to conceal from myself how very poor I am. In the person of Christ my position and poverty come all clearly out to light ; and I have not where to lay my head : I have nothing but sin, as I see in that sin-bearing Lamb ;—and death, as I see, in that dying Sacrifice ;—and curse, in that cursed tree ;—and weakness, in that fainting Sufferer ;—and shame, in his deep confusion and reproach. All these were mine, if he became poor for me. All these I own as mine, if I would not repudiate him and deny that he became poor for me. If he took my position and my poverty, I read my position and learn my poverty in *him*. For he did not become needlessly poor ; he did not become more poor than I. There was indeed neither need, nor room, nor possibility of *that*.

And did, then, my poverty reduce the Rich One—him *who* was rich—did it reduce even such an one to such humiliation ? He was so poor he had not where to lay his head : he had *not* a friend to comfort him : he had not a smile from his Father : he had not a garment : he had not a grave.

And is this my poverty—even mine ? Will I disown it ? I disown Christ if I do. Is this my poverty ? And am I proud ? Do I thank God I am not as other men ? Do I resent God’s call to humiliation and contrition ? Do I feel *as*

if the Lord were asking too much when he asks me to abhor myself in dust and ashes?—to own that I am wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked? He refrains from showing me my poverty fully in my own person, for it would eternally destroy me. He shows it to me in Christ, and asks me to behold the truth. He shows it to me in Christ bearing it for me,—bearing it away; and still do I quarrel with the truth? Do I still say, I am rich? Do I still refuse to break down, and own that I am poor,—and be accordingly poor in spirit? Then how can God deal with me after this? Can he find a better way of teaching me that I am poor—of training me to be poor in spirit?

Oh! let me not resist God's wondrous method; let me not charge God foolishly with making the Rich One poorer than was needed, poorer than was true of those for whose sakes he became poor. This is my poverty: I am a guilty, dead, cursed, helpless, shameful thing. O my God, "I am poor and needy."

II. "But the Lord thinketh upon me." For the selfsame plan enforces, with equal power and relevancy, the duty of my being rich in Christ. Every thread and fibre of this great thought is crying, on the part of Christ, "I counsel thee to buy of me gold tried in the fire, that thou mayest be rich." And I am bound to be rich. I am not merely at liberty: not merely have the right, the opportunity, the privilege of being rich: but I am under imperative and overwhelming obligation. Guilty though I be, I am bound to be the Righteousness of God in him. With the sentence of death in myself, I am bound to arise from the dead and have life eternal. Cursed for continuing not in all things written in the law to do them, I am bound to have the blessing in all its fulness. Weak and helpless, I am bound to be strong in the Lord. Covered with shame, I am bound to glory in the Lord, and to be glorious in the eyes of the Lord. "For he who was rich yet for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich." And I am shut up to acquiesce in this arrangement, and responsible, in my own case, for seeing to it, that this arrangement do not fail of its issue. I dare not face the guilt of making it, in my case, void. Jesus looks to me, to thee, to each one of us, for his vindication, for his satisfaction, for his

reward. He became poor. He who was rich became poor. Am I prepared to say that I will stand out and render this arrangement void, without effect, useless? I *do* make it, in my case, useless, if I am not poor in spirit. But I also make it useless, ineffectual, superfluous, if I do not by faith in Christ become rich. That is the fruit designed and contemplated by Divine wisdom, love, and purpose. Save for making the poor rich, it fails and is dishonoured. Dishonoured, in fact, it shall never be. The Father's purpose must prevent it. Its own inherent character must prevent it. But my responsibility is not affected by the secret decree. I am called upon to come, and, by faith in Christ, receive, through his poverty, the destruction of my poverty and the enriching of my position and person before God for ever. It must be offensive to Christ if I affect to be rich when I am so poor. It must be offensive to Christ if I continue to be poor, when I may be so rich. I am constrained—necessity is laid upon me—to give effect by faith to this arrangement—to gratify and glorify Christ by giving effect to it. He having entered into my position and poverty, I am bound to enter into his position and his riches. Had he merely proposed to become poor that I might become rich, I dared not have rejected his proposal. But it is no mere proposal: he who was rich for our sakes became poor: and now I have no alternative, but at once by faith to become rich. I see in his poverty how poor I am—for his poverty was for my sake, was for me, was mine. And if I would not stamp his wonderful arrangement with the brand of stupidity, and folly, and failure, I must follow out the design of his becoming poor, even this, namely, that I might become rich. By all the riches of glory in the highest heavens from which he stooped, and by all the depth of poverty as in the lowest hell to which he descended; and by all in Christ found anywhere within the range between that highest glory and that deepest shame, I am pressed in spirit to acquiesce in this glorious exchange, that it may not be of none effect; that I may have all my need supplied according to his riches in glory; that I through his poverty may be made rich; for better put it cannot be than in these sacred and ever-memorable words.

And thus, most marvellously, I am bound to be poor in

myself to the utmost depths of poverty,—and rich in Christ to the highest heights of the heavenly places : and I am bound in both these obligations, by the one inexpressibly splendid and inexhaustible arrangement by which “he who was rich for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich.” Oh! poor and needy soul! As a magnet passes over iron filings and attracts them, you cannot escape from being drawn into the riches of Christ. Yours is the kingdom of heaven. You are pressed, constrained, shut up into it. The Spirit moveth you to gratify him whom your soul loveth—to gratify him by causing him to see of the travail of his soul—to see of the fruit of his poverty. Come, therefore, to this glorious exchange. Be distinct, be special, be detailed, in transacting it. Jesus put himself in full detail into all thy poverty. Bring thy poverty in all its details, and find special, exact, countervailing riches. What is thy poverty at this hour? what is thy desire? Righteousness? Life? Blessing? Strength? Glory? Grace in thy Father’s sight? Nearness to God? Peace? Joy? Comfort? Can you not find it in Christ’s riches? in the unsearchable riches of Christ? and did he not suffer the very poverty from which, out of his riches, you desire relief? Is it thy desire, for instance, to be near to God? and thou feelest that thou art poor in that thou art far from God? He who was rich in being near to God, in the Father’s bosom, became poor, far-off, forsaken,—(“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”)—that we through this poverty might be made rich, might be brought nigh. Come only with thine own poverty by the way of *his* poverty, and thou shalt find thyself, ere ever thou art aware, standing amidst the full riches of Christ :—acceptable in the Father’s sight; alive for evermore; blessed with all spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ Jesus; strong in the Lord and in the glory of his power; changed into the same image from glory to glory :—the faithful Lord fulfilling in this wondrous and charming method his all-comprehending promise, “The Lord will give grace and glory” (Ps. lxxxiv. 11), according to the riches of his own grace, and according to his riches in glory by Christ Jesus. For, in every respect wherein Christ was rich, he became poor; that, in every respect wherein we were poor, we might be rich.

ART. V.—*Christendom in the Parables of our Lord.*

THE parables which I propose to consider in this article are those which give in outline the origin, development, and issue of the kingdom of heaven in its present earthly and embodied form.

They are chiefly "The Sower;" "The Tares of the Field;" "The Mustard-Seed;" "The Leaven;" "The Unjust Judge;" "The Ten Virgins;" "The Talents," and "The Pounds."

The word Christendom, in the sense in which we commonly use it, as covering the whole extent of organised or professing Christianity, is the nearest approach to an exact modern equivalent for the term "kingdom of heaven," as used in these parables, that I can find. We may regard these parables as embodying our Saviour's anticipations concerning the kingdom within the period defined by Himself.

From the parable of the Sower we learn His anticipation with respect to the immediate results of the preaching of the word, which is the chief means He instituted for founding, maintaining, and extending His kingdom in the world. This parable clearly shows that He anticipated only partial and not complete nor immediate success. There are four classes of hearers described by Him. One class only is wholly unaffected by the word. One class only is permanently and beneficially affected by it. Two classes are only temporarily affected. These results are represented as following the sowing of the good seed of the word in such a manner as to show that the Saviour was thinking of what would ordinarily and generally be the effect of the preaching of the gospel in the world. He did not, I conceive, intend to indicate the exact proportion in which these results would follow the sowing of the word, nor teach that the state of different classes of hearers is an unchangeable one, so that men cannot pass from one state to another, or that men may not, at different periods of their lives, belong to different classes of hearers. All that He meant to teach was, that there would always be such varieties among hearers, and such mixed results from preaching. This parable is peculiarly well fitted to check the excesses of a certain type

of preaching which is not uncommon in our day, in which strong statements are made, sometimes before large audiences, about the instantaneous conversion of every soul present, followed by prayers in the same key. Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit, at once calm, sober, hopeful, and strong, which a due consideration of the significance of the parable of the Sower would induce. A reaction unfavourable to the gospel is almost certain to follow exaggerations of this kind, and the strained state of feeling they are naturally fitted to produce, and do very often produce. The parable is also fitted to correct the defects of another type of preaching, which does not seem to contemplate or aim at any immediate or early results at all of the highest spiritual kind,—a type which, in its extreme form, is fitted to quench real zeal, hinder growth, and put people to sleep. It is hardly needful to point out how the history of preaching in Christendom has just been a fulfilment of the forecast given us by our Lord Himself in the parable of the Sower. The parable of the Sower is really the preacher's *vade mecum*. It forewarns us that the results of the preaching of the gospel at best will always be mixed. It encourages us to expect that it will never be wholly fruitless. We learn from it Christ's own anticipations on the subject.

The next parable I propose to consider shows us that our Saviour anticipated that His Church would be a mixed society, and that it would not be wholly free from alien elements. It is interesting to notice that while we have a sower and seed in the parable of the Tares, as well as in the parable of the Sower, in the former the sower of the good seed is the Son of Man, in the latter the preacher of the gospel, whoever he may be; in the former the children of the kingdom are the good seed, in the latter the word of the kingdom is the seed. The mixed state of matters described in the parable of the Tares cannot therefore be attributed to the sower of the good seed, but is traced to the action of a hostile agent.

The Saviour's own interpretation of the parable of the Tares seems to give a wider application of it than to the Church. He says, "The field is the world." In the parable He says, "The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in *his field*." He seems simply to teach that there will be good and bad till the end of the world. All this is, of

course, true, but without excluding the widest reference, past and future, that the words of the parable and of the interpretation fairly suggest, the point of immediate practical importance to us suggested by the parable is this, that in the parts of the wide field in which the Son of Man has sowed the children of the kingdom, the enemy will sow tares,—that the enemy will follow hard on the heels of the Son of Man, as it were, and of malicious intent sow tares.

We need not regard the enemy's action as confined to these enclosures, but as chiefly directed to the end of spoiling them. The specific character of the persons meant by the tares, the children of the wicked one, may be inferred from the parable. They are persons who so resemble the wheat that they are mistaken for it, and cannot be detected in their true character till the time of fruit-bearing. They are therefore those who assume or bear the Christian name, but are destitute of the essential elements of Christian character and life. Christ represents these elements as introduced into the Church in spite of any reasonable precautions¹ that can be taken to prevent it, and as getting so inextricably mixed with the wheat as to render it impossible for merely human agents to attempt successfully the work of separation, and on this ground He puts a warning into the mouth of the owner of the field against the intemperate zeal that would rashly undertake the work. For the sake of the wheat, the tares are to be permitted to grow side by side with it till the time of harvest, which is the end of the world (or the age), when the work of separation will be intrusted to competent hands. Christ then anticipated that the Church would be a mixed body up to the very end of its career in this age; He discouraged all attempts that should have for their object the attainment of a perfectly pure church, in the sense that none but the children of the kingdom, sown by Himself, should be permitted to remain in its fellowship,—such attempts as really involved an anticipation of the final judgment of men's character and state before God.

Short of this, the Saviour cannot be supposed to forbid the

¹ The words, "while men slept," are designed to show the stealth of the enemy, not to expose the sloth of the husbandmen: men must have rest.

exercise of such discipline as is essential to the existence of any society at all, as He Himself elsewhere expressly sanctioned and enjoined, and as the apostles afterwards inculcated and practised. Into the laws and limits, the nature and object, of such discipline it would be quite beside the purpose of this paper to enter, as I believe it was quite beside the purpose of our Lord in uttering this parable. His purpose was of the most general and comprehensive kind, and did not permit the introduction of such details.

It is interesting to notice that our Lord seems to have distinctly anticipated an outbreak of that intolerant zeal within His Church, which has led at different times and in different degrees, on the one hand to bloody persecutions, and on the other to the establishment of separatist communities which arrogate to themselves the exclusive position of the true Church, excommunicate all without, and practically claim to be infallible. None, perhaps, of the great historic Churches has a record altogether free from the taint of intolerance in the form of the persecuting spirit, but to Rome must be assigned the palm in this direction.

Among the smaller and more recent separatist bodies who have made the attempt to form associations composed only of real Christians, and who claim that they tolerate none else in their fellowship, the Strict or Darbyite section of the self-styled Brethren carry off the palm for exclusiveness.

The next parable—the Mustard-Seed—represents the growth and extent of the kingdom of heaven in the world as it strikes the eye of the beholder. The comparison instituted by the Saviour is between the present small beginnings and the ultimate extension of the Church, the visibility it should at length attain in the world. It was to become of such account in the world that its shelter would be sought by those who never would have thought of associating themselves with it, had it not become within its own area a great overshadowing and influential society. Flocks of birds were to come and lodge in the branches of it.

Christ, from this parable, clearly anticipated that His kingdom would become a great world-power. The field in this parable is doubtless the world, as it is in the parable of the Tares, and the relation of the extension of the Church to

the world in which it is planted is fittingly and fairly represented by the relationship which a full-grown mustard-tree would bear to the field in which it grew. The parable represents the kingdom of heaven in its external aspect only, and gives no insight into its internal condition.

The parable of the Leaven hid in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened does give an insight into the state of the Church, and what it would in time become. The comparison in this parable is, I conceive, between the kingdom of heaven and the whole incident which is the subject-matter of the story, and not simply between the kingdom of heaven and the leaven. What the Saviour represented in the parable as done by the woman was to be done in the Church, and with the same result. The woman introduced leaven into the meal, and gradually the whole was leavened. The thing symbolised by the leaven was to be introduced into the Church, and its influence was to become general. Now, what does the leaven symbolise? What would it naturally and inevitably suggest to the minds of the hearers, and what light do we obtain upon its significance from our Saviour's use of it in His teaching, and from apostolic usage?

The legal prohibitions of the use of leaven in connection with the Passover and other offerings clearly show that in Israel it symbolised evil. In only one case was the use of leaven in any offering enjoined. "Leavened bread was to be offered with the sacrifice of thanksgiving of the peace-offerings." It may, however, in this case have been designed to represent the imperfection that cleaves to our best works and services. However this may be, the term leaven would naturally suggest the idea of evil, of moral corruption, to the minds of a Jewish audience. A consideration of the nature of leaven itself would suggest this. It is matter in a state of putrefaction.

At a later period of His own ministry our Lord warned His disciples against the leaven of the Pharisees. In one place this is said to refer to their doctrine, and in another place the hypocrisy of the Pharisees is said to be signified. It is only necessary to allude to St. Paul's use of the word. Deriving it from the legal enactments in relation to the Passover, he takes it to represent malice and wickedness. Scripture usage there as a whole, would lead us to regard it as symbolising formalism, corrupt doctrine, and evil dispositions and conduct. Unless

then, our Saviour's use of it in this parable is to be regarded as the single exception to the meaning given it in every other place where it occurs in Scripture, it must be taken to represent here the introduction and spread of these things in the Church.

It may be freely admitted that as there are good uses to which leaven in a literal sense may be applied, so it might very properly be used as signifying the transforming power of the Gospel in the hearts and lives of men, and in society and the world, according to the traditional interpretation of the parable, but this use of it would make the parable represent the gospel as doing what it has not done. The gospel has intrinsic power to leaven the whole mass of humanity, and transform it into its own character. But it has not done so. It has spread very partially in the world. Vast masses of heathenism are almost untouched by it, whereas Christendom has been deeply and widely corrupted.

The Church conquered the world up to a certain point with her own proper weapons, but the world afterwards entered into and conquered the Church. The fabric of the true faith was gradually built up under the Spirit's guidance in a marvellous manner, but the leaven of error and corruption was introduced very early, and spread apace, ever gaining on the truth. We see abundant traces of the beginnings of them in the Epistles, and we read there prophetic descriptions of their course and issues. They gained head steadily till the whole mass of professing Christianity may be said to have been pretty thoroughly corrupted. Her doctrine, her polity, her morals, were all wellnigh universally corrupted. The Western Church has been visited by the spirit of reform; and partial purification of doctrine and life has been the result. But the Reformed Churches have never been wholly free from the leaven of formalism, or error, or anything that leaven signifies. There have been times when dead and powerless orthodoxy has been widely prevalent, and there have been times when the Sadducean spirit has been predominant. Looking around on the Protestant Christendom of our own day generally, while making full allowance for all the hopeful signs, for all the true life, and all the fruitful thought and work that we see, few will deny that there are powerful forces and influences at work within her own border that threaten to sap or overlay her faith and corrupt her life, and that in some

branches of Protestantism at least these forces seem in the meantime to be gaining much ground. It may be objected that the parable teaches that the whole mass of the meal is to be leavened, and that the whole mass of professing Christianity is not and never has been so corrupted. Neither has the whole world, nor even the whole area of professing Christianity, ever been thoroughly leavened with the gospel.

It may be said that the whole world will one day be thoroughly leavened by the gospel, and that the parable contemplates the ultimate effect of the introduction of the gospel into the world.

To this it may be answered that the parable predicts that one day the Church will be more deeply and widely corrupted than it ever has been. The parable of the Tares, which covers the whole of the present age, certainly precludes the idea of any absolutely universal and thorough leavening, either of the world or of the Church with the gospel within the period to which it refers. Certain it is that at one period in the past, general corruption of doctrine and life prevailed throughout Christendom. Certain it is that now Christendom, in the most comprehensive sense, is proportionately far more widely corrupted by many alien elements than the world in general is transformed by the power of the gospel. Certain it is that there is enough in the outlook to cause grave anxiety to the most hopeful. This is the state of matters after nearly nineteen centuries of Christian history. My contention is that Christ anticipated it, and it seems to me, in view of the course of things in the history of the Church, and the state of things in the world and the Church to-day, that having said so much as He did say on the subject of His kingdom in the other parables, it would have been a perplexing thing had He not given some clear intimation of the extent to which the kingdom which He founded in the world, in the form in which it was to be embodied in this age, would be corrupted and perverted.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the parable of the Draw-net which covers the same ground and teaches the same truth as the parable of the Tares, nor on the parables of the Treasure Hid in the Field, and the Pearl of Great Price, which do not bear on my subject, unless they are—contrary to the traditional and generally accepted exposition—to be taken as representing Christ's self-renouncing love in seeking and saving those wh-

form His true body—the Church within Christendom—the Invisible Church of our traditional theology. This view of these two parables, which however we do not adopt, would give a completeness to this first group of seven contained in the thirteenth chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel, four of which were spoken to the multitudes on the sea-shore, and three of which were spoken to the disciples in the house. Were this view correct, there would be a fitness in the division,—the parables of the mixed state of matters that would exist in Christendom being spoken to the mixed audience, the parables of the finding of the true Church, with the summarised repetition in another form of the teaching of the Sower and the Tares, being spoken to the disciples alone.

The remaining parables which I proposed to consider—"The Talents," "The Pounds," "The Unjust Judge," and "The Ten Virgins," bring out distinctly the fact that the history of the kingdom of heaven, in its present form and manifestation, is to be brought to a close by the Saviour's own return, and show what the state of the Church or of Christendom will be at that time. The question whether the Talents and the Pounds are two separate parables, or different reports of the same parable, is quite immaterial for the purpose of this article, though, for myself, I have no doubt they are two distinct parables. In them, our Saviour taught His disciples that He would leave them, and that He would return. In the parable of the Pounds, which was suggested by the expectation that the kingdom of God should immediately appear, He taught that the purpose of His departure would be to receive a kingdom, and that when He had received it, He would return. His words are, "A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return, and it came to pass when he was returned, having received a kingdom."

A still future form of the kingdom of God, subsequent to the form treated of in this parable, is thus distinctly spoken of by the Saviour. I do not go deeper into the subject. It would be beside my present purpose. I only point out this fact in passing.

Both the parable of the Talents and the Pounds teach that Christ would make suitable provision for the administration of the affairs of His kingdom in His absence, that He would have His servants live and act in expectation of His

return. They show that life in the Church is a life of service. They show that He anticipated failure in service on the part of some. The "Pounds" show that He anticipated rebellion on the part of others. He anticipated failure among the servants, rebellion among the citizens. These are points of interest and importance, but the points I would emphasise are :—*first*, the fact that He represents that the order of things which He would introduce on His departure, and which ~~was~~ really introduced at Pentecost,—that order under which ~~we~~ live—is to be terminated by His return ; and further, *secondly*, the fact that He intimated in both parables, that His absence would be prolonged.

In the parable of the Talents we read, "After a long time the lord of those servants cometh and reckoneth with them." In the parable of the Pounds we read, "A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return."

The journey into a far country and the return naturally suggest a prolonged absence.

The other two parables—the Unjust Judge and the Ten Virgins—agree with the Pounds and the Talents in representing the coming of the Son of Man as the end of the Church's history. In the Unjust Judge we see the Church,—in this parable it would appear to be the inward, spiritual Church—the Church of God's elect—oppressed and praying—but at last fainting in prayer, so that the Saviour says plainly, "When the Son of Man cometh, shall He find faith on the earth?" He anticipated the general decay, if not the utter extinction, of faith before His return.

The same anticipation finds expression in the parable of the Ten Virgins. In it we have the Church presented to us in her waiting attitude. She goes forth joyfully to meet the bridegroom—the whole Church in its mixed character,—she did so at the outset of her history—but when the bridegroom tarries they all slumber and sleep. The liveliness of expectation at first cherished of the Lord's return subsides. It did so early in the Church's history. Only in the case of the wise virgins has this expectation such vital roots as enable them to recover their dormant faith, and go in to the marriage with the Bridegroom when He comes.

Neither in this parable nor in any other where there are two or more classes of persons introduced, are we to suppose that an exact numerical proportion is signified. It is plain on the surface of the matter that on such a principle our conclusions would be involved in contradiction and absurdity. The Talents and Pounds, for instance, are contemporaneous with the Virgins, and this principle would give us differing proportions of the wise and foolish, the faithful and unfaithful.

To sum up the whole matter, I gather from these parables, the importance of the place of which in Christ's teaching no believing reader or expositor of the gospel will be disposed to deny, the reference of which to the Church in the sense in which I have viewed it, all, whatever may be their opinion of the soundness of the interpretation given above, will admit,—to sum up the whole matter, I gather from these parables that Christ anticipated only partial success for the preaching of the gospel in this age ; that He anticipated that His Church would be a mixed body during its whole course ; that the spirit of intolerance and persecution would break out within it ; that it would become a great power in the world ; that it would be soon and deeply and extensively corrupted in life and doctrine ; that during His absence, which would be prolonged, and in consequence of its prolongation, although there would always be a body of faithful, praying, waiting people, yet the expectation of His return would cease generally to be a practical, influential motive in the lives of His professing people, and that faith itself would become wellnigh extinct in the earth.

These are the conclusions which a natural, unforced interpretation of the parables leads to, and they seem to be verified by the course of the Church's history and the present state and prospects of Christendom. They anticipate what has come to pass. I have purposely refrained from going beyond the limits of the parables, and taking in a wider range of Scripture teaching on the topics touched upon, for whatever views we may entertain of the whole subject of the kingdom of heaven in its present outward form, of its history, state, and prospects, it is a matter of the first importance to ascertain what Christ's thoughts about it were, as given us in these forecasts of it which His parables contain.

JOHN KELLY.

ART. VI.—*Constructive Exegesis*.¹

EXEGESIS in its broadest sense includes the whole function of interpretation as employed upon the Holy Scriptures. The interpreter acts as the mediator between mind and mind in the transmission of thought. Taken at the highest, his office is that of the prophet, who receives directly the thought of God and communicates it to man. In this Article, however, exegesis will be considered simply as employed in *understanding* the Scriptures, leaving out of view the methods by which its results are to be made available for the use or advantage of others. As thus employed it aims to elicit from a given passage or book the whole thought and purpose of the writer.

Schleiermacher, indeed, included interpretation as a whole under the definition *die Kunst des Verstehens*, "the art of understanding." Inadequate as the definition is, it undoubtedly penetrates to what is fundamental. An art, truly, and apt in this age of much reading to lag behind in the so-called progress of the arts! The searching challenge of Philip the Evangelist, "Understandest thou what thou readest?" (*γινώσκεις ἃ ἀναγινώσκεις*; the felicitous paranomasia of the Greek being perhaps untranslatable) still goes to the heart of the matter, and needs fresh and constant iteration with more than Socratic pertinacity, in the ear of every student of the Bible.

In what sense, or to what extent, is exegesis, thus considered, *constructive*? The question concerns the order and the aim of the entire exegetic process. In raising, and in attempting to answer, this inquiry, I would address the student, as well as the professional expounder of the Bible—the reader, as well as the writer, of commentaries. We are at present witnessing a remarkable revival of Biblical studies; the press is teeming with commentaries. The appearance of the Anglo-American Revised New Testament has awakened a fresh general interest in the problems and principles that specially concern the exegete. Surely, there

¹ From the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

was never more need that Biblical interpretation should subject its methods to critical inquiry, ground its work upon broad philosophical principles, and obtain the clearest possible conception of its own ideal. Any real progress will much depend upon its keeping steadily in view the true goal of its course in order to press thitherward with undiverted energies. My main object in this Article is to show that in the exegetic process the constructive idea should dominate throughout. Precisely what is meant by constructive—should any ambiguity attach to the term in this connection—will very soon appear.

Let us hasten to admit that in no field of inquiry is minute criticism and analysis more necessary, in none has it been more productive. The tracing of etymologies, the discrimination of synonyms, analysis of grammatical forms and functions to the last degree of minuteness, have breathed new life into many a dead form of ancient speech, and recovered to Biblical science many a long lost, but germinant and fruitful fact. Kühner's analysis of the sentence, which Professor Greene has elaborated to still greater perfection, and has introduced to the familiar acquaintance of American students, has contributed not a little to lucid exegesis. Witness also the value of a single historical investigation, as given in *The Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul*, by James Smith of Jordanhill. Still, there is a line to be drawn between studies that are auxiliary to exegesis and exegesis itself. History, philology, archæology, criticism—these are indispensable to the interpreter, and the interpreter to them. Without them he has neither tools nor materials; they, in turn, can but grope blindly among the archives of the past without the *organon* which it is the office of interpretation to furnish. Let us now consider

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EXEGETIC PROCESS.

I. *Exegesis begins with Particulars; namely, with the Examination of Words and Phrases.*—Its method from the very outset is, and must be, scientific. It grounds all its work upon the minutest analysis of phenomena. The elements of expression are scrutinised in the light of the widest inductive research. Exegesis first applies itself to ascertain, with the aid of lexicography and grammar, the meanings of words and

their relations in the sentence. It seeks for sharply-defined terms and vivid impressions of single thoughts. The meaning of every particle, even of each component factor of it that *had* a meaning, is indispensable to the success of the investigation. No atom or fibre of the discourse, provided the atom or the fibre were still living, can be allowed to escape the interpreter's scrutiny. He is not concerned with words as relics, with their historical associations or transformations as such, but with that which they signified to him who spoke them. To penetrate to the life of the word and of the sentence,—to their signification at the time when they were uttered,—this is his first and indispensable task. Hence he accepts in its literal truth the well-known dictum of Melancthon: "*Scripturam non posse intelligi theologicæ, nisi antea sit intellectum grammaticæ.*"

With this first stage of the exegetical process,—which perhaps answers to *grammatical exegesis*, in the larger sense of the term,—many seem to stop, or at least to consider their main task accomplished. The reasons are various. One is, that, though but a first step, it is a slow and difficult one. It is a task requiring large knowledge, acute observation, laborious and widely-extended inductive research. Besides, it is, in the very nature of the case, accompanied by exegetic processes of a higher order, which impart a certain appearance of completeness to the result. Bishop Ellicott, in his commentaries on the Epistles of Paul, has for the most part restricted himself to this stage of the work. These commentaries testify to the possibilities of the grammatical process rigorously applied, and by the hand of a master. The author, it seems to me, goes beyond the proper province of a commentator in incorporating into his notes so much grammatical and lexical material not needed for the elucidation of the passage in hand. As it is, suitable indexes would have made this material far more useful to the New Testament student.

Another reason why exegesis is often confined to the explanation of single words and sentences, is to be found in the homiletical motive with which the Scriptures are studied, taken in connection with the habit of preaching from single verses. Broad, deep knowledge of the Bible is not to be

attained by studying texts and difficult passages. Still a third reason may be found in the verse-arrangement that has so long prevailed in our modern Bibles—the printing of each verse as if it were a separate paragraph. The revisers of the New Version rightly speak of it in their preface as interposing “serious obstacles to the right understanding of the Holy Scriptures.” Happily they also set the example of a return to the earlier and better method of printing in longer paragraphs. Notwithstanding all that has been said upon the subject, the great majority of readers have but a slight apprehension of the mischievous effect of the prevalent method of printing. How it tends to obscure the sense of a passage may be seen by comparing the first twelve verses of the second chapter of Philippians with the original. A curious instance of the obliteration of an important historical transition may be found in Mark iii. 19. In many of the best editions of the Oxford Bible it reads, with a period before and after: “And Judas Iscariot which also betrayed him; and they went into an house.” Examining the whole passage, we see that the first half of the verse forms the close of Mark’s account of the appointment of the twelve; the latter half, “and they went into an house,” begins his account of the memorable warning given to the scribes against incurring the guilt of an eternal sin. It took place probably several months after the appointment of the twelve, certainly after an extended preaching tour in Galilee had intervened.

Nor is it merely the unlearned reader who is thus misled. What exegete has arisen on American soil of greater learning than Joseph Addison Alexander? Yet in his Commentary on Mark—a work whose value it would be superfluous to indorse here—we find the two clauses of the above-mentioned verse explained as if forming integral parts of the same section; an oversight on the part of the author that we can scarcely account for, except by referring it to the long-continued habit of seeing and reading them together.

Linguistic learning and tastes predispose an exegete to expend disproportionate time upon the meaning of a single word,—disproportionate, I mean, so far as such investigation is made part of the exegetic process. For it is apt to become a study of the linguistic form rather than of the actual

thought for which it stands, or it becomes an inquiry into a fact for its own sake, and thus diverts the attention of the interpreter from more difficult and important problems. Not that exegesis can make too much use of etymology, lexicography, or archæology; but these are sciences in their own right, they are not exegesis, and for its purpose are only servitors and auxiliaries. Hence the significance of the old maxim of law, *Qui hæret in litera hæret in cortice*, "He who considers merely the letter of an instrument, goes but skin-deep into its meaning;" or, as again paraphrased by Broom, "He who too minutely regards the form of expression, takes but a superficial, and therefore probably an erroneous, view of the meaning of an instrument."

Science, as well as philosophy, is impatient of *disjecta membra*. Whatever be the concrete object presented to its contemplation, it seeks to bring separate parts into their proper order, and to conceive of the object as a whole. Now the objects which are presented to the contemplation of exegetical science are the most perfect products of the mind,—products which must therefore exhibit complexity and unity in the highest degree. "You will allow," says Plato, "that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having its own body and head and feet." That is, in discourse properly so called, the thought to be conveyed must be somewhat highly organised, and the structure of the discourse must have a corresponding degree of organic completeness. The first and chief task of the speaker or the writer is thus to give organic form to his thought. He labours to combine, construct, create. This creative or constructive process takes place within his own mind. Perfection there assures perfection in expression. Now, the interpreter aims to follow the workings of the writer's mind; he thinks his thoughts after him; his sympathy with the writer must be such as to enable him to reproduce in great measure the original constructive process. Hence, the description of particulars, and the grammatical analysis which have been spoken of above, only constitute a preparation for the most important part of his work. These particulars he must construct anew in terms furnished by his own thinking and experience, till the whole thought and purpose of the writer have taken living form in his own soul.

We may derive instruction from the analogous methods of natural science ; methods emphasised by the example and the teaching of the great masters in that realm. The following anecdote told by a friend of Agassiz is in illustration : "Some thirty-five years ago, at a meeting of a literary and scientific club of which I happened to be a member, a discussion sprang up concerning Dr. Hitchcock's book on bird-tracks, and plates were exhibited representing his geological discoveries. After much time had been consumed in describing the bird-tracks as isolated phenomena, and in lavishing compliments on Dr. Hitchcock, a man suddenly rose who in five minutes dominated the whole assembly. He was, he said, much interested in the specimens before them, and he would add that he thought highly of Dr. Hitchcock's book as far as it accurately described the curious and interesting facts he had unearthed ; but, he added, the defect in Dr. Hitchcock's volume is this, that 'it is *dees-creep-teeve* and not *com-par-a-teeve*.' It was evident throughout that the native language of the critic was French, and that he found some difficulty in forcing his thoughts into English words ; but I never can forget the intense emphasis he put on the words descriptive and comparative ; by this emphasis flashing into the minds of the whole company, the difference between an enumeration of strange unexplained facts, and the same facts as interpreted and put into relation with other facts more generally known. . . . The critic was of course Agassiz." The exegete has still much to learn from the naturalist if he will not lose himself and his aim in the contemplation of particulars. "There are many royal men," says Plato in the *Phædrus*, discussing studies that we may rank under the same general head as interpretation, "and yet we are still sadly in the dark ; . . . if I find any man who is able to see unity and plurality in nature, him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a God."

It is already plain what a scientific method enjoins upon us. In the interpretation of a book we must hasten forward to the contemplation of that order which belongs to it as a whole. Its words, phrases, and thoughts cannot be apprehended separately, but only as constituent elements of an organic product. From the very first, then, multiplicity is to be thought

into unity. Far more must this be our method when we come to that book which in respect to its unity and plurality of structure stands unique in literature. In the divine λόγος we shall be led on to the contemplation of the λόγος—in the successive communications through inspired men during a course of sixteen centuries we shall perceive ourselves to be reading one inseparable record and message of a divinely-wrought deliverance. But how is our progress to this deeper and broader understanding of the Scriptures conditioned? In vindicating the constructive idea as that which is fundamental and essential in their interpretation, we are brought to consider the

SECOND STAGE OF THE EXEGETIC PROCESS.

II. *To reproduce Discourse in its Continuity.*—The organic order which we are now and first to seek is that by virtue of which the thoughts of the writer assume a consecutive coherence. In discourse nothing is isolated; there must be coherence; and the coherence is that of a series, not that of a system. Homer describes the speech that falls from the lips of Menelaus as something woven. The vitality of discourse depends on its continuity. The nervous cord itself is not more sensitive to separation. Sever it, and the flow of life ceases. No conception is more frequently misleading than that which views discourse as the stringing together of a series of pictures; an analogy obvious enough in some aspects, but conveying no hint of that continuous energy by virtue of which alone speech achieves its consummate function. It is rather a melody; you must perceive the notes, not only one by one and in due succession, but in a succession sufficiently rapid, or else the melody vanishes.

Lessing has shown, in his *Laocoon*, the essential characteristic of discourse as a medium of expression,—how it is a series of symbols presented in succession, contrasted with plastic art, which presents them side by side—how the best poetry instinctively recognises this characteristic. Homer, for instance, does not paint the shield of Achilles as finished, but as in process of creation. “When he wants us to see the chariot of Juno, Hebe must put it together, piece by piece, before our eyes.” Discourse presents ideas in signs addressed

to the ear; its order is primarily consecutive, not simultaneous. This is a fact that conditions the processes not only of the poet and the orator, but of the interpreter as well. The unity which he seeks first to reproduce to himself is the unity of discourse as such. For it is the inevitable defect of the written page that it can express but imperfectly the connections of thought. Imperfect at best is articulate speech and all the tones and the mimicry of the human voice; far more imperfect are the written symbols, by which the former are suggested, not represented. Here, in a peculiar sense, it is the letter (*γράμμα*, that which is written) that killeth. The writer seeks to write his thought as he would have it heard; his success can never be more than approximate. Exegesis must first transform written speech into oral speech; it must hear it with its own ear; the written page must somehow become a phonograph under its gaze, a speaking page, reproducing to its far-hearing sense the tones that first sounded in the soul of the speaker or writer.

Above all must the New Testament be so interpreted. There are written books and spoken books. The jurist scrutinises the will, the statute, or the treaty that lies before him as addressed to the eye rather than to the ear. Leaving out of view the few specimens of oratory proper and the relics of folk poetry,—such, for instance, as have come down to us in the poems of Homer and the Lay of the Niebelungs,—the world's classics are for the most part studied compositions of the solitary pen. The *Novum Organon*, the *Paradise Lost*, the *Decline and Fall*, conform to the laws of written speech; they are not read best aloud; they are the discourse of habitual writers to habitual readers. With the New Testament it is strikingly different. The greater part of this book is a record of spoken thought—of discourse fresh from the lips, warm from the quick-beating hearts of men who are speaking to men face to face. The first three Gospels are the fresh echoes of the very preaching of the apostolic twelve. Paul's Epistles show equally plain traces of the manner of their composition; they reflect his daily discourse. They were written down by an amanuensis, while the ardent apostle was addressing the distant audience that his spirit beheld and longed for. He knew, as he dictated them, that they were to

be read aloud, that most of his readers were to hear them. Thus the interpreter is ever to remember that such writings are not to be interpreted as if they were the systematised sections and chapters of a text-book, or the cold artificialisms of a tedious, pedantic exactitude. The vital current in them is continuous and free; thought and feeling flow without break from the beginning to the end of each book.

In books on hermeneutics we are amply furnished with directions as to this part of our task, under the head of logical interpretation. They are necessarily mechanical, but not useless. To discuss these rules is not my purpose, nor even to urge their patient study and application. He will spare no pains of this sort who loves his task and who comprehends its difficulty. To recover the consecutive coherence of those strains of discourse,—the unique product of minds in the very highest state of creative activity,—the rhythmic movement, the turns and transitions of thought, their digressions and apparent breaks, to feel the emotions, impulses, and passions with which they vibrate, to trace in them the expression of will and character, as well as thought—all this is more than mere labour or learning can achieve; it requires also the insight, the skill, the sympathetic and mirror-like soul of genius itself.

Let me call attention here to one canon not made sufficiently prominent, as it seems to me, by writers on interpretation, and too much disregarded by expositors. It is this: "The phrase or clause should often be taken as the unit of thought, rather than the single terms of which it is composed." Due regard to this will not only shorten the way from the grammatical to a broader exegesis, it will also facilitate correct apprehension of the scope of a passage, and even the proper interpretation of the terms themselves. Instances of such phrases will occur to every student of the Scriptures: *eg.* in Acts ix. 21, τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο "to call on the name of," an Old Testament phrase applied to the worshipping of God, and familiar to Jewish ears, as a glance at the Concordance of the Septuagint shows, is simply to be taken as a whole in that well-known signification. In Romans i. 17, ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, "from faith to faith;" I cannot but think it an error on the part of the majority of recent

expositors (see Meyer, Alford, Grimm, Philippi, Godet), to interpret the expression as two phrases separately modifying the predicate. The use of *ἐκ* and *ἐν* for the purpose of forming a single phrase is sufficiently frequent to furnish at least a presumption that this is the case here, the reference being either to the progressive nature of faith (as Calvin), or to the fact that the salvation spoken of is entirely of faith (as Hodge, Kendrick). A distinguished writer has remarked on the importance of this canon in legal hermeneutics: "The longer I study the subject, the more I am impressed with the truth that the sentence or phrase is usually the unit of interpretation, and that false constructions oftener grow out of the attempt to decide a difficult question by the meaning of a single word taken by itself than from any other cause."¹

A word, finally, upon another point, before we pass to the next and, for the purpose of this paper, the most important phase of our subject. It is in recombining discourse according to its consecutive unity that we may detect most certainly the marks of the writer's individuality. In words, phrases, and even sentences, we deal largely with the product of the many. It is the community, the age, that puts its stamp upon these, and makes them the current coin of thought. The writer's vocabulary and commonplaces, though of his selection, are in the slightest sense his. He not only adopts, consciously and unconsciously, already existing forms of speech, but is determined not a little by them as regards his conceptions and modes of thought. It is the order of presentation and the larger relations of his discourse that disclose most perfectly his personal creative activity. To discover what is on the one hand the product of the occasion and the individual, and on the other of the age and the community, is now recognised as one of the most necessary, and at the same time most difficult, tasks that criticism and theology have assigned to New Testament exegesis. The style of the New Testament writers has received as yet comparatively little attention. In this interest the Septuagint is yet to be thoroughly explored, together with the other remains of Hellenic and Hellenistic Greek; while the researches of Schöttgen, Delitzsch, Wünsche, and others into Rabbinic literature will furnish material hardly less useful.

¹ Prof. W.G. Hammond in *Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics*, p. 290.

THE FINAL STAGE OF THE EXEGETIC PROCESS.

III. The task of exegesis, finally, is *to reproduce the organic unity of discourse*.—It is the inner order now that we seek, not the order that the thought has been constrained to assume under the conditions imposed by the very nature of discourse. The unity of discourse that we have just been considering is the unity of a series, the coherence of its thoughts in the order of their presentation. As we have just seen, it is necessary to restore that living coherence, to recombine the elements of the series until the whole has produced a single collective impression. On reflection, however, we find still another thought-arrangement necessary. The train of images and ideas has passed in order before the mental vision ; we may compare it to an army filing by in single column ; the same army in the order of its organisation will present a different array. So the order of discourse is by no means the organic order of the thoughts that compose it.

To reproduce this organic order is evidently the last and highest function of exegesis. It is to obtain a clear conception of that structural unity of thought and purpose by virtue of which its several ideas and parts constituted in the mind of the writer an organic whole. In this process we have as a leading question from first to last : What is the central theme, or, in other words, what is the fundamental intention of the writer ? For it is this that furnishes the key to the whole reconstructive problem. It is not itself the solution of the problem ; the problem is to bring together in their true, namely, their original inner order, the elements upon the separate significance of which it was the business of grammatical exegesis to pronounce. The fundamental formative thought is the original draught of the architect, enabling us to reconstruct with success.

Some fine examples of constructive exposition are presented to us in Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms. Professor Godet has written his Commentary on Luke with this aim : one of the best products of the method. We cannot, of course expect to find in every book of the New Testament the same unity as is displayed in a poem or an argumentative oration : there is not perhaps in every case a single constructive idea

as Lange, for instance, maintains, is to be found in each of Paul's Epistles. At least we are not allowed to assume it *a priori*. The spontaneous variety of the mind is not to be so fettered. Yet the exegete cannot rest satisfied with his investigations until they have disclosed the leading thought or purpose of the writer, and the organic relations sustained thereto by the several component parts of the work.

Let me call the reader's attention to a passage in Mark, the book which is to be the subject of the International Sunday-school Lessons throughout the year 1882. It includes thirty-four verses, from Mark ii. 1 to iii. 6. The passage strikingly illustrates, if I mistake not, that inner unity which we have been considering. There are five distinct sections, which may be entitled as follows: 1. Healing of a Paralytic; 2. Call of Matthew; 3. Reply concerning Fasting; 4. the Grain plucked on the Sabbath; 5. Healing of the Withered Hand.

At first glance these sections seem to have no close connection. Nearer scrutiny reveals a sequence which is clearly neither accidental, nor due merely to the fact of their original chronological order. They sketch the rapidly developing hostility of the Pharisaic hierarchy to Christ during the few months that immediately preceded the organisation of the apostolate on the Mount of Beatitudes. At the healing of the paralytic our Lord for the first time in the narrative is brought into open collision with the scribes and Pharisees; his answer to their challenge, accompanied by the deed of healing, if it did not silence them, at least compelled their reluctant applause. In the second of the above sections, we find their hostility raised to a higher pitch by the admission of a hated publican into the circle of Christ's immediate followers. In the third, the question at issue is that of fasting—a question that they deemed of vital importance, and inferior only to that of the Sabbath. In the fourth, Christ confronts them for the first time upon the Sabbath question, that which the scribes naturally made the prominent issue during this stage of Christ's ministry. Charged with a technical infraction of the law in the person of his disciples, he rests his defence on the great truth of his own Messianic lordship over man and the Sabbath. In the fifth section the "chapter" (which these thirty-four verses ought properly to form) closes and culminates. Christ's

answer, appealing as it did to the profoundest ethical consciousness of his hearers, and rendered more majestic by the act of supernatural power that followed, silenced his antagonists, and drove them from the hardly contested field. It was the unanswerable answer. "And the Pharisees went out, and straightway with the Herodians took counsel against him, how they might destroy him." Here occurs the first mention by this evangelist of that conspiracy which finally resulted in the Redeemer's death. It is introduced as the final act, the *dénouement*, as it were, of a tersely outlined drama that almost anticipates the history of the passion week. The passage is one of very great importance in the interpretation of the whole gospel history. The under-running thought and purpose of the framer of the narrative can hardly be mistaken. Yet this Gospel of Mark is the book which a distinguished authority has recently pronounced—"disproportionate, inartistic, and uncouth; scarcely, indeed, to be called a book, but rather a collection of anecdotes."¹

Various portions of this Gospel reveal alike the writer's purpose and his skill. Equally distinct traces of a designed structural arrangement appear in the other historical books of the New Testament, in spite of the apparent disconnection of their parts. The great dogmatic works of the Middle Ages have been styled "cathedrals of thought." The phrase is doubtless intended to describe their amplitude of treatment, as well as the massive, enduring strength of their logic. The New Testament books, whether we regard their central aim or their structural harmonies, may with equal aptness be styled temples of Divine thought. Let us reverently study not only the truths they enshrine, but the Divine adjustments of form by which revelation has been made communicable to man in its completeness and harmony.

It is especially the historical books of the Bible that have suffered from neglect of the true exegetical method. So long ago as 1852 this was pointed out by Baumgarten with respect to the Book of Acts—the neglect of the systematic study of its inner connections. "The most obvious testimony to this neglect," he says, "is the confession which the theological science of our own times has made with respect to the Acts of

¹ Dr. Edwin A. Abbott in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Art. "Gospels."

the Apostles, of which it avows its inability to point out the plan and the object," that it has been reserved for modern times to become conscious of the need of a clear and definite insight into the inner structure and composition of this book. Baumgarten's work was primarily designed to prepare the way for a comprehensive exposition of that portion of New Testament history, and to rescue it from the fragmentary handling to which it had previously been exposed.

I have already referred to the analogous methods of science. The scientific inquirer seeks for typical forms, laws of combination and development, distinct movements of historical advance and expansion. His constant impulse is towards those larger unities that disclose the Divine thought in its fullest variety, manifoldness, and harmony. It will not be denied that the same essential principles prevail in exegetical, as in all truly scientific method. The chief obstacle to their successful application is not always clearly apprehended. In nature the interpreter has before him the actual forms; in the written page the interpreter has before him only a collection of symbols. These will not furnish the concrete realities which the constructive process requires any more than the architect's drawings and specifications will provide the materials for the construction of the cathedral or temple. It is from the entities that these represent that we are to rear, each in the spaces of his own thought, the temple structures of Divine discourse; and as the work goes on, without sound of hammer, or of axe, or of any tool of iron, let us trust that the Spirit of God may inform these structures into living temples, whose walls shall resound for ever with celestial symphonies.

The demand of constructive exegesis—the demand that the contents of a work shall be understood in their inner unity—is not satisfied by ascertaining its leading thoughts, or by drawing up an analysis of its contents. It is rather by means of the theme, or leading thought, that it traces and retraces in detail the unfolding purpose of the writer, and comprehends the adjustment and adaptations by which that purpose is achieved. Indeed, it is only by attending closely to the general aim of a discourse that its individual parts can be correctly or adequately interpreted; and while exegesis begins

with the investigation of single phenomena, in order thereby to attain to the comprehension of their unity, it is after all the unifying principle itself that affords a means of verifying the correctness of the earlier process.

It is most of all in these latter stages of the exegete's work,—namely, in testing and verifying his results,—that the principle for which I contend comes most prominently into view. The principle is, that in exegesis the constructive aim should dominate the entire plan of work. Keen perception of facts, vivid apprehension of single thoughts, must be secondary to the discernment of their inner affinities and relations to the general scope of the author's work. The prime and indispensable requisite is an adequate and clear conception of the fundamental theme; and in the exegete's work considered as a whole all study of details is rigidly to be subordinated to the attainment of such a conception.

I would not be understood as urging attention to *a* method of exegesis, but rather to the principles that underlie all exegesis rightly and broadly considered. Nor would I insist on the term "constructive," except for the purpose of better describing the actual process by which alone exegesis can hope to attain its ideal or accomplish its best results. I recall here the words of a writer upon art, criticising, some years ago, the method of instruction then pursued in the South Kensington School of Design: "It disregards," says the writer, "the subordination of detail to the action and the larger masses . . . The feeling," he adds, "which lay at the root of their work was, get the details right, and the masses must be right—a superficial maxim, and one that is invariably falsified by practice; for no one does ever get the details absolutely right, and the sum of the errors is worse than any possible error in the larger way of working."

As we look out upon the widening horizon of historical and philological inquiry, as we at the same time discern the quickening consciousness of the Church of Christ touching the vital questions of the trustworthiness and the inspiration of the historical writings of the Bible, it becomes manifest how pressing is the demand of the time for an exegesis such as it has been my object briefly to delineate—an exegesis rigorously

scientific in its method, and equally scientific in its scope and comprehension—an exegesis that shall push steadily forward on the long path that it has still to hew out for itself toward its distant goal. Perhaps no one has recognised this demand more clearly than the lamented Hofmann of Erlangen, especially as regards the more comprehensive exposition of the Scriptures. It is indicated in the title of his great work, left incomplete at his death: “Die heilige Schrift des neuen Testaments zusammenhangend untersucht”—an invaluable bequest to Biblical science, notwithstanding its serious defects, especially as a philological commentary. The works of Baumgarten and Godet have already been spoken of. Similarly valuable, though in another sort, are Bernard’s *Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament*, and R. Payne Smith’s *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ*. The general movement towards a more comprehensive exegesis of the New Testament has followed two chief directions. On the one hand, it has aimed at the systematic exposition of the historical contents of the Gospels; these studies now constitute a theological *cursus* by themselves, with a rapidly-enlarging body of literature, to which Ebrard, Lange, Greswell, our own Norton, and others, have made such splendid contributions. On the other hand, it aims at a comprehensive genetic presentation of the doctrines of the New Testament in their historical unity—a line of inquiry already somewhat fruitful, but promising results of still greater value to Biblical science.

To sum up all in one word: let us penetrate beneath mere phenomena and mechanism, and discern powers. “Living is the word of God and powerful” (Heb. iv. 12), says the Divine Word of itself. He who detects the working of forces will inevitably be led to work constructively in reaching his conception of their products. The sublimest harmonies of the material universe have been disclosing themselves to modern science under the concept of force. Long before modern science, David had a poet’s glimpse of the same truth, when he saw the sun “coming as a bridegroom out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race.” Essentially the same conception is embodied in the title “Celestial Physics,” that Kepler gave to one of his astronomical treatises. So Goethe

not only sees, but feels and hears, the resistless approach of the dawn : ¹—

“Sounding loud to spirit-hearing,
See the new-born Day appearing !
Rocky portals jarring shatter ;
Phœbus' wheels in rolling clatter ;
With a crash the Light draws near.”

But the Christian revelation did not find expression in the working of external forces. The sphere in which its communication took place was the human soul—a sphere of being where inconceivably mighty energies are in activity, and which constitutes a universe of phenomena even more varied and complex than those of external nature. In the forms of that inner world were disclosed the truths of revelation—that law of Jehovah to which David, in the Psalm quoted above, ascribes a perfection beyond that of the visible heavens. If the Bible be indeed the Word, and not merely the words of God,—a continuous discourse held with the soul of man through sixteen centuries,—it has a cosmic harmony of its own sublimer to the thoughtful mind than that of the stellar universe. Who shall be the Kepler to interpret the dynamics of this cosmos—to demonstrate the Divine wisdom as exhibited in the adjustment of those forces whose resultant is revelation, the “living and powerful” word? Such an one will impart a fresh and deeper meaning to the great astronomer’s hallelujah after the discovery of his third law of the planetary motions: “Father of the world, what moved Thee thus to exalt a poor weak little creature of earth so high that he stands in light a far-ruling king, almost a god? For he thinks thy thoughts after Thee.”

Various corollaries from the principles set forth in the preceding pages will suggest themselves to those who are engaged in exegetical study or instruction. With the mention of three I will bring the discussion to a close.

First, the Scriptures should be read consecutively more than it is now the fashion to do, and also in large portions at a time. The preacher must ponder his one text; the exegete spend weeks of critical study upon a single paragraph; a single chapter may be the soul’s food for many a devotional hour,

¹ *Faust*, Second Part; Bayard Taylor’s translation.

and lift it to the seventh heaven of rapture ; but this is not the way to know the Bible. We must abandon piecemeal reading, surrender ourselves to the Bible in the spirit of which Mrs. Browning speaks :—

“Gloriously forget ourselves, and plunge,
Soul-forward, headlong into a book's profound,
Impassioned with its beauty.”

Chrysostom is said to have had Romans read aloud to him twice a week ; we read at the most a chapter at a sitting ; yet the whole Gospel of Mark can be deliberately read aloud in two hours, the prophecy of Habakkuk in twenty minutes. Kinglake, in his *History of the Crimean War*, refers to the necessity of a consecutive, continuous reading in the investigation of historical documents. “It may seem strange,” he says, “but the truth is, that the general scope of a lengthened official correspondence is not to be gathered by merely learning at intervals the import of each despatch.” If we hope to eradicate habits of feeble intermittent attention and disjointed thinking, if students of the Bible are to be less satisfied with a scrap-book knowledge of its contents, and the necessarily superficial or distorted view of its teachings that flourishes in such a soil, there is here pointed out at least one remedial method.

Secondly, with the majority of Biblical students their exegetical work should be largely and systematically expended upon an English version. Far be it from the writer to depreciate the study of the original. But the great body of pastors, and also of laymen, who desire to search the Scriptures for themselves, are conscious of a painfully inadequate knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, or, with the best linguistic training, have but limited leisure for independent exegetical study. What is to be done? Put aside the original? No ; but, along with a thorough grammatical scrutiny of special passages in the Greek and Hebrew, let them work on a larger plan with an English version. Many have doubtless been unconsciously deterred from continuous systematic study of the Scriptures by the notion that exegesis, properly so called, begins and ends with the original text. On the contrary, there is only here and there a scholar who can apprehend the drift and logical connection of a series of chapters without resorting to the

repeated reading of a translation. In order to obtain a single collective impression, his mind must not be diverted by attention to peculiarities of form or idiom ; he must read it in that language in which he can also think. But it is not the object of this Article to discuss this important practical subject. I would only urge the more general extension of rigorous exegetical methods to the study of our English Bible.

A third corollary concerns the question of Inspiration. The theology of our day finds itself persistently met by the demand for a theory of inspiration that shall draw a clearer line of demarcation between the human and the divine in the Scripture, that shall serve as a rule by which to eliminate the subjective, the relative, the transitory, and arrive by a short method at the absolute objective truth of revelation, whether considered as history or as doctrine: It is plain, from the foregoing discussion, that this demand is premature. Of the inspiration of the Bible as a book, the Bible itself, as might be expected, says comparatively little. When we ask what in it is the product of a direct, personal, supernatural agency of the Divine Spirit—that question, so far as concerns a *scientifically formulated* theory, must wait long for an answer. It is in the organic unity of the Bible that the clearest manifestations and proofs of inspiration are to be discerned. Of the fact of such a unity we are not without proofs, though on the part of most believers they are rather felt than perceived. But the scientific exposition of that unity is the task of exegesis, and, as already intimated in a previous paragraph, it has scarcely more than entered upon its accomplishment. The solar system of revelation moves in a vast and majestic orbit ; the forces determining the line of its orbit are numerous and complex. Biblical science has only begun to accumulate the data by which to determine its direction or its governing law.

This reply, I am aware, will not satisfy an objector who occupies anti-supernaturalistic ground. He will claim that it virtually surrenders our position to the rejecters of inspiration. To him we may further reply that the delay in solving the problem is not the fault of theology alone. Communication of supernatural truth, if it take place at all, must, from the nature of the case, be determined by antecedent conditions of language and of mental constitution, existing not only in the individual,

but in the race to whom the communication is made. To distinguish between the human and the Divine in the production of a historical record such as the Bible, presupposes data derivable only from the sciences of language, mythology, and ethnic psychology. These sciences are comparatively recent and immature. Though they have contributed much to the progress of historical criticism, their chief labour is still to collect facts and verify provisional theories. In establishing definite laws of historical development their success is largely prospective. In this state of the case, with many of the requisite data lacking, it is by no means surprising that theology has thus far *philosophised* with but imperfect success upon the question of inspiration, and has failed to establish upon a thoroughly *scientific* basis whatever theory it may have propounded.

WILLIAM ARNOLD STEVENS.

ART. VII.—*The Collapse of Faith.*¹

THE manifold phases of religious doubt and questioning which have succeeded one another so rapidly in this our mobile and sensitive generation, are well expressed by a few descriptive phrases, which are more or less significant and forcible. The metaphor which lurks behind each one of these phrases is at least suggestive of reflection and inquiry. "The Eclipse of Faith" suggests the darkness and gloom which for the moment may oppress the individual or the community. But it also suggests the conviction, or at least the hope, that this condition is only temporary. The sun is not extinguished because it is darkened. The individual man, or the community, perhaps needs only to change its position in order to come again into the bright and blessed light. "The Decay of Faith" emphasises some diseased or abnormal action of the powers, from which recovery is possible. Should such a decay terminate in the dissolution of the individual, the life of the community may still go on, and perhaps with renewed energy. Both these phrases imply, if they do not express, the under-

¹ From *The Princeton Review*.

lying conviction that faith has solid grounds of truth on which it may rest ; and consequently, though an individual or a generation may falter in its allegiance, the truth will not fail to shine upon other souls and upon other generations with intenser brilliancy and effect.

But what phrase shall we select to express that type of unbelief which seems to have taken so strong a hold of not a few of the present generation—whether they are unwilling sceptics, agnostic seekers who never find, or earnest and reverent souls who are in terror lest God and his truth have ceased to be because so many wise men deny them ? What shall we say of the alarm of those lookers-on who observe not merely that many faintly believe, but discover the more appalling evidence that multitudes are drifting into the half-formed conviction that the reasons for faith seem one after another to be dissipated by the advance of science and culture, as morning clouds melt before the morning light.

No phrase seems more fitting for this state of mingled doubt and fear than "*The Collapse of Faith*," whether it describes the failure of faith, or the fear that this failure is reasonable and is likely to be universal. Other phrases make the presence or absence of faith to be dependent on the subjective condition of the persons concerned. Whether the hindrances to faith in these cases be intellectual or moral, they have only to be removed, and the light of truth will appear again. The condition for which we seek a suitable appellation is, the more or less settled and prevailing conviction that faith is not only failing, but that it is doomed to a slow but certain dissolution, and that all the indications of the prevailing time-spirit justify this conclusion.

We are well aware that the presence and prevalence of such a conviction are no new phenomena in the history of Christendom. Bishop Butler recognises a similar collapse of faith in his time, in the words so often quoted : "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious ; and accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by

way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world." It was doubtless his reflections on this condition of opinion which led him on one occasion, when walking in his garden with his chaplain, to stop suddenly and ask the question, "Why might not whole communities and public bodies be seized with fits of insanity as well as individuals?" and in response to the reply, to add, "Nothing but this principle, that they are liable to insanity equally at least with private persons, can account for the major part of those transactions of which we read in history." The amiable yet sharp-witted Berkeley has drawn a lively portrait of the free-thinkers of his time, which, with certain inconsiderable changes, finds its exact counterpart in the advanced thinkers of our own time. Niebuhr, the leader and almost creator of modern historical criticism, recognised the atheistic unbelief of his own day as worse than insanity—as almost a demoniacal frenzy.

It avails but little, however, to refer to Butler or Berkeley, or even to Niebuhr with his old-fashioned notions about Providence and prayer and moral retribution, which he so obstinately retained with his new theories of the philosophy of history. The advanced critics of our time are characteristically averse to any comparison of old times and old thoughts with the events and thoughts of the present. Butler and Berkeley, in the opinion of many, have been altogether left behind by the prodigious advances of modern science and the deeper insight of modern philosophy. Development and evolution are no longer used in the high spiritual significance in which Niebuhr employed these terms. It is only as these terms have become wholly materialised by Comte and Spencer that they are accepted in the most modern philosophy.

The authority of Butler has not only been set aside, but by the dexterous use of modern dialectics it has been shown that the cumbrous and old-fashioned battery which he contrived for the defence of Christianity is capable of being used with deadly effect by the new-fashioned assailants of theism. And as for Berkeley, the new atheistic materialism is ostentatiously Berkeleian in its creed—using the very arguments which Berkeley devised for the annihilation of matter to demonstrate that spirit and matter are in substance but one.

Leaving the times of Butler and Berkeley to themselves,

with their historians and critics, and returning to our own, we cannot deny the fact that a collapse of faith has befallen us in a somewhat peculiar and a very formidable fashion. Its most alarming feature is this, that, whether reasonably or unreasonably, men of knowledge and culture are so extensively taking it for granted that Christian theism, in the essential truths of personality in God, responsibility in man, and the providential and supernatural conduct of human history, is doomed to vanish before what is called modern science and culture. They do not all affirm that this collapse will be final. But they find unmistakable and alarming indications that it is making rapid progress among thinking and cultivated men. We could cite many arguments and concessions to this effect from numberless essays and criticisms proceeding from very able and discerning writers who represent various schools of thought and feeling. This conclusion is held, indeed, in various forms: by some in the form of a fixed and logical conclusion, by others as a gloomy and unwelcome foreboding, by others as a shivering misgiving, by others in a spirit of sorrowing but patient fortitude, by others in a temper of frivolous refinement, and by others in a mood of malignant recklessness or despairing pessimism. In short, there is alarming evidence that a positive and scornful contempt of Christian theism as a doctrine and a life, a desponding or malignant disbelief in its truth, and a more or less assured confidence in its downfall, have become more or less definitely the creed of many young men in England and America.

We propose to examine the reasons for these conclusions, in whatever form or spirit they may be held, and whether by the friends or the foes of the Christian faith. To give greater definiteness to our theme, we would propose the definite inquiry whether faith has in the last century gained or lost in the argument, and especially whether, under the critical and confident attacks that are peculiar to the present age, her cause is weaker or stronger at the court of the last resort—the court of the sober second thoughts of considerate and competent men. By the argument we do not mean the argument as viewed in the light of a rigid and dry logic, but in the actual hold which the truths in question have gained and are likely to keep in the convictions of the present and the next generation. We

are prepared to concede that in no century since the Protestant Reformation have the opinions of believers in Christian theism been modified in so many particulars as during the present. And yet we would contend that in spite of these changes, and in many cases in consequence of these changes, faith in Christian theism and all that it involves never stood so strongly on grounds of reason in the minds of those who accept it as true, and never could urge so many arguments in its defence. Our position implies that we do not accept as final the confident, and in a sense the honest, unbeliefs of eminent scientists who may be narrow in proportion to their eminence. Nor are we convinced by the *a priori* assumptions of pantheistic or agnostic philosophers by profession, nor by the logical deductions of the school of critics who from the opening to the close of human history deny the possibility that God can direct or interfere with it as puerile or fanatical. We do not sympathise with the supercilious tone of that literary criticism which is moved by no fervent sympathy with those views of duty or spiritual aspiration which are characteristically Christian, whether Christianity be true or false. While we recognise the force of all these classes of negative arguments and prepossessions, we find stronger reasons for rejecting than for accepting them. While we would do the amplest justice to the considerations which induce so many to adopt negative conclusions, and while we sympathise with the alarm which is felt by so many honest inquirers after truth lest the foundations of faith should be destroyed, we would reassure them and reassure ourselves with a brief survey of the argument for and against the Christian faith as it stands at the present time, under the several heads to which we have referred.

I. It will be conceded by common consent that what is called *modern science* should be considered first of all, as well for its intrinsic claims to attention as for the confidence with which its authority is appealed to. We are also compelled to connect *philosophy* with science, because by a naïve and therefore pertinacious effrontery modern science claims to have become a philosophy, and as such to furnish materials and to dictate principles, methods, and laws for every department of special investigation. Even when science ignores and

denounces metaphysics and speculation, it unconsciously sets up and uses a metaphysics of its own, though this is often nothing better than a transformed and amplified physiology or physics.

Connecting for these reasons science and philosophy together, we propose as our first inquiry : What effect upon the great argument before us has been wrought during the preceding century by the changes in each and in both, whether considered separately or as one ? We limit our view to the last century because, with the exception of the Newtonian physics, terrestrial and celestial, modern science in every one of its divisions has been the growth of this period. Within this time also every variety of metaphysics, including the transfigured or rather the disguised physics of which we have spoken, has had its ardent representatives and devotees.

Going back a little earlier than a century ago, we find that in 1770 the *Système de la Nature*, by Baron Von Holbach, very generally attracted the attention of the philosophers of Europe, and claimed to express the ultimate and prevailing thought of the age. It was grossly and avowedly atheistic, painfully but not brilliantly imaginative, violently and contemptuously arrogant with respect to any and every form of religious faith and feeling. It called forth at once the indignant protest of Voltaire, who represented the reasoned deism of the logical school, and subsequently the passionate remonstrances of Rousseau, the founder and leader of the sentimentalists. Far gone in its negations as the new illumination of science and philosophy had proceeded, it had not gone far enough to respond with distinct and full-mouthed assent to Von Holbach's outspoken and defiant assault upon theism. And yet this writer in a most important sense had the argument of his time on his side. He commanded the assent of the hour. Against his logic, whether weak or strong, whether it were the logic of science or sentiment, Voltaire's ingenious protests and Rousseau's eloquent appeals could avail but little, and that little but for a little while. When we say he had the argument we certainly do not mean that he had the truth on his side, but that all the logic was on his side which was provided in the principles and premises which were currently recognised by cultivated men in respect to man and his signi-

fiance in the universe. To use a current if not a cant phrase of our day, Holbach and his gospel of atheism represented the *Zeit-Geist* of 1770, and therefore it carried the day.

The *Système de la Nature* has little meaning and less force for thinkers of the present generation. The few who read it now read it as a philosophical curiosity. It is wholly disregarded by fresh and earnest seekers after truth. This is partly owing to its defects of style and to the abundant use of a verbose and flowery rhetoric in place of soberly reasoned deductions from accepted principles. A better reason why it has lost favour with the present generation is that its science is antiquated, having literally been left behind in every point of detail by the rush of discovery and experiment since 1770. The modern reader of this old argument, if argument it may be called, is therefore compelled to read it over-against a background of assumed scientific truth which has been exploded or outgrown. Or if it is not wholly outgrown, in place of what was a scanty and shadowy framework is seen a finished and elaborate structure of verified forces and laws. The scientific reasoner of the present day literally lives in a new physical and spiritual universe, with its correlated forces, its formulated laws, and above all with its long history of developed progress, that promises a still more imposing future. Splendid as were Holbach's fantastic dreams of the undeveloped forces of nature, he did not anticipate the half of what has since been realised of her then undiscovered capacities and her correlated laws.

Two treatises of the present day may not unfairly be taken as representing the fairest expression of the negative attitude of modern science with respect to theism. The one is *Atheistic*, the other is *Agnostic*. Positive atheism is taught in *A Candid Examination of Theism* by Physicus. The theory of agnosticism or agnostic atheism is expounded at length in Mr. Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*. The first is a reasoned argument to the conclusion that modern science, by its discovery of the doctrine of the conservation of force, finds no occasion whatever to believe in design or in God. The introduction to the second professes to prove that while modern science finds reason to believe that there is an Absolute, it finds equal reason for denying that this Absolute can ever be known. Both these writers seem at first thought

to have an immense advantage over Von Holbach in the vast and imposing additions which modern science has made to our knowledge of verified facts and to our stock of stimulating and quickening theories. A close examination of each will show, however, that neither of these gains, nor both together, have made the logic of the new atheism or the new agnosticism a jot more convincing than the logic of the old. They have neither added a single new link to the old chain, nor made a single old link stronger than it was before. They have neither introduced a new method of using the old facts or the new, nor weakened in any particular any of the old methods of inference or any of the old grounds of belief. The new universe of modern science has indeed become immensely expanded to man's certain insight, and been made immeasurably more impressive to his instructed and quickened imagination. Its spaces stretch out in every direction before the eye in immeasurable tracts which the imagination falters in its attempts to traverse. But the instructed eye finds in these most distant provinces examples of order, beauty, and goodness as brilliant and overwhelming as in those which are near. New agents have been discovered in the far and the near, the products and actings of which have made science familiar even to uninstructed minds as the minister and magician of art.

It would seem at first that these brilliant discoveries, these verified facts, and these determined laws, would have made the old theory of a self-existent, creating, and loving Intelligence more necessary and more acceptable to the scientific intellect. At the least, we might conclude that the logic of atheism could find no advantage in modern science above the logic of theism. Such at least is the judgment of the unsophisticated intellect when first confronted with the facts and relations which science reveals.

It becomes therefore a question of more than curious interest, by what processes of intellectual legerdemain has the new atheism become so plausible, and by what subtle transitions of thought have the atheistic and agnostic theories so largely taken possession of the *Zeit-Geist* of the present generation. The strength of these theories and the likelihood of their endurance may be estimated by a brief review of their history, involving as it must a critical judgment of the logical value of

the steps in the process by which they have grown into such gigantic proportions and been applied to such appalling conclusions.

The least informed of the students of science is not ignorant that the so-called galvanic force, originally a product of the subtle chemistry which was almost unknown in 1770, has enabled us to excite and regulate in various ways that molecular action of which we so glibly speak, but which we very imperfectly understand. We have gone so far, at least, that we can talk by threads of metal beneath and athwart the sky. We have learned by processes as simple as they are daring to interpret the constituents of the nearest and the remotest of the stars. Many of the forces and agents which we had counted as diverse we have learned to regard as one. We can even convert the one into the other backwards and forwards, forwards and backwards, till they seem to assume the arts and ways of a mocking and mischief-loving Proteus. And yet we have learned to predict and trace his arts and ways so far as to have found the expression and condition of each form of force in some mode or rate of molecular action. Molecular action, again, we have connected with the motion of masses, and to this have found affinities in the undulating light and in the supposed throbbing and heat-bearing ether. We have concluded by legitimate theorising that the so-called physical forces are correlated by a common measure or by mensurable motion, and that the agents or atoms which defy the discernment of the senses, whether differing in quantity only or also in quality, do yet perform their several functions after common relations of number and proportion.

We have learned far more than this. The observed interchange of material forces very naturally enforced attention to the possible interdependence and reciprocal action of the several parts and agents of the physical universe. It has forced science to recognise the universe itself as an organism of co-acting and conspiring parts, each of which must act with and upon all the rest, and in turn be acted on by each and all, in order that any one may perform its humblest or its noblest office. This relationship, which had always been more or less distinctly recognised in the sphere of life, and which has given its plausibility and charm to pantheism in its grosser and more

spiritual forms, had struggled almost in vain to find a place within the domain of the inorganic until the doctrine of the correlation of force flung the door widely open for its admission. This gave it authority and prestige with a class of scientists who would otherwise have rejected it as utterly strange to the traditions and axioms of the mechanical philosophy. With organic relations a way was also opened for development or evolution. These were first limited to the familiar processes of growth from simpler to more complex forms, and from humbler to nobler functions. For this progress some definitely working agency must be subsidised, and some semblance of law and regularity must be provided, and forthwith heredity and tendency to variation and the struggle for existence and natural selection emerged in succession upon the arena, all being summed up under the general title of Evolution. Some of these forces or laws were hospitably admitted within the temple of the new physics without the tests and passwords usual to science of verification by induction and formulation through laws. They have certainly enriched our scientific vocabulary if they have not added to the definiteness of our scientific conceptions. They have immensely stimulated if they have not completely satisfied the scientific imagination.

But the entire history has not yet been told. At a somewhat early stage of this history which we have traced, palaeontology had begun to read in the records of the remoter ages an undeniable testimony to progress and development of some sort, such as would be altogether consistent with the working of the law of evolution, so soon as it should be hypostasised as an agent or force in the way already explained. Plausible analogies suggested themselves between the development of living germs into complicated organisms and certain mechanical changes in form, structure, or orbit. These again were assumed to have been provided for in some original impulse of motion which it was conjectured might involve the development of the several forms of molecular activity which were required to account for the phenomena of heat, light, colour, etc. Very suddenly our scientific dialect is enriched by three separate conceptions used in swift and unnoticed interchange with one another, viz., *development* mechanically viewed, *evolution* in the organic sense, and last of all *differentiation*—a purely logical

term. These three, as we have said, are used interchangeably by many scientists, and not infrequently are inextricably confounded. Similarly, mechanical accretion, structural growth, with a capacity for special functions, and logical integration, were included under one indiscriminate generalisation. Last of all, by one gigantic leap of personification founded on a most comprehensive analogy, the progressive movement of evolution was exalted as at once the originating force and the ultimate law of all being, whether living or dead, whether material or spiritual, and crowned with all the glories which were once accorded to a self-existent and intelligent person, but are now transferred to the unknown and unknowable Absolute.

These wide-reaching conclusions, it should be observed, are claimed by many to be severely and strictly scientific. There are indeed many scientists—we trust they are very many—who know that some are nothing more than simple hypotheses, and as such belong to pure philosophy. They are none the worse for this reason, if they are only recognised as mere speculations. Their claims to acceptance or authority should be firmly resisted whenever it is claimed that they have been demonstrated or verified as scientific truth.

Historically considered, the theory of evolution can be shown to have been not only speculative in its origin but theistic in its assumptions and tendencies. The physics of the last century knew nothing of organic interdependence, much less did it know anything of organic evolution. It was the mechanical philosophy of Descartes and Newton which furnished the premises from which the atheism of Von Holbach was reasoned. It is true he insisted on the distinction between dead and living matter, yet his living matter was only matter in motion. Our modern creative evolution and the unknowable absolute would never have been thought of had not Kant introduced the element of organic relationship with its implied theism for the second time into the arena of physics and metaphysics, and this just at the moment when chemistry, physiology, and palæontology stood ready to give to this more elevated medium of interpretation the verification of their splendid and almost bewildering discoveries. It follows that the new atheism of Physicus and Spencer builds on a philosophy which is essentially spiritual if not theistic in its assumptions.

Leaving this point, as tempting us aside from the right line of discussion, we proceed to inquire whether the science of to-day with its splendid discoveries and its magnificent generalisations, and the philosophy of to-day with its organic relationships and evolutionary progress, are any more demonstrative of either atheism or agnosticism than were the science and philosophy of a century ago, as represented in the "System of Nature." For convenience we separate the atheism of Physicus from the agnosticism of Spencer.

The first point which we notice is, that the doctrines of the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force, which Physicus relies to set aside the necessity of a self-existent Creator, are purely scientific conceptions, and as such pertain only to the finite universe. These ultimate generalisations are as truly limited propositions, and only concern a limited subject-matter, as do any of the special scientific conclusions that can be deduced from either. The fact that they explain every physical phenomenon, by a general affirmation of the force or the law which holds of each, only makes them more wonderful and comprehensive than the phenomena which they explain, but it does not for this reason take them out of the realm of the finite. If a scientific ultimate can satisfy the mind, it being finite, as the scientific atheist contends it must be in order to be understood and assented to, then the creed of an atheist of the school of Physicus must be: I believe in indestructible matter or in persistent force, in extent m , in powers n , and in laws r , all finite. So far science conducts him, and only so far. The instant he affirms any or all of these finites to be self-existent, he leaves the domain of science and steps over the boundary which divides it from the region beyond, whether this be called the domain of philosophy or the domain of faith. He does the same when he assumes the position of agnosticism pure and simple; i.e. when he will neither affirm nor deny that man can know anything besides. Physicus himself confesses that his elaborate attempt to demonstrate that modern science can dispense with God, only carries us to the bounds of the finite, to the *flammantria mania mundi*, and that his magic formula of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter are purely scientific doctrines which concern the finite as we find it, and go no farther.

He frankly admits that metaphysically a self-existent infinite is supposable; i.e. it involves no inconsistency with scientific principles, conclusions, or experiments. With his purely metaphysical arguments for and against such an Infinite we have at present no concern. We are interested only in the question whether the position which he so triumphantly urges has any force, that modern science has enabled us to dispense with a self-existent infinite by reason of its axioms or discoveries that matter is indestructible and force is persistent; whether, in brief, the new atheism of Physicus has any advantage over the old atheism of Von Holbach. We find that the universe of each is a finite, and only a finite. So far as either is claimed to be self-existent, it is claimed to be so not on grounds of science, but of philosophy or faith. More is known of the extent, the powers, and laws of the new universe than of the old. But we look in vain for the slightest evidence that the universe of matter and of spirit as known to the scientist of 1881, with its forces and its laws, with the history of its evolutions in the past so distinctly recorded, and its prophecy of the developments in the future so clearly revealed, is, on grounds of philosophy, any the less dependent for its being and its order on a self-existent intelligent originator than the universe as known to the Encyclopædist of 1770, when as yet there was no chemistry, no geology, no spectroscopy, no Darwinism, and no Herbert Spencer!

Herbert Spencer, as all our readers should know, takes a position entirely different from that of Physicus in respect to the absolute or the unknowable force. He is not content with arguing back to the reality of such a force, on the grounds of science, nor with showing that indestructible matter and persistent force are interchangeable conceptions, but he is moved in his "First Principles" to inquire whether there is not or may not be besides an unknowable object of faith and worship. Confounding in his sudden zeal the scientific or unformulated unknowable (still finite) which evolution supposes, and which reveals itself in manifold phases or effects under changing and progressive conditions and laws—confounding this with that metaphysical absolute which theists had so long ignorantly worshipped in the form of a personal God, but which the new apostle solemnly says, *I now declare unto you*, and being espe-

cially moved with concern that Hamilton and Mansel should have been so rash as to deny the great Unknown whose altars are found everywhere—he proceeds to construct an elaborate argument to prove that such a metaphysical absolute exists. He finds evidence that he exists in that religious or metaphysical faith which is continually reaching after the *not-finite* or the ultra-scientific. The evidence that he is unknowable he finds in the general truth that all *finite* force or matter is unknowable in its essence, and is only known by its manifestations or effects, and therefore, by analogy or some sort of *salto mortale*, he concludes that the *infinite* beyond cannot be known. Q. E. D.!

We have considered these theories in detail that we might satisfactorily answer our main question: viz., whether faith in a self-existent and personal God is in danger of final collapse because of the discoveries of modern science, and especially by reason of the general popularity of the doctrine of Evolution. We have compared the atheism of Von Holbach, so far as its logic is concerned, with the atheism of Physicus and the agnosticism of Spencer. We submit the question whether atheism has gained anything in its logic during the past century from the wonderful discoveries of modern science, or from the suggestions which these discoveries have made to philosophy. The thought may occur to some that argument does not always win. We reply that if argument does not win in science and philosophy, nothing else can. We believe that argument always wins in the long-run, and that this was never so true as at the present time, when criticism was never so sharp and critics were never so numerous.

The temporary popularity of an imposing and ambiguous formula is no new event in the domain of science or philosophy. The only security or remedy against it for either scientists or philosophers is that both should become better logicians and never fail to remember that A is always A, and A can never be self-evolved into not-A. Let these time honoured rules be but faithfully applied, and it will soon be discovered that both atheistic and agnostic evolutionism are products of a natural tendency in speculative men to hypostatise logical abstractions into real agents. If the same agent under varying conditions produces varying effects in an

fixed order, these effects can very easily be conceived as developed from the agent which begins the series, provided the order be fixed and the phenomena are more and more varied and complex as they proceed. By the aid of modern science we find this progressive and intelligible order more and more signally manifested in the structure and past history of the universe itself, indicating and implying a plan which no single scientist can grasp, and a history which no finite mind can remember or interpret. Science, moreover, being impossible without definition and classification, the moment we begin to think, we aim to discover those forces and laws which are most comprehensive. These we naturally place highest in our logical scheme, *i.e.* first in the order of our explanation, as we follow the geometry, the thinking, the history, and the progress which all science unconsciously assumes must control the universe. We project on our logical maps and draw in our scientific sketch-books a hierarchy of conceptions, constructing our frameworks of outlined *abstracta* according to our theory of nature's operations and their rationalised order. Into this diagram we write as fast as we may our hierarchy of genera and species, of families and varieties, as fast as observation or experiment will warrant. As our logical tree is developed under our hand by twos and twos, in ramifications and sub-ramifications, it is not surprising that we poetically imagine that the genus *originates* the species, and the species is *transformed* into the variety by an inherent force belonging not to the individual agent but to its abstract counterpart. Finding, moreover, in the world of life of both plant and animal that the boundary lines which we had drawn between our species are neither so definite nor so rigid as had been supposed, we necessarily correct our observations by ascribing to the organic power of the individual agents, whether material or spiritual, a greater flexibility to varying conditions, and to environment a corresponding modifying power. Finding also in the progressive history of the generations of life ample evidence of progressive variations from simple to complex forms, with corresponding advances from lower to higher endowments, we necessarily find in the original germs or molecules, whatever these may be, a sensitiveness to varying circumstances such as had never been

dreamed of under the old hierarchies of genera and species. When, with these results, we go back again to our familiar and time-honoured logical schemes, it is not surprising that by an unconscious hypostasis we ascribe to the logical genus or species the capacity of perpetually differentiating itself into sub-species or varieties, and of fixing these results in more or less stable subordinates; or, conversely, that we assert for individual agents a limitless and planless capacity to affect and be affected by its fellows. Hence have originated two forms of development or evolution. Hegelianism was first in order, which, out of the splendid poetry of Schelling, constructed its logical universe by the development or evolution of every form of the concrete by means of the self-moving and self-differentiating power of abstract notions: beginning with Being and ending with the most complicated agent that is destined to exist in nature and the most consummate event that shall occur in history, uniformly finding a self-existent Infinite in the organic total of the whole that has been, and is, and is to be. Next emerged materialistic evolution, which begins its apparently infinite yet actually finite cycle with the seemingly impotent and unpromising stardust that has within itself the potency and promise of all the highest forms of life, and ends with the completed possibilities of these wondrous agencies in a universe that signalises its finished perfection by falling into a chaos in whose ruins are the elements of renewed development and order. These two forms of evolution, the logical and the biological, are alike in their genesis and their essential features. The logic of both is substantially the same. The Hegelian or metaphysical evolutionism has had its day. Though it has not ceased to exert its special fascinations upon men of special culture, it has lost its power to dogmatise in the name of either philosophy or science. Biological evolutionism is at present especially noisy and pretentious, and claims to furnish both foundation and method for every science of nature and of man. The first saves both philosophy and science, but sinks man's free and personal life into the abyss of logical necessity. The second subjects not only personality but science itself to the uncertainties of blind materialism. For the time, materialistic and biological evolutionism will doubtless have special

fascinations for men of limited culture and dogmatic temper. It is our belief that so soon as the logic of time shall convince those men who know how to reason that this form of evolutionism not only destroys faith but strangles science, they will reject it with contempt if not with abhorrence.

But while we contend that logic in the long-run is destined to win, we concede that many other elements decide the question whether it will conquer sooner or later. The convincing force of an argument or theory is one thing, and the conviction which it produces or fails to produce is another. We may not judge of the strength or weakness of faith in a community or a period solely by the logical strength or weakness of its accepted philosophy. In former times, says Coleridge, principles were better than the men, nowadays the men are better than their principles. This is as true of the actual as contrasted with the theoretic faiths of men as it is of their characters as compared with their creeds. We find abundant reasons for believing that many scientists and philosophers are by no means so atheistic or agnostic in their actual thinking as their speculative avowals and reasonings would seem to imply. There is certainly no lack in the confidence, if it be not sometimes the bravado or effrontery, with which the agnostics of our time propound their conclusions and their reasons for holding them. The coolness with which they assert that the new doctrines solve all the mysteries of matter and spirit, of life and organisation, and the confidence with which they dispose of creation and design, are equally refreshing. The bravery also with which they profess their readiness to accept any martyrdom for their most hallowed convictions to which they may be called by their loyalty to science is also imposing, if it is not inspiring. We observe a difference, however, between the outspoken and plucky antagonism of the old materialistic atheism and the half-reluctant consent which many of our negative thinkers affect as they accept the conclusions to which science compels them, or the blushing euphemisms with which they utter their half-extorted confessions of unbelief or blasphemy. The imaginative mysticism with which the new atheism drapes the hideous idols of negation is another indication that the scientific unbelief of our day is less hearty, less positive, and less self-satisfied than were the coarser and rougher denials of other times. These phenomena

are not difficult to be reconciled with the more accurate knowledge and the higher cultivation of the times in which we live. They are exactly what we ought to look for in a period distinguished by intense activity in limited spheres of observation, and sagacious and splendid generalisations within the wide ranges of hypothesis and speculation. The habit of careful observation engenders confidence as well as caution. The successful confirmation of a few happy conjectures may inflate to a romantic reliance on the most improbable hypotheses. In this way the sense of obligation to logical coherence may become gradually relaxed, the judgment concerning the true and the real be enervated, and the universe of tremendous fact be transformed into any unreal phantasmagoria of speculation which may illustrate or confirm some newly broached imaginative theory. Faith in moral and religious truth, on the other hand, though intellectual in its activity and its grounds, is in its very essence intensely realistic and practical. It is not necessarily carefully adjusted even by men of high intellectual culture to their scientific or philosophical theories, and hence it is not always helped or hindered by either so seriously as would seem to be inevitable. The fact is certainly unquestioned that orthodox and even ultra-orthodox Christian believers not infrequently accept a theory of the universe which is utterly atheistic or agnostic, or a doctrine of man that is hopelessly materialistic, with little or no interruption to a fervent Christian experience.

II. This distinction between the logical and practical faiths of men forces itself upon our attention as we proceed to our next topic, and inquire what we ought to think of the *ethical theories and tendencies* of our times. That many of these theories are eminently dangerous and destructive no man can possibly deny. Viewed from a purely logical standpoint, nothing seems more clear than that every theory of ethics which is derived from materialistic evolutionism must deprive moral obligation of its permanence and sacredness. The utmost that any can do is to enforce the most sacred duties of life, by associations which are confessed to be factitious in so far as they are creatures of social forces. Every such theory must resolve the authority of duty itself into the right of the

strongest, to compel by the bayonet when directed by science and wisdom, or by the shouts and jeers of an ignorant and brutal mob. It finds the original rudiments of conscience in the dread of the war-club and the bludgeon. "The imperious word *ought*," says Mr. Charles Darwin, "seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct either innate or partly acquired." A matured and cultured conscience is only that inextricable web of associations which society weaves about every one of its members for and against the impulses which it chooses or finds necessary to encourage or repress as society rises or sinks. These associations form the conscience of the individual into a swift witness *against*, or it may be *for*, murder and lust and violence. The law of duty supposed by the older atheists and deists to be written upon the heart of man so clearly as to need no enforcement or authority from the voice of God, is now held to be written on the brain through physiological agencies, which, when hardened by social repetitions, are transmitted by the hereditary force of a thousand generations. It is assumed indeed that this social movement must be upward and onward—from the lower to the higher, from the worse to the better,—but without reason. These theorists seem never to have asked themselves, and no reason is provided in the facts and analogies of the system, why some interruption of development may not produce a single brain of mighty force, seething with the impulses of murder and lawlessness, that shall break the force of heredity and cast out the better conscience from its brain-shell, and proclaim to the willing multitude some new law of licence in the name of some newly developed theory of property, the state, or social order. The advocates of the new ethics are professed logicians and practised reasoners, who pride themselves on their coherent thinking and the unflinching courage with which they adhere to the logic of their convictions. And yet they show no timidity for themselves or their fellows lest these consequences should be acted out in some drama of terrific horror by men whose associations are not yet rightly or strongly adjusted, or lest a new code of scientific communism, murder, and lust should be thrust up into their own lecture-rooms from the hell which lies beneath, or be enforced upon the community by the law of the bludgeon or the shouts

of a maddened public sentiment. Spectators and critics who do not accept these opinions are filled with alarm as they follow out the logic of these new ethics, for to them the logic is as direct and as cruel as the ball of the rifle towards its mark. But their advocates and exponents are as cool and unconcerned about these or any consequences as if they were tracing the path of a blank cartridge or the orbit of an asteroid. The story is credited of Voltaire that on a certain occasion the conversation at his table was becoming somewhat free in respect to God and immortality, when he suddenly rose and locked his servants out of the room, saying that he did not care to be murdered or robbed as the consequences of the free theories which might be expounded in his own house. Our modern theorists would esteem such a precaution eminently unscientific and puerile. Even the atheists of the last century held with a sort of fervour to permanent laws of nature in favour of temperance and kindness and courtesy, which enabled them to dispense with God. But the atheists of the modern school make duty to be the chance of changing growth of a society of humans who have slowly struggled upwards from brutes to men, and may at any moment exalt into a law of duty what strain of brute or devil still lurks in their blood.

We think it right to argue that were the faith of the new theorists as earnest as it purports to be, they would not and could not be so indifferent as they are to these possible consequences. It would seem that they must inevitably recoil from them with terror for themselves and for their kind. It would scarcely be courteous to assert that they are not serious in holding their premises. It would be positively discourteous to insinuate that they do not understand the necessary conclusions of their own logic. How then may we explain the fact that they either do not forecast or do not fear the practical consequences to which their premises lead? A partial explanation may be found in the suggestion that scientific speculation in these times seems to be practised in some sort as a species of diversion or exercise of ingenuity—a setting up of one hypothesis against another in the way of logical pastime, with now and then a flight of poetic enthusiasm enlivened with a sharp hit, not always in the best temper, against theologians. If this is true, speculation has become

less dangerous to practical faith in duty simply because it is less earnest as it becomes more audacious,—seeming more brave, in proportion as it lacks the courage of its own convictions.

Another and more satisfactory solution is found in the fact that ethical truth shines so clearly by its own light, and stands so strongly upon its own foundations, as to be regarded by theorists of every description as practically unassailable. Even the advocates of the most destructive theories justify their audacity by the secret conviction that moral truth in the long-run can never suffer from any assault of science. Accordingly not a few reasoners who pride themselves on the rigour of their logic and the sharpness of their analysis take refuge from their own deductions in some convenient shelter of faith or feeling. They would fain save their faith in duty from the scientific assaults which they themselves make upon its supremacy, by some special *Te Deum* of sentimental worship in their private chapel of common humanity or common sense. We do not defend the reasonableness of this divided allegiance. We simply notice the fact as explaining how faith in duty can be made to survive the destructive influence of the most dangerous theories, and why active religious convictions seem to be able to exist in some minds along with an anti-religious philosophy. We are forced to adopt some such theory in order to explain some of the strange incongruities of our times. In this speculative age many believe more earnestly in duty and in goodness than their theories provide for, and seem to hold their shallow and destructive ethics more as exercises for scientific ingenuity than with the spirit of martyr-like or even of manly conviction. The negative theories of morals which are so zealously defended would be more dangerous were the disbelief more positive and earnest. Scientific frivolity, however, is a poor excuse, and yet it may be the best excuse which can be given for the unbelieving and destructive ethics of the day.

III. Leaving the unbelief of the agnostic and materialistic types, with their ethical corollaries, we proceed to those forms which question or lower *personality in both God and man*, and inquire as to the hold which they have upon the speculative

and practical thinking of the present generation. Under this grouping, pantheism and naturalistic deism are placed side by side, so far as the doctrine of God is concerned. So far as we have to do with man, and God's relations to man, the supernatural is excluded alike by each. Miracle, inspiration, providence, prayer, personal sympathy and help from God, are all rejected or vaguely and faintly believed. The question which we propose to answer is this: Has the alleged collapse of faith proceeded further in these directions in the present generation than ever before? or, on the other hand, are there signs of recovery and reaction? In reply to this question, we cannot deny that faith in the personality of God has been greatly weakened by the indefinite haziness into which the idea of God is resolved by the pantheistic metaphysics or overlaid by pantheistic imagery. The same result has followed the remoteness of distance to which the Supreme is removed by the complicated machinery of forces and laws which the deism of the mechanical physics interposes between man and his Maker, or the unfeeling indifference to human interests which Epicurean culture and dilettanteism ascribe to the Deity.

But when we ask whether pantheism or deism or Epicureanism are stronger in evidence or argument than they were in the last generation, or are rooted more firmly in the rational convictions of the thinkers of the present day than in days gone by, we find no evidence that either is true. The bewildering wonder evoked by the pantheistic metaphysics seems to us to be giving way to a soberer and clearer philosophy of the Infinite. The imaginative tendency which was satisfied with the brilliant turnings of the kaleidoscope is beginning to find the sharp-cut visions of the telescope more restful to the eye. In the judgment of the cool and well-instructed intellect, personality, in both Creator and the created, ranks higher than any quantity of matter or energy of force or complexity of laws. It is now more than suspected that the intelligent direction of forces to definite ends is a nobler function than unconscious subjection to either blind force or uninstructed law. Self-existence is less of an offence to the clearest and coolest intellects when affirmed of a Person whose resources are within himself, and consciously known to himself, than when affirmed of unnumbered particles of star-dust that happen to find them-

selves together in such relations as to constitute a kosmos in embryo, with the promise and potency of a wondrous history. A deity who is capable of sympathy and care for beings who in turn can remember or forget him stands far higher in dignity and is far more worthy to be believed in, than a something or somewhat who is too imbecile or too dignified to respond to the longings of the human heart. It would seem that it is beginning to be discovered that the pantheist has exhausted all there is of argument in the assumption that Infinitude excludes any division or separateness of being, or in the vastness of the finite as revealed by modern science, or in the mystery of organic dependence and activity by which parts and wholes share and contribute to a common life. The deist of the mechanical philosophy is becoming rather tired of a God who, having made and continuing to uphold the universe, and after an intelligent plan, is condemned to be a mere inspector of its workings, with no opportunity for that personal agency which begets personal trust or submission or comfort or hope. A special providence and a prayer-hearing and prayer-answering Father in heaven would bring some relief from the stupidity and tiresome monotony of a god so limited and inert. Even the Epicurean dilettante is so desirous of a new sensation as almost to be ready to welcome it in the form of the hope of a heaven of established holiness and the fear of a hell of matured and energetic depravity.

We do not contend that there is any general or formal abandonment of either the pantheistic or the deistic theories of the universe. We are also aware that the preoccupation of so many of the active-minded thinkers of the time with physical theories of society and history has had something to do with the ebbing tide of pantheistic and deistic theologies. We do not contend that the one class of these theories is greatly to be preferred to the other. But we find evidence that the logic of neither is invincible if men of similar gifts and culture so readily exchange the one for the other. We find also reason to believe that the truths which have satisfied the speculative and practical wants of many generations will gain a more favourable hearing and a kindlier reception so soon as the tide shall begin to ebb, as it surely will, from an atheistic science and philosophy. The clearness and severity of the processes which

are enjoined in the physical sciences, the exactness of definition, the severity of crucial experiments, and the demand for general consistency with the experiences and observations of common life, are rapidly disciplining the present generation to habits of judgment and reasoning which are favourable to a philosophy which finds room for personality in man and the Deity, and with personality opens the way for personal worship and communion between living men and the living God.

IV. But let all this be conceded, and let us assume that the old faith in God's personality and providence may resume its old place in the schools of philosophy and science—what shall we say of the old faith in the supernatural of *the Christian Scriptures and the Christian Church*? Is not faith in the supernatural and even in the providential of actual history becoming weaker and more vacillating than ever? Has not the new historical criticism given such deadly blows to the naïve confidence of men in the miraculous element of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures that it must needs fall into a fatal collapse from which it can never again revive? Is it not as obvious as it is true, that from the days of Lessing to the days of Kuenen the traditional confidence of the Christian Church in the Hebrew and Christian miracles has been gradually giving way before the searching scrutiny of scientific criticism until less of it than ever remains among leading scholars, and the little that survives is asserted in propositions of more indefinite vagueness and feebler energy than ever before? While it may be true that supernaturalism as a possible theory is coming more into fashion—and not always to its honour—are not Moses and Jesus fast becoming thoroughly *naturalised*, and by critical tendencies which cannot be resisted?

Of these assertions and the facts on which they rest the following may be taken as a truthful estimate. It is doubtless true that within the present century scientific criticism has been applied to every description of history as never before, and from this scrutiny sacred history could not and ought not to escape. While it is by no means true that sacred and critical learning were previously unknown, and while it perhaps might be shown that every one of the newest destructive theories had been broached and defended by earlier

critics, it will not be denied that the learning of the last three generations, especially in history and philosophy, has become more exact and scientific, and consequently more trustworthy, than ever before. A keener historical discernment, a more just and vivid imagination, and a more penetrating insight into causes and principles, have certainly been applied to all historical conclusions, whether the subject is sacred or secular. As a consequence, the old admiring credulity with which ancient life and ancient men and ancient institutions were almost worshipped, as something grandiose if not superhuman, has been abandoned if not shamed out of sight. The old legends have been read into common if not into vulgar prose, the ancient myths have lost their gorgeous colouring and their imposing drapery, and the most venerated personages have come down from the lofty pedestals on which they stood like statues and been forced to try the common, and at times the awkward, gait of ordinary mortals. From this severe ordeal the ancient religions have in one sense suffered most, while in another sense they have suffered least. They are no longer any of them accounted for by deliberate knavery and conscious fraud as their sole or chief originators, but are largely explained as the natural and necessary outgrowths of the sentiment of worship as it has wrought out for itself an objective symbolic environment from nature and history. It was natural and necessary that as these theories have been successively matured, they should be applied to the Christian history, including the life of Jesus and the origin of the Christian Church—pre-eminently to the supernatural element in the same—as possibly natural phenomena. What has been the result: and first on the positive side? In answer to this question we may confidently affirm, that so far as *the drapery* or *setting* of the supernatural are concerned, the confidence of men in its substantial exactness has been greatly increased. The geography, the chronology, the literature—the lifelikeness of the story as we find it, and whatever else rewards the historic sense, or confirms the trustworthiness of the narrative, or connects it with accredited knowledge from other sources—have successfully withstood the ordeal; and the sacred story in all these particulars—the supernatural in it being excluded—is more real and more credible than before. Renan may be

taken as in some respects the most plausible of the rejecters of the supernatural in this history; and yet he is the most positive and outspoken in asserting that the Gospels and Epistles, in the perfect verisimilitude of place and time, give the most decisive evidence of their early origin. All negative critics do not agree with Renan upon this point; but Renan has the advantage above them all in being more free from merely scholastic presuppositions and more open to the broader lights of common-sense. For the history of the first Christian centuries modern criticism has also rendered an inestimable service in sweeping away a vast amount of rubbish in respect to the supposed superhuman intelligence of the early believers, and their miraculous exemption from the frailties incident to their times, and to their inferior position in respect of culture, wealth, and political influence. In short, it has done for the beginnings of Christianity what a good field-glass achieves for a distant landscape—it has made every outline sharp and every colour fresh and glowing, and the whole field of vision vivid with life and reality—none the less but all the more because it forces upon the eye the sticks and stones and mud and gravel and every variety of disagreeable literalness which a less fresh and realistic vision would fail to represent at all. It certainly cannot be denied that the new criticism has brought into very distinct and prominent relief the human side of the Gospel and early Christian history. But what has it done for the supernatural element? How has that been affected by the new and fresh lights which have been poured upon the past? Has the miraculous disappeared under the lights which modern science has focussed into these vivid pictures? As the vague has become distinct, and the dim outlines have been sharpened, and the distant has been brought near, has the supernatural vanished from the wondrous picture and “the splendid vision” of our reverent faith faded into the “light of common day”? To this question of questions but one answer can be given. Whether the supernatural vanishes out of sight or stands forth from the picture in bolder relief, depends on the eye that looks upon the picture more than upon the artist that uses the lens to bring it near. The sharper and more vivid setting of the past simply serves to bring the student of the present century into the immediate

presence of the first, and to confront him face to face with the wondrous Personage who is acknowledged to be the central figure in the wondrous story. It does for Him the most that it can ; for the frequent wish of the heart and intellect, either expressed or unexpressed, has invariably been, " Would that I had lived in the days of Christ, that I might see Him for myself and judge of Him by myself ! " Modern criticism does this effectively, but it does no more. This is all that it can do, and all that it should promise to do. The literalness, the homeliness, and the entangledness of the natural with the human to the mind prepared to believe serves only to bring out more strikingly the supernatural and the divine in the picture. Over-against this background of homely reality—made more homely just in proportion as it is made real—the supernatural Christ stands forth in a contrast so striking and with a relief so startling that the man prepared to believe says with a depth and fulness of conviction which the new criticism alone could make possible, " Never man spake like this man," " Truly this was the Son of God ! "

Moreover, the new criticism has rendered a striking service to faith by the violent expedients to which it has driven the determined rejecters of the supernatural in their attempts to account for Christ and Christianity on naturalistic principles. These expedients have demonstrated their own unsatisfactory and violent character by their uniform failure to satisfy a single generation or school of critics. In some instances, as is well known, they have been abandoned by their own originators. The naturalistic theory of Paulus, the mythical theory of Strauss, the tendency theory of Baur, the romantic theory of Renan, and the various mosaics or rather kaleidoscopic pictures made up of parts of each, have all failed permanently to answer the questions which the new criticism has forced upon the attention of men as never before. They have failed altogether to account for the origination and first triumphs of the gospel story on the supposition that the supernatural in it was false. It would seem as though the entire round of possible negative hypotheses had been traversed by adventurous critics, to say nothing of sundry amazing aerial flights by manifest romancers, and in vain, and as though nothing was left for the rejecters of super-

natural Christianity except to select some one of the many paths which inevitably return upon themselves and end in disappointment and disgust.

We are fully aware that very many of the rejecters of the supernatural in the Christian history remain unconvinced, notwithstanding the confessed failures of these manifold negative theories. We know too well that incredulity in respect to the truth of the gospel history—if it should not rather be called the extreme of credulity—has become a fixed fashion or affectation in many cultivated circles. But we find no special strength, certainly no special novelty, in the arguments which they urge. Their attitude is not so much an attitude of conviction as of uncritical dogmatism which savours quite as much of scornful self-assertion as of docile and open-minded readiness to revise the fashionable opinions of a coterie, or to rouse themselves to fresh and earnest investigation. If to be willing to revise one's creed is a test of the truth-loving and liberal spirit, the anti-supernaturalist critics are generally sadly deficient in this important indication.

The relations of the new criticism to the supernatural element in the Jewish history differ somewhat from those to the gospel story, for the reason that the materials and data are relatively scanty, inaccessible, and uncertain. Sundry important questions may be said to be still *sub judice*, and may remain for a long time undecided. A new and exciting interest has recently been aroused by the startling theories that have found a formal and earnest advocate in Professor Robertson Smith. At first thought it might seem that if the traditional views in respect to the history of the Levitical system and the authorship of parts of the Old Testament are to be disturbed so seriously as he and his teachers affirm, then the deeper and older foundations in Mosaism on which Christianity professes to stand must inevitably give way, and both Mosaism and Christianity as supernatural systems must be engulfed in one yawning chasm of ruin. A second thought reminds us that the new theory seems to require, more than any other, a continually acknowledged and ever present supernatural agency with a people whose institutions were capable of constant expansion. The sudden enlargement of a ritual system already established, with a significance so spiritual, and

its acceptance by the people at a time too when their spiritual insight was rapidly advancing, can be accounted for most satisfactorily by the presence of the prophetic office and of prophetic authority. But whatever may have been the relations of the prophets to the priesthood, one thing is certain—that the more we study the past of the Hebrew nation, and compare it with that of any other, the more conspicuously do Moses and Elijah, Abraham and David, Isaiah and Ezekiel, stand forth as qualified and commissioned by supernatural gifts, and so qualified as to speak in the name of God to the men of their times and to the men of all times. What their message was to their own people, and what through them it is to us, may be questions which it is not always easy for us to answer in detail. Some of these questions it may not be possible for us to answer at all, and yet in the light of modern criticism we may hold with firmer faith than ever before that the God who “of old time spoke unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners” is the same God who “at the end of these days hath spoken unto us in his Son.”

The special researches which are now prosecuted with such zeal into the documents which have always been and still continue to be the treasure and the pride of the Jewish people, all serve to establish their high antiquity. The discovery of other documents, whether unrolled from mummies or unearthed from tablets of clay, testify to a similarity between traditions of possible truth, and connect the Hebrew people with their contemporaries by manifold relations which glow with manifested reality. They attest the high antiquity of the Hebrew story and its essential truth in ways and by evidence which could never be so well appreciated as now. Whatever else is uncertain, of one thing we may be confident, and that is, that the existence of the Hebrew nation, with their conception of Jehovah as their national God—while yet in a real and spiritual sense he was the rightful though the rejected Sovereign of other nations—with their belief in his miraculous presence and constant faithfulness, with their ritual, their sacrifices, and their hopes, with their history of backsliding and recovery, can be in no way so satisfactorily explained to any man who believes the supernatural agency of God to be

possible as by the belief that God was supernaturally present with Israel in fact. To this conclusion we believe that all critics and students of history must sooner or later come. Thither the stream of tendency must bring them all at last, and with them the consenting judgment and the warm approval of all intelligent and right-thinking men who do not profess to be scholars, but who are yet competent to understand and sympathise with any great movement in the world's thinking and feeling.

V. These considerations very naturally suggest the inquiry, What evidence is furnished by the *culture* and *literature* of the times in respect to the relative strength or weakness of the believing spirit, and the consequent energy and prospects of faith in Christianity and in Christ? We include under literature all those intellectual products that by their perfection of form, their attractiveness to the imagination, and their popular character, are fitted to move and sway the minds and hearts of the more or less cultured part of the community. The literature of a period is in one sense the reflex of its beliefs and its sentiments, representing as it does all its phases of activity from its profoundest reflection up to any sparkling play of wit or trivial sally of humour. In a most important sense, by its reacting force it forms and fixes the principles of the times, as it expresses them in its pithy utterances, holds them by its arguments, pictures them in its imagery, makes them brilliant by its wit, or burns them into the heart by its eloquence. What Plutarch in a memorable utterance says of poetry is eminently true of literature, that "it mediates between philosophy and life," if we understand by philosophy the solid convictions of the schools, and by life the practical sentiments and impulses that control the mass of the community. Literature in these times has a wider field of activity than ever, and more properly assumes to be representative of our general and pervasive life. The time was when it was a separate estate, more or less an independent and lawless power, which tyrannised over the consciences and tastes, and arrayed its independent energies against the Church, the State, and whatever of morality or prescription was dependent on either. For this reason literature is thought by many to be the natural

and necessary foe of faith and spirituality, and in its very genius to be necessarily destructive. The self-called wits of the previous generations in England are conceived to have been freethinkers of necessity for no other reason than that the Christianity of the Church was an inviting target for their wit and ribaldry. The enormous destructive power which was wielded by the literary class in France cannot easily be overestimated. Literature is not, however, necessarily destructive or unbelieving, especially in countries in which thought is free and the expression of it is untrammelled, and letters are at once the arena and the instrument for those assaults and defences of which opposing parties avail themselves. In the earlier days of England's better life literature was believing and devout, for the reason that the best thought and feeling glowed with such intensity that it could not but find expression in the highest forms ; and hence literature, though often sensuous and passionately free of speech, was characteristically religious. When the faith of England was less fervent and her morals became rotten, poetry and criticism could not but emit a rank and noisome odour. When religion revived again, the modern school of poetry revived with it, criticism became more self-respecting and considerate, and philosophy more profound and religious. Whatever may be said of the literature of the present generation, it cannot be justly charged with indecency or indecorum of sentiment, with flippant scepticism or rude blasphemy of speech. Its moral sympathies are elevated, and its language is studiously decorous and reverential. The spiritual truths which faith accepts and the faith which warmly cleaves to them are honoured with studious respect. The Christian motives, the Christian life, the characteristically Christian virtues, are warmly recognised as the highest and purest of all human experiences, the nearest real approximations to the ideals of ethical and spiritual realisation. It is not too much to say also that the philosophy, the history, the poetry, and the criticism of the present era are to a large extent positively and avowedly Christian.

If we exclude science and philosophy, as we properly may, we find that the only considerable exception to the prevailing Christian character of English literature is its criticism. The age itself is characteristically critical in all its activities, and it

ought to occasion no surprise that its critics by profession should often be questioning and sometimes sceptical; nor indeed that the attitude of those writers who study point and effectiveness should often be negative and even sarcastic with respect to a positive Christian faith and an earnest religious life. It is an age in which every received tradition, every positive principle, every fashion and maxim even, must be justified by a fresh analysis of its nature and a review of the grounds on which it stands. The verities of conscience and of faith on the one hand, by their very nature as fundamental and authoritative, and of individual conviction on the other, not only challenge but demand fresh investigation from every man who thinks.

It may be questioned, however, whether these critics by profession and occupation always represent the deliberate convictions of the ablest men even of a critical generation. Not a few of the ablest and most active are young men, whom marriage and a profession will bring into closer fellowship with facts and truths which experience only can enable them justly to measure and estimate. Very many of the veterans who are justly honoured as foremost among critics have drifted into a literary career as a consequence of the morbid sensitiveness which disqualified them for being actors in life and forced them to be lookers-on, with the consequent defects of mere spectators, upon a drama which demands faith in reality at every turn, whether for the present or the future; whether the action turns upon prudence, or duty, or courage, or fidelity, or prayer, or hope. Men who fling themselves out of the ring from any confessed distaste or disqualification, are not likely to be the best judges or umpires of the forces that are destined to win in any battle. Emerson, Carlyle, Clough, Matthew Arnold, Leslie Stephen, J. A. Froude, F. W. Newman, and W. R. Greg, are all examples of men who take a more or less negative attitude with respect to the Christian history, the Christian verities, and the Christian affections. Their critical negations fairly and truly represent, so far as they themselves are concerned, that collapse of faith which some of them so eloquently portray, and even passionately and pitifully deplore. That in speaking for themselves they also speak for others, and so far represent a distinct phase of modern thought, and especially of

our cultured life, cannot be questioned. That this scepticism is real and fundamental and most tenacious, we cannot doubt, and do not care to deny. But we find reason to believe that it is not so hopelessly negative as the painful confessions and the occasional caustic and contemptuous denials of some writers would seem to imply. However much of commonly received Christian truth these men fail to accept, they show most unmistakably that there is very much to which either as symbol or fact they most tenaciously cleave, and to which they attach a serious significance—so serious that without it the earth would be to them a waste, life a dream, and man a contemptible enigma. While the Christian theology, the Christian Church, and the Christian emotions and activities awaken but feeble responses of sympathy, the Christian patience, and self-denial, and reverence, and self-control, are more than ever admired; they are even worshipped—sometimes, it would almost seem, in place of the Christ who first exemplified and inspired them. What does all this signify, except that the best ideal of what a Christianised humanity should become has taken too strong a hold of the best side of modern criticism ever to be eradicated by any influence, whether open or subtle, whether direct or indirect? Perhaps this critical scepticism is but a one-sided manifestation of that scrupulous caution in judging of evidence which the Christian love of truth originally inspired. Possibly this want of sympathy with the ordinary manifestations of Christian life is largely and justly to be ascribed to the glaring inconsistencies and defects of this life as reflected in the minds of keen-eyed and unsympathising observers. The distorted and grotesque images of the Christian life which are reflected by this sensitive idealism, when tested by what it ought to be, may incapacitate these critics from candidly judging what it is in fact. The Church itself, with all its zeal and saintliness, is by no means so pure or so wise in its earthly manifestations of the divine life as not to give abundant occasion for the sharpest criticism on the part of its sympathising friends. It is not surprising that its less sympathetic observers, especially those who are critics by occupation, should at times flood it with showers of sparkling satire. And yet, were not its faith and life a positive and an augmenting power, its defects and

inconsistencies would attract less attention and awaken a feeble criticism.

VI. This brings us to the very portals of the Church itself, and bids us look into the inner sanctuary, and ask with somewhat fearful solicitude whether faith glows or smoulders upon the altars within, well knowing that so will faith weaken or prevail in every other department of human activity. We find to our surprise that, in the judgment of not a few, the saddest indication of a hopeless collapse of faith is discerned by many in a general weakening of orthodoxy among so-called Christian believers. The creeds, which were once held as so sacred, are now freely, if not profanely, criticised. Some of the discriminations and watchwords of the Protestant theology are resolved into the traditions of the scholastic theology or the compromises of practised dialecticians. Christian doctrines that are rightly regarded as fundamental are propounded in novel phraseology, are explained by new analogies, and are defended by new proof-texts. With some of these texts, which have been cited without question for generations, the new exegesis deals in merciless forgetfulness that they have been made sacred by the associations of centuries in the catechism and the pulpit. Nay, logical theology itself and creed-making are publicly denounced as a device of the devil, and one form of stating the Christian faith is declared to be as good as another where all are necessarily so imperfect and one-sided.

It is not easy to prove to a certain class of alarmists that even these extravagant speeches are only the foam of a great movement of Christian thinking which bodes good rather than evil to Christian theology and Christian catholicity. It is difficult to allay the honest fears of men who cannot distinguish between that reflective or reasoned statement of religious truth which must characterise every formulated creed and school theology, from those picturesque and emotional expressions of religious truth, largely in popular language, with which the Scriptures abound. Even if this difference can be made clear, it is not easy to demonstrate that with the revolution in the principles and rules of exegesis, together with what is almost a revolution in the principles of religious philosophy, the old methods of handling proof-texts and of translating their import

into catechetical and theological propositions must be modified in some essential particulars. And yet the conviction of this necessity is confessed by the deeds if not in the words of the majority of Protestant theologians now living. Most of them, certainly all who have the ear of their generation, whether consciously or unconsciously, whether avowedly or disavowedly, use proof-texts in a manner that differs materially from the traditions of other generations. They accept if they do not acknowledge the principle that the Christian theology of an age must be more or less manifestly the product of its philosophy conjoined with its scientific interpretation of proof-texts. These principles are as certain to gain ground as Christian and philosophic truth are certain to triumph. So fast and so far as they prevail they must essentially modify the unquestioned authority of traditional creeds and formulated theological systems. The faith of the Church of the remote future and of the near present may be less dogmatic and unquestioning than formerly, but it may be more discriminating, catholic, and devout. While we are not so simple as not to be fully aware that faith in Christ as a Person involves faith in a positive creed and a reasoned and formulated theology, we contend that the one may exist without the development of the other, and that under certain circumstances faith in Christ and in Christian truth may increase in proportion as zeal for a system or a creed declines. While it is certain that when faith in Christ declines or vanishes faith in Christian creeds and theologies must go with it, the converse is not necessarily true.

This increased catholicity, or it may be indifference, of Christian believers in respect to theological definitions and controversies is not necessarily an indication of diminished loyalty to Christian truth or to the great Teacher of the Christian Church. It may, and to a large extent we think it does, arise from a profounder reverence for his majesty, a more loving gratitude for his mercy, and a firmer faith in the power of his life and death. The presence of these practical emotions may show that the faith of the Church is the more tenacious and fervent with respect to what it holds just in proportion as it thinks less of many of the propositions or catchwords which have been flaunted so conspicuously on the banners of the Church militant, or have been shouted from the throats of its

brazen-voiced leaders. It does not necessarily follow because the five points of Calvinism are made less of than formerly by those who call themselves Calvinists, or because the counter propositions of this or that school of Arminians are less confidently asserted as containing the last and best words of Christian truth, or because questions of Church organisation or Church millinery or Church ritualism are now esteemed of less vital importance than formerly—it does not follow from all this that faith in whatever truth commends God's authority or his love, or in the order and decency of worship as of supreme importance, is weaker now than it was two generations ago. We ought to say more than this. We ought positively to affirm, what every enlightened philosopher or theologian knows and believes in his heart of hearts, that the methods of conceiving, stating, and defending theological truth have immensely improved in the last two generations; that as theology has become more modest and less dogmatical, it has become immeasurably more confident and strong; that what it may have conceded as uncertain, and as possibly incapable of positive definition or argument, has been more than supplied by what it can affirm with augmented confidence and urge upon the conscience and heart with fearless and rational positiveness. Moreover, we also believe that with all the flippancy and scepticism of the public mind in respect to much that is asserted as Christian and vital truth, there was never a time in which the defenders of Christian supernaturalism, who are competent and willing to discriminate between strong and weak arguments, are certain to meet with a more ready response in the understanding and hearts of intelligent men. It is true that formal and traditional arguments pass for little in these days. The droning repetition of old statements of doctrine in which there is no fresh and modern life is listened to with indifference and dismissed with contempt. The platitudes of unctuous exhortation are stale, flat, and unprofitable. The repetitions of the so-called evidences may be as dry as remainder biscuit, but the arguments of an earnest believer, and, above all, the life of a man or woman of fervent faith, never had greater power to waken trains of convincing reasoning and to urge fervent appeals than at the present moment.

VII. Our argument had brought us within the portals of the Church, and led us to inquire whether faith was still glowing upon its altars. We had almost forgotten that faith by its very nature cannot be limited to priests and teachers, but in its very nature must live or die in the hearts of the mass of living worshippers. The question whether faith is suffering a fatal collapse cannot be answered till we have discovered how far and with what energy it animates and directs the life of the Christian Church. We have examined the atheistic and agnostic science and philosophy, the new-fangled ethics, the learned and the literary criticism, and the shifting theology of our times, in order that we might ascertain how far faith may have relatively declined, and what are the signs of its dissolution, or it may be of its revival. It remains for us to inquire what indications in respect to its recovery or decline are furnished by the religious life of Christendom. Our readers will hardly suspect us of attaching too little importance to the influence of speculative opinions and literary associations. But while these react with enormous power on the thinking and feeling of every generation, they themselves are to a large extent the creations of the spiritual and ethical life of a generation. The great thinkers and writers of every time were each trained in a home where faith glowed or smouldered, where God was worshipped or was dishonoured, in a community where Christian duty and inspiration were honoured or scorned, at a school or university where science and letters fostered or sneered at faith and devotion, and by teachers who honoured or denied God and Christ. The lives of Kant and Schleiermacher, of Voltaire and Rousseau, of Mill and Parker, show that those speculative opinions of theirs which moulded the opinions of one or more generations were themselves largely determined by their personal spiritual and ethical life.

If the leaders of thought often determine what the people believe, the faith of the people is as often expressed in what their leaders teach. Faith can never die out of the science, the philosophy, the ethics, and the literature of a people so long as faith is cherished in their hearts and rules in their homes. If we are to find decisive indications of a popular collapse of faith, we must find them in a decline in the spiritual and ethical life of the Christian Church, and in the reflex of this decline in the

waning respect of the community for sincere and earnest Christian living and sacrifice. We couple the two together, for we shall always find the two together so soon as the partisan or persecuting age has gone by. What then shall we say of the Christian life at present as an evidence of the earnestness of the faith beneath? and what of the heartfelt respect for Christian earnestness as a pervasive impulse in the community?

First, What is the relative tone and strength of the Christian life of the present day? Many things may be said, and said truly, in criticism and satire, of its shallowness and its inconsistencies, of its fickleness and its mistakes, of the want of judgment in its zeal and of the want of zeal with its judgment, of its pitiful lack of practical wisdom, and its more pitiful lack of Christian simplicity. The unsympathising critic has reason to be offended if not disgusted at times at the strange motley of this-worldliness and other-worldliness which it wears, at the flashy character of its excitements and the more flashy character of its exhorters and pulpit mountebanks. But suppose we look beneath and ask ourselves about the patient continuance in well-doing of the multitudes who seek for glory, honour, and immortality in a secret life that is hid with Christ in God, or endeavour to do justice to the purified atmosphere of those thousands of humble but happy Christian homes, in which Christ is honoured as supreme, and is never forgotten by day or night however hard and obscure may be the lot in life, or limited the sphere of thought or action. It would not be easy to compute the "potential energy" which slumbers in the faith of these myriads of believing souls, but which now and then makes itself felt when a time of stress comes upon the land. Let it be granted that the forms of its acting may occasionally reveal narrowness and ignorance, and that with the pure fire of genuine love there may be mingled much strange fire of fanaticism and folly. All that we are concerned to know is whether the genuine faith of men is dead or dying. In the midst of manifest uncertainty and fickleness of opinion, do the men who profess to believe in God and immortality and the gospel believe less firmly than in former times? If they are less positive in respect to many points, do they hold less confidently and warmly to the truths in which a man cares to live and to die? Let the answer be found in the practical fruits of Christian living which abound

in the individual and social life of the present day, and which are confessedly the products of faith in a present and living Christ. After all the concessions which we must make in respect to the unwisdom and fickleness of the external forms of Christian living, we are constrained to say that there was never a time when faith in Christ and in distinctively Christian truth was so energetic a force in individual and social life as it is at the present moment. Its energy was never so great, its modes of action were never so varied, its penetrating and recreating force was never so widely felt, never so transforming and so all-subduing, as at this moment, and its application to the complex relations of human activity in individual and social life was never so manifold and so beneficent.

And what is thought and felt in respect to the energy and earnestness of this faith by those lookers-on who are severe and not always sympathising witnesses? There is plenty of satire for its follies and mistakes, often well deserved; there is keen distrust of its overweening pretensions; there is many a secret joke if not an open rebuke at its sharp practices; there is much severe and sometimes uncharitable questioning of the motives and professions of inconsistent zealots. There is much honest and more affected wonder that the Church is not more unworldly by men who profess no other godliness for themselves than the worship of gain. But it is very rare that in any community, however small, there are not found a few men and women who are acknowledged to be worthy Christian disciples, and whose worth enforces respect for the faith which they profess. We do not deny that there are points of serious weakness in the Christian life at the present day, points of weakness which but few are quick to discern or care to criticise. In this country and in all countries these are largely incident to the rapid material developments of the times, and the kind of individual and social culture which must attend such a growth. This material growth has also been attended by the development of science, inventive arts, and literary tastes at even a more rapid pace, which has partially withdrawn the allegiance of many from spiritual aims and the higher ends and types of life. With the development of physical science, though in no sense as its legitimate effect, a shallow materialism, a pretentious and

more superficial atheism, a still more shallow ethics, have made more or less headway, all of which have weakened the legitimate force of the higher truths, and have tended to satisfy men with thoughts and cares for the present life. That the Christian Church has so well maintained its allegiance to its Master under temptations so manifold and so dazzling is perhaps more surprising than that it has yielded so much to the spirit of the times.

But let it be granted that the Christian Church remains true to its Master, and retains much of the freshness of its faith and zeal; does it follow that with the decay of faith among men of letters, and its collapse with men of science, it will not sooner or later also fail among the intelligent and reflecting in common life? How can it be reasoned that the natural originators and directors of thought shall not finally control the opinions of all classes, and so the old faith shall not gradually die out from root to branch of the intelligent life of the community? How can it be contrarywise that the sturdy or the quickened faith of the masses of men shall make itself felt by way of reaction against the dicta of scientific associations and metaphysical dogmatists and literary critics? Can faith in these days make headway against reason, and especially against the instructed reason of positive science and the illuminated time-spirit? These questions are often asked, and they admit and require a distinct and positive answer.

The lines of evidence and argument which are decisive of the great truths with which faith need concern itself are equally open to all men who are capable of cool reflection. Science often hinders rather than helps to the exercise of such reflection by limiting the attention to special activities and special relations, by the glare and bewilderment of brilliant discoveries, by the narrow conceit of independence or novelty of opinion, and by the excitement attendant upon the reception of a paradoxical theory. The activity of its defenders and the novelty of its subject-matter may so preoccupy the mind as to shut out those familiar relations which would decide the argument with a simpler and more limited understanding. Faith, so far as it is an intellectual process, being when philosophically conceived either an intuitive or inductive act upon moral or spiritual data, requires concentrated attention

to a few comprehensive but easily apprehensible facts and relations. These facts and relations are given, or rather they are offered, to every man's experience and to every man's reflection. They concern God, duty, immortality, personality, moral perfection, sin, guilt, redemption, on the one hand, and the acts and manifestations of God in providence and human history which are suited to man's condition. The man in common life is tempted only to ridicule the atheism of Physicus, and having no special reverence for authority, he pronounces positively, "The fool hath said in his heart, No God." He smiles at the laborious piety of Mr. Spencer in charging impiety upon the man who thinks of God as a Father, and professes to know that he may worship Him; for to him personality is a very positive and dignified fact, and he cannot even understand what Mr. Spencer means. The new ethics he practically rejects and abhors, because he has rights to defend and sacred duties to perform, and a private and family and social life to live, with its manifold obligations and its needed laws and restraints. His difficulties about the supernatural were all settled when he had occasion to use prayer or to trust in the guidance of Providence. A revelation in which there is no supernatural would be improbable and one-sided to him—too vapid and mean either to live or die by. Critical difficulties about the Old Testament or the New, and the solutions of them, he leaves to scholars to decide, having ample warrant for all which, as a believer in Christ, he is called to accept. Having decisive reasons for all that he is called on or able to believe, his faith is completely rational.

He may be perplexed and disturbed by what he hears and reads of scientific atheism and philosophical naturalism, but if he falls back upon what he believes, and confines his attention to this and the reasons for holding it, his faith is unmoved, and out of a convinced understanding he fights the battle of life, by faith in his Divine Master. More than this: he helps to keep faith alive on the earth, as he gives his testimony to that truth of which he has become doubly convinced by the most satisfactory of all trials, the trial of personal experience, the trial of a life that is hidden with Christ in God, and often the trial of a death which is anticipated and overcome by faith.

The strength of faith in any period and in any community depends on the number of individual souls who accept these truths as practical principles, and the energy with which their inner and outer life are controlled by them. Whether the argument in respect to the other questions and lines of thought seems to be the stronger or weaker, or whether few or more individuals take the unbelieving or the believing side, so long as earnest men believe the supernatural Christ with rational conviction induced by moral and spiritual evidence, and act out their faith in energetic and zealous Christian living, faith can never collapse. It is then in this direction that the activities of all believing men should be turned to gain strength and prevalence for their practical convictions on the broad and obvious grounds by which Christianity must stand or fall. It is in this sense that the truth is always so significant, and pre-eminently at the present time, that Christianity is not a philosophy, nor a history, nor a theology, but a Life. It is because Christianity is attacked from so many quarters, and what is assumed to be essential in it is assailed with so much zeal and plausibility on grounds that are familiar to but few, that these strong arguments should be brought into the foreground, while those which are limited to specialists or are of inferior significance should be occasionally or sparingly used. It were better to abandon every outwork and redoubt, even the strongest and most capable of successful defence, than to be driven out of a single position. The loss of a weak position is nothing, but the disgrace of not having known it to be defenceless is injurious to any cause. The real weakness of the Christian cause as it is often defended lies in the ignorance on the part of its friends of the real strength of the arguments by which it stands. Whether still other sharp lessons of temporary defeat or disgrace shall be needed to enforce wiser judgments remains to be proved. While the defenders of the Christian faith, as we have argued, have no reason for fear, or even for misgiving, they have no occasion for bravado. The frequency with which these obvious precepts of wisdom have often been disregarded gives point and emphasis to the remark, that one of the most convincing proofs of the Divine authority of Christianity is that it has survived so long in spite of its defenders.

NOAH PORTER.

ART. VIII.—*The Influence of the German University System on Theological Literature.*¹

IN the great Protestant Universities of Germany are to be found wonderful advantages for learned research, a mighty spirit of research, and many and great merits. The Germans, compared with the Hollanders, the British, and even the French, are a poor nation, and both munificent salaries and large incomes are rare among them ; so that the endowments and emoluments of their professorships are munificent when viewed in relation to the habits of the people, although very moderate when measured by a British standard. The organisation of their Universities is wise and liberal, the professorships amazingly numerous, and the division of labour accordingly minute. This partition of branches of instruction, with the cheapness of living and of books, and the scale of the libraries, enables scholars to pursue the different departments of literature to their extreme ramifications, with a nicety unknown in any other country. Hence, in German Universities are found men devoting their whole lives to examining and teaching departments which, in other countries, are either not touched, or treated as a brief appendage to some other branch. Studious effort is, moreover, honoured, and literary success valued by the whole people and the governments. The appointing power is, no doubt, usually employed with great impartiality and wisdom to elevate men of real diligence and learning to distinguished chairs.

The genius of the German Protestant people also contributes in a splendid way to the fruitfulness of this vast literary husbandry. Intensely devoted to freedom of speculative thought, thorough, laborious, patient in temperament, they are perhaps the more independent and adventurous in literary inquiry, because they have been allowed so little liberty of political action. This part of Germany is still the *Protestant* nation—proud of the right of free inquiry, and zealous to exercise it everywhere they are allowed. In no country of Christendom is the higher education so prominent and so honoured ; and

¹ From the *Southern Presbyterian Review*.

nowhere is the *trade of scholarship* so completely organised, or so persistently plied.

Hence it would be both incorrect and ungrateful to deny the indebtedness of the civilised world to German scholarship. In no department of human learning have the Germans been laggards; in some they have laid scholars under peculiar obligations. In philology, the editing of the classics and the patristic writings, the illustration of the Scripture text, the compilation of accurate lexicons and critical grammars of all the tongues which are taught in civilised countries, they have long taken the lead. And they are now coming to the forefront in the more realistic sciences of law, medicine, chemistry, which men used to consider as the prerogative of the more practical Briton and Gaul.

But in no department have the Germans attracted so much attention as in theology. Men speak of "German theology," sometimes with fear, sometimes with admiration, but often as though it were a something single and unique, and separated from all other schools of theology by uniform traits. Whereas, there are as many German theologies, at least, as there are British or American, differing as widely from each other in merit and in opinions. There is, indeed, so much of a pretext for speaking of "German theology" as a single system by itself, that the most of the writers of that nation, of all the various schools, have a few common traits. One of these is the use of a peculiar philosophic nomenclature, made prevalent among them by the long ascendancy of one or another phase of idealism. Another may be said to be a certain boldness of criticism in dealing with inspired declarations, which, to the orthodox apprehension of the Reformed, savours of a degree of licence. But German theology is yet as many-sided as that of Great Britain or America, and there are as wide differences between the good and the bad. Of some of their expositors and dogmatic theologians, it is hard to utter praise too high.

But in settling the weight to be attached by English-speaking Christians to the theological emissions of the German press, there are some very plain facts which must be considered.

1. In German Protestantism, Lutheranism is now virtually dominant. One sufficient cause of this result is the ascendancy of Prussia, and her persistent policy of unifying her State

Church. The University of Marburg, a small one, is now the only distinctively Reformed or Presbyterian institution left in Germany. It is not asserted that all Reformed divines are excluded from all the rest. But the general rule is, that the Lutherans are preferred, and are in the ascendant. Now, as students well know, Lutheran theology is no longer that of Martin Luther, as to the distinctive points of Calvinism. On these doctrines the most evangelical and orthodox teaching one hears in Germany is as hostile and as condemnatory as that we are wont to hear at home from Wesleyans and Arminians. But this fact is almost trivial, when compared with another, viz, that the present Lutheranism, when not rationalistic, is sacramentarian. The most devout, the staunchest assertors of inspiration, like Luthardt of Leipzig, teach a phase of baptismal regeneration, and the real, corporeal presence in the Supper. The fruits of this teaching there, as everywhere else, are evil.

3. The Protestant Churches of Germany are State establishments; and such are their Universities with their theological departments. The theory of this relation to the State is rigorously Erastian. It is well known in history that at the Reformation the German princes usurped the power of dictating to their subjects a religion, with a tyranny at least equal to that of the Popes. The motto of treaties and laws was, "*Cujus regio, ejus religio*." The ruler of the land ruled the religion of the land. The people of an unfortunate State had to change their faith and worship backwards and forwards, from the Reformed to the Lutheran, and from either to the Popish, as the sword or the interests or the lusts of the prince dictated. Nor is the Church in Germany less helpless under an imperious Erastianism to-day. Of spiritual church-government there is simply none. The church courts are either absolute ciphers, or they are but names for what are really *bureaux* of State administration, as little reflecting a spiritual power as a bureau of police or street-paving. The prostration of church power under the secular received notable illustration as late as 1875-6, when the foul state of the marriage and divorce laws of Prussia (which Bunsen has cited as the one of two grand blots on the Protestant world¹) provoked a protest from the Lutheran pastors. The answer was an imperious edict from Bismarck,

¹ *Hippolytus*, vol. ii.

suppressing their protest, commanding them to solemnise the adulterous unions, and ordering them to expurgate the church liturgy, so as utterly to suppress its implied disapprobation of the antichristian law and usage.¹ In England, where a nominally Protestant, but Erastian Church is established by law, the healthy vitality of the national conscience is expressed in Dissent. The Dissenting Churches embody nearly or quite half the population, and give a place of refuge to honest and manly Christians. In Germany, Dissent is so insignificant as to be practically *nihil*. The pressure exists in full force: there is not enough vitality to evoke this form of remonstrance.

Hence, with this State subjugation of the Church, and doctrine of baptismal regeneration, every German Protestant child is baptized in infancy, and is confirmed at the approach of puberty, before it is betrothed or conscripted. All are full members of the Church; all have been to their first communion; there is no church discipline in the hand of any spiritual court to deprive any of membership, although he become infidel, atheist, adulterer, or drunkard. Every member of the Church is, so far as ecclesiastical title goes, eligible to a theological professorship. The appointing power to theological chairs is virtually the State. There is no need whatever that a man be ordained to the ministry, that he have a saving, personal knowledge of the gospel, or make any profession of it. Rather is it necessary that he attain the proper academic degree, defend his *Thesis theologica* in a Latin disputation, get himself much talked of as a diligent linguist and student, and an adventurous, slashing critic; and that he be acceptable to the Government. The class of theological students, from whom the appointments to theological professorships most naturally are taken, does not pretend to be in any way more spiritually-minded than the body of University students. To require a credible profession of regeneration and spiritual life, as a prerequisite for joining a theological school (or for receiving ordination and a parish, even), would excite in Germany nothing but astonishment: it would be hard to tell whether the feeling of absurdity or of resentment would most predominate in the German mind at this demand. It is not meant that none of this class of students are devout, pray-

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, October 1880, p. 270.

ing men ; there are doubtless cases of true piety. But no such profession or quality is ever demanded. Certainly there exists, between the mass of the students of divinity and the others, no marked distinction of manners, morals, church attendance, or habits of devotion. Church historians know that the theory of Spenser and Francke was denounced by the general mind of Lutheran Germany, and dubbed by the nickname of "Pietism." But that theory was, in the main, embraced by evangelical Christians in America as almost a self-evident truth. It is at least an accepted axiom that the pastor, and especially the teacher of pastors, must be a man who has spiritual experience of the truth.

Hence, the American evangelical Christian must be reminded of the large abatement to be made in estimating the weight to be attached to much of the German theology. To tell our people that an author is *a theological professor*, is virtually to say, that he is not only a living, experimental Christian, but that he is supposed to be an eminent one. His opinions are the object almost of religious reverence. At least, he has credit for the most thorough earnestness and sincerity in his teachings. It is supposed, as of course, that his declarations are made with all the solemn intent proper to one who believes himself dealing with the interests of immortal souls. It is hard for our people practically to feel that a man so trusted in the holiest things, may be dealing with the sacred text in precisely the same spirit as that in which he would criticise a Saga, or an Anacreontic ode. To appreciate the matter aright, they should represent to themselves a Bancroft or an Emerson, with aims perhaps very genteel and scholarly, but wholly non-religious and unspiritual, criticising the authorship of Ossian, or of Junius's Letters.

Now, the apostle Paul has passed his verdict on such men : "Christ crucified . . . to the Greeks foolishness." "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things." They "have the understanding darkened by reason of the hardening of their heart." "But the anointing

which ye (believers) have received of him abideth in you," says the apostle John: "and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." "He that believeth hath the witness in himself." Unless we are prepared to contradict God's Holy Spirit, we must ascribe to the unregenerate critics, however learned, this consequence, that their carnal state must cause them to dislike and misconceive true godliness and salvation by grace. Such a judgment they will, of course, disclaim and resent; they will flout the pretensions of spiritual discernment, which the children of grace derive with sanctification from the Holy Ghost, as Boeotian, or as fanatical, or as a cheap and vulgar mode of asserting one's intellectual and literary aristocracy without paying for it the price of that diligent learning which they arrogate. If Paul and John speak truth, it is, of course, unavoidable that these men should answer the charge thus. The same "blindness of heart" which makes them unconscious of the spiritual beauty of the gospel, will of course make them unconscious of their prejudice. They are perfectly sincere in thinking themselves dispassionate. They are in a state analogous to that of the freezing man, who, *because he is so chilled* as no longer to feel the cold, does not feel that he is frost-bitten. It is thus with the man who is so utterly possessed by a blinding prejudice against his neighbour, that it is for the time simply impossible for him to take an equitable view of that neighbour's acts. This is the very time he protests that he is entirely dispassionate, and is calmly condemning his neighbour from the simple force of truth and justice! It is obvious that if the apostle's verdict be true, these worldly men will be unconscious of its truth. And they cannot but resent the charge as unhandsome. But none the less the Christian who does not wish to fly in the face of Inspiration must make the charge. He makes it, not because he is glad to insult anybody, especially any learned men, but because he dares not insult God by contradicting Him. We will, while making it in this case, give the scholars all the credit we can for every excellence they can claim, courteous manners, correct morals (shaming of course all mere pretenders to spirituality), diligence, minute learning, and even a commendable intellectual

honesty wherever the spiritual truth, which is the object of their unconscious prejudice, does not present itself. When it comes to the handling of the themes of redemption, there must be then a certain incompetency in spite of their learning; and if the apostles have not slandered the "natural man," we must hold ourselves prepared to discount a large part of their conclusions.

3. The spiritual atmosphere which these scholars inhabit, moreover, must be judged by us extremely unfavourable to evangelical investigation; or several of our most firmly established convictions must be discarded by us. We have held it beyond a doubt, that the influence of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration must be deadening and unwholesome. But the Lutheran divines now usually hold this with a tenacity proportioned to their professed orthodoxy. We have been taught to regard the sanctification of the Lord's day as ordained by a *jus divinum*; and to believe that God has thus enjoined it, because its right observance is essential to the healthy culture of the soul. Well; Lutheranism believes that all sacred days of Divine authority are as utterly abrogated as the new-moon sacrifices; that "to sabbatise is to Judaize;" and Lutheranism very diligently "shows its faith by its works." Take this sample from Luther's *Table-Talk*: "If anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day's sake, if anywhere any one sets up its observance on a Jewish foundation, then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast on it, to do anything that shall remove this encroachment on Christian liberty." When their holiest man can so insolently reject God's ordinance, the common-sense of the reader will suggest how much improvement is like to be made of the Lord's day by average Lutherans.

The evangelical Christian accordingly recognises the spiritual atmosphere of these great centres of learning as *fearfully cold*. One index of this is, that American students of divinity around them, although sufficiently masters of the language to attend German lectures, feel themselves instinctively drawn to set up separate preaching. Devotional meetings are rare. Sunday is, to most, merely a holiday. The average University student is heard to boast, not seldom, that he has not entered a church for a year, and hopes not to do so until his marriage, when he will

have to enter it once more. But he is none the less a baptized and confirmed member of the Lutheran Church. The state of church attendance tells the whole story, as to the spiritual atmosphere. Berlin now has more than one million one hundred thousand people. It has about thirty-two Protestant places of worship, of which many are very small, and scarcely any have a full attendance. Göttingen is a little city of twenty thousand. Its University has about seventy professors and one thousand students. In the whole town and University are four places of Protestant worship—two of which are small. The "University Church" has *one sermon a fortnight* during the sessions. On a good day one may see there from fifteen to twenty-five young men, who may pass for students (or may be, in part, genteel merchants' clerks). The theological department counts from eighty to a hundred students! Where are these on Sunday morning? "In the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg an inquiry was made in 1854 into the condition of the Lutheran Church, and it was found that no service had been held in the head churches for 228 times, because there had been no congregations."¹ No one has drawn this picture in darker colours than the evangelical divine, Christlieb, of Bonn. He says:² "There are large parishes in Berlin and Hamburg where, according to recent statistics, only from one to two per cent. of the population are regular church-goers. Elsewhere it is somewhat better. But speaking of Germany in general, we may say that in the larger towns the proportion seldom exceeds nine or ten per cent., and in the majority of cases it is far lower." In fact, the general aspect of Protestant Germany, on the Lord's day, is prevalently that of a civilised pagan country like China. The bulk of the population does not enter God's house, but does go to places of amusement. The only marked religious activity in the larger part of Germany (there are happy *oases* of spiritual fruitfulness, like Elberfeld) is among the Papists. Their churches are thronged; and during the hours of mass the worshippers remind one of a busy swarm of bees about their hive. The contrast is, to the Protestant, most mortifying.

The inferences which the practical mind must draw from this picture are two: the spiritual atmosphere is not one in

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1880, p. 274.

² *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 27.

which we should expect evangelical views to flourish ; and the fruits of German theological criticism in its own country are not such as to encourage its dominancy here. While German scholarship has been busy with its labours, it has suffered almost a whole nation to lapse into a semi-heathenish condition. It has had Popery within the reach of its arm ever since the end of the "Thirty Years' War" (Peace of Westphalia, 1648), and has won nothing against it. Tried by its works, German divinity is found wanting.

4. The writings of the Rationalistic schools betray this spiritual blight in a defect which the living believer must ever regard as a cardinal one. This is the failure to appreciate, and to weigh at all, that class of internal evidences for the gospel and for the doctrines of grace which is presented in the correspondence between them and the experiences and convictions of the gracious soul. This is, indeed, the vital, the invaluable evidence. The class of criticisms alluded to know nothing of it. They dissect the Evangelists, Epistles, and Prophets, just as they do Homer or the Vedas. They have never felt that declaration of our Saviour : "The words which I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." The response which is made by the profoundest intuitions of the human heart and conscience, quickened by the Spirit, to these lively oracles, immediately avouching them as the words of the Creator of the human soul, is unnoticed by these critics. They propose to settle the authenticity or falsehood of the records by antiquarian processes only, similar to those by which Niebuhr proposed to test the legends of early Rome, or Wolf, the genuineness of the Homeric Epics.

5. The sober and practical mind finds the best argument of the real value of this species of discussion in its history. Let us glance over a small part of it. The time was when Rosenmüller and Kuinoel were ranked as marvels of critical acumen and learning. Now, the mention of their special conclusions excites a smile, and their works are obsolete. In the latter part of the last century, Semler led off in what was then the new school of Rationalism, explaining away everything in the sacred records which transcended human conception. To-day, while there are plenty in Germany who hold to his sceptical results, none follow or believe in his criticism. He was first

Professor of Theology in, and at last head of, the divinity school of Halle. Eichhorn was a famous professor of Oriental languages and literature at Göttingen, up to 1827. He also is a disbeliever in all the supernatural, and explains all the miracles of the Bible as natural events. The Book of Isaiah he regarded as entirely unauthentic—the product of a plurality of writers put together at random.

De Wette was theological professor in the University of Basle. He is usually regarded as the founder of the historico-critical school in Germany, which was, though less extreme than the Tübingen school, tinctured largely with Rationalism. He does not believe that the Chronicles are Scripture, or that the apostle Paul wrote Ephesians or 1st Timothy. The latter he rejects, because it has un-Pauline phrases, and because it portrays a too advanced state of the Gnostic heresy for Paul's day, and a church-government too mature. In these points he has been utterly refuted by Bunsen's *Hippolytus*.

Paulus, professor of theology at Heidelberg, 1811, was a thorough Rationalist, who "sat down to examine the Bible with the profound conviction that everything in it represented as supernatural was only natural, or fabulous; and that *true criticism* consisted in endeavouring to prove this."

Baur (Ferd. Chr.) was professor of Protestant theology at Tübingen from 1826 to 1860. He is usually regarded as the founder of the "Tübingen school," which arrogates to itself the name of "*the critical*." He has been both represented and contradicted by his pupils and successors, Volkmar, Keim, Hilgenfeld, etc. Its principles may be said to be two: that nothing supernatural can ever have really occurred; and that the Christianity of the first age was from the first divided by two hostile and contradictory schools, the *Petrine* and the *Pauline*. For this notable hypothesis the only tangible pretext is the narrative of Gal. ii. 11-16. The advocates of the two doctrines had, he thinks, each their Gospels, compiled to suit their views; and the later Gospels, especially John's, were forged to smooth over this fatal breach and hush up the squabble, long after the deaths of the men whose names they bear. Hence, the source of the materials used for these pious frauds must be guessed. The guess of Baur and Volkmar is, that at first there was a brief writing of somebody, possibly

the Evangelist Matthew, strictly Petrine (or Judaizing) in tenor. Somebody on the Pauline, or Liberal side, got up a life of Christ in Luke's name. Of this the Luke now in our Bibles is a later re-hash and expansion. Then somebody, to make weight against this fuller Luke, about A.D. 134 wrote the book which now passes by the name of Matthew. And after this somebody forged the Gospel of Mark, as it now stands, in order to smooth over this ugly Petrine and Pauline difference, and give homogeneity to the Christian scheme. Then, finally, about 170 A.D., still another forger wrote a Gospel, with the object of completing this amalgamation, and affixed the apostle John's name to it. But Baur's pupil, Hilgenfeld, supposes Matthew was completed first, then Mark, and then Luke. Köstlin thinks there was first a Mark, then Matthew, then another Mark, then Luke. Ewald, once at Tübingen, but later at Göttingen, teaches that there was (1) a Gospel of Philip; (2) some *Logia* or speeches of Jesus, of unknown authorship; (3) a short biography ascribed to Mark; (4) an anonymous Gospel; (5) the Matthew now in our Bibles; (6, 7, 8) three short writings of unknown authors, detailing incidents of Christ's early years, of which there is no extant remains or proof, but of which Ewald speaks as confidently as though he had them in his hand.

But an anonymous critic of this Tübingen school cuts the matter short. The "Anonymous Saxon" concludes that the fourth Gospel was the work of John, but that it is wholly unreliable and false. His theory is, compared with the learned Ewald's, refreshing for its simplicity. It is that John did his own lying.

Would the reader see a specimen of the "criticism" on which the date of John's Gospel is settled by this school? Hilgenfeld argues, that John omits the circumstance that Simon the Cyrenian was impressed to bear the cross for the fainting Saviour. The synoptic Gospels narrate it. But Basilides (2d century) made a pretext of that narrative to support his Gnostic crotchet, that the person crucified was an ordinary Jew, and not the Messiah. Therefore John's Gospel was written after Basilides! If this is argument, one might as easily prove that the Declaration of Independence was written after the fourteenth amendment.

But the admirable harmony of this criticism displays itself in the date the school assign for the forgery of John. Baur is certain it could not have been earlier than A.D. 160. Bunsen fatally refuted him in his *Hippolytus*. Zeller places it at 150. Hilgenfeld 130 to 140. Keim in A.D. 130. More recent examinations by Luthardt, of Leipzig, of the orthodox school, refute the whole of them, and demonstrate the genuineness of the Gospel as work of the apostle John in the first century. Bunsen even carries it up to as early a date as A.D. 60-65.

Sohrenkel, in his sketch of the life of Jesus, undertakes to construct a biography of the Saviour, wholly omitting the supernatural powers, by the violent supposition that the Gospels were later works embodying a number of superstitious legends of the early Christians. But David Fr. Strauss crowned this work by his *Life of Jesus*, fashioned on the mythical hypothesis. This learned professor of divinity studied for a time at Tübingen. He was elected divinity professor at Zürich (Switzerland), but, by a popular *émoult*, prevented from taking his chair, though he continued for the rest of his life to draw a part of his salary. He married an actress, from whom he was afterwards divorced. The use he made of the leisure subsidised by this Christian annuity was to publish a second *Life of Jesus* more antichristian than the first; and at last to carry his anti-supernatural position to its consistent extent—*atheism*. His last work adopts the evolutionism of Huxley and Haeckel, denies the existence of soul and God, and makes man a helpless subject of mechanical fate. The English reader may see a full, moderate, and intelligent account of these speculations in the 6th, 7th, and 8th Lectures of Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*.

Now, the purpose of this bird's-eye view is not to attempt a refutation in this place of any of these conclusions. The reader is only requested to note the following facts. Each of these mutually destructive speculations has been advanced by theologians. Each has had in Germany a large following, and has claimed to be the final result of sound investigation. Each has been superseded in its turn; and while a virtually infidel result is still reached, the old methods are discarded for some newer hypothesis. None of them has been able to do what the old orthodox doctrine of inspiration has always done, retain the hearty and permanent confidence of a mass of

Christians, great in numbers, respectable in learning, and venerable for character.

Another trait of this part of the German theology is its submission to the sway of successive schools of philosophy. One century has witnessed the triumph of Kant's, of Schelling's, of Fichte's, of Hegel's system; and the death of all of them. To-day one must look out of Germany for learned Hegelians, the last of the schools mentioned, and the unorthodox philosophy of Germany to-day sways towards the opposite extreme from Idealism, that of Materialism. But it has been the weakness of the popular German theologians to mould their creeds into the forms of these unsubstantial and fleeting philosophies. A Feuerbach, following Hegel, as he supposes, reduces God to the mere objectified reflex of his own consciousness. A pious and eloquent Schleiermacher imbues his whole system with idealistic pantheism.

The unhealthiness of the theological atmosphere is revealed also in a way still more painful and significant by the foibles of the so-called orthodox. What name is more venerated by Americans than that of the sainted Tholuck, the beloved theologian of Halle? But even he charges the apostle Paul with making "a false construction." He seems to confess that, on Rom. ix. 17, he intimated that the apostle had misrepresented Exod. ix. 16 (Septuagint), "because he believed he could in that way better refute the Calvinistic view."—(Haldane on *Romans*, pp. 741, 742, ed. of 1870.) Tholuck's semi-Pelagianism, and his utter unconsciousness of man's natural state of ungodliness and enmity to God, seemed to have perverted his view of the Epistle to the Romans. Again, the pious Neander seems to give the weight of his assent to that deficient theory of inspiration which makes it only an elevation of the prophet's own rational consciousness. A Bunsen (*Hippolytus*, vol. i. p. 10) declares with passion that the cloven tongues of fire at Pentecost were only lightning flashes from a thunder-cloud, and flouts the idea that the twelve really spoke in unknown tongues. Meyer, the so-called conservative, the vaunted bulwark on the orthodox side, began his career an Arian. He seems to have gotten no further than Homoiousianism, admitting that Christ has a nature *like his Father's*. But he admits that his divinity would be proved by 1 Tim. iii. 16; *were the Epistle only genuine*. He teaches that man has

two souls, the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$. He holds the Gnostic doctrine, that sin resides in the "corporeo-psychical" part of man's constitution, and that the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ is only trammelled by it like an unwilling but chained captive. His theology is distinctly semi-Pelagian. He declares that Paul borrowed the allegory of Hagar from the Rabbins, and holds that he was sincere, but erroneous, in thus arguing. "If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

6. Why is it that men of undoubted learning and diligence thus pursue speculations so convicted by the result of evanescence and futility? The more profound solution has doubtless been given in our picture of the State Church and its results. Another solution is to be sought in the defects of the German system of University education. These are so great that, after conceding all the praise these Universities deserve, we cannot but ascribe the main credit of German scholarship to the *Gymnasia*. In the Universities there is no regimen exacting diligence in study. There is no roll-call; and a student need not even present his body with any punctuality in any lecture-room. But if his body is there, absolutely no means are used to secure the exertion of his mind. The University professor never asks questions, never holds any recitation. With the most of his students he most probably never speaks one word on the subject he teaches, and may remain utterly ignorant whether the man before him is an idiot, or is mentally rejecting every item of instruction he offers him. Unless the student is a candidate for a degree, he is not even examined at the end of the session or the course. The excuse for this fatal neglect is, that the student has had enough of this species of drill in the *Gymnasium*, so that now it is sufficient for him to have the lecturer's example and guidance in the work of study. But this plea is wholly inadequate. The mere lecturer maintains only a one-sided relation to his pupils' minds. If they listen, they may learn his mind; but he never learns theirs. Every mind has its own idiosyncrasy, out of which arise its own peculiar weaknesses, wants, and misapprehensions. The experience of the writer as a teacher of Bachelors of Arts, in studies properly post-graduate and of a university grade, who may be presumed to bring to their work at least as much mental discipline as the lads from a German *Gymnasium*, confirms this view. This experience proves that lectures without

recitations would leave his students only half-taught. All but a few would carry away the queerest possible half-views and misconceptions of the doctrines enounced to them. The recitation, the personal dealing, the detection of the individual's peculiarity, the testing and correcting of his apprehension of the ideas delivered to him, are worth more than the lecture. Consequently, the one-sided instruction must result in a one-sided culture. Is not this the solution of that feature of the German mind, that, while the memory is stored with such a multitude of facts, the logical power remains so inaccurate, and the mind is so often the victim of its own hobbies?

There is another feature which presents an instance of the law that human imperfection permits no good to exist without its evil, even as there can be no tree without its shadow. The great division of labour in the German Universities has been spoken of, with its grand advantage of enabling scholars to pursue the *minutiae* of scholarship at their leisure. But hence result the known evils of *specialism*. Judicious medical men have recognised it. The specialist, who devotes all his mind to the study and medical treatment of a particular set of nerves, acquires, of course, an amount of knowledge and dexterity about them beyond the attainment of the finest general practitioner. But unless this specialist is a very wise and self-restrained man, he gains this at the expense of one-sidedness of mind; he becomes overweening in his thinking; he makes his set of nerves his pet crotchet; he exaggerates their influence, until his judgment in pathology becomes weak, and even absurd. Doubtless there is too much specialism in German erudition; and hence, while the pursuit of particular branches is thorough beyond that of any other scholars, the views of truth are not well co-ordinated, and the scientific judgment is infirm.

There is reason also to believe that the overweening applause so long given to German scholarship has borne its natural fruit,—undue inflation of the applauded. It is not asserted that there are no men in their learned circles who pursue a cosmopolitan learning; but certainly the general result is that their scholars consider Germany sufficient unto herself. Their boast is that Germany is “the schoolmistress of the world.” They feel that they can give to all, but have need to borrow of none. *The best recent efforts of learning and study in other countries*

remain usually unnoticed by them and discounted from their appreciation. A German theologian, for instance, when told that the American students are waiting with eagerness for the final work of Dr. Ph. Dorner, complacently accepts it as perfectly natural and proper, as much so as that one should "go to Newcastle for coals." But when one mentions the final work of the American Dorner, Dr. Charles Hodge, the exceedingly learned man, who has read the Vedas, and is deep in the latest Sanscrit and the most recondite German discussions of Egyptology, knows nothing of Hodge. He feels that for him to read any other than German scholarship would be more like "carrying coals to Newcastle." An exception to this contemptuous discounting of all the rest of the world exists in favour of a few British and American authors. These are men who studied in Germany, who have continued their correspondence with the German scholars, and who make a boast of retaining in those foreign lands the German methods. A few such scholars, Professor Max Müller, Professor Robertson Smith, for instance, receive some recognition, because, in smiling on them, Germany is still, in a sense, exalting herself.

If the late Dr. J. Addison Alexander may be believed, there was still another exception to be noted in his day. In the last conversation the writer had with him (June 1856), the character of the English scholarship of the 17th and 18th centuries was mentioned, at once thoroughly modest, and honest. The works of Prideaux were mentioned as fine specimens of historical research, exhaustive in their learning, and yet plain, perspicuous, and modest in their method. Dr. Alexander replied about in these words: "I am extremely glad to hear you say so; because such is just my estimate of those scholars. And I will tell you, what you, who are so much younger than I am, and who have not been in Germany, as I have been, are not in a position to know so well as I do. That is, that these Germans, with all their affectation of ignoring British learning, sometimes make a quiet use, nevertheless, of these old scholars, as convenient quarries to dig ready material out of, which they use without acknowledging. You have mentioned Prideaux. Now, it is singular, that there is a late German work, very pretentious, on that part of the ancient church history, which has almost made its fortune out of plagiarisms from Prideaux." This is given
 1 the authority of Dr. Alexander solely.

7. But the worst literary influence remains to be explained. As the German University is actually administered by its teachers, its "final clause" is not to communicate knowledge to pupils, but, to manufacture professors. The professor does not lecture so much for the purpose of teaching the ascertained and recognised body of his science—the student is presumed to have gotten that already, in the *Gymnasium*, or by his own reading—the prelection is rather designed to set him a pattern of the methods of new research in the outworks of the science. The aspirant is perpetually taught that to get into the line of promotion, he must "do new work;" which means, that he must make some addition, not known before, to the science which he has adopted as his specialty. The test of ability is not the man's capacity to acquire an intelligent, perspicuous knowledge of the science, however thorough and extensive. Nor is it to be able to make useful applications of the principles of the science, already established, for the benefit of mankind. Nor is it to be able to teach the whole known science effectively to other minds. All this is not enough. The aspirant must "do new work." He must also evince independent powers of research or invention by extending his science in some quarter not explored before, however minute, or merely curious and trivial. Hence, "Do new work" is a sort of *shibboleth* with them. The "dissertation," which introduces the candidate to the privilege of an examination for an honorary degree, must profess to "do new work." When the young aspirant has become a "*privat-docent*," his main hopes of promotion and a salary repose on his getting the name of having "done new work." When he becomes at last a "professor extraordinary," his prospect of elevation to the rank of a full professor depends still on his "doing new work." One peculiarity of the German University is, that this "*Professor ausserordentlich*," or assistant professor, is not really the assistant of his senior, but his rival. He may have a miserable pittance of salary; but he has the privilege of lecturing on any part of the course he pleases; on the very same parts his senior is lecturing on, at the same time; and instead of following, he may move abreast of, or in advance of him. It is supposed that this licence stimulates both senior and assistant, and keeps them both diligent and pushing. It certainly stimulates the assistant; for he is grasping up after his "*bread and butter*." Hence, it is not unknown that the

superior shall lecture to six or seven students, and his assistant to forty or sixty. And the case is probably found to be this: that the old, superior professor is still delivering the same course which, twenty years before, made him *Magnus Apollo* in the University, and delivering it with all the increased efficiency derived from experience in teaching and successive re-explorations of his ground; while his assistant is "doing *new work*." The senior *has done* his "new work" a few years ago. Probably it was really important work, constituting really grand extensions in the domains of his science; possibly it was work so valuable, that it really left little except the gleanings of trifles in that sphere of science for those who come after him; but, alas for this senior! it is no longer "new work" to-day. And so, his students pronounce that he is no longer "fresh." They forsake him for his young aspiring assistant, who is "doing new work;" the new work, namely, of whittling and polishing some little angle of the science which his senior had left "in the rough," and which is never going to be anything more than a curious triviality after it is polished. And the enthusiastic young gentlemen fancy that they are mastering the body of the science, because they are assisting so zealously in this polishing of the useless angle; when, in fact, what they need is, to be studying the old work, which is not fresh, so as to ground themselves in the rudiments of their science.

The consequences of this system are in part admirable. It begets in a numerous body of young aspirants a restless, if an innovating activity in research. A multitude of minds are pushing the outer boundaries of knowledge in every direction. In the physical sciences, which partake of the almost boundless variety of their subject-nature, and in antiquarian researches, where the documents are so numerous, this plan may work well. The young man who would teach mineralogy, or chemistry, or botany, or electricity, cannot indeed hope to add a whole province to the domain of his science, like a Davy, a Franklin, or a Linnæus. But he may hope to construct some acid or neutral salt never combined before, and give it a learned name; or to detect, analyse, and classify a few weeds or mosses which the books had not before recorded. Nor should these minute industries in the scientific field be wholly despised; for it may be, that in some future induction, which

really leads to important truth, the little facts may bear a useful part. No one can predict.

But obviously, the results of this system are far from healthy in the spheres of philosophy and (especially) revealed theology. The facts and data with which the philosopher can properly deal, are limited; they can properly include only those contents of consciousness which are common to sane men. That is all. Hence, when this imperious injunction is still imported into philosophy, that the aspirant in this branch of study must "do new work," or else remain an underling, with no professorship, no honour, no fame, and very little "bread and butter," he is placed under violently unhealthy influences. What can he do? He can only innovate: he can only attack existing doctrines; and if it happens that the existing doctrines are already settled aright, he must unsettle them to get them wrong. Let us suppose, for example, that the venerable Dr. Archibald Alexander, while teaching in Princeton that beautiful course of elementary ethics which is left to us in his little volume of "Moral Science," was condemned, according to the German system, to have under him this "Professor ausserordentlich," with the privilege, not of assisting, but of rivalling his senior, with a starveling salary of \$250 per annum, and a nice young lady in some New Jersey church, betrothed to him some five or seven years ago, with no chance of marriage under present circumstances. This young gentleman is told that his getting a full post and salary in some younger western seminary (as the Alleghany or Chicago) depends on his "doing new work" in his department. It will not be enough for him, adopting the system of his venerable senior, to add some more resources of diligence in illustrating it, and successful perspicuity in teaching it. This is not really "doing new work." It does not evince original, creative, philosophic talent. Let us suppose, again, that the ethical philosophy of Dr. Alexander is *the true one*. We now have precisely the German conditions. Unless the assistant professor is almost miraculously a saint, of course he gets a "bee in his bonnet." He can only rise by differing substantively from his senior's philosophy. But that is the right philosophy. Then he must rise by inventing a false one, and by exerting his learning and ingenuity to make the false one look like the truth.

But it is when this law is virtually applied to the student of theology that it works the most deadly mischief. Here, as we believe, is a divine science. Its whole data are given to us in revelation, and are, therefore, limited and definite in number, and immutable, because infallible in character. There can be but one right system. All others, so far as they vary from this, are wrong. There is, indeed, much scope for exegetical diligence. But this continued exegetical labour can never introduce substantial modification into a single essential member or relation of the system: it can only add the lesser, and as the industry proceeds, increasingly minute, confirmations to the main results accepted from the first by true believers. Here is a vital distinction, which is more and more overlooked in days of pretended "progress." And the proof of its justice is this: that the revealed code, containing all these data of the science of redemption, was avowedly and expressly given by God to the common people, with the pledge that it was sufficient to give them the infallible knowledge of salvation; and the qualifications required for its right apprehension were not any antiquarian learnings and sciences of criticism, to be acquired in the future development of civilisation, but an obedient heart and spiritual discernment given in answer to believing prayer.—John vii. 17; xvi. 13 and 23; James i. 5; 1st Epistle of John ii. 27, etc. etc. In short, that revealed theology *cannot be a progressive science*, is proved by this short argument. It was equally given by its Author to save sinners of the first century of the Christian era, and of the last. He declares that it saves by its truth, and by the reception of its truth alone. If then, the system by which we are to be saved in the last age is the result of a progression in science, it could not have been a system to save the sinners of the first age.

Hence, when the injunction to "do new work" is thrust upon the theologian, it is almost a direct incentive to heretical innovation. The *animus* which this trait of the German erudition has imported into theological study is poisonous to orthodoxy. It begets an endless and ever restless spirit of innovation. To the current inquiring mind, the doctrines which are accepted and established are presumptively obnoxious because they are accepted. The Protestant principle is that nothing is to command our faith merely because supported by

human prescription. Educated Germany is prone to push the truth to this extreme: that because a proposition happens to be supported by the prescription of the day, therefore it is not to be believed.

When the influence of this usage is properly appreciated, the American Christian becomes aware that he has been under a species of hallucination in attaching any serious significance to this species of critical and theological speculations. Devout and evangelical men among us are, of course, "in dead earnest" in handling the topics of redemption. They believe that it is by these topics immortal souls are to live or perish for ever. Through these topics the holiest attributes of God, and the most sacred compassions of the incarnate Saviour, receive their manifestation. We remember that there is an ever-present responsibility resting on all who touch them, for the manner in which they handle them. Hence, it is hard for us to apprehend the footing which doctrines, and facts concerning the sacred writings, hold in these minds as merely interesting antiquarian subjects for an intellectual sword-play. The Rationalists are, of course, not oblivious of the ephemeral life of the previous speculations of their comrades. They know that the usual term of their life is not more than a generation; and as all the previous ones have had their day and died, there is a tacit understanding that the ones they are studying will have the same fate. To the resident in Germany, there is, as men say, a "feeling in the air," that no one regards these critical theories as final. This admission betrays itself in a hundred hints. One inquires, for instance, whether a given great man is a leading power in his department of literature. The answer is: "Oh, not now; he has been before the German public too long. Blank is now the coming man" (mentioning a younger celebrity). Does one ask why, if the writings of the first were true and just, they should not continue to lead the mind of the country, inasmuch as Truth is never old?—the answer is a shrug, and the remark, "Why, his last great work has been out twenty years!" The new contribution is recognised with favour, not as destined to establish final conclusions, but as furnishing a new scholarly theme, as creditable to German erudition, and as placing a literary comrade in the way of promotion.

In a word, much of this writing is the literary "student's

duel." The young German of fashion is the model of military courtesy, and member of a fashionable university *corps*. He fights two or three duels per session with gentlemen of other *corps*, with whom he has not the shadow of a quarrel, and with whom he will be thoroughly warm and cordial at the next "kneiper." He seeks to slash him with his sword, and shed his blood (in a mild way). Now should this antagonist take his discomfiture *au grand sérieux*, and pursue his quarrel, after the fashion of the British or American duellist—with real deadly intent—the men of fashion would view this as clear proof of lack of breeding, almost of lack of civilisation. So when German *litterati* learn that we take their attacks on the Scriptures and the doctrines of grace in this solemn way, they are affected with a somewhat similar sentiment. It is a combination of amusement and disgust; our making a life-and-death affair of them is an index of "deficient culture," indeed of a state of very imperfect civilisation. It proves that we have not experienced the liberalising influences of letters which educate a man out of intolerance. Had we the full German culture, we should be too courteous and tolerant to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints;" we should not allow a consideration so prosaic as that "there is only one name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved," to obstruct the freedom of learned inquiry.

8. Our indictment against the spirit of this theology then is, that it tends to unsettle everything, and settle nothing. It has mistaken licence of mind for liberty of mind. It claims the privilege of pursuing the Protestant freedom, "to prove all things and hold fast that which is good;" but it perverts that right to a questioning of good things, which results in the holding fast to nothing. It is said that the truly philosophic method is to question every position in our beliefs, and that this is a duty which one man cannot do for another more than he can eat and breathe for him, so that even the most fundamental and settled dictates of belief shall be held subject to debate by each new comer. It is sneeringly asked: Would you have the pastors of the Church especially, hold their creeds on ignorant prescription? Shall they preach dogmas as Bible truths only because a Synod, confessedly not inspired, said, three hundred years ago, that the Bible taught them?

We reply, Of course not. But let it be supposed that

possibly that Synod was right; that the canonical Scriptures are God's Word; and that the creed formulated by the Synod from them is the meaning of God in them. If, on the one hand, the "say so" of this naughty thing, a Synod, does not prove this true, neither does it prove it untrue. Suppose, now, for argument's sake, the Synod true. How then will this universal right and duty of free inquiry combine with that fact in the results? This question reveals at a touch the shallow and impertinent sophism. Does this right of free inquiry take the form of a right to reject the truth, and that on the ground that some good men, before us, in the legitimate exercise of this same right, ascertained that truth for us? Hardly! In the case supposed then, the individual right of free inquiry resolves itself simply into this: the right (and duty) of embracing heartily and intelligently the truths given to us. That is all. The sophistical assumption in this innovating criticism is, that this individual right can only be fully exercised by differing from all previous uninspired results. But this would be true only on the supposition that all previous results must be erroneous, because uninspired. If this were true, then all the exertions of these last (uninspired) critics are thereby shown to be thoroughly impertinent. How baseless the theory is appears from a simple dilemma: Either this method of criticism and free speculation is not a method for the ascertainment of truth; or it is. If it is not, it is worthless, and the sooner we have done with it the better. If it is, then it leads to the permanent establishment of truths. Therefore the Protestants who come after these critics can no longer exercise their freedom of inquiry without claiming a licence to *criticise and reject Truth!* Any other science of ascertained truth may offer us good and sufficient instances. The teacher of geometry does not inhibit free thought. He does not teach the conclusions of his science by dictation, but he knows that the right exercise of free thought by his pupils will inevitably lead to their re-adoption of the same old theorems taught ever since Euclid. How is this? Because they are clearly true. Ah, but this is an exact science; a science of absolute truth, says one. Let another instance be taken, then. The German antiquary teaches his pupils that Dionysius, Paul's convert in Athens, *did not write the Celestis Hierarchia*. He by no means teaches this by mere dictation. He invites his pupils

to the fullest freedom of inquiry. But he expects them inevitably to readopt his conclusion.

But it is pleaded that the human mind is an imperfect instrument of cognition, and this imperfection cleaves, in some degree, to its most fundamental exercises. Hence, it is argued, the only way to secure accurate knowledge is to hold all conclusions, even the foundation ones of the science studied, subject to re-examination and possible modification, by every student. This conception implies, that the only way to build the temple of truth securely, is for each builder to relay for himself all the stones, including the foundation stones. Another proposition is far more certain: that if everybody is to be continually moving the bottom stones, no temple of truth can be built at all for anybody. Each builder should, indeed, acquaint himself intelligently with those foundation stones (as with all above them in the wall), but not for the purpose of moving them. He acquaints himself with them for the purpose of approving their position, and satisfying himself they are in the right place. This overweening critical spirit overlooks an all-important truth,—that the attainments of sound, healthy research are cumulative. The results of the mental labour of previous generations should count for something. Some things should get settled by the progress of knowledge. Truths ascertained in one way reflect their light of evidence on other truths; so that these latter become perfectly clear in their certainty, and are most thoroughly settled for the most enlightened and just-minded men. There is no theory which is really more dishonouring to the rights of the human intellect than this innovating criticism, for its tendency is to mark all the efforts of men, continually, with practical futility. It seems to say, that man's intelligence is never to attain conclusive results. If this were indeed so, we see not how such a faculty is worthy of rights to any prerogative, or any freedom.

When we see the rationalistic theology and criticism, then, perpetually announcing new results, we ask: Have any new and important data been discovered, such as justify the laying anew of the foundations? Have any more primitive documents been discovered? What are they? The Moabite Stone, the Rosetta Stone, with the readings of Egyptian monuments deduced therefrom. The cuneiform remains in Mesopotamia. The Sinai MS. of the Scriptures, found by Tischendorf, the lost

work of Hippolytus of Portus (if we may trust Bunsen). But every one of these are favourable, and only favourable, to the old conclusions as to the canon and text of Scripture, so far as they touch the subject at all. Have any new lights of importance been thrown upon dates or the genuineness of patristic writings since the era of Cave, Bentley, and the other great critics who settled the estimation of this literature? Have any testimonies as to the Canon been unearthed more authoritative than those of Caius and Eusebius? None. The *materials* remain substantially as they were, when the renewed and exhaustive research of a Hug, an Alexander, and a Sampson, made a final settlement for fair minds of the Canon. But the new criticism goes on, shuffling its pack of cards over and over without any ground, making its new deals of pretended conclusions, which have nearly as much fortuity, and as little authority, as the deals of the fortune-teller's cards.

But it is claimed that, though the materials remain substantially the same, the advance of philology has given a new *apparatus* of exposition, and the methods of the new criticism place the data in new lights.

No one can be readier than the writer to recognise with gratitude every collateral ray of light thrown on exegesis by philology. But the recent beams are, compared with the great flood thrown by the Reformed exegetes of the previous ages, slender side-lights, and they are in the main confirmatory of the old orthodox methods and conclusions. To say that modern philology has furnished any grounds for revolutionising exegesis is simply a boastful misrepresentation. Let *Winer* be taken as the most illustrious example. His Rationalism was probably so entire as to create for him the conditions of a complete grammatical equity and impartiality, by means of his very indifference to the doctrines extracted from the text. It made no difference to his prejudices or feelings whether the Scriptures were so interpreted as to teach Calvinism or semi-Pelagianism, since to him they were no inspired authority for anything. Hence he could investigate their grammatical laws with the same equanimity as those of Tyrtæus or Pindar. What has been the result? That the principles of his grammatical constructions give the same conclusions in exegesis usually reached in Calvin's. In the minuter details and accomplishments of exegesis, he completes Calvin's exegetical

results; in a few cases he differs from him, usually not for the better.

As for the methods of the new internal criticism, we meet the claim by a direct denial of their correctness. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Their most pungent condemnation is from their clashing results in the hands of their own advocates. On such critical premises an ingenious man might prove almost anything about any authentic writing. A much more plausible argument could be made to prove that the history of the first Napoleon is mythical (as Archbishop Whately showed), than that the Gospels of Jesus are mythical. One maxim of the common-sense of mankind contains a refutation of the most of these criticisms: that "Truth is often stranger than fiction."

Only one of these so-called critical principles—one now exceedingly fashionable—will be mentioned in conclusion.

Protestant expositors have always admitted the utility of learning all that is possible of the personality of the human penman of the inspired document, of his times, education, opinions, modes of thought, idiosyncrasy of language, and nationality. Why? Because it is possible that any of these, when authentically known, may throw a side-light, usually a dim one, on the interpretation of his words. But now this obvious old admission is travestied and reappears in this form: that the human author's ascertained doctrinal "standpoint" is to dictate our construction of his inspired writing. And this sometimes when the doctrinal standpoint is the one he held before his conversion to the gospel! Clearly this principle begs the whole question of that writer's inspiration. On the orthodox theory of inspiration, that the Holy Spirit, using the man as his amanuensis, did not suppress the human element of thought and style, but directed it infallibly to the giving of the form of expression designed by God for the composition, the penman's personal traits would naturally appear in the verbal medium of the divine thought. But even then they would not be allowed to vitiate the perfect truth of that thought. But to say that the propositions themselves were the results of the human writer's education and opinions is simply to say that he had no inspiration. If the sacred writers claimed inspiration, and sufficiently attested the truth of the claim, then this theory of exposition is naught.

R. L. DABNEY.

ART. IX.—*Current Literature.*

THE revival of interest in Hebrew study has created a demand for improved tools. The time-honoured handbook of Gesenius, which has rendered such long and worthy service, fails in many important particulars to represent the best results of recent research. The original work has been corrected and improved, in numberless details, by the successive editors, Roediger and Kautsch; but of necessity the book remains destitute of scientific plan and proportion, while it conveys no idea whatever of the organic unity and development of the language. In Germany, the giant Grammars of Ewald, Olshausen, and Böttelur have furnished the material for a number of smaller and more practical treatises by Nägelsbach, Müller, Stade, and in Holland by Land. In our own country several excellent manuals have appeared, of which by far the best, in point of scientific structure and practical use, is the *Introductory Hebrew Grammar* by Professor Davidson of Edinburgh. For the beginner the book is perfect, but unfortunately it lacks a Syntax. Among the smaller Hebrew Grammars in German none stands higher than the *Schul-Grammatik* of Dr. Müller (1), and the best bit of work in it is the Syntax. The author is an eminent Arabic scholar. He makes good use of the analogies and suggestions furnished by the system of Arabic grammar. But he has been careful to leave full room for the psychological element, and, in interpreting the peculiarities of Hebrew speech, he has kept his eyes open to the general relations of all the Semitic dialects. The great principles and formative forces of the language are brought out with much distinctness, and then the details are exhibited under these in their genetic connection. The plan of the whole is systematic and comprehensive, while for the size of the work the treatment is singularly minute and particular. True, this logical method sometimes entails the disadvantage of scattering similar phenomena over several sections, and combining dissimilar facts in the same paragraph. But the

(1) *Outlines of Hebrew Syntax*, by Dr. A. Müller. Translated and Edited by Professor Robertson of Glasgow. James Maclehose and Sons, 1882.

practical loss is slight, and is more than compensated by the scientific gain. Moreover, the author's elaborate system of cross-references puts it in the power of the painstaking student to entirely obviate this necessary defect. The style is nearly always clear, and in the translation—thanks to Professor Robertson, who has also materially added to the accuracy and completeness of the work—the meaning is sometimes made even more plain and pointed than it is in the original. No better tools could be used by the young student of Hebrew, who desires to secure a rapid and intelligent mastery of the language, than Dr. Davidson's Grammar for the Accidence, and this excellent treatise of Dr. Müller's for the Syntax. The certain alliance of the two works in the service of Hebrew study must have been foreseen by the publisher, for in respect of size and shape the books are a perfect match.

We think it may safely be said that the Church of our time has had few contributions to its theological thought equal in value—or anything like equal in value—to Dr. Dorner's *System of Doctrine* (2), of which the third and fourth volumes are now before us in English dress. It is therefore with some regret that we feel it necessary—for the present at least—to pass them over with the comparatively brief notice which the limits of this article afford. We cannot peruse a page or sentence without feeling that we are in the company of a master-mind, a mind which has done much hard and lonely wrestling in the darker places of Christian doctrine: and the result of this wrestling is the book before us. It need not be said surely, that in expressing the exceptionally high value of this work, we do not accept all its positions; indeed, it seems to us one main part of its value, though detracting in some sort from its completeness, that it keeps us arguing with the writer from point to point, testing in our own way the strength of his premises, disagreeing with him sometimes, and so travelling onward along the line of his conclusions to conclusions which are substantially our own.

(2) *A System of Christian Doctrine*, by Dr. J. A. Dorner, Oberconsistorialrath and Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated by Rev. Alfred Cave, B.A., Principal and Professor of Theology, Hackney College, London, and Rev. J. S. Banks, Professor of Theology, Wesleyan College, Leeds. Vols. iii. and iv. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Volume iii. commences with a discussion of the doctrine of Evil, which impresses us at the very first by the calmness and patience with which the argument is conducted, leaving us to contrast Dorner's treatment with the comparatively crude discussions of the subject with which we have grown familiar at home. His position is that the beginning of evil is formed in an act, not in a state; while, as to its origin, he dismisses, after a remarkably subtle and elaborate treatment, the theory of its origination either in dualism or in the Divine unity, and finds it somewhere within the region of creaturely freedom, where alone, as it seems to us, it can be found. "The origin of evil in general has its adequate ground in creaturely freedom. Only the *possibility* of evil can therefore coincide with the creation, and God cannot be called the author of its reality." We cannot follow the author into his chapters regarding evil in its universality, in which he travels round again the whole circle of the doctrine regarding the Fall and human depravity, pronouncing substantially for the Reformation doctrine, but with some reservations upon the subject of representative sin which do not quite satisfy or convince us. The question of the personality of the Devil is handled with remarkable ability, and Dorner shows how the abstract principle of evil is ever, as it were, striving after a complete personality for *itself*, yet ends only in "endeavour," whilst yet this leaves room for the existence of a spirit in which, in a great measure, evil realises itself, and in effect reigns supreme. The latter portion of this volume treats of Christology—first, historically, as expressed in the Old and New Testaments, and in the teaching of the Church, ancient and modern; and, second, dogmatically, as represented in Christ's person and offices. Dr. Dorner thus summarises his view as to the "ecclesiastical development of Christology:"—

"The entire apostolic testimony is partly appropriated by the Church in a manner always more complete, and is partly unfolded and dogmatically verified in a manner always more comprehensive, hence the ecclesiastical development of Christology begins at the lowest canonical stage, and under the guidance and stimulus of the Spirit of God and the word of the canon, attains the principal elements of Christology, and establishes their internally sure connection. The history of this doctrine falls into three periods. The first, to A.D. 381, establishes the two sides ('natures') of the Person of Christ according to their main elements. The second, to the end of the eighteenth

century, seeks to lay down the unity of the Person and the relation of these two sides to each other, but without a closer investigation of their nature, rather under a conception of the same, by which the one side must necessarily be abridged by the other, as happened at different epochs in opposite fashion. The third period, from 1800 on, has for its problem, after the two sides have again attained recognition in their equality of authority, to allow the distinctions in the Person of Christ their rights in so uniform a manner that, in the interests of the unity of Person, the compatibility, nay, the inner living relation of its distinctions to one another, is also exhibited, and therefore an image of Christ is sketched which is actually and truly human and Divine at once—that is, ‘theanthropic.’”

The illustration of this “abstract” is exceedingly full and suggestive; but its interest, partly from the fact that so much has been done already in this field by Dorner himself and others, is perhaps less than that of the dogmatical portion which follows. Dorner’s treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation is firm, and even sometimes not only strong, but almost daring in the breadth of its treatment, as where he ventures a speculation—which, we confess, seems to us a needless one—as to whether the being born of a virgin was a *necessary condition* of Incarnation, here following up and analysing the position of Schleiermacher; it is unnecessary, however, to add, that Dorner himself accepts the virgin-birth.

Vol. iv. brings us to the doctrine of the Atonement, and we confess that we have not met with any treatment of this subject which, in all its main features, so fully states and defends the doctrine as we need to have it stated and defended to-day. The value, and yet—beyond a certain point—the insufficiency of merely subjective theories is shown with singular clearness; and the analysis of the evangelical doctrine of substitution is such as triumphantly to undo the charge of unreasonableness which is so frequently brought against it.

We have left ourselves no space to dwell upon other sections of this great work; and we have only to mention the fact that, in this last volume, the doctrines of Justification by Faith, of the Sacraments, and the department of Eschatology, have their place. Much though we should have wished to follow our author through these fields, we feel the less regret, inasmuch as we feel sure that theological scholars must have much to say upon this work in time to come. Let us add here that in no part of the work does Dorner’s firmness seem more wanting than in

his chapters upon Eschatology. Before the awful question of Eternal Punishment he seems to stand asking still; little satisfied, indeed, with the familiar theories of Conditional Immortality and Universalism, he thinks he finds in freedom of the will a fact which, while he admits the principle of eternal punishment, viz. that the finally impenitent must be lost, makes it impossible for him to say whether any will finally reject the gospel, while it makes it equally impossible to assert that all will accept it. It will be seen at once that this involves his special views with regard to an intermediate state, for which we must refer the reader to the work itself. Here, then, the voice of the teacher has a somewhat uncertain ring; and the work closes with less of completeness than it would otherwise have claimed. Yet we have no hesitation in saying that in this work the student will find a mine of rare value, and one not easily to be wrought out. We ought to add that the work of translation has been admirably done by Principal Cave and Professor Banks.

We have before us two small volumes by Dr. Newman Smyth, an American minister who, by their means, has suddenly risen into prominence—*The Orthodox Theology of To-day*, and *Old Faiths in a New Light* (3). It may be explained that just about the time when these books were issued, a professorship in Andover became vacant, and Dr. Smyth was appointed to the vacant chair. A power of veto, however, lay with a governing body in connection with the College, and we understand that by this body the appointment was not confirmed. At this stage, however, Dr. Smyth was offered a lectureship in the College, which he declined. This curious position of affairs seems to us to express unpleasantly, yet clearly, the impression left by his books. They are so clever and so suggestive and fresh that a lectureship in his hands could scarcely fail to be a success; but they are scarcely sufficient to give such a definite idea either of his intellectual strength or as to his theological position as is usually deemed desirable in professorial appointments. The first named of

(3) *The Orthodox Theology of To-day*. London: R. D. Dickinson.

Old Faiths in a New Light, by the Rev. Newman Smyth, D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Quincy, Illinois, U.S.A. With Prefatory Note by the Rev. A. B. Bruce, D.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. Charles R. Higham, Farringdon Street, London.

these two volumes, *The Orthodox Theology of To-day*, is a series of lectures on the following subjects :—"The Churches and Creeds ;" "Does Orthodoxy misunderstand God ?" "Forgiveness and Suffering ;" "Imperfect Theories of the Future Life ;" "Negative and Positive Elements in the Conception of the Future Life ;" "Social Immortality : " and it is meant to be substantially a defence of orthodoxy from some of the charges popularly made against it. Some very fine things are said with regard to the uses of Creeds, and it is valuable to have such a fresh plea for their retention as is here given ; but when we come to the chapter upon "Forgiveness and Suffering" we find ourselves at sea, just when we would like to be on firm ground. The author endeavours to indicate the component elements in Divine Forgiveness, and these are—(1) *benevolence*, or self-impartation, a putting of the Divine nature into the heart of humanity ; (2) *sympathy*, or "the power of putting one's-self in the place of another"—a power which is exemplified when the mother's heart enters into the suffering and shame of a lost child ; (3) *righteousness*, "love's self-respect." In illustration of this last Dr. Smyth writes : "Love can forgive, but it must suffer in forgiving, and by its own pain and grief for the wrong done show its own recoil from sin, and condemnation of it, even while it forgives and delights in giving back again its trust ; and there can be no genuine human forgiveness, no real reconciliation between friends, unless there be some suffering upon the part of both." And so his view of the doctrine is gathered up substantially into this sentence : "The Father's sorrow expressed in the Christ, the Divine feeling of shame for sin manifested in Christ's measureless grief for it ; in one word, Divine love vicariously suffering for sin, is its sufficient and God-like atonement." The author appends a long note indicating that he accepts also, in some sense, which he does not very clearly define, other and "lower" views : but essentially his position is here. Now, we contend that though all this is in the Atonement, the objectively sacrificial aspect of it is not to be found in any of the elements referred to by Dr. Smyth. We do not, of course, at all mean to impugn the author's own orthodoxy ; we are rather inclined to think of him, from indications here given, as holding the substance of the doctrine, though unduly subordinating certain aspects ; but

we simply express our view as to the inadequacy of his definition as covering the position of orthodox theology to-day. *Old Faiths in a New Light* is both an able and an interesting book, much stronger in texture than that already noticed. Its purpose, like that of the latter, is apologetical, the idea being apparently to read the old faiths in such a way as to show their compatibility with modern thought and culture. We should think that it represents very well the line along which the author has himself travelled toward his present position, and we see the marks of one who has "fought his doubts and gathered strength," hence the work is sure to render no small service to those who are studying "old faith" with their faces toward the "new light." We cannot help feeling—and we say this in view of both books—that we are in the presence of a singularly frank and open mind. But here again we have to confess that we have been somewhat puzzled: there is, for instance, in such chapters as those on the historical growth and scientific tendency of the Bible, a somewhat exaggerated inclination to treat matters after the fashion of the modern school. And whilst those for whom the foundations have been roughly shaken are likely to gain undoubted benefit, we are not so sure that the effect will be altogether beneficial upon those who have suffered only a more superficial disturbance. In all fairness, it must be said that such chapters as those entitled "The Culmination in the Christ," and "The Unfinished World and its Corruption" are full of fresh and stimulating thought. To sum up, we cannot help feeling that, whilst standing by our plea of indefiniteness in regard to these books, there is yet much in them to lead us to form high hopes of work yet to be done by the author.

We are glad to call the reader's attention to a very devout and spiritually suggestive little book by M. Tophel of Geneva, entitled *The Work of the Holy Spirit in Man*, which has just been translated by the Rev. T. J. Després (4). It consists of five discourses upon the following subjects:—The Holy Spirit's Work of Spiritual Renewing—The Gift of the Holy Spirit—

(4) *The Work of the Holy Spirit in Man*. Discourses by G. Tophel, Pastor of the Evangelical Church, Geneva. Translated from the French by Rev. T. J. Després. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Our Duties towards the Holy Spirit—The Crowning of the Spirit's Work—and The Sin against the Holy Spirit. Too little attention has, we think, been called to these things, and a popular treatise such as this was therefore not without its need. M. Tophel shows at the outset how the result of the Fall has been a revolution in the nature, by which the lower or fleshly side of it attained supremacy, and points out how the work of the Spirit is the restoration of the Divine and natural order. When he comes to speak of the gift of the Spirit we find ourselves somewhat inclined to differ from him in his broad line of demarcation between the gift of the Holy Spirit as vouchsafed to the Old Testament and to the New Testament Church. That there was a marked difference between the privileges of the former and the latter we readily admit: but we do not quite see our way to so definite a distinction as that "in the Old Dispensation the Holy Spirit wrought *upon* believers, but did not, in His Person, dwell *in* believers, and abide permanently in them." The chapter upon our duties toward the Spirit is full of practical suggestiveness, and ought to be read with care by the devout Christian. We must also say that we have seldom seen what appears to us an exposition more simple and clear of the Sin against the Holy Ghost than that which M. Tophel gives. In style the book is somewhat peculiar,—for the English reader somewhat too declamatory,—and M. Després, who, however, has done his work admirably, might safely have freed some of the sentences from their interjectional character.

The Ministry of Healing (5), by the Rev. Dr. A. J. Gordon, of Boston, is an interesting and thoughtful work upon a subject which is attracting the attention of an increasing number of Christian people. Dr. Gordon marshals together witnesses from all ages and all classes in favour of his belief that cures may still be wrought through prayer, and that the age of miracles is not past: and we own that he makes out at least a fair case for inquiry. Starting from Scripture, he goes on to show how the Fathers regarded the question: how Augustine, in later life, admitted the probability of miraculous cures: and

(5) *The Ministry of Healing; or, Miracles of Cure in all Ages*, by A. J. Gordon, D.D., Boston. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

how the great names of Luther and Melancthon can also be quoted on the same side. In a later part of the volume he gives an interesting sketch of the work of Dorothea Trüdel, Pastor Blumhardt, Pastor Stockmayer, and others. Even those who probably would not go so far as Dr. Gordon—although we are not to be understood as looking upon him at all in the light of an extreme advocate—will find this volume full of interest, and we are rather inclined to think that those who have hitherto set all such speculations aside as baseless may be led in some measure to revise their opinion of them.

Messrs. T. and T. Clark have recently published, in connection with their Handbooks for Bible-classes, an excellent little manual of *Scottish Church History* (6), by the Rev. Norman Walker of Dysart. It is sufficiently comprehensive, for it begins with St. Rule in the fourth century, and brings down the history almost to the present day. Considering the brief limits within which Mr. Walker has been restricted, his work appears to be very satisfactory, and, like everything that he does, it is written in a singularly lucid and pleasing style. Towards the end of the book, we see a sign of the Disestablishment feeling which is so widespread in Scotland, in the manner of reference to the Established Church; perhaps this would have been wisely omitted. Each section is followed up by suitable questions; and altogether this handbook will form an admirable basis for a course of instruction in Scottish ecclesiastical history.

In the last Number of this Review we had occasion to notice several books on "Preaching," and just about the time at which we were then writing a small book appeared upon the subject which has drawn to it a considerable amount of attention; we refer to Mr. Mahaffy's Essay upon "Modern Preaching" (7). It is perhaps to be wondered at that it should have received so much attention; and perhaps we may find the reason partly in the fact that Mr. Mahaffy is well known from his contributions—some of them of undoubted value—to other departments of literature, partly from the fact that his book is very readable,

(6) *Scottish Church History*, by Rev. Norman L. Walker, Dysart. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

(7) *The Decay of Modern Preaching. An Essay.* By J. P. Mahaffy. London: Macmillan and Co.

and partly from the interest of his subject. It is, to our thinking, a very light and superficial treatment of that subject, and is indeed just such an essay as a clever writer might be expected to compose in the leisure hours of an evening or two. Apparently taking for granted the position that the influence of the pulpit is decaying, he runs in an easy and somewhat jaunty manner through the various causes, historical, social, and personal, which appear to him to explain this decay, and, after giving illustrations of some "defective types," he concludes with a few pages devoted to "remedies," in which he includes better training, an order of itinerant preachers, the abolition of what he curiously calls "constant sermons," and—inferentially at least—celibacy. In a brief epilogue the author confides to his readers his belief that "among the better classes, and with educated congregations," the day of preaching has gone by, while, for the "ignorant masses," it will continue to have its use. The whole book is disappointing; it is written by a man of culture—himself a clergyman—and expresses the not very profound opinion of many cultured people; it points to the defects of modern preaching from their point of view, and suggests remedies which primarily apply to the clergy who minister to the "better classes;" yet it winds up by telling us that for these very people the "day" of preaching has gone by. There is no evidence that the clever author has had any large opportunity of understanding the function of preaching in its relation to the great masses of the people.

These two volumes (8) quite sustain the high and useful character of this work, for which preachers and teachers are indebted to the enterprise of the publisher. It would seem as if Mr. Dickinson had bound over the gentlemen employed in this undertaking to place all available aids at the disposal of those who may consult his commentaries. Many busy workers will thank him for this, and even those who presently decry such helps (and there are some such), might on merely looking into these volumes find good reason to change their opinions. The commentary on *Proverbs*, as indeed all the

(8) *A Homiletical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs*, by Rev. W. Harris. *Daniel*, by T. Robinson, D.D. London: Richard D. Dickinson, 1882. (The Preacher's Homiletical Commentary.)

volumes of this encyclopædic series, is much more than a simple collation of comments on each paragraph and verse, after the fashion of the older commentators. We have here the present-day tendencies pandered to most largely, and here let us say (lest the use of the verb might suggest lack of sympathy on our part, while the reverse is the case) most legitimately. For besides the mere teaching of the Word in the old final sense of application to mind, heart, conscience, and life, we have illustration, suggestion, and a rare and rich assortment of most valuable extracts from all the leading writers on the Book of Proverbs. The Book of *Daniel* has found a competent commentator in the author of a *Suggestive Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. In his present work Dr. Robinson has amassed a great pile of ecclesiastico-historical illustrations, and has endeavoured conscientiously to give an interpretation of the contents of the book, either founded upon these historical facts or confirmed by them. We shall not follow the author into any details, as the whole book is so confessedly difficult of interpretation, and we fear until "the time of the end" the interpretation may to a large extent remain sealed. But we find a valuable homiletical index, which will enable an ordinary reader at a glance to apprehend the general plan and teaching (in Dr. Robinson's view) of the book. We should have mentioned that in the commentary on *Proverbs* there is also a table of contents which will prove most serviceable.

The plan of the printed page of the *Pulpit Commentary* (9) is different from that of the Homiletical Commentary, but the plan of editorial work and the underlying idea seem very much alike. It is enough to notice the name of Mr. Rawlinson as the author of the introduction to exposition and homiletics of the Book of Exodus, to be assured that the work is well and competently done. His thorough knowledge of Eastern and Egyptian civilisations and histories peculiarly fit him for such work. He has been assisted by various coadjutors in the supply of short homilies, and we must say that, so far as we have examined it, the work has been generally executed in a first-class manner. The matter brought before eye

(9) *The Pulpit Commentary; Exodus—Exposition and Homiletics*, by Rev. George Rawlinson, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1882.

and mind is well arranged. The subjects treated in the homiletical division, which, as in the preceding Commentary, follows the exposition paragraph by paragraph, are exhaustively discussed, and are well adapted for handy use to the preacher and lecturer, as well as to the ordinary reader, by capital logical divisions. Of course, in an *English* Commentary, whether written wholly by Churchmen, or, as in this case, edited and written by Churchmen and Dissenters, we shall most naturally find certain expressions which do not convey to Presbyterians and Scotch theologians the same rich and full ideas as we are bound to believe they do to Englishmen. As a case in point, we may refer to the persistent use of the title "Eucharist" for the Lord's Supper. Thus in page 265, on Exod. xii. 14, "The Passover continued in the Eucharist," we have a most excellent fourfold division of the subject, which is only marred by the fact that the title given to the subject of each sentence, in its original signification, has its *rationale* only in the third division, and falls into the mistake of giving the whole merely the name of one part. Here is the division:—I. The Eucharist is the after commemoration of the event which the Passover prefigured and foreshadowed. II. The Eucharist sets forth the Christian's deliverance from bondage as the Passover did the Jew's. III. The Eucharist is a feast of thanksgiving to the Christian, as the Passover festival was to the Jew. IV. The Eucharist, like the Passover, is a feast upon a sacrifice. We can scarcely refrain here from extracting one sentence from the short paragraph under this fourth division: "In the Eucharist, where the true victim is Christ himself, whose sacrifice upon the cross is alone propitiatory, a commemoration of the death of Christ is made, and then there follows a feast of the most sacred kind." How much better it would be to give up the term "Eucharist," which is really defective, and use only the phrase "the Lord's Supper." But if there be one small fault here and there, there are a thousand and one things worthy of praise. Here is one, from the same part of the Book, Exod. xii. 1: "*The Lord spake.*—According to the Biblical record, neither Moses nor Aaron introduced any legislation of their own, either at this time or later. The whole system, religious, political, and ecclesiastical, was received by Divine revelation, commanded by God, and merely established by the agency of

the two brothers. *In the land of Egypt*.—The introduction of these words seems to show that we have a separate document on the subject of the Passover, written independently of what has preceded, some time after the Exodus, and placed here without alteration, when Moses gathered together his various writings into a single work." The homiletical index at the end of the book is valuable.

The appearance of Dr. Dabney's *Syllabus* (10) is the response to a strong desire on the part of the theological students of his class of 1878. They so highly valued the prelections of their accomplished preceptor, and were so determined to profit most largely under his guidance, and to assist others to gain the same advantage, that they resolved, with his leave, to print and publish, mainly for the private use of themselves, their forerunners and successors in the Doctor's classes, the propositions and questions put at the commencement of the study of a particular theme, together with the notes thereupon by the Professor. There are seventy-four lectures, occupying 887 pages. The order followed in the arrangement of subjects is mainly that of the Westminster Confession of Faith, but after commencing with "Natural Theology" there follows "a brief review of the doctrines of Psychology and Ethics which are most involved in the study of Theology." The first edition was published by a committee of students; the second is now sent forth by Dr. Dabney himself, who tells us that "the main design, next to the establishment of Divine truth, has been to furnish students in divinity, pastors, and intelligent lay Christians, a view of the whole field of Christian theology, without swelling the work to a size too unwieldy and costly for the purposes of instruction." This valuable work is little known in this country, but we believe it will not much longer remain so. The references to the best writers upon each branch of discussion set forth in the syllabus are varied, and exhaustive of what is best in theological science. We find, too, a thorough familiarity with Scottish theology as represented by Hill,

(10) *Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia*, by R. L. Dabney, D.D., LL.D. 2d Ed. St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Co. of St. Louis, 1878. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Dick, Cunningham, Chalmers, as well as with the Patristic, Genevan, French, German, and American. So far as we have read and examined this volume, we have met nothing that the most orthodox in this country might not, or rather does not, accept. It almost seems as if many American divines and American students of theology were in appearance at least more orthodox than ourselves, and we would advise all who fear for the existence of the old Calvinistic theology to look up this book and they will find that in "the country of the future," so long as such lectures are listened to, published by the desire of the students, and so long as such books command the attention and respect of thoughtful men, there can be no fear of either a cold ecclesiastical culture, or a sheer indifference to the truth of God, gaining dominion over the reason or the heart. And we may add, that with the strictest orthodoxy, we have here a fair display of good common-sense, as in Lecture LX., on Prayer, which is as *reasonable* as the most undevout rationalist can demand, and is yet Scriptural and reverential. We may give a specimen :—

"It is said, that if the Christian prays with right motives, and with an assured belief that he shall obtain, he will obtain: no matter what he asks (unless it be something unlawful). Yes; but what warrant has he for the belief that he shall obtain? Faith, without an intelligible warrant, is sheer presumption. Suppose, for instance, the object of petition is the recovery of a sick friend, where does the applicant read God's pledge of a specific answer to that prayer? Certainly not in Scripture. Does he pretend a direct spiritual communication? Hardly. We have no specific warrant at all; and if he works himself up into a notion that he is assured of the answer, it is but a baseless fantasy, rather insulting than honouring to God. I know that pious biography is full of supposed instances of this kind, as when Luther is said to have prayed for the recovery of Melancthon. These are the follies of good men; and yet God's abounding mercy may in some cases answer prayers thus blemished. . . . It is right to pray for such things (recovery from sickness, recovery of friends, good name, daily bread, deliverance from persecution, conversion of particular sinners, etc. etc.); it is even commanded; and we have ground in the benevolence, love, and power of God, and tender sympathy of the Mediator, to hope for the specific answer. But still the truest believer will offer those prayers with doubts of receiving the specific answer, for the simple reason, that God has nowise specifically promised to bestow it. The enlightened believer urges such petitions, perhaps warmly; but still all are conditioned on an 'if it be possible,' 'if it be consistent with God's secret will.' And he does not know whether he shall receive or not, just because that will is still secret. But such prayers offered with this general trust in

God's power, benevolence, and better wisdom, and offered in pious motives, are accepted, even though not answered. Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 8 with verse 9; Matt. xxvi. 39 with Heb. v. 7. God does not give the very thing sought, though innocent in itself. He had never promised it; but He 'makes all things work together for good' to the petitioner. This should be enough to satisfy every saint."

Mr. Lilley dedicates his book (11) "To my class-fellows at the New College, Edinburgh, with unfeigned regards," and we may say at once that his class-fellows have no cause to withhold their respect. Nobody doubts that Mr. Lilley has considerable ability, and faith in his powers is confirmed by this excellent work. The whole idea of this book is great, and we have pleasure in adding that the idea is well kept in mind, and well wrought throughout. In reading it, one is constantly reminded of the work of an American citizen, *The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation*. In comprehensive grasp (though Mr. Lilley modestly tells us that he has excluded much that might have been inserted), philosophic method, and fine spiritual tone, both are alike. We could wish much that our author's fervent desire were gratified, and that the youth of our country were led not only savingly to embrace the great truths of the gospel, but also to see the deep foundations and springs, the wide issues and strong obligations thereof. After an introduction, which is a reprint of an article by Mr. Lilley which appeared in the pages of this Review three years ago, he proceeds in eleven chapters to bring before his readers the truths concerning God and man which made the gospel necessary and possible. This book is, as is hinted, but a forerunner, and we shall cherish the hope that it will meet with such success as to lead the author to proceed to the full execution of his design.

This handsome volume (12) is rich in matter of consolation. It is unique in its conception as to the method of dealing with this subject. Ordinarily, writers are content to seek in the form of pious meditations to administer consolation, but Mr. Agnew, while giving much that is fitted to lead the

(11) *The Gospel of God: An Introduction to the Message of Christianity*, by J. P. Lilley, M.A. London: James Nisbet and Co., 1881.

(12) *The Theology of Consolation; or an Account of many old Writings and Writers on that Subject*, by Rev. David A. C. Agnew. Edinburgh: Ogle and Murray, 1881.

chastened spirit to a thorough resignation and an abiding joy in the comfortable knowledge of the way, word, and will of God, here and there philosophises and seeks to meet the demands of the intellect when these conflict either with the conscience or the heart. Adopting this method, we can imagine that our author will reach a more select audience than writers on such subjects usually do; but we would question whether, looking to the whole get-up and excellent paper of the book, it will not be more limited in its circulation than it might otherwise be. For this might prove more than many to be a people's book. It is so rich in its store of gatherings from our old literature in this branch of truth, that we wish for it as extensive a circulation as the accomplished author can desire. It must have been to himself a labour of love, and a source of comfort and consolation, and we doubt not that what has been passed through his own mind and heart will be blessed to many sufferers and mourners. We may indicate the contents of this volume. After an introductory essay on the teachings of Scripture concerning consolation, Book First, dealing with the *writings*, has two subdivisions, viz., (1) Consolation as the first aspect of the Gospel, in which are given quotations from Luther, Dr. Crisp, "The Marrow," etc. etc., and (2) Consolation revived and confirmed. Book Second, treating of *writers*, gives a biographical dictionary illustrative of Book First.

The fertile pen of the author of *The Patriarchs* (13) flows on apace with nothing to retard it, except at an odd time, when it bravely becomes a sword, and combats an idea opposed to that propounded in the text. One may read this book with as much ease as he would read a favourite story. Doubtless, with its large type and its thirty-two illustrations, it was meant to be popular, and we have little hesitation in believing that it will be very popular in the denomination to which the Doctor belongs, and, perhaps, may deservedly find a much larger audience. The history of the patriarchs is here brought before us with all the art of an old story-teller who knows

(13) *The Patriarchs, their Lives and Lessons*, by Fergus Ferguson, M.A., LL.D., containing thirty-two illustrations. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1882.

what he is about, and how to interest with lively talk; nor is he forgetful wisely, and let us say sometimes *awkily*, of the practical lessons that are everywhere to be found in the narrative. We do not need on every occasion to combat views to which we are opposed, but, without entering further into criticism, we cannot help saying that the flowing matter tells more of haste than of artistic finish; *e.g.* at page 247 our author says, in regard to Jacob wrestling with the angel: "It is plain from the reference to the case which long afterwards was made by the prophet Hosea, that the physical struggle thus was illustrative of, and indeed accompanied by, a spiritual struggle of corresponding intensity, and ultimately of corresponding success;" while, in a note at page 250, he gives a direct negative to Robertson and Charles Wesley, by saying, with sledge-hammer effect, "The struggle, I repeat, was simply a corporeal one, but that, probably, emblematical of a fight for the lingering corruptions of his heart, which he was slow to abandon." But, we daresay, such slips will be noticed by very few of the readers of this interesting and useful work.

We hardly think Mr. Philip appears at anything like his best in this little volume of sermons or lectures (14). There is much in it well fitted to edify a congregation, but we cannot say that it will serve to increase the fame of the preacher, though we hope and expect it will have a wider influence in recalling the living tones and the genial sympathy of the author. One thing, too, is certain, that here we find amidst sweet odours His name which is as ointment poured forth.

The title *Inheritors of the Kingdom* (15) does not really give any idea of the range of this little volume. It should rather have been "The Sermon on the Mount," as it wholly refers to the teaching of our Lord in that inexhaustible dis-

(14) *The Garden of Gethsemane*, by the Rev. George Philip, M.A., of Free St. John's, Edinburgh. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

(15) *The Inheritors of the Kingdom*: being Expository Discourses on St. Matthew v. 1-16, by the Rev. Joseph Duncan. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1882.

course. Printed at the request of friends, these parish discourses justify their good opinion, in giving evidence, in thought and structure, of care and strong desire to do good to the hearers. Readers will be equally benefited.

Dean Goulbourn introduces this new edition of Dr. Tait's book to the public (16). It contains fifty-two short expositions, and the author intends that the devout possessor of the volume should not only read each, but should prayerfully meditate upon each for a week, thus going over the whole in a year. We fear such a hope as this, though repeated and enforced by the Dean, is simply an evidence of a common yet narrow mode of looking at helps to devotional feeling. We should have rather hoped that a stimulus would have been given through the book to the systematic study of the Word of God, and we are sure the author and his introducer never desired anything less.

We have seldom met with a fairer and more sympathetic writer on the relations which exist between Christianity and modern doubt than the Vicar of All-Saints, Clapham Park. It would be well if all who are interested in the conflict that presently engages the theological, scientific, and dilettante worlds would read this well-timed and well-toned book (17). "It is addressed to Christians rather than to sceptics," and we are wholly inclined to think that half the battle would be won were Christians more true to the teaching and temper of Christianity. The fundamental principles extended in this volume were originally addressed to Christian workers at Mildmay Hall. Were such workers everywhere to listen to the wise counsels that are here presented for consideration, we cannot help thinking that the end Mr. Girdlestone has in view, viz. the decrease of scepticism, would be largely helped. "Here lies another weighty consideration for us: What evidence of a living Christ do we ourselves offer? Men have a right to demand evidence. They have no right to demand of us

(16) *Seeds of Thought*, by William Tait, D.D., Pau, France. New Edition. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(17) *Christianity and Modern Scepticism*, by the Rev. A. G. Girdlestone, M.A., Clapham Park. London: Hedder and Stoughton, 1882.

miracles. But they have a right to see Christ in us. And so far as Christ is not in us, we are heavily responsible for their doubt or unbelief." The contents are—I. Method of treating the subject; II. Defects in our methods of presenting truth; III. IV. V. Defective principles in ascertaining and teaching religious truth; VI. Revelation appeals to the reasoning faculties; VII. The moral character of scepticism; VIII. Qualifications required for dealing with sceptics; IX. Suggestions for personal dealing with sceptics; X. The relation of natural science to the subject; App., A popular reply to a secularistic lecture.

From another point of view, we have in this small volume (18) of sermons preached during Lent 1882, at St. Matthew's Church, West Kensington Park, an attempt to meet the necessities of the present age of novelties, or revivals of old heresies, in doctrine. This is a praiseworthy effort to fortify the followers of Christ against the plausible, but fatal errors of false teachers in the Church of England and elsewhere, who in a spurious charity say, or seem to say, that each man's opinion, and not the Bible, is to be the standard of truth—and that doctrines as antagonistic as light and darkness are only different sides of truth.

While many gospel addresses are published at the present time, it cannot be questioned that the condition of believers is engrossing much attention in the Church. For there is abroad a great deal of false and shallow teaching as to the doctrines of the Word of God, and perhaps no doctrine is so much contemplated, with very different results, as that of the sanctification of believers. This volume (19) is confessedly written for the help of believers, and we find in it separately treated—(1) Full salvation in Christ; (2) The Spiritual Conflict; (3) The life of faith and fellowship; (4) Justification, Sanctification, etc.; and (5) Briefer thoughts and counsels for daily helps in spiritual life. The various "thoughts" are

(18) *Burning Questions of the Day, or Plain Truths on certain fatal Errors*, by Rev. Flavel S. Cook, D.D., Rev. E. Drummond Hutton, D.D., and five others. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(19) *Counsels and Thoughts for the Spiritual Life of Believers*, by Thomas Moor. Same publishers.

well expressed in true and simple language, and are eminently helpful just now to a true appreciation of the Scriptural doctrine, while the counsels are wise and tender. The briefer thoughts and counsels in the last division are most helpful to devotion, and are so arranged as to occupy any one so inclined daily for three months.

This (20) is an exposition of Romans vii. 1 to viii. 17, and is a very valuable contribution to the illustration of the soul's experience in its passage from a condition of Sin to a condition of Salvation. We have in this volume not only the usual exposition, but a keen analysis of the thoughts and requirements of the written Word. We may give one paragraph, which, while not committing ourselves to its exegesis, may lead our readers to see what they may expect in this valuable work,—a paragraph which is, as we think, a fair average specimen of its style and contents:—

“But what, then, is the work of Christ with reference to this unchangeable moral law? It is just the supply of power to keep this law. It is just what Cyprian confirmed by his own experience, ‘the so forming us by a second birth, into new creatures, that what was doubted becomes certain, what was closed becomes opened, what was difficult becomes easy, what had seemed impossible becomes within our power.’ The demand of Jesus is the same as the demand of Moses, only Moses had nothing to say but ‘do right,’ while Jesus has something more; Moses could not pacify the conscience oppressed with the guilt of doing wrong (Heb. ix. 9), while Jesus can. Moses could not breathe into his followers God’s Spirit to make their labour not in vain, which Jesus can. ‘The very thing,’ says St. Paul, ‘which the Law could not accomplish, because of the greater strength of our rebellious evil nature, this one thing God accomplishes by having sent His Son to die for us : for He so inflicted the penalty of the Law, which is death, upon Christ’s body, that the promise of the law, which is life, might be freely given to us, provided we ‘walk no longer after the flesh, but after the Spirit’ (Rom. viii. 1-4).”

We need hardly, at this time of day, say anything more with reference to Dr. Moody Stuart’s reply to Kuenen and Professor Robertson Smith (21), than that the new critics are made to feel the sharp sword of an old-fashioned pattern. Perhaps no

(20) *From Sin to Salvation ; the Pauline Picture of the Redemptive Process*, by Thomas Griffiths, A.M., late Prebendary of St. Paul’s. London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

(21) *Israel’s Lawgiver : his Narrative true and his Laws genuine*, by A. Moody Stuart, D.D. London : James Nisbet and Co., 1882.

one of his school possesses in himself such a combination of fine sentiment, subtle analysis and illustration of the teaching of the Word, with a keen logic which at one time reduces a specious argument to absurdity, and at another, by simply carrying out its principles, exposes its unguardedness and want of generalisation. If any one still wishes to know what the new critics say as to Moses, Sacrifice, and the Books of Chronicles, he will find here the essence placed in a setting of orthodox argument; and we take leave to say that the setting is more valuable than the stone. We simply indicate here what may be expected from the study of this contribution to the present controversy, and we commend most heartily an excellent piece of work, revealing the hand of a master.

Prepared for the most part for the official duties of the year of Presidency, these addresses and sermons (22) are worth reading. The valedictory address to Westminster students who will by and bye fill the post of teachers in day-schools, is a fine specimen of an earnest attempt to arouse the teacher in our everyday schools to a high sense of his privileges and responsibilities. "The teacher is the living book of the scholar," is one of the great themes of this lecture. But of course the contents are varied, and have no connection other than that they were delivered within a year. However, as the production of a thoughtful and observant and practical man, they are full of wise helpfulness.

This is a little memorial (23) of the late Vicar of Holy Trinity Church, Scarborough. These lectures were written down by himself after delivery, and we should think that though wanting the sweetness of the author's manner in delivery (as the editor says), they may have gained rather than lost by having been spoken before being written.

There is nothing like getting into the heart of a country if we wish to study its manners. This record of a visit to some

(22) *Addresses and Sermons*, by E. E. Jenkins, M.A., President of the Wesleyan Methodist Conference, 1880. London: Woolmer, 1882.

(23) *Lectures on St. Paul's First Epistle to the Thessalonians, Chaps. I.-IV.*, by the late Rev. R. V. Dunlop. Edinburgh: Grant and Son, 1882.

of the mission stations of India (24), though quite unpretentious, is one of the best of the kind we have met with. It really gives insight. We are brought face to face with the difficulties, duties, and delights of missionary work in India.

The Story of the West Port Church (25) should be read by everybody. We hardly think any reader will be disappointed. The notices of Chalmers and of Tasker are full of life, and the beginnings and the results of their work have a healthier interest than any romance.

Two volumes by American authors are deserving of our notice. *The Republic of God* (26) is a trenchant exposition of the principles of theology. In it we are immediately brought face to face with the great truths of God and salvation. Generally Dr. Mulford lays down his thesis in a simple statement—giving a simple definition, and immediately thereupon he amplifies his definition into a series of descriptive propositions which carry the reader into the heart of the subject. This is a book in which a student will delight, and let us say, a hard-headed student will have no occasion to lament his early training in Euclid, as the concentrated material of the *Republic of God* will demand good powers of mental digestion.

As regards the other volume—*The Religious Feeling* (27)—though its title is not very attractive, yet we are pleased to welcome it as an excellent and rare contribution to the study of the Evidences. Dr. Newman Smyth has given us here the results of prolonged and patient study of the German theologies and philosophical systems of religion in combination with the moral theories of modern English minds. "The variation by which this new venture, among the great multitude of books, hopes to live, and to be useful, may be said to be the result of a process of natural selection, in an American mind, from the German idealism and the English positivism." This mixture

(24) *Days of Grace in India*, by Henry Stanley Newman. London: S. W. Partridge and Co.

(25) Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace.

(26) *The Republic of God*. An Institute of Theology, by Elisha Mulford. L.L.D. 5th Ed. London: R. D. Dickinson, 1882.

(27) *The Religious Feeling: A Study for Faith*, by Rev. Newman Smyth, D.D., Illinois, U.S.A. (Same publisher.)

of thought, like a mixture of races, has produced a striking and valuable volume, which, from its size and price, is easily within the reach of all.

Younger readers will find much to interest them in Dr. C. K. True's *Life of Sir Walter Raleigh* (28). The story of this heroic man bears to be told again and again: there is a fascination in it which will ever command the attention of youth, while to more mature readers it presents a study of a strangely complicated human character which it would be worth their while to master. Dr. True, as being himself an American, naturally keeps in special prominence Raleigh's work as a pioneer, but he gives us also vivid glimpses of men and manners in the English court in Raleigh's day. He has not attempted anything more than a simple narrative, rightly judging that younger readers are not particularly interested in details of literary research, and the book is consequently like a fine, well-limned portrait, in which the painter has not attempted to idealise, but has been content to give a true and lifelike presentment of the man as he was.

Those who have not already made acquaintance with Mr. Robert Young's *Modern Missions, their Trials and Triumphs* (29), will, we are sure, be glad to have their attention called to it. Mr. Young, from his position as Assistant Foreign Missions Secretary to the Free Church of Scotland, has naturally had large opportunity of acquainting himself with his subject, and he has done so, as this book shows, to good purpose. Beginning with India, he travels here over—we might say—the missionary map of the world, and shows what has been accomplished. It would be impossible for us here to do more than simply indicate the breadth of his treatment. Under the head of India, a chapter is devoted to Danish pioneers, after which he tells how English missions began in that continent, telling again briefly the story of Carey's work. He next gives an account of the Serampore Mission, which is followed up by a

(28) *Life and Times of Sir Walter Raleigh*, by Charles K. True, D.D. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

(29) *Modern Missions, their Trials and Triumphs*, by Robert Young, Assistant Secretary to the Foreign Missions Committee of the Free Church of Scotland. London: T. F. Unwin.

succinct sketch of the work done since 1813, and a special chapter on Zenana-work. In the same succinct, yet interesting way, missions in Burmah, in China, and Japan, in South Africa, Western Africa, Central Africa, Madagascar, Polynesia, and Melanesia, are passed in review: and no reader will come to the end of the work without feeling that, in very brief space, he has been put in a position to follow the future history of Foreign Missions with an intelligence to which he had hitherto been a stranger.

In connection with a re-issue of the Latin Ecclesiastical Writers, we have before us the fifth volume of the series, *Pauli Orosii Historiarum adversum Paganos, Libri vii*, to which is added his *Liber Apologeticus* (30). It is a very fine edition of a writer who is little known to us moderns, but who deserves no mean place in our regard. Paul Orosius, who was a Spaniard, and a contemporary of Augustine, wrote his History in the year 417, at this great theologian's request. It had a very special purpose, for it was designed to refute the constantly reiterated charge of those days, that Christianity had ruined the Roman power by leading the people to forsake the deities who, it was said, had led Rome on to victory. What Paul Orosius set himself to do was to show by unanswerable facts the baselessness of this charge: and the result was a work which represents, we believe, one of the earliest attempts made by Church writers to frame a philosophy of history. His work must have been the result of extraordinary labour, and it is of value, apart altogether from its apologetical aspect, as a perfect storehouse of early history. The edition before us may be described as a variorum one, the various readings being given at the foot of the page, and also references to authors to whom Orosius is supposed from time to time to refer. The work is prefaced by a critical introduction, and at the end are two copious indexes, one of authors quoted by Orosius, the other an *index rerum*, both so full and minute as to make the History a valuable book of reference.

(30) Vienna: *Apud C. Geroldi Filium Bibliopolum Academia*, 1882.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1882.

ART. I.—*Natural Religion.*

THE author of *Ecce Homo* now gives us *Natural Religion*. Presumably this is the long-promised book upon fundamental theological questions. In the problematic preface to the earlier work, the ambiguity of which had the effect of a surprise, it being impossible in the darkness, studiously utilised, to tell whether it was the ensign of friend or foe, we were informed, it will be remembered, with a certain eccentricity of definition, that theological questions would be avoided. "Christ, as the creator of modern theology and religion," was to form the theme of another volume, "which, however, the author did not hope to publish for some time to come." More than a decade and a half of years have passed away, and now a further work appears by the anonymous author, dealing professedly with theological questions; and although it is very largely a collection of papers contributed to a monthly magazine, there are some reasons for inferring, notwithstanding, that it is not intended to be a mere reprint of fugitive papers, but that we have before us the long-talked-of speculative foundation of his treatment of the life and work of Jesus. Certainly this new book is a kind of complement to the earlier one. Whereas that discussed, "How can we esteem Christ if the supernatural

is disregarded?" this discusses "How, if the supernatural is eschewed, can we regard Christianity?" And the two books seem to be carefully arranged on the same plan. There is in each a mysterious preface; there is also in each a first and a second part of a similar design. In the first part in each the author's plan apparently is to conceal his ultimate opinions with some care, and in addition to the perplexity caused by indefiniteness of statement, to introduce several chapters wholly beside the main argument, in obedience, it would seem, to the Ciceronian advice about exordia "*reddere auditores benevolos attentos dociles*;" then having endeavoured to make his readers "sympathetic, alert, and tractable," to unfold in the second part, without let or hindrance, his more esoteric teaching; the whole in each case being completed by a concluding chapter, as apparently hesitant upon the most vital points controverted as the preceding exposition has been decided. Still, with all the apparent similarity of the two books, the prominent fact in comparing them is a manifest and wide divergence of standpoint. In *Ecce Homo*, for example, it was possible for the author to write as his last words upon the origin of the Church of Christ, "No man saw the building of the New Jerusalem; . . . it descended out of heaven from God." In *Natural Religion* both God and heaven have become as much figures of speech as the New Jerusalem, for God is the universe, we are told; and when we not unnaturally ask, "But why say God, if you merely mean universe, or world, or nature," we are assured in reply that the question is only verbal.

For some features of *Natural Religion* unfeigned commendation may be expressed. Style makes the fortune of books, and so oftentimes do incidental statements. In both respects *Natural Religion* is noteworthy. It has many felicities of expression, beauties of thought, and aptnesses of quotation. Take the following apothegm upon the unity of the Bible:—

"Mr. Mill," it is said on p. 169, "refers with a touch of sarcasm to those who fancy the Bible is all one book. It is a great mistake to do so; but it is perhaps a still greater mistake to think that it is *not* one book, or that it has no unity. The writings of which it is composed, allowing a few exceptions, agree together and differ from most other books in certain characteristics. Certain large matters are always in question, and the action moves forward with a slow evolution, like the dénouement of a play, through a thousand years of history."

And in another place the author continues (p. 176) :—

"That which is peculiar to the Bible, and has caused it to be spoken of as one book rather than many, viz., the unity reigning throughout a work upon which so many generations laboured, gives it a vastness beyond comparison, so that the greatest work of individual literary genius shows by the side of it like some building of human hands beside the Peak of Teneriffe."

But for its length, I should like to quote the eloquent and acute reflections given in the third chapter, on the distinction between intuitive and intellectual knowledge. Having a long course before us, however, one additional quotation must suffice, which it will not be surprising to hear cited again and again against the author himself and his new gospel :—

"It is said," the author writes on p. 181, "that the theophilanthropist Larevellère-Lepeaux once confided to Talleyrand his disappointment at the ill-success of his attempt to bring into vogue a sort of improved Christianity, a benevolent rationalism which he had invented to meet the wants of a sceptical age. 'His propaganda made no way,' he said; 'what was he to do?' he asked. The ex-bishop politely condoled with him, feared it was indeed a difficult task to found a new religion, more difficult than could be imagined, so difficult that he hardly knew what to advise! 'Still'—so he went on after a moment's reflection—'there is one plan which you might at least try; I should recommend you to be crucified and to rise again the third day.'"

And there are noteworthy features besides the literary finish and acuteness of occasional thoughts. There is an evident earnestness, sometimes rising to fervour, in pleading the necessity of a religion for the most materialistic. There is also a clear recognition of the great intellectual conflict in which this age is called to engage, and it is well to be reminded sometimes that in the present strife between Christianity and science

"The question is nothing less than this, whether we are to regard the grave with assured hope, and the ties between human beings as indissoluble by death; or, on the other hand, to dismiss the hope of a future life as too doubtful to be worth considering, even if not absolutely chimerical" (p. 4).

The great social crisis through which the age is passing also comes in for an earnest and almost desperate recognition, for we read of the "vast rebellion of the less prosperous classes against the whole system which has nursed them,"—of the "fierce repudiation on their part of the whole system or law, way of viewing the universe or worship, which lies at the basis of the civilised world," and we are pointed to a result

"of which few measure the awful importance, almost threatening the death of European civilisation itself." Nor is the loud lament over the divisions and inactivity of the churches, which might be the effectual antidote to these subtle social poisons, without its value, and we may heartily thank the author for reminding us that "there is a mine under modern society, which, if we consider it, has been the necessary result of the abeyance in recent times of the idea of the church," the State requiring a church, as the body wants a soul. Perhaps however, the *greatest* gratitude is due to the anonymous author for attempting this reconciliation of his between modern thought and religion, secularism and faith, culture and Christianity, and letting the light of day fall on its emptiness.

The bad features of "Natural Religion" seem to be its frequent exaggeration, its looseness of definition, and its totally inadequate perception, whether of the great need of humanity on the one hand, or of the absolute character of the work of Christ on the other. Two faults certainly vitiate the entire work, namely, the serious exaggeration of representing science and Christianity as contradictions, and the very inadequate perception of the necessity and importance of the Christian redemption. Of each of these notice must be taken at tolerable length further on. For the present, it will answer the purpose of substantiating the above charges, to call attention to two or three minor errors.

How egregious an instance of loose definition is given, for example, when it is said that the theological view of the universe is "all summed up in the three propositions that a Personal Will is the cause of the universe, that that Will is perfectly benevolent, that that Will has sometimes interfered by miracles with the order of the universe!" This definition may do for a leveller who is concerning himself with the elements common to all theistic religions; it is altogether unsatisfactory to regard these several propositions as together equivalent to the distinctive features of Christianity; and, be it remembered, that the whole point of the discussion is Christianity—not Theism—*versus* science. Possibly this narrowness of view is the consequence of another remarkable instance of definition. The author seems to be under the impression that the etymology of such a word as theology will lead him to its

present significance. He might as well expect the etymology of the word "philosophy" to conduct him to its actual and varying usage. Satisfied with this etymological method, he is content to explain that widest and most eluding contrast of theology and religion, by saying that "by theology the nature of God is ascertained, and false views of it eradicated from the understanding; by religion the truths thus obtained are turned over in the mind, and assimilated by the imagination and the feelings." Alas! so long and abstruse a page in the history of human thinking as that which deals with the distinction between theology on the one hand and religion on the other, is not to be so easily deciphered. Etymology is no substitute for close historical study, and a dictionary is a slovenly auxiliary where philosophical criticism is indispensable. Certainly the author may define these fundamental terms as he likes, but in that case he must add that, *in his view*, theology is the knowledge we may have of God, and religion that knowledge as suffused with emotion, as Professor Bain or Matthew Arnold would say. It is not allowable for him to coin definitions at will, and append them, without express limitation, to words commonly used in a much wider sense. It is Christian theology with which he is concerned, and Christian theology is by no means identical with the intellectual knowledge man may have of God. There are at least three senses in which Christian theology is used, to say nothing of theology which is not Christian. Thus the phrase sometimes stands for the science of God as known to the Christian; sometimes for the science of the doctrines of God and man in their several relations; and sometimes, in the widest sense of all, as the science of the Christian religion in all its forms, as contained in the Bible, as seen in history, as framed into theory, and as adapted to practical ends. Religion, in its Christian sense, may be not unsuitably regarded as assimilated theology; but then theology must be used in its widest meaning. To use it in its narrowest is to transform the whole argument into a syllogism with four terms. Let a careful reader substitute now and again the author's own definition of these two leading technicalities, and he will speedily become convinced of the numerous fallacies engendered unsuspectingly by this etymological method of definition, until after a time he will read quite calmly that the universal

characteristic of "theology" is "*energy*," where the whole context, according to the above definition, requires religion.

Yet again, what can the author mean when he declares that a "system of doctrine which has been left unrevised for more than a thousand years must needs promote scepticism"! It would be a pleasure indeed to find this system of doctrine. What section of the Christian Church cleaves to the doctrinal system of the eighth century? To the Christian thinker the sources of his faith are divine, but these sources are not a system. A system is the slow construction of generations; and history itself records how the whole past has been a progress through the conflict of opposites. So far from there having been any system of Christian doctrine "unrevised for a thousand years," the history of the Church reveals that creed differs from creed, Confession from Confession, age from age, and that, century by century, very large "revisions" of Christian doctrine, as formulated in human speech, have taken place. Indeed, instead of any system of Christian doctrine having been unrevised for a thousand years, the discerning eye will see a very perceptible progress by the labours of successive thinkers; and in this field, as in all the realms of research, battles over rival theories, the accession of one leader of thought and the fall of another, heresies and apologies, assaults and defences, have all contributed in the long-run to the general advance in intellectual apprehension.

The Bible is to the Protestant theologian what Nature is to the physicist; itself divine and unalterable, but to be progressively apprehended by the combined labours of many generations. Possibly it was the New Testament which the author meant when he spoke of the system of doctrine which has been left unrevised; but the New Testament is no more a system of doctrine, than the natural world is a system of science. Further, if the revelation given to us by Christ and his apostles is the knowledge which is incredible because it has not been revised, it might be well for the author to ponder upon Bishop Butler's suggestive method of reply; for what becomes then of his references to the "anxious retrospectiveness" of Christians, which is not "thought a healthy symptom in other institutions"? Will he rebuke the modern investigators of the physical world with "anxious retrospectiveness"? Yet the great system of

Nature, meaning thereby the system as studied by man and not as formulated, has been left unrevised, we are assured by students of nature, for a good many more thousands of years than one. "Life looks onward not backward," we are told, therefore let Natural Science be our gospel, and "the spiritual city of Western civilisation" be our church; but alas, Western civilisation is to be based more and more on science, and science dies if it does not ceaselessly display "an anxious retrospectiveness," restlessly questioning that Universe which seems to be the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, and admitting nothing which cannot be verified by ancient and constant nature. The "anxious retrospectiveness" of the Christian thinker is no more unhealthy than that of the devotee of natural science; the former studies the revelation of God in Christ, which has been given, as he thinks, once for all, and hopes to mirror all the length and breadth and depth and height of that revelation in his own mind as the years roll on and investigators increase; the latter studies the revelation of God in nature, which has also apparently been made unchangeable for this stage of universal history, and hopes to mirror *its* length and breadth and height and depth as time unfolds and workers multiply. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*

Besides, the author shows throughout his work a lamentably insufficient appreciation of the positions of the Christian thinker, who takes his stand, and "can no other," upon the absolute character of the religion of Jesus. As Paul put it, the gospel of Christ is the power of God unto salvation, and the author seems to be unaware that the salvation of which Paul spoke is a very different thing, in kind as well as degree, from any amelioration civilisation and natural science can effect. He who knows what Schleiermacher called the "Christian consciousness," also knows that it is impossible for him ever to regard any other religion or philosophy as the equal even of the gospel of Jesus, to say nothing of the superior. Faith in Christ, as the Scriptures and the Evangelical Churches understand the words, places its partakers in a wholly different category from those who are taught and aided by natural knowledge; they are conscious of having entered upon a radically new world, of having awakened to radically new experiences, of having submitted to a radically

new discipline ; it is as if they had been *born* anew ; their life is apparently an eternal life. It is true that an attack is made in this book upon a science which knows no religion, as well as upon a Christianity which is supposed obsolete. The author wages, it should be said, a triangular battle, with his right hitting out at the Christian believer, and with his left aiming at the Secularist. But the remarks just made relate to the scanty appreciation displayed for the grounds on which the revision of Christianity, in its earliest form, appears to its advocates needless.

But it is time to give an analysis of the entire argument of the work. There are two candidates for the position of leader and physician of mankind, of fosterer of that higher life without which life would not be worth living, we are told—Christianity and Science. But the system of the Christian Church, it is alleged, “is full of survivals, its text-books have been left too long without revision, its teaching is so archaic as to be in great part scarcely intelligible without the aid of ancient history, while the method of tests and exclusions has drained it of intellectual vigour, and has left it mainly under the control of nerveless minds, so that it is hardly listened to by men of the world, except on the ground that anility and puerility after all are forces, and might do untold mischief if they were needlessly provoked.” Is there then, the author asks, any help for man in his higher cravings, in science? And, it would appear, our author thinks, that science possesses many of the potent characteristics of Christianity, without being obsolescent. Christianity and science both agree, for example, in an earnest protest against human wisdom, religion saying, “Let man be silent and listen when God speaks;” science saying, “Let us interrogate nature, and let us be sure the answer we get is really nature’s, and not a mere echo of our own voice.” And this superficial agreement extends further, for science is also theistic. “If we will look at things, and not merely at words, we shall soon see that the scientific man has a theology and a God, a most impressive theology, a most awful and glorious God.” “I say” (continues our author) “that man believes in a God, who feels himself in the presence of a power which is not himself, and is immeasurably above himself, a power in the contemplation of which he is absorbed,

in the knowledge of which he finds safety and happiness ; and such is nature to the scientific man." A scientific man then is called a theist, not merely because he realises a stupendous power above himself, but, first, because he displays in the presence of that power awe and fear,—worship, that is to say,—worship being defined as admiration, blended with love ; and, next, because he has a sense of personal connection and relationship, so to speak, with that power, "for he cannot separate himself from that which he contemplates." Instead of atheism then, the result of cancelling supernaturalism, and submitting to science, is a theology in which all men, whether they consider it or not, do actually agree—that which is concerned with God in nature. But if theology, in a certain sense of the word, would survive the disappearance of supernaturalism, how would it be with religion ? This question is next considered, and with this result. Having defined theology as that which ascertains the nature of God and eradicates false views thereof, and religion as the truths there obtained, turned over in the mind and assimilated by the imagination and the feelings, religion is also declared to be possible after the denial of the supernatural. There may be, we are assured, a worship of the unity in the universe ; for "who is not conscious of a feeling of awe when he realises the greatness of the universe, when from thinking of this thing and that thing he rises to the thought of the sum and system of things ?" Such a worship of the unity of the universe is seen, it is pointed out, in Goethe and Wordsworth, with some misrepresentation of the latter confessedly, a misrepresentation seen in another particular. The motto of the work under examination is a sentence from Wordsworth—"We live by admiration ;" what Wordsworth really said was, "We live by admiration, hope, and love," a very different statement. If it be then asked, of what practical value is this natural religion ? does it affect the lives of its votaries, open their purses, and stimulate their self-denial ?—the author does not shrink even from these tests. Natural religion is stated to be of large practical value. Like Christianity, natural religion has a warfare with *the world*, for, in the esteem of the author, the *world* is "a kind of conspiracy of prejudices, a union of all that is stagnant, inert, mechanical, and automatic into a coherent and tyrannous power and jealous

consentient opinion ;" in a word, the world is "conventionalism," life without worship. Understanding the world in this sense, modern scientific teaching does but repeat, it is alleged (in these days when it is said that there is no agreement about religion), the maxims which have always made the basis of the religion of Christendom, that "there is one thing needful," and that "it shall profit a man nothing if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul." Then, so far from coming into collision with modern culture, as Christianity does, "natural religion" is but a synonym for culture, it is said. Ecclesiastical Christianity assuredly has a certain one-sidedness which has made it oppressive to science and art, truth and beauty, but this new religion has no quarrel with culture, which has been summed up by Goethe as life in the whole, in the good, in the beautiful ; for in natural religion "morality, under the name of life in the good, stands between art, which is life in the beautiful, and science, or the knowledge of the law of the universe, which is life in the whole ; looked at so, religion is seen to be entirely beyond dispute, and to be only another name for the higher life—the life of the soul." Indeed, the author does not hesitate to affirm that this natural religion may be called natural Christianity, for "it appeals to the sense of duty as forcibly, preaches righteousness and truth, justice and mercy, as solemnly and as exclusively as Christianity itself does, only it does not shock modern views of the universe." Further, if queries be put as to its citizen-making ability, Natural Religion has a great importance for states, we are told ; for "look, almost where you will in the wide field of history, you find religion, wherever it works freely and mightily, either giving birth to and sustaining states, or else raising them up to a sounder life after their destruction." Religion in the individual is identical with culture ; religion in its public aspect is identical with civilisation. Nor does this Natural Religion shrink from the aggressive test,—it also is missionary ; the modern religion finds a vast work ready for its hands, a work which will even compel it to give itself some organisation.

"When Western civilisation is confronted with the races outside it or the classes that have sunk below it, what does it feel irresistibly compelled to teach ? Science, that is, definiteness of conception, accuracy of observation

and computation, intellectual conscientiousness and patience, and, closely connected with these, the active spirit which rejects fatalism, and believes that man's condition can be bettered by his efforts—what else? Humanity, not limited by tribe or nation, and including all principles affecting man's dealings with his kind, respect for women, respect for individual liberty, respect for misfortune; again, what else? Delight and confidence in nature, opposed alike to the superstitious dread of idolatry, and to the joylessness of monasticism and puritanism."

Lastly, Natural Religion, like Christianity, has and must have, a church. If modern civilisation would become missionary, it must embody itself in something of the nature of a Christian society. The church of natural religion is "the spiritual city of Western civilisation."

A good summary of the whole argument may be obtained by abbreviating the author's own abbreviation in his closing chapter. There is a lower life, he says, of which the animating principle is secularity, or, in the popular sense of the word, materialism. There is a higher life, of which the animating principle has been called at different times by different names, but the most comprehensive name for it is Religion. It is the influence which draws men's thoughts away from their personal interests, making them intensely aware of other existences, to which it binds them by strong ties, sometimes of admiration, sometimes of awe, sometimes of duty, sometimes of love. But this process of incorporating individual men by religion suffers interruption and frustration in many ways, principally in two. Religions hurt each other by collision, they also decay inwardly. Exclusiveness and degeneration are their banes. The latter is of peculiar range and importance. Almost always, when religion comes before us historically, it is seen consecrating conceptions obsolete or obsolescent. The stage in which it fully satisfies the best intellects lasts commonly but a moment. Then begins a time in which it wants a little help from interpretation. What was meant literally must now be taken figuratively; what was advanced as fact must be received as allegory. Yet, still for a long time, the very greatest minds range themselves sincerely on the side of belief. A third stage begins in the history of religions when the best minds begin consciously to admit that their view of the universe has altered since the religion was first promulgated. Then, and not till then, arises a great practical question, what is to be done?

To-day we see a great religion approaching the end of its second millennium. But it suffers from both the perversions. First, it cannot persuade itself but that all other religions must be its enemies. Secondly, it has allowed itself like other great religions to be stereotyped. But there is a resource available for renewing the youth of Christianity. "Both the Old and New Testaments lose that appearance of obsolescence which ecclesiastical formalism has given them, and stand out as true sacred books and classics of mankind, so soon as in the former nature is written for God, and in the latter humanity for Christ."

These then are the principles contributed by the author towards the solution of the perplexities of the age,—the supernatural is incredible, the true theology is the knowledge of nature, the true religion is the worship of nature, the world to be avoided like death is the conventional, the church of the future is modern European civilisation, and the rational zeal is ardour in the spread of this civilisation.

Little would be gained by attacking a work like this point by point. The pressing matter is to show the invalidity of its most important assumptions. I address myself to three points—*first*, the author's conception of the supernatural; *secondly*, his conception of science; and *thirdly*, his conception of the terminableness of the work of Christ. If these fundamental axioms are shown to be not only not axiomatic but false, his entire structure falls to the ground.

What, then, does the author mean by the supernatural, or by supernaturalism, those very frequent words with him? He speaks, for example, of Christianity and Theism being too exclusively identified with the doctrine of the supernatural; what is this doctrine of the supernatural? He rather assumes the words to be well understood than explains them. Nevertheless, in one place he uses the phrase "beyond Nature" as an equivalent for the supernatural, and in another the phrase "above Nature." When we ask next the vital question, What, then, is Nature? the author informs us that he employs the word "as a name comprehending all the uniform laws of the Universe as known in our experience, and excluding such laws as are inferred from experience so exceptional and isolated as to be difficult of verification." This is certainly a

remarkable definition ; it would exclude from Nature all the laws which may be ascertained in the future, and all the diverse facts of the world in which we live, the laws of which seem beyond our present reach at any rate ; according to such a definition, minds and passions, and all the things in the universe which we believe are governed by laws, but the laws of which we do not know, would be classed as supernatural. However, let us take the spirit rather than the letter. We shall not be far wrong apparently if we regard Nature as, in the author's esteem, the present system of things as cognisable by the faculties of man, and the supernatural as that which is outside this system and ascertainable by revelation from without. Even now the terms "natural" and "supernatural" are popular and not philosophical designations. They are not exclusive, like "black" and "white," but are only fairly expressive, like "animal" and "vegetable," until you come to debated cases, failing us just where precision is indispensable. Such facts, for example, as prophecy and miracle, which the author would doubtless call supernatural, would as undoubtedly be regarded by the Christian thinker as strictly natural, that is, "as belonging to the present system of things and cognisable by the faculties of man." On the other hand, there is not a fact in the present system of things which would not be referred by the Christian thinker to the supernatural, to that which is "outside the present system and ascertainable by revelation from without." A good deal of jugglery has been done both by physicists and theologians with these two words, and it is high time that it be recognised that they cannot be used in argument with mathematical precision. X plus Y , the supernatural plus the natural, cannot be given as the unanalysable formula for the Universe, because some X is Y , and all Y is X . The great battle which this age especially seems called to wage cannot be fought out as a ranging of nature against the supernatural ; the actual combatants must be much more definitely placed. The real question is as to a view of the Universe,—as to whether the Christian or the Rationalistic view of the Universe is the true one, using the term Rationalistic in preference to the author's term of scientific, because, as will presently appear, the latter term is again a curious misnomer. The Rationalistic view constitutes the faculties of man the sole source of truth :

the Christian view knows something of a revelation from without humanity, which, having presented its credentials to the human faculties, subsequently constitutes itself an authority above reason. Looking from another standpoint, Rationalism is limited by the uniformities visible in the present world of sight and sense, whilst Christianity perceives other uniformities as well.

The great controversy of the age is, it is well to repeat, which system of thought offers the truer explanation of the entire universe, past, present, and to be, that which proceeds from the unaided human faculties, or that which proceeds from the human faculties assisted by knowledge communicated from without. There are two current and opposite views of the universe. According to the one, the Christian, a plan no more mutable than the Deity, a plan commencing and ending we know not where or when, but some stages of which are known to us, advances from Creation through the Fall to Judaism, to the advent of Christ, and onwards to the full establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven Christ founded. According to the other view, the Rationalistic, a plan no more mutable than the laws of the universe, supposed to be governed by unchangeable laws, a plan commencing and ending we know not where or when, but some stages of which we know, advances from an ascertainable past state by strict causation to an ascertainable future state. In neither case is there any question of a change of plan. The Divine plan, the Christian would say, is as immutable as the being of God. They misrepresent the Christian view who speak of miracles as a breach of the Divine plan. Miracles are simply breaches of an order of events, the permanence of which we had assumed too hastily. The Christian simply believes in a consecution of causes and effects somewhat more complicated in evolution and considerably less capable of forecast than the Rationalist; he does not believe in any sudden change or caprice; in his esteem, what the Deity has planned from all eternity with perfect knowledge, He takes all eternity to work out. It is only an accommodation to the poverty of human speech and the profundity of the related thoughts to call a miracle a breach of law. The real state of the case is, in the Christian view, that the mind of God is not so easily followed as at first appeared, for having acted steadily along one line of

cause and effect for a time, with equal forethought and determination He is believed to act a while along another. Miracles are divinely pre-arranged *junctions* of different lines of causes. In short, the Rationalist is to the Christian like that bore of society, the teller of characters, who, from a few uniformities observed, pretends to foretell the entire history of so mysterious a thing as a mind,—whereas a little more contact with facts would soon present many features totally irreconcilable with his confident theory. In brief, the gigantic contrast of view between the Christian and the Rationalist theory of the universe cannot possibly be expressed by the opposition between nature and the supernatural; for, to the Christian, the nature which excludes a creator is unnatural, and the so-called supernatural is perfectly natural. The bearing of this objection will appear more clearly still from the next.

What then, in the second place, is the author's conception of science? He seems to confine the word to the physical sciences and the science of man. But science is a method, not a subject-matter. Indeed, in one page, he says himself, speaking of the nature of science, "Science, that is definiteness of conception, accuracy of observation and computation, intellectual conscientiousness and patience, and, closely connected with these, the active spirit which rejects fatalism and believes that man's condition may be bettered by his efforts." This is admirable; but it is only an occasional flash of genius, too rightly regarded in this case as caring little for consistency. Science, then, is a method; it collects facts without prepossession, it summarises facts in clear conceptions, and in these laborious pursuits it knows neither fatigue nor fear. Well and good. Science is the result of the mental habit of patience and thoroughness, that is to say, it knows nothing of overhaste and prejudice: and the results themselves may be divided into facts, and laws embodying facts. If the author had added that science is also methodical, and presents its results in orderly arrangement, he would have given a very able definition indeed. Science, then, consists of facts, ideas, and order. As a necessary inference, science does not consist of surmises or hypotheses, or facts without connection; and again, as a necessary inference, science is not the universe, but an attempt to understand the universe, to mirror the facts, and laws, and

scheme of the universe in human perceptions, and ideas, and order. Here then the engrossing controversy already referred to again emerges. The question to be discussed, and to be discussed scientifically,—that is to say, without unproved assumption and with patience,—is whether Christianity, the system of facts and ideas promulgated by Christ and his apostles, is scientific, that is, is based upon facts accurately summarised in ideas, or to be strictly accurate (remembering that so-called Nature is not yet Science, although presumably capable of becoming such), whether Christianity is so largely based upon facts and formed of ideas explanatory of those facts that there is a large presumption that it is wholly so composed. The Christian thinker will reply straightway that Christianity is as capable of being framed into a science as Nature is. In this assertion lies the great task of the present age, for the Christian apologist on the one hand, and for the Rationalist apologist on the other. Whenever the battle is joined, the Christian thinker will maintain with some confidence that the Rationalist belies one first principle of science, and is partial in his collection of facts. He will point to numerous facts in his personal experience, and in the history of the universe, of which the Rationalistic theory takes no account. When the Rationalist concludes from the data at his disposal that the universe is a scheme of uniformities, the entire past, present, and future of which he may know when his task of collecting facts and drawing inferences has been completed in his own way and by his own faculties, the Christian thinker will step in and affirm that the Rationalist is unnecessarily limited in his method, unduly limited in his facts, and therefore involuntarily limited in his conclusions. The Christian thinker will instance many facts, which are totally inexplicable on the theory that the Omnipotent is omnimutant force, and equally inexplicable on the theory that this present phase of being has within it nothing but what the present stellar and solar arrangements have produced, if that statement of the case be preferred. The Christian thinker will call to his aid the testimony of consciousness and that of common sense. Reference will probably be first made to that mass of experience which, for want of a better name, the Christian will ascribe to his being born again. High ground even will be taken, and he will say that it is not his

part to authenticate these experiences to the Rationalist, any more than a painter is bound to provide a blind critic with eyes, or a musician a deaf critic with ears. Taking his stand upon that peculiar consciousness which is his own—of sin as distinct from error, and of the forgiveness of sin, of volitional weakness and the superadded strength from above—the Christian will aver that these facts, in themselves indisputable, with many others, are uncaused by previous facts in his life, and therefore are incompatible with a theory which knows no powers superior to natural laws, as the phrase is. And there is only one reply possible. The Christian may be told that his experience is abnormal; in other words, that he is beside himself. In this case he will summon common sense as a witness; he will refer to the invariable consequence of a reception of Christianity, and will show that the same fundamental consciousness is attested in the third century and the sixteenth as well as in the nineteenth, amongst Asiatics, Americans, and Polynesians, as well as Europeans. Nor will the catalogue of unrecognised facts end with the common characteristics of the Christian consciousness. History will afford many phenomena also inexplicable on the Rationalistic theory. Should the Rationalist reject the reality of prophecy and miracle, and the evidence afforded by the history of revelation from Moses to Christ, and from Christ to Mrs. Booth, he will only be allowed so to do, not on *a priori* grounds, as at present—for that would be again to sacrifice the cardinal principle of science, which ordains that all supposed facts and theories be dispassionately examined—but solely after a careful and prolonged examination. What is signified by prophecy, miracle, divine interference in human affairs, cannot at the present stage be regarded either as untrue as facts, or as referable to the ordinary laws of the solar system. They call for a very careful and prolonged investigation, both empirically and causally, before such a book as that before us, with its categorical assertions about the obsolescence of Christianity, can be regarded as otherwise than an unscientific prejudgment of a most vital question.

But all attacks on, as well as defences of, Christianity, must ultimately be Christocentric. What, in the third place, is the author's conception of Jesus who is called Christ? No express

reply is given in this book, although the legitimate inference from its tone would be that if Christianity is obsolete, Christ is obsolete too. In *Ecce Homo*, it is true, we were presented with many suggestive thoughts upon incidental effects of the life and teaching of Christ; and for a while the Christian was willing to put himself, "in imagination, at the time when He whom we call Christ bore no such name, but was simply, as St. Luke describes, a young man of promise . . . to trace his biography from point to point;" ignoring in the process not only the epistles and apostles, at the bidding of the writer, but even the testimony of Christ himself, the Christian was willing to endeavour to adopt such a standpoint so long as "what was published" was expressly regarded as "a fragment." An "advocatus diaboli" sometimes brings a saintly character into stronger relief. But when what is published is no longer "a fragment," the question must inevitably arise as to the author's conception of Christ, which is matured and not fragmentary. Christianity has a very express claim to propound concerning Jesus of Nazareth. Without doubt, Christian teachers find it an agreeable task to dwell upon the character and words of Jesus, —his originality, his calmness, his moral beauty, his mental vastness, his immeasurable strength, his large joy, his poignant sorrow; but these are only side-lights, they contend, upon the real significance of Jesus. It seems to the Christian very scant praise to say that the Messiah was a most estimable man, a giant in intellectual and moral force, and the greatest philanthropist of his age, if the qualification is straightway added that the world has rolled beyond his days, and left him stranded. To applaud his proclamation of the "law of edification, mercy, and forgiveness," and his founding of "the Christian Republic" seems to the Christian man very faint adulation indeed, when in the same breath it is assumed that Jesus was simply the finest product of Judaism, displaying, moreover, the deficiencies of his epoch and the limitations of his contemporaries. Now it is confessedly difficult to transform a patron into a worshipper, but if the transformation is ever to be made, it must be by steady insistence on the leading contention of Christianity. Christ has introduced into the world a series of new facts, the Christian asserts, the truth of which any one may verify for himself, and the recognition of which necessitates the

estimation of his religion as well as himself, as "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Those facts are summarized in the Scriptural term "salvation." When the Christian man declares that neither culture nor science can "save,"—that, in more detail, poetry may elevate and refine but cannot save, philosophy may ennoble and guide but cannot save, knowledge of physical laws may impart pleasure and prudence but cannot save, good laws may lessen crime and encourage commerce but cannot save, a high ideal of individual, social and political life may assist the production of a people healthy in body, sound in mind, free, industrious, and happy, but in no sense supersedes the necessity for salvation,—when such a contention is made, it is the part of wisdom, it is the inalienable task of science, to see whether there is not some important truth here, for surely Christianity as well as science may have its technical terms for new facts, which cannot be expressed otherwise than by new words or the adaptation of old ones. Let this fact, or series of facts, called "salvation" be investigated in the scientific spirit, and the inquirer will find that there are psychological phenomena of a peculiar and instructive kind connoted by this technical word, and that, so far from passing it and its facts heedlessly by, it is his duty as a dispassionate inquirer to observe the related facts carefully, and seek their causes; indeed, should he find them inexplicable on the Rationalistic theory of the universe, it is his duty to reject that theory even as a working hypothesis, and look about for a theory of a more satisfactory kind. Either Christ made most extraordinary personal claims, or his words have been grossly misreported by every biographer of the New Testament. If he made extraordinary personal claims, those claims will be put to a most crucial test in this matter of 'salvation.' For if the preaching of "Christ and Him crucified" does bring a mental rest, an ethical force, an intellectual enlargement, which nothing else does in the utterances of mankind, then inferences follow for the earnest and unprejudiced inquirer many and fast. There can be no halting-places between Christ's being a gross impostor and a true man, between his being a true man and more than man, between his being more than man and his being divine, and so on step by step until a whole series of connected truths

follows from this new experience, or new fact, or new facts, of "salvation," and it becomes very speedily evident that Christianity is an absolute religion, which cannot become obsolete. It is only by ignoring the reconciliation of many antinomies which Christ has made that the transitoriness of his work can become in any degree plausible.

ALFRED CAYE

ART. II.—*The Secret of Sanctification.*¹

NO more important subject than this of sanctification can occupy the attention of living men. It represents the chief contribution of Christianity to the morals of the world. Inasmuch then as the subject of ethics is receiving an unusual amount of attention at the present time, and as in such volumes as Spencer's *Data of Ethics* and Stephen's *Science of Ethics* we have the flower and fruit of the world's wisdom upon morals, it may not be inopportune to subject Christian ethics, so far as sanctification is concerned, to careful treatment. If we mistake not, there will be found in the Christian method a simplicity and a power in striking contrast to the abstract subtleties which go to form the *refined selfishness* which, with the world, passes muster as morals.

¹ *The Work of the Holy Spirit in Man.* Discourses by G. Tophel, pastor of the Evangelical Church, Geneva. Translated from the French by Rev. T. J. Després. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1882. Pp. i.-viii. 118.

Holiness as understood by the Writers of the Bible, by Joseph Agar Beet. Second Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880. Pp. 62.

The 'Higher Life' Doctrine of Sanctification tried by the Word of God, by Henry A. Boardman, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1877. Pp. 286.

The Sinlessness of Jesus, an Evidence for Christianity, by Carl Ullmann, D.D. Translated by Sophia Taylor. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1870. Pp. i.-xii. 300.

La Sainteté Parfaite de Jésus Christ, par F. Godet, Neuchâtel. 1869.

Le Saint Esprit, étude doctrinale et pratique sur sa personne et sur son œuvre, par E. Guers. Toulouse: Société des Livres Religieux. 1865. Pp. i.-xii. 348.

The Christ of History, by John Young, LL.D. Third Edition. London: William Allan. 1861. Pp. i.-xiv. 257.

Lehre von der Person Christi, von Wolfgang F. Gess. Berlin: 1856.

Christi Person und Werk nach Christi Selbstzeugnissen und den Zeugnissen der Apostel, von W. F. Gess, D.D. Basel: 1870, 1878, and 1879.

It will not be needful to notice at length the Agent in Sanctification. This is the Holy Ghost; and there is no dispute among Christians upon the point. Increased attention has in recent years been paid to his person and operation. This is so far a matter for thankfulness. If it was true some time since that the Church had largely "unlearned the Holy Spirit," it can hardly be maintained now. The truth seems rather to be that we are now in danger of grieving the Holy Ghost by giving more attention to him than to the great Object he labours to reveal. The two works mentioned in our list, from the pens of French pastors, contain interesting discussions upon the work of the Holy Ghost. The recent one contains hardly anything which was not stated more clearly and fully in 1865, by M. Guers. Still M. Tophel has made the subject his own; and, though we are inclined to question one or two of his positions, there can be no doubt about the freshness and earnestness of his discussion. *The Paraclete*, by Dr. Joseph Parker, is another volume, published in the first instance anonymously in 1874, upon the personality and ministry of the Holy Ghost, and contains many striking and epigrammatic statements. We need only mention the "Higher Life" literature in bulk, by such authors as W. E. Boardman, Asa Mahan, C. G. Finney, and the Smiths, husband and wife: it deals with the work of the Spirit in man, although radiating a very considerable amount of darkness and confusion upon Christian experience. But the ablest volume in recent years on the subject of the work of the Spirit is undoubtedly *The Philosophy of the Divine Operation in the Redemption of Man*, by James B. Walker, that "American citizen" who did such service to truth in his little volume on *The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation*, and who, in 1869, followed it up with this small volume about the Holy Spirit. It deserves more attention than, so far as we know, it has received.

But there is one feature in the agency of the Holy Ghost deserving of the fullest consideration, and this is His striking *want of self-assertion*, His freedom, if we may risk the thought, from all *egotism*. He has no desire, as the Scriptures He has inspired show, to direct any special attention to Himself. Any references made to His personality and work are of the most cursory character. He has evidently no idea, after the manner

of men, of making himself his hero. "He shall not speak of himself" was the splendid testimony of Christ regarding him. In truth, the Scripture references to the Holy Ghost are such as a most modest author would give incidentally about himself in the course of a work written to magnify another. While it may be most interesting, therefore, to meditate upon these incidental references, it becomes us never to lose sight of the fact that it is the manifestation of another which the Spirit has constantly in view, and by this manifestation He means to elevate mankind. In short, it is not the doctrine about the Holy Ghost which saves and sanctifies, but the doctrine about the Person, or rather the Person himself, whom the Spirit all through "delighteth to honour." Who is the Spirit's hero will presently appear.

Assuming, then, that the Holy Spirit is the agent in sanctification, we pass at once to consider what sanctification means and how He is pleased to secure it. The word *ἀγιασμός*, translated in Scripture sometimes "sanctification" and sometimes "holiness," as reference to the following passages will show—Rom. vi. 19-22; 1 Cor. i. 30; 1 Thess. iv. 3, 4, 7; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 15; Heb. xii. 14; and 1 Pet. i. 2—is only found in Biblical and ecclesiastical Greek. It denotes, according to Cremer in his *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, "1. The accomplishment of the salvation expressed in *ἀγιαζεῖν*, and 2. The result of this action, in that it is contemplated as effected." When then we next inquire about the exact meaning of *ἀγιαζεῖν*, we find that it means "to set something into a state opposed to *κοινόν*; or where the something is already *κοινόν* to deliver it from this state and put it into a state corresponding to the revealed nature of God." Or, to quote from Professor Godet, when referring in one of his works to our Lord sanctifying Himself,—

"To sanctify one's-self is not synonymous with to purify one's-self. To purify one's-self supposes that one has been polluted (*souillé*); to sanctify one's-self is simply to consecrate to God the natural faculties of soul and of body, at the moment when they enter into exercise. Pure is opposed to impure, holy (*saint*) to profane or natural."¹

A person consequently can "sanctify himself" who does not

¹ Cf. *Etudes Bibliques*, par F. Godet, D.D., Deuxième Série, p. 111.

need to purify himself. This was our Lord's position, as John xvii. 19 shows.

Now in Mr. Beet's little book we have a careful induction made of the passages where "holiness" and its cognates occur. He is exceedingly anxious to make emphatic the idea of consecration, or setting apart for a sacred purpose, as covering the term in question. He even goes the length of saying—

"The priests were *holy*, whatever might be their conduct. Samson was a *holy man of God*, even in the embrace of Delilah, for God's claim that they should be His had placed them in a new position, and could not be set aside by, although it greatly aggravated the guilt of, their unfaithfulness. Just so, God claims for Himself all those whom He rescues from the penalty of their sins. And, whatever they may do, His claim puts them in a new and very solemn position."¹

This Mr. Beet calls "objective holiness," and then he proceeds to speak of the realisation of this in human experience, thus :—

"That man is holy who looks upon himself and all his possessions as belonging to God, and uses all his time, powers, and opportunities, to work out the purposes of God, *i.e.* to advance the kingdom of Christ. This is the subjective holiness to which God calls His people."²

And Mr. Beet manifestly imagines that this *perfect* consecration may be realised in this life, as a further quotation will show :—

"In Romans vi. 11, St. Paul bids us to *reckon ourselves to be dead to sin, but living for God in Christ Jesus*. This reckoning is the mental process of faith. For it results in assurance resting upon the promise of God. Now we cannot do wrong in obeying the apostle, *i.e.* in reckoning ourselves to be dead to sin, and henceforth living for God. But up to this moment we have been sadly alive to sin, and living in part to please ourselves. Our own past experience contradicts flatly the reckoning which St. Paul bids us make. But as we stand beneath the cross of him who died that we might live no longer for ourselves but for him, and as we feel the constraining power of his mysterious love, we dare not hesitate. And with a confidence which seems to us akin to madness, but which is commanded by God, we venture to believe, at the apostle's bidding, that we are now dead to sin, and from this moment we shall live for God, and that in this separation from sin and devotion to God we shall be maintained to the end of life by the presence and power of the Holy Spirit. And while we thus believe, the command of God, which in believing we obey, is itself a pledge that in the moment of our faith God works in us that which he bids us believe. Else

¹ Pp. 39-40.

² P. 41.

the reckoning which at his bidding we make is false, and his word a deception. Therefore, just as we obtain forgiveness by believing that in the moment of our faith, and through the death of Christ, our sins are forgiven, so, by believing that it is ours, we also so obtain and retain the holiness which God requires and gives."¹

The same view is given by Mr. Beet in his *Commentary on the Romans* under chap. vi. 11, where he declares this death unto sin to be no

"impracticable ideal, or one to be obtained only by few, and after long spiritual effort. Paul says that God designs baptism to be the entrance into it. It is therefore designed for the lambs who have lately entered the fold. They obtain it by reckoning at God's bidding, i.e. by believing, that it is already theirs. This implies that our separation from sin and devotion to God are God's gifts to us, and work in us. . . . And it implies that God gives them to us IN THE MOMENT WE BELIEVE THEM TO BE OURS. Else our reckoning, which we make at his bidding, is a mistake."

It must be admitted, that if this account of the victory over sin be correct, it resolves itself into the easiest thing in the world. All that is necessary is to believe on the ground of Romans vi. 11, that it is dead, and lo, in a moment, it is gone and need never trouble us more !

This earnest effort to make out "perfect sanctification" as a present possibility is fallacious, and a little careful thinking will show it. Consecration to God, as a conscious experience, is not so simple a matter as Mr. Beet supposes. It implies some knowledge of God and of His most holy will. To speak of Samson being "a *holy man of God*, even in the embrace of Delilah," is a strange confusion of thought. Was Samson at the moment consciously consecrated to God, or was he simply seeking self-indulgence ? Samson's position was identical with that of the priestesses of Venus, except that they, poor things, imagined Venus was gratified through their impurities, while Samson dare not suppose that his riot was pleasing to the Holy One he professed to worship. In order to *perfect* consecration, there must be a knowledge of the Divine nature and will, so far as they are revealed, and this in the very nature of things cannot be acquired in a moment. It requires time and "long spiritual effort," so that the laborious effort made by Mr. Beet in his pamphlet and in his commentary to justify the Arminian notion of "perfect sanctification" only reveals the inaccuracy

¹ Pp. 52-3.

of Arminian thought. With our present powers of spiritual perception, it is impossible for us to take in with any measure of fulness the Divine nature and the Divine will, and we must accordingly content ourselves with *approximate* consecration. The perfect consecration will come in due time. To assert, as Mr. Beet does, that "holiness, *i.e.* devotion to God, implies complete victory over all sin," is simply to assert that consecration, if it exists at all, must be *perfect*; a quiet "begging of the question," which Christian experience disproves.

"Sanctification," then, we have found, signifies *consecration to God*, but the consecration can only be *proportional to our knowledge* of God's nature and demands. To assume that we can grasp instantaneously the whole problem, and yield ourselves in perfect consecration, is contrary to the whole analogy of the Divine administration. We must content ourselves with a progressive apprehension of God and His purposes concerning us. Our language must be that of Paul, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect; but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus" (Phil. iii. 12).

With some notion of the exact meaning of the term "sanctification," although it remains to be developed in the course of the discussion, we now proceed to inquire what *method* is adopted by the Holy Spirit to secure in sinners this sanctification? And in such an inquiry we always receive assistance from the analogy of His operations elsewhere. How does the Spirit work in the physical and the mental spheres? If we have certain knowledge about His operation therein, it will assist us in our spiritual study.

Beginning, then, with the method adopted by the Spirit to secure our *bodily* health and power, we are led at once to what has been called "Holland's law," from the person who first directed attention to it. It is to this effect: that *the less we think about ourselves the better for our bodily health*. Hippish people who are continually thinking about themselves never can be healthy. Attention directed to the organs of the body tends to functional derangement; and, if persevered in, may lead to organic disease. If we think, for example, of our pulse-beats, the heart's action is quickened. If we imagine we are short of breath, our breathing becomes still shorter. Only let us fancy

we are ill, and keep on complaining, and our shamming will turn in time into very serious reality. On the other hand, let us be too busy with our work or with our play—for both are lawful in their season—to have any time to think about ourselves, and the result will be bodily vigour in as great a degree as our constitutions will permit. The law of physical health is to think as little as possible about ourselves.¹

This law, it may be easily shown, obtains in the *mental* domain as well. The man who is constantly thinking about himself cannot in the very nature of things be a great thinker. You never find an *egotist* in the first rank of thinkers. He divides his powers between himself and his subject, and so cannot give the same power to his theme as the man who “loses himself in his subject.” In order to give our whole strength to our thinking we must lose sight of ourselves.

Now, it is this method which the Spirit also adopts in matters spiritual. So long as we are looking into ourselves expecting to find something to recommend us to God, we cannot come to peace. But the moment we turn our back upon ourselves, so to speak, because altogether vile, and look right away to Jesus as the foundation of all our hope, we enter into peace and find ourselves pardoned and accepted in the Beloved. And the reason why anxious souls are kept sometimes so long from peace is because they are looking in, hoping to find in frames and feelings their ground and title to acceptance, instead of looking steadily *out* to Jesus and His perfect work as their only proper plea. The faith which justifies us is the simple *outlook* to Jesus as the ground of our pardon and acceptance, and the corresponding refusal to look self-complacently upon ourselves. In short, we are offered pardon and acceptance on the ground of our satisfaction with Christ, as our Substitute and Saviour, and of our *dissatisfaction with ourselves*. The method adopted by the Spirit, therefore, in justification, cuts the feet from all self-satisfaction, and throws our interest *outwards* upon Jesus Christ.

Now what we have further to notice is that the same method obtains in *sanctification*. Here, as before, it is the *outlook* which the Spirit employs to sanctify us. It is not a

¹ We discussed this subject with some care in an article on “Non-Self-Consciousness” in this Review for July 1871.

Morbid looking in upon frames and feelings, it is not self-contemplation which through the Divine blessing sanctifies; *spiritual hypochondriasis* is just as detrimental as the physical. But we are sanctified through looking steadily away from self to that Divine glory which the Spirit has been pleased to reveal. And, indeed, if sanctification means consecration to God, it seems a necessary inference that the consecration can only become a reality so far as we occupy ourselves with God, His nature and His demands.

And here it is necessary for us to direct attention to a *law of assimilation*, as we may call it, obtaining even in the physical world. Not only does "like beget like," in Nature's ordinary processes of reproduction, but *likeness comes through outlook*. An accurate observer furnishes the following illustrations:—

"A certain involuntary adjustment assimilates us to that upon which we look. Roses redden the cheeks of her who stoops to gather them, and buttercups turn little people's chins yellow. When we look at a vast landscape, our chests expand as if we would enlarge to fill it. When we examine a minute object, we naturally contract, not only our forehead, but all our dimensions. If I see two men wrestling, I wrestle too with my limbs and features. When a country fellow comes upon the stage, you will see twenty faces in the boxes putting on the bumpkin expression. There is no need of multiplying instances to reach this generalisation; every person and thing we look upon puts its special mark upon us. If THIS IS REPEATED OFTEN ENOUGH WE GET A PERMANENT RESEMBLANCE TO IT, or at least a fixed aspect which we took from it. Husband and wife come to look alike at last, as has often been noticed. It is a common saying of a jockey that he is 'all horse;' and I have often fancied that milkmen get a stiff, upright carriage, and an angular movement of the arm, that reminds one of a pump and the working of its handle."¹

Now this law of assimilation, which we have thus discovered in the physical world, has its counterpart in the moral. Is it not what underlies such a proverb as "A man is known by the company he keeps," or "Evil communications corrupt good manners"? Is it not the very idea which plays such a prominent part in the Spencerian philosophy, that an object receives a definite determination from its environment? What the Spirit does, consequently, to secure the sanctification of sinners is to present to us the glory of God, and then through

¹ Cf. Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes's *Professor at the Breakfast Table*, chap. vii.

our steady and persevering contemplation of it we are changed into His image.

In no passage of Scripture is the secret of sanctification more clearly revealed than in 2 Cor. iii. 18, which, notwithstanding the emendation of the Revised Version, we render accurately thus, "But we all, with unveiled face beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transfigured into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." The context shows that Paul's mind was, when writing this passage, filled with the idea of the transfiguration of Moses on the mount. That transfiguration took place through Moses looking with unveiled face on the glory of God, for it is expressly said that when he went back to God after veiling himself before the people, he took the veil off him and communed face to face (cf. Exod. xxxiv. 34). Paul's idea, then, is that the same course must be pursued by us, if we are to secure that transfiguration of the soul which sanctification means; we must with unveiled face gaze upon the glory wherever it is revealed for us, and then we shall be transfigured from glory to glory even as by the Lord the Spirit.

We cannot do better than pursue the line of thought suggested by this passage. Paul speaks of "beholding the glory as in a mirror" (*κατοπτριζόμενοι*). The emendation adopted by the revisers, "reflecting as in a mirror," is not absolutely necessary, and it confuses the figure employed in the passage. The first thought suggested by this is that we have not God's glory in the way of direct vision, but of reflection as in a mirror. Moses got the vision, as far as possible, "face to face" in the mount; and we hope to get "face to face" with God in the life to come; but in the meantime we must content ourselves with beholding His reflection. What, then, is the mirror in which God's glory is revealed? Undoubtedly outward nature is a mirror in which God's glory is reflected. But, alas! men look into this mirror daily, and in some cases deny that they can see any Divine glory in it. They think it reveals the glory of a Newton or of a Darwin, but they deny it reveals any definite glory of God. Common-sense people may note the fact that Newton and Darwin and men of such mark do not *put thought into nature*, but *find* it there. They are not inventors of truth, but merely discoverers of it; and, as Cousin

long ago observed, they do not say "*My truth*," but acknowledge that it is the common heritage in nature. On this account plain people conclude that a Thinker was surely in nature before these great interpreters came; and that nature does reflect the glory of a Being greater than all the students. If we are asked to believe either that the thoughts in nature came by chance or came from a Being whom we call God, and regard as the Supreme Intelligence, then we decline to accept the theory of chance, as beyond our powers of credulity.¹ We believe that much more may be learned regarding the Supreme from nature than that He is the "unknown and unknowable." The not-distant future will pronounce the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer as only the latest superstition.²

But we are prepared to admit that the glory of God requires to be more distinctly revealed than in the mirror of nature, if sinners are to be sanctified by contemplating it. And a better mirror than nature has been provided. We need hardly say that this is in *Revelation*. This collection of books, commonly called the Bible, has no explanation on natural principles. Development cannot account for their existence; we must regard them as the outcome of *Inspiration*. Or to put it in the light given by a daring, yet reverential transatlantic thinker, we must regard revelation as the outcome of a "continuous supernatural evolution."³ The Word is a mirror, then, prepared by the Spirit in a most patient development, and intended to reflect the glory of God. Just as we cannot gaze directly upon the sun without pain, but can appreciate his image when reflected for us amid ameliorating conditions; so we could not at present gaze upon God's unclouded glory, but can appreciate it as reflected in the mirror of revelation. And we may without fear point to Scripture as giving us an incomparable image of God. Beside the Scriptural idea, the most pretentious portraits of the absolute now painted for us are the veriest daubs. As mirrors, these uncommonly wise books seem strangely out of focus, and their blurred conceptions are sufficient to repel us all.

But now when, "with unveiled face," we begin to look into

¹ Cf. Graham's *Creed of Science*, p. 344. ² Cf. Bowne's *Metaphysics*, p. 16.

³ Cf. Newman Smyth's *Old Faiths in New Light*, Scribner's American Edition, p. 239, and indeed *passim*.

the mirror of revelation, we find the Divine glory *gradually* developed. Following the suggestion of Ewald, we see in the Old Testament at least four stages in this development of the Divine glory; and these are indicated by the additional ~~names~~ assumed by the Supreme in the progress of the sacred history. First we have God as the *Almighty*, since the first idea which strikes the imagination and sensibilities of man is that of power. Next we have added to this the idea of *self-existence*. The Almighty takes a new name—"Jehovah," "I am that I am," or perhaps rather, "I will be what I will be," to put it in modern parlance, the Lord of development, He who has command of all progress! Next, in the times of the Jewish monarchy, we find him portrayed as "Jehovah of hosts," commanding armies, the seen and the unseen, like earthly kings. While in the later age, that of national decline, the idea of holiness rose into special prominence, and prophets present, as the true idea in adoration, the cry of the seraphim, "Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory."¹

Now, what we have to notice is, that Old Testament sanctification was *proportional* to the revelation of the glory. The *morale* of the age of Abraham, for instance, was necessarily imperfect, but those who affect to despise the Old Testament morality should remember that Abraham was immeasurably superior to any of his contemporaries in faith and insight, and superior to what the vast majority of us would have been in his circumstances. The revelation he had of God's glory was mainly an impression of power, and, as he walked in the shadow of the Almighty, he relied upon His strength; but the sanctification was necessarily the feeling of absolute dependence upon the mighty God, before whom he was to walk and to strive to be perfect. It was the same with later saints; the Divine glory was made up of a few outlines suggesting the image, and these had their *counterparts* in the saints who contemplated them, but their sanctification was necessarily incomplete.

But the "fulness of time" came, and with it a perfect image of God. The names of God in the Old Testament gave place to the person of Jesus Christ in the New. In the face of Jesus

¹ Isa. vi. 3; cf. also Newman Smyth, *ut supra*, pp. 89-93.

Christ God's glory is indeed revealed (2 Cor. iv. 6). We look into the mirror of the Gospels, and, lo! we see God incarnate, the Divine revealed through the human. The Son of God becomes the Son of Man, and we learn through His humanity what Divinity must be. As Keble puts it, in his *Christian Year*—

“The Son of God in radiance beam'd
Too bright for us to scan,
But we may face the rays that stream'd
From the mild Son of Man.”

In Jesus Christ we have the hero of revelation. The one policy of the Holy Spirit is to direct sinners to Jesus. “Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak; and he will show you things to come. He shall GLORIFY ME; for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you” (John xvi. 13, 14). It is through the personality of Jesus that the Spirit secures the salvation and sanctification of sinners. He not only leads us to look to Jesus as the ground of our justification, but also leads us to look to him as the transforming and sanctifying power needed to elevate our whole character.

It is on this account that we place at the head of this article on sanctification such works as Ullmann's *Sinlessness of Jesus*, Godet's apologetic conference on *La Sainteté parfaite de Jésus Christ*, Young's *Christ of History*, and Gess's shorter and longer works upon the Person of Christ. We might have mentioned too the different lives of Christ which teem forth from the press down to the *Leben Jesu* of Weiss, whose first volume, just published at Berlin, gives promise of increasing our insight into the meaning of the wonderful and perfect life.

Now it has been observed by an able writer, already referred to, that it is extremely difficult to reduce social phenomena to any permanent laws, since, as history clearly teaches, the appearance of a single great spirit, of a religious founder like Buddha, or even of a conqueror like Cæsar, might greatly modify them.¹ And he rightly asserts that no student dare ignore the teaching in the matter of *love* which the world owes to Christ. We may go further and affirm that in Jesus Christ

¹ *The Creed of Science*, by Wm. Graham, M.A., pp. 30-1; also p. 97, etc.

we have the culmination of a "supernatural evolution," a personality which no hypothesis of natural development can explain, the most important factor in the elevation of the race. It is by Him the Holy Spirit proposes to sanctify the human race, so far as it is willing to be sanctified.

We spoke at the outset about the striking simplicity of *Christian Ethics*, as compared with the utilitarian theories which now propose to supplant it. Christianity proposes to sanctify sinners through the contemplation of a Person; the philosophers propose to elevate the human race through a series of abstract speculations most difficult to follow and beyond the comprehension of the vast majority of mankind. If the race is to be saved by the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, for example, the elect number will be a minority indeed!

But now we must look a little more particularly at this Person, the contemplation of whom, by the blessing of the Spirit, is to transfigure us. The very first characteristic which strikes our attention is His *sinless perfection*. Will not the presentation of such a Person to our minds and hearts discourage us? Is it not to tantalise us by dangling before us an impracticable ideal? That this objection is no fancy will appear from the following quotation from the preface to Spencer's *Data of Ethics*. The philosopher says—

"Nor does mischief result only from this undue severity of the ethical doctrine bequeathed us by the harsh past. Further mischief results from the impracticability of its ideal. In violent reaction against the utter selfishness of life as carried on in barbarous societies, it has insisted on a life utterly unselfish. But just as the rampant egoism of a brutal militancy was not to be remedied by attempts at the absolute subjection of the ego in convents and monasteries; so neither is the misconduct of ordinary humanity, as now existing, to be remedied by upholding a standard of abnegation beyond human achievement. Rather the effect is to produce a despairing abandonment of all attempts at a higher life. And not only does an effort to achieve the impossible end in this way, but it simultaneously discredits the possible. By association with rules that cannot be obeyed, rules that can be obeyed lose their authority."

The contrast between the Christian method and the Spencerian is perfect. The philosopher will accommodate his standard to what he regards as the ability of men; the Spirit presents a perfect pattern, and proposes to assimilate us sinners to Him. It may seem wiser to lower the standard, but the

more the subject is investigated the wiser will appear the proposal of the Spirit. If we inquire into the conditions of progress in the arts, for instance, we shall find that as far as possible a *perfect* copy is procured, and progress is realised in trying to approach it. Teachers never bring down the copy to the capacity of the pupil, but always maintain the highest ideal, and allow the pupil to strain every nerve to come near to it. The same law obtains in literary skill. The best classic models are selected, studied, and patiently approached. This notion of accommodating the aim of men to their supposed capacity is essentially absurd. If the race is to be elevated, if it is to experience a real progress, then nothing less than perfection should be placed before it, that it may be perpetually approaching it.¹ What we want, therefore, is not an accommodating example, only a little better than ourselves, but a perfect example, one who has been "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners." This is presented to us in the person of Jesus Christ.

Now, that there may be no mistake about our Lord's position, we observe that he was without any "original" and without any "actual" sin. He was besides *impeccable*. Doubtless He was "in all points tempted just as we are," but in his case the temptation came from without, not from within.² Hence, when Satan came to him, he found nothing upon which he could work (John xiv. 30). Into the large and interesting question of our Lord's temptations we cannot here enter. But there is a large literature upon the subject, which is in part given by Ullmann in his second supplement. One point we desire to make, however, in the direct line of our argument, and this is, that if sanctification is induced through the Spirit assimilating us to the realised ideal, Jesus Christ, then His impeccability finds its counterpart in the "perseverance of the saints" on earth, and their ultimate impeccability in heaven. For if the glory presented to us were in any measure of *doubtful* continuance, it is clear a sanctification of a doubtful continuance too could alone result. But the sanctification secured by the Spirit is intended to be permanent, and in due

¹ Cf. Ullmann's *Sinlessness of Jesus*, p. 166; also Gess's *Lehre von der Person Christi*, pp. 339, etc., and his *Christi Selbatzeugniss*, pp. 112-115.

² Cf. Nicholl's *Incarnate Saviour*, p. 80.

season perfect; hence the pattern required must be not only perfect but impeccable.

Besides, the sense of sin and of shortcoming, which is an essential part of the sanctification of *sinners*, does not demand for its production any liability to sin on the part of our example. In fact, the argument is all the other way. To revert to our previous illustrations: when we are acquiring an art, our sense of deficiency springs from the *perfection* of our pattern, not from its identification with our copy in imperfection. The truth is, that any imperfection in the pattern will only prevent our perception of imperfection in the copy. The sense of personal insufficiency depends upon the comparison of our crude and halting endeavours with the perfect example placed before us. So is it with the sense of sin. Jesus had no sin, and no sympathy with sin, and *sin* never was a temptation to him; the consequence is that every time we gaze upon him, the sense of our sin, and sinful tendencies, and liability to temptation, becomes painfully yet wholesomely acute within us, and like Job we repent in dust and ashes.

And it is just here that the folly and mischief of the "higher life" views of sanctification appear. Practically they are identical with the Wesleyan doctrine of "perfect sanctification." Much has been hoped from this doctrine, but it has only led to self-deception and disappointment. Mr. Dale, for example, has said—

"There was one doctrine of John Wesley's—the doctrine of perfect sanctification—which ought to have led to a great and original ethical development; but the doctrine has not grown; it seems to remain just where John Wesley left it."¹

This he attributes to the lack of genius or of courage on the part of the theologians. But we attribute the standstill to a much deeper cause: the doctrine has not grown, because it is essentially rotten and fallacious. The meaning of "perfect sanctification" in this present life is *self-satisfaction*. The whole structure of salvation is to induce *dissatisfaction with self* and *satisfaction with the Saviour*. The Spirit holds up the mirror that we may see in it the perfect sanctification of Christ, and may thereby be dissatisfied with our own sanctification. There can be no progress on any other terms. The

¹ *The Evangelical Revival*, p. 39.

moment the learner becomes self-satisfied, his progress ceases. The moment the pardoned sinner becomes self-satisfied, his spiritual progress ceases. The doctrine of Wesley has fostered delusion and nothing more !

And were anything required to demonstrate to a thinking mind the truth of this, it would be the "higher-life" movement. We shall not emphasise the disappearance of Mr. Pearsall Smith from the religious world he presumed for a season to instruct; nor shall we enter upon the exposure of the shallow literature which he and his associates have published. The volume of Dr. Henry A. Boardman, mentioned in our list, gives to the whole school a most deserved castigation. We content ourselves with showing, as we believe we have done, that a doctrine which induces *self-satisfaction* is delusive and hostile to all progress.

So far from sanctification progressing through complacent introspection, it may be shown that it progresses best when we are not occupied with ourselves. The transfiguration of Moses has already been referred to. Forty days and forty nights was the great lawgiver with Jehovah in the mount. With unveiled face he gazed on God, and appreciated in his long vigils the manifestation made to him. The result was the transfiguration of his face. It became so luminous that the people could not gaze upon it. But it is expressly said, "He wist not that the skin of his face shone while he talked with him" (Exod. xxxiv. 29). It is clear that Moses did not think once during the six weeks of communion about the luminosity of his face. It never occurred to him that he was undergoing such a transfiguration. His whole soul was centred in God, and the transformation came over him when he was not thinking about it. Nor have we any reason to suppose that our Saviour on the mount of transfiguration was meditating upon his personal effulgence, or on the fact that his face was shining like the sun. It was the Father who occupied his thoughts; he was gazing on the Father's glory, and so became transfigured through his prayer. And Stephen likewise, as he peered into the empyrean, and saw with dying eye his ascended Lord arising from his throne to receive his martyred servant, did not bethink himself of the "angel-face" which the sight of the glory had secured. In these cases, it was the steady *outlook* which

induced the transfiguration glory. In the very same way, our sanctification will best proceed when we do not think about it. Let us think about our Saviour, let us rivet our whole soul upon the glory of God as manifested in the face of Jesus Christ, and the transfiguration will come, surely and steadily, like the dawn as it creeps so quietly over the mountains, and makes the landscape glow.

In strict accordance with this, sanctification proves a gradual, progressive experience. The "perfect sanctification" theory is that people contract sanctification just like instantaneous photography. The soul is the sensitive plate, it is exposed for a moment or two in the camera of rapturous experience to the image of God in Christ, when lo ! a perfect image of Christ is immediately, they imagine, formed in the soul, and they can consequently look within with the utmost satisfaction. But it so happens that these "perfect sanctifications" seem soon to fade; the picture has not somehow been properly fixed; and so it wears out in a very little while. The truth is, however, that our spiritual perceptions do not grasp the Divine image with the precision of an achromatic lens; our minds and hearts are too sluggish to take in so speedily the perfect picture; we need to *repeat* our study of the Gospels, to read the lives of Christ which teem from the press of Christendom, and to practise the Divine Commandments before we can get any hold worth speaking about of that magnificent revelation of God's glory which Jesus gives. If then the Spirit for wisest reasons assimilates us to Christ through our appreciation and knowledge of him, our sanctification must be in *direct proportion to our knowledge*.

But the notion seems widely entertained that if we do not expect to be made in this life, and in the shortest time, sinlessly perfect, we are dishonouring the Spirit of Grace. It is supposed that in maintaining that sanctification is a gradual work, and not an immediate inspiration of perfection, we are casting reflections upon the power of God. The truth, however, lies just the other way. The question we must ask is *not*, "Can God by his Spirit make us in this life sinlessly perfect?" for, so far as God is concerned, "all things are possible;" but simply this, "Does it enter into the designs of his wisdom to accomplish here below, while we are *absent from the Lord*,

this work of his grace ?”¹ This question we must in the light of Scripture answer in the negative, and we can see, from what has already been adduced, the consummate wisdom of denying to men in this life the self-satisfaction they try to reach through their fancied perfection.

Besides, it is a mistake to suppose that by a *gradual* sanctification of sinners God gets less glory than by an *immediate* one. The same mistake has been made regarding the creation of the world. It was long thought to be derogatory to the Divine glory to suppose that the creation had occupied longer than six natural days. Unless the phenomena were “hurried up” with the most magical expedition, it was thought that a belief in creation and the Creator would be endangered. But now we are learning to see, in the patient development of ages, an exhibition of creative foresight and wisdom grander and more glorious than any hurried work within a week of natural days could have been. The analogy may be applied. Our perfectionists imagine that the new creation is to be realised even still more speedily than the old creation was once imagined to have been. The spiritual phenomena must be hurried up. We must get through the *Palæozoic*, *Secondary*, and *Tertiary* periods, with such happy despatch that we shall be in a paradisaical state before a week’s end, and, though *neophytes*, be prepared to profess perfection before men on a moment’s notice. Perfectionism is a philosophy of impatience; but the Spirit, who can be patient because eternal, if we may judge from the analogy of his dispensations, prefers *development*. Our Lord may in a night become transfigured as he prayerfully holds communion with God, for his appreciation of his Father’s glory was perfect (Matt. xi. 27); but it is no discredit to Moses that he is six weeks in the mount before the transfiguration of his face; nor is it any discredit to the saints that they are gradually transfigured into the Divine image.

There is another point to which we may here refer, and that is the *activity* which is implied in this gradual sanctification. The reason we mention this is to correct the dangerous *passivity* of soul which the “higher life” school urge as the condition of perfect sanctification. Their whole secret is to be in a mystic sense “dead to sin.” “If I am dead and God

¹ Cf. *La Religion Chrétienne*, par A. Henriquet, note, pp. 144-5.

lives in me, what does He do it for?" says Mrs. Pearsall Smith in her *Christian's Secret*. "Is it not that He may speak for me, live for me, walk for me—that He may, in short, work in me that which is well-pleasing in His sight? Oh, I am persuaded that if Christians only knew the life God would live in them if *they would let Him*, they would never try to live again themselves." This idea of passivity, that God may work, partakes of the notion underlying supererogation. God is to work, and we are to luxuriate like Lotos-eaters in passivity. It may be shown that passivity is impossible. Thus to quote again from Professor Bowne's recent remarkable work on *Metaphysics*:—

"The distinctive mark of being consists in some power of action. . . . This notion of purely passive being is a misleading abstraction from our physical experience. Matter appears to us as inert and receptive, and we overlook entirely both its force of resistance and reaction, by which we become aware of its existence, and also the physical teaching concerning its dynamic nature. . . . The passive being, then, not only explains nothing, but its existence can never be known except through a revelation. Now, whoever will reflect that this being does and explains nothing, and that all the effects upon him, by which he becomes aware of its existence, are the activities of something else, will see that there is, and can be, no warrant for introducing such a factor into a philosophic system."¹

The notion of "purely passive being" is thus shown to be philosophically untenable. But we have no need to revert to philosophic subtleties to demonstrate the folly and fallacy of this mysticism. If, as we have seen, the Spirit employs the perfect Christ to sanctify sinners, and if he was *continually active* in his warfare against sin, sin we mean in others and in the world, for he had none in himself, is it not as clear as day that the contemplation of him will induce *perpetual activity* in us against all sin? He is not active that we may be passive; he was and is active, that we may follow his example.

But it will be said, "Is there nothing underlying the 'second baptism,' which is so much talked about now?" A few words upon this point may prove profitable before we pass on to our conclusion about the sanctification which we are to reach in heaven. The Pentecostal baptism was undoubtedly a "revival" to the disciples, while it was an "awakening" to the new

¹ Professor B. P. Bowne's *Metaphysics*, pp. 41-3.

converts. The question is, How far may we expect its repetition? The gift of tongues on that occasion is not, we believe, expected to be repeated in our experience. We must be content to acquire languages more leisurely by grammar and lexicon and ordinary methods. Nor do we anticipate the revival of physical miracles. Some, indeed, are living in this hope. They fancy that if they had the supernatural scientifically demonstrated, the conquest of the world would be easy. But a consideration of the use of miracles by the disciples after Pentecost leads us clearly to the conclusion that they used miracle more sparingly than Christ had done, and that the greater miracles, which he had promised them (John xiv. 12), and on which the progress of Christianity mainly depended, were *spiritual* miracles, the conversion and sanctification of souls. Eliminating, then, these miraculous appendages from the Pentecostal baptism, we ask what the residuum means for us. That the disciples were *not* rendered sinlessly perfect by it, is as clear as anything can be. Nothing but the exigencies of a perfectionist theory could induce such an idea. But this is certain: they were led by their baptism at Pentecost to expatiate, not upon their baptism, but *upon the death and resurrection of their Master* as the all-important facts for lost men. In other words, the *revival* they experienced led them, according to our whole course of thought, to *look outwards and upwards*, to dwell with intense satisfaction and interest upon the finished work and present reign of Christ, and kept them effectually from all self-satisfaction. The Pentecostal baptism was a glorifying of Jesus through the outpouring of the Spirit, not a magnifying of the Spirit himself.

This will help us to appreciate why Pentecost was such a notable fact in the history of the Spirit's operations. The Spirit works by knowledge on the hearts of men, as we have seen. Now in Old Testament times the knowledge of Christ was a dim, prophetic, typical thing; it wanted clearness and detail. "The Holy Spirit of Education," as he has been called, was consequently limited in the scope and range of his operations. He was the author of Old Testament sanctification just as well as of New Testament sanctification; but the former was not so thorough as the latter, because the

knowledge of Christ by which the sanctification was secured was so limited and dim. But when the crucifixion, burial, and resurrection of Christ had taken place, the sword of the Spirit took its keenest edge, and spiritual conquests were won, outshining all previous experience. The Pentecost was a time of spiritual marvel, because the knowledge of Christ, extending to his self-sacrifice and resurrection, had been so largely increased.

And this again will help to elucidate the passage, John iv. 15-17, which has been made such use of in recent years. Because our Lord here says of the Spirit, "He dwelleth WITH you and shall be IN you," it is argued that in the previous dispensation there was no indwelling of the Spirit, but a mere companionship, which dominated souls so to speak *ab extra*. Old Testament sanctification has in consequence come in for considerable suspicion from "advanced" believers. It is little wonder that lay expositors fall into this idea, when men like M. M. Guers and Tophel insist upon it. The former says:—

"Until then (*i.e.* Pentecost) he had been *with them*; but from this day he will be *in them*; these are the very words of the Saviour; now, I do not think that he had them thus shaded off (*nuances*) without motive; they mean manifestly a modification real, important, and profound in the subsequent relations of the Holy Spirit with them. *He will be in you*, says Jesus; *IN YOU*! there is in this without doubt a very little word; but, all little as it is, it does not the less characterise an entire economy, that which had then commenced, and under which we have still to-day the privilege of living."¹

M. Tophel states it thus:—

"In the Old Dispensation, the Holy Spirit wrought *upon* believers, but did not in His person dwell *in* believers, and abide permanently in them. He appeared unto men; He did not incarnate Himself in man. His action was intermittent; He went and came, like the dove which Noah sent forth from the ark, and which went to and fro, finding no rest; while in the New Dispensation He dwells, He abides in the heart, as the dove, His emblem, which John the Baptist saw descending and alighting upon the head of Jesus. Affianced of the soul, the Spirit went oft to see His betrothed, but was not yet one with her: the marriage was not consummated, until the Pentecost, after the glorification of Jesus Christ."

Now the insinuation here is that the Holy Spirit's operations before Pentecost were different in *kind* from His subsequent

¹ M. Guers' *Le Saint-Esprit*, pp. 73-4; the whole section, pp. 70-79, is upon this point, but it is too long to translate here.

² M. Tophel's work *ut supra*, p. 39.

operations. We confess that this hazy doctrine is incomprehensible to us. We find from such passages as Num. xxvii. 18, and 1 Pet. i. 11, that the Holy Spirit was *in* men in Old Testament times just as well as in New Testament ones. So that the idea of a generic difference existing between the dispensations so far as the Spirit's operations are concerned must, we believe, be rejected. Besides, the context (John xiv. 15-16) seems to show that all our Lord meant on the occasion was that the Holy Spirit had been hitherto comforting them through the companionship of Christ; but, after our Lord's departure, He would by His own indwelling constitute Himself their comforter. But this throws no light upon the conditions of Old Testament sanctification.

While maintaining, however, that there was no difference in *kind* in the Spirit's Old Testament and New Testament operations, we recognise a difference in *degree*. The fresh facts of our Lord's matchless history enabled the Spirit, by applying them, to work a *wider* and a *deeper* work in the heart of mankind. Pentecost was an awakening and revival proportional to the increased interest in and knowledge of Christ, which were then, as never before, possible. Its lesson to all generations is manifestly this: that in proportion as the attention of sinners is directed to Christ and him crucified, and now risen and reigning, as the only Saviour, the Spirit will own it to the conversion of sinners, and the quickening of believers. Pentecostal experiences will return again only when Christ crucified and risen becomes the all-absorbing theme with us, as it was with the apostles.

Sanctification, then, as we have seen, is induced by the contemplation in the mirror of Revelation of God's glory in Jesus Christ. The perfect life can alone lift sinful lives into consecration. The consecration is not perfect yet; but it will gradually approach perfection as we humbly try to master the meaning of the perfect consecration of Christ. In this mastery, however, we feel we are hindered through indwelling sin, through infirmities of many kinds. The glory in the mirror is but a reflected glory; it is dim, like a daguerreotype, after all. Now, what we have in conclusion to notice is that we are passing onwards to the "beatific vision," when we shall see him, not in the mirror, but as he is, and face to face, and then our sanctification shall be perfect: "we shall be like him, for we

shall see him as he is" (1 John iii. 2). Doubtless, we can form no adequate conception of such an experience; "it doth not yet appear what we shall be." To be free from sin, original and actual, to have the vision of faith exchanged for immediate perception, to be enabled to take in the glory, and not feel undone like Isaiah, or as one dead like John, and by the contemplation to be transfigured into his perfect image, is an experience which we can only in the faintest degree imagine. But one thing seems certain: that even in that heaven where all are sinless, the redeemed will not be gazing self-complacently upon themselves, but will occupy themselves with Jesus. In heaven, as on earth, the saints will continue to look away from self, and be absorbed in the Saviour. Mrs. Cousin has given this idea beautifully in the hymn she has put into the mouth of Samuel Rutherford:—

"The bride eyes, not her garment,
But her dear Bridegroom's face ;
I will not gaze at glory,
But on my King of grace :
Not at the cross He giveth,
But on His piercéd hand ;
The Lamb is all the glory
Of Immanuel's land."

The secret of sanctification is, then, as we have found, the *outlook* of the soul to the perfect Christ, as given to us in the mirror of Revelation. This outlook, by the Spirit's blessing, is made effectual in inducing in us a sense of sin and short-coming, a deep penitence for the sinful and "common" character of our by-past lives, and an earnest resolve to follow our Lord's example in the matter of present consecration. This consecration is only approximate; it cannot be perfect, until, amid sinless conditions, we fully appreciate the Master's example; but we advance towards perfection daily, in the assurance that it is no impracticable ideal, but one which we shall reach at last. Patiently we advance, and at the last, life's long effort is crowned with perfect consecration when we exchange faith for beatific vision, and the Book for its Hero Himself. Progressive sanctification on earth, perfect consecration in heaven, this is the ethical programme of Christianity, and we have nothing to be compared with it in the ethics of the schools.

ROB. M'CHEYNE EDGAR

ART. III.—*Recent Contributions to the Ecclesiastical Antiquities of Scotland.*

THE Scottish people ought to be a nation of antiquarians. For in whatever else it may be poor, Scotland is rich, surpassing rich in antiquities. The present Keeper of the National Museum of the Antiquaries of Scotland assures his countrymen that they are the possessors of a series of sculptured monuments, unique in their character and possessed of singular merit as works of art, constituting a wealth of material such as has not fallen to the lot of any other nation of Northern Europe. And this wealth, of which any nation might be proud, is not confined to prehistoric monuments. Scotland is rich in structural remains; rich in relics, such as books and bells, crosiers and reliquaries; rich in decorative metal work; rich in old carved woodwork.

With all this store of structural, monumental, and artistic remains, have the people of Scotland displayed appreciation of its value—have Scottish antiquarians contributed largely to archæological literature? The verdict must be in the negative if the authorities in Scotland itself are to be the judges.

Writing in the *Quarterly Review* for June 1849, Joseph Robertson has a heavy indictment to prefer against Scottish archæologists in the matter of architectural antiquities. He complains that little had been done in this department, and that what little had been accomplished was the work of strangers, of such an one, for example, as the Englishman Billings, of whose *Baronial and Ecclesiastical Antiquities of Scotland* twenty-seven parts had then been published; and he writes of “the callous North,” as only “shamed into some kind of interest in the architectural monuments of its elder time,” when her own Scott had begun to rekindle the decaying embers of nationality. As regards ecclesiastical remains in Scotland, Mr. Robertson affirms that at the date of his writing, the materials for even a meagre sketch are scanty and indigested, that Argyll is the only county the ecclesiology of which had been explored, while of the papers in which this was done, by a member of the Cambridge Camden Society, even the name was unknown to some of the best antiquaries of Edinburgh.

As it was thirty-three years ago even so is it in our day, if we are to accept the finding of Joseph Anderson. In all his Rhind Lectures, but more especially in those of the second series, this accomplished archæologist complains bitterly of Scottish apathy and neglect in respect of the materials for the pursuit of his favourite science. The affluence of relics which his country possesses for the illustration of Celtic art and national history is left, he asserts, to decay and perish, scattered in neglected graveyards, unprotected and weather-beaten on lonely hillsides, built into dikes by roadsides, broken up as building materials or as macadamising for roads. Even with the schoolmaster abroad and a school-board in every parish, Dr. Anderson considers our education completely fails to show us the relation in which the ancient products of the culture and art of Scotland stand to the ripening culture of which they were the early blossom and far off promise; and he seems wellnigh to despair of a time ever coming when the weather-worn and wasting, the maltreated and mutilated remnants of Scottish antiquities will be gathered into the capital, and there, within the walls of the Antiquarian Museum, be so arranged and catalogued as to form a gallery of art materials in the country to which they are indigenous, although it would be an epoch in the history of art were such a gallery ever to be formed. When he comes to treat of the Ruthwell Cross, Dr. Anderson becomes pathetic over "its pitiable story." Surveying it demolished, broken, buried, restored and reconstructed by private enterprise, deciphered and demonstrated to be of national interest and importance, he supposes it would have fared better with this literary and historic monument had it been covered with Assyrian bilinguals or African hieroglyphics, for in that case, he sardonically conjectures, the chances are all in favour of its being acquired at great expense and brought to this country in triumph with much public rejoicing over its acquisition.

Now, whatever force there may be in the representations of the Quarterly reviewer of 1849 regarding the state of matters in his day, we do think the lecturer of 1882 takes a pessimist view of things as they now are. Surely within the last thirty years a great advance has been made in Scottish archæology, and a large addition been made to the literature of the science. The "callous North" has become fervid; it is

no longer possible to twit and taunt Scotchmen with the allegation that works bearing upon the ecclesiastical antiquities of their country are published in England; and if all the remnants of Celtic art and architecture are not gathered together in one place—a step in the direction of centralisation of doubtful utility, even if it could be carried out, it cannot with any fairness be alleged that they are allowed to remain unnoticed, without efforts being put forth to protect what of them can be protected, and to perpetuate, through the skill of the draftsmen, a knowledge of that which no human power can prevent crumbling into primeval dust. It may serve to make good our contention in this matter, while at the same time it widens the acquaintance of our readers with a singularly interesting department of archæological inquiry if we now take a rapid survey of the more outstanding contributions quite recently made by professionals and amateurs, by individuals and associations, by Protestants and Roman Catholics, to the ecclesiastical antiquities of Scotland.

It is in no spirit of irony, simply on the principle of giving honour to whom honour is due, that, in seeking to mitigate in some measure the pessimism of Dr. Anderson's representations, we give a first place to

THE RHIND LECTURES IN ARCHÆOLOGY.¹

It were no small praise to bestow upon this volume to affirm that it equals in interest of subject and in excellence of treatment the volume that contained the first series by the same lecturer.² That praise we can, with all freedom, bestow upon Dr. Anderson's second series. It is in every respect worthy of the high position the lecturer occupies among Scottish archæologists, and worthy of a place in that series which Dr. A. Mitchell so well inaugurated with his *Past in the Present*. The lectures in the earlier volume were devoted to the treatment of structural remains and of such existing relics as books, bells, crosiers, and reliquaries; those in this volume

¹ *Scotland in Early Christian Times*. Second Series. The Rhind Lectures in Archæology for 1880. By Joseph Anderson, Keeper of the National Museum of the Antiquaries of Scotland. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1881.

² Reviewed in Article on "The Archæology of Celtic Christianity" in No. cxviii. of this Review.

treat of brooches ; the so-called "Silver Armour;" and the art, symbolism, and inscriptions of monuments. Although not so exclusively ecclesiastical in their origin and use as those described in the prior series, the objects grouped and delineated in the present one cannot fail to have interest for the ecclesiastical archæologist. Especially will this be the case with the St. Vigean sculptured monuments and the Ruthwell inscribed cross. In his second lecture Dr. Anderson tells how in the quaint old church of St. Fechin, now known as St. Vigeans, Forfarshire, fragments of sculptured monuments have been discovered to have been used by twelfth-century builders in the re-building of the church of their day. The most remarkable of the stones thus recovered is a slab bearing on the obverse an elaborately sculptured cross, the space between the cross and the raised edging being filled with figures of nondescript animals, the general character of the decoration on the reverse of the stone being pictorial. The cross on this stone, as also on another now sadly mutilated but originally a more imposing monument, is a Latin one of distinctively Celtic form. The other fragments of sculptured monuments, disinterred from the walls of this twelfth-century church, and considered then to be only fit for building material, number upwards of thirty, and in the figure subjects of their elaborate sculpture bear a general resemblance to each other.

The first-mentioned monument is remarkable as possessing the only specimen out of Iona of an inscription graven in letters of Celtic type resembling those found in Celtic manuscripts. The inscription is placed on one of the edges of the slab at the bottom of a pattern of interlaced work, and consists of twenty-four letters not divided into words. The first word all archæologists are agreed in regarding as *Drosten*, the name of the nephew of St. Columba and first abbot of Deer ; and the last word, with like unanimity, is taken to be *Forcus*, the original form of the modern name *Fergus*. How the first and last word are to be connected, and how the entire inscription should be read, are points upon which archæologists are not agreed. Sir James Simpson proposed as the reading of the inscription, *The stone of Drost, son of Voret, of the race of Fergus*. Dr. Anderson, however, with characteristic caution and unwillingness to encourage guessing,

declines to accept what he admits is an ingenious reading, though he has none of his own to substitute. He contents himself with determining the nature and probable date of the letters that form the inscription, the interpretation of inscriptions forming, in his judgment, no necessary part of the functions of a Rhind lecturer.

Happily there is no need for exercising scientific caution and restraint in the case of the other inscribed monument—that of the Ruthwell Cross. In 1834, Dr. Henry Duncan, then parish minister of Ruthwell, on the coast of Dumfriesshire, wrote the description of his parish for the *Second Statistical Account of Scotland*. Under the heading of “Antiquities” he narrated all that is known of the later history of this remarkable column; how it stood in the old church of Ruthwell till 1642, when the General Assembly, then sitting at St. Andrews, passed an order for its destruction as idolatrous; how the order was partially obeyed by the throwing down of the column and the obliterating of such representations as were supposed to be objects of popish worship; how, up to 1772, it was lying where it fell, serving as a seat for some of the congregation, but was about that date removed to the churchyard, and how, in 1802, what of it then remained was removed to the manse garden, where it now stands, the only large fragment not recovered having been supplied by a “country mason,” under the minister’s directions. The two broad faces of the column contain conventional representations of such personages and incidents as John the Baptist and John the Evangelist, the salutation of the Virgin, the meeting of Mary and Elisabeth, the flight into Egypt, the miracle of the healing of the blind, the washing of the Saviour’s feet, our Lord trampling upon two swine, and a legendary incident in the life of St. Anthony. The panels containing these figure-subjects are surrounded with flat borders, on which are incised Latin inscriptions taken from the Vulgate Bible, and descriptive of the contents of each panel. The two narrow sides of the monument are covered with scroll-work, representing a vine bearing grapes in symmetrical clusters—a bird or beast lodging in each of the branches and feeding on the fruit. From the days of the catacombs the vine has been a favourite subject of Christian art and symbolism, and its appearance on the Ruthwell Cross presents no

difficulty. The chief archæological interest, however, of this relic, attaches to the raised borders that enclose the panels of scroll-work, and constitute the edges of the narrow sides. These also, like those of the panels on the broad faces, contain inscriptions, but not in Roman letters. The words are in the Runes characters of the old northern alphabet used by the Teutonic nations before they adopted the letters of the Roman alphabet. How are the Runes of the Ruthwell Cross to be rendered into modern English? When Dr. Duncan wrote his description of the monument in 1834, Mr. T. G. Repp, a Danish gentleman, and one of the librarians of the Advocates' Library in Edinburgh, had suggested a reading which satisfied the archæologists of his day. According to this rendering, the inscription tells of the donation of a vessel of Christ, that is, a baptismal font, of eleven pounds weight, with ornaments, by authority of the Therfusien Fathers, as reparation for the devastation of the fields and the theft of thirteen cows in the vale of Ashlafr. It shows how largely conjecture guided the research of antiquarians at no very far back date, when we find that devastation and donation had no existence save in the imagination of the learned Dane. Mr. Repp had constructed this distinct record of what never took place, by assuming the existence of linguistic forms which the Ruthwell inscription did not possess, although—strange to tell—he read the letters, in most cases, correctly enough. The late J. M. Kemble was the first to discover that not only was the language of the inscription Anglo-Saxon—Mr. Repp knew as much—but that its structure was rhythmical. Convinced that the inscription on one side of the cross contained the words, "Christ was on the Rood," he reached the conclusion, in 1840, that the Runes gave a poetic description of our Lord's passion, and succeeded in arranging the four columns in consecutive order, with here and there a blank, the result of mutilation and defacement. Mr. Kemble then directed his attention to other things, content with the progress he had made. But, years afterwards, turning over the leaves of a collection of poetical pieces in the South Anglian or Wessex dialect, of the tenth or eleventh century, he came upon a poem, entitled, "The Dream of the Holy Rood," which carried back his thoughts to the cross in Ruthwell manse-garden. On examining the matter more closely, he found certain lines in the

poem to be identical with those that formed the stone-inscription. In its completed form, then, Mr. Kemble's discovery amounted to this, that on the two sides of a cross originally standing in a parish church in the south of Scotland, were carved, in a North Anglian dialect, passages taken from a poem written prior to the tenth century, in a South Anglian speech. No theory has as yet been put forth that is adequate to account for the wide area over which, in manuscript version, this unique composition must have travelled, when it made its way from the north of Italy to the south of Scotland; but there need be no difficulty in understanding how it came to be held in great esteem when once the poem has been mastered. Confident that they will value what follows, both on account of its literary merits and its linguistic interests, we make no apology to our readers for placing before them some extracts from the poem, only premising that italics are employed to indicate those passages which form the inscription on the Ruthwell cross.¹ To a Christian asleep the Holy Rood appears in the sky, and receiving the power of speech, it thus rehearses the story of its experience in "the hour when One in Sion hung for love's sake on a cross":—

"'Twas many a year ago,
I yet remember it,
That I was hewn down
At the wood's end
Three men bare me upon their shoulders
Until they set me down upon a hill.
Then saw I tremble
The whole extent of earth.
But yet I stood fast.
*Then the young hero prepared himself,
That was Almighty God,
Strong and firm of mood,
He mounted the lofty cross,
Courageously in the sight of many.*
I trembled when He embraced me,
Yet dared I not to bow earthwards—
Fall to the bosom of the ground,

¹ The poem in its entirety will be found in the valuable work of Professor Stephens, *Runic Monuments of Scandinavia and England*.

But I was compelled to stand fast.
 A cross was I reared,
I raised the powerful King,
The Lord of the heavens,
I dared not fall down,
 They pierced me with dark nails.

They reviled us both together,
I was all stained with blood
Poured from the man's side.

The shadow went forth
 Wan under the welkin,
 All creation wept,
 They mourned the fall of their King.
Christ was on the cross,
And thither hastening
Men came from afar
Unto the noble one :
I that all beheld,
With sorrow was I stricken.

The warriors left me there
 Standing defiled with gore.
With shafts all wounded
They laid him down limb-weary ;
They stood at the corpse's head
Beholding the Lord of heaven,
 And he rested himself there a while,
 Weary after the mighty contest."

The Rhind Lectures in Archæology are the work of one who occupies in Scotland a foremost place in the ranks of professional archæologists. But what about those who lay no claim to be regarded as professional authorities, who regard themselves as only amateur antiquarians? What about a class of men in Scotland favourably situated for prosecuting the study of ecclesiastical antiquities—the clergy? Have the ministers in Scotland done anything, in recent years, to rebut the charges brought against Scotchmen in general, by such professionals as Robertson and Anderson, and to vindicate for their countrymen a claim to be regarded as worthy custodiers of their national treasures, structural and monumental? Our readers may be better able to decide what answer should be returned to these questions if we now bring under their notice

THE HISTORY OF PLUSCARDYN PRIORY.¹

This handsome quarto of 285 pages, printed on club paper, and embellished with upwards of fifty illustrations, is the expanded form of a lecture delivered, some four years ago, "in the city of Elgin." That circumstance will sufficiently account for any blemishes or defects which the critical eye may detect in the execution of a work otherwise worthy of no stinted praise. The endeavour to impart a modern interest to transactions of the fourteenth century, as, for example, in chapter vii. which has for title "The Bishop moderates in a call and settlement," and at page 181, in which the mystery-plays of the Middle Ages are affirmed to be revived "in Protestant mission and Sunday-school 'Service of Song,' with readings and lantern illustrations;" the frequent references to the ecclesiastical divisions of the present day, strongly biassed in a Free Church direction; the cropping up here and there of a little slipshod carelessness—the old church at Urquhart ought surely to be more correctly described than it is when stated to be "*beside where the Free Church now stands*,"—such things as these may be quite permissible in a popular lecture having the Free High Church of Elgin or the Free Church of Pluscarden for place of delivery, but are likely to be regarded as inconsistent with the dignity, impartiality, and exactness of their somewhat austere science by professional archæologists. Apart from such minor blemishes the book is an admirable one, full of painstaking research at first-hand, animated throughout with a fine antiquarian spirit, and replete with information specially attractive to "the loons of Morayshire," of whom Mr. Macphail is proud to let it be known he is one, while interesting to all lovers of Scottish antiquities. The merits and excellencies of the work will appear when it is compared with earlier productions of a similar nature. In 1874 there was published Mackenzie Walcott's *Scoti Monasticon: The Ancient Church of Scotland, a History of the Cathedrals, Conventual Foundations, Collegiate Churches, and Hospitals of Scotland*. It is creditable to an

¹ *History of the Religious House of Pluscardyn, Convent of the Vale of Saint Andrew in Morayshire*. With Introduction, containing the History and a Description of the present state of the Mother House of the Order of Vallis Caulium in Burgundy. By Rev. S. R. Macphail, A.M., Liverpool. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier. 1881.

Englishman, who is also an English ecclesiastic, to have taken such pains as the "Præcentor of Chichester" has done in order to write with information and impartiality upon Scottish ecclesiology. Mr. Walcott's work, however, cannot be implicitly relied upon for accuracy of statement, and it is marred throughout by the workings of a spirit of hostility to the Reformation in Scotland. Mr. Walcott will not admit this. He professes to write "as an archæologist, and not as a religious polemic," and he claims to have compiled his material in "an impartial spirit." But the reader has only to peruse the preface and first twenty-five pages of the work to be convinced that the profession is worthless, and the claim such as cannot be admitted. When a writer on Scottish Church history gravely affirms that "in Scotland all interest and sanctity dies out with the repudiation of the Episcopate," and when he praises God that "now the ancient (Episcopal) Church of Scotland, reformed and quickened by English consecration in Westminster Abbey, after passing through a long course of depression and actual persecution, is the mother of an episcopate spread over a whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific,"—he may receive the approving smile of Charles Wordsworth, but he must lay his account with the incredulous laughter of every educated Scotchman.¹

Another publication having a more intimate bearing upon Mr. Macphail's work, is the *History of Beaully Priory*, edited in 1877 by Mr. Chisholm Batten for the Grampian Club. Unfortunately for this association, the books published under its auspices have no reputation for accurate and careful editing, and Mr. Batten's issue of the charters of Beaully Priory forms no exception. The houses of Beaully and Ardochattan were founded in the same year as the house of Pluscardyn (1230), and as these three belonged to the same order of monks,

¹ As was to be expected, Mr. Walcott has nothing but stern reprobation for our Scottish Reformer, the destruction of "the houses of God," of "the ecclesiastical framework, foundations, and buildings," being attributed to "John Knox and his opinions." If Mr. Walcott would read the thirty-fifth chapter of John Hill Burton's *History of Scotland*, he would find the blame laid at another door, that of the Earl of Hertford, and this statement made by one who had no greater appreciation of or admiration for Scottish Presbyterianism than the "Præcentor of Chichester" has: "It is a matter of justice to remember how and by whom these buildings were destroyed, because their ruin has generally been debited or credited to the Reformers of John Knox's school."

having their mother-house in Burgundy, it was natural to expect that Mr. Batten would furnish reliable information regarding the monastery of Vallis Caulium. His information, however, is both meagre and inaccurate, leaving the impression on his readers that small trace of the parent structure now remains, and that the site has relapsed into a condition resembling "the forest primeval." It was the unsatisfactory nature of the Grampian Club editor's information regarding the Burgundy house that led Mr. Macphail to make a journey to Chatillon-sur-Seine in the hopes of discovering something more definite. So doing he was abundantly rewarded. The opening section of the introduction gives a most racy description of the Scotchman in search of site and structure, and of the unexpected treasures of remains which crowned his quest. In a part of Burgundy, called in Latin 'Vallis Caulium,' in French 'Val de Chou' or 'Val des Choux,' in English 'Valley of Cabbages,' and in Scotch 'the Kale Glen,' he found the old priory standing, in great measure, complete, enough remaining of chapel and other buildings to indicate what they had once been. Following up this pleasing discovery the Pluscardyn historian makes it abundantly clear even to non-professional readers that the order of Vallis Caulium was an offshoot of the great Benedictine order, its rule or constitution being a combination of Carthusian and Cistercian reforms of that of St. Benedict, that its monastic founder was Guido or Viand, a lay brother of the neighbouring Carthusian House of Lugny, and its secular patron Eudes or Odo, Duke of Burgundy, who, going to Palestine in the fourth crusade, erected this monastery in gratitude for his safe return; and that, although the object of founder and patron was a more secluded and simple life at the spot of homely title, their successors soon added the contents of fish-ponds and hogsheads of the famed vintages of Pommard to the cabbage-garden fare of the sequestered glen. The matter regarding which Mr. Macphail is not so explicit as could be wished, owing solely to lack of precise information, is how and why monks of Burgundy sought settlement in Scotland and founded three priories in one year but no more afterwards. The most he has to tell his readers is that "to plant a religious house was in Scotland very much what baptism was under Charlemagne—a badge of bondage to a

foreign influence," and that influence in this case he is inclined to trace back to Malvoisin, Archbishop of St. Andrews in the days of Alexander II., who was at Rome soon after the establishment of the order, and may have represented to his sovereign that ecclesiastical dependencies and religious houses, presided over by aliens, would be favourable to the royal supremacy in Morayshire, which had been one of the most turbulent provinces in Scotland.

Adopting the form of an imaginary visit to the priory, Mr. Macphail gives a lively description of life in the Kale Glen, conformed to the rule of the order which sought to combine the laxity of Cistercians with the strictness of Carthusians. In the course of their visit the mythical strangers find themselves in the guest-hall, the church, the refectory, and the dormitories in the court of offices; they form acquaintance with the guest-brother, the prior, the chanter, the cook, and the cellarer; they dine with the brethren upon fish or soup, vegetables or milk, and, in the event of their visit falling upon a fast day, water takes the place of milk, a service of fruit is given instead of the small allowance of wine upon other days; they hear the evening bell and the "Salve Regina" of vespers, and at night the dull sound of a plank hastily struck tells them a monk is about to expire, and summons his brothers to pray for him and repeat the creed, to be followed by the "Subvenite" when he is dead; they look in upon a monk taking his first sleep as a full brother of the order in his cell, just four feet by six and a half, provided with a straw-mat placed upon an oaken plank, while in the wall is a wooden peg for the hood with which yesterday he was invested by the prior; and before leaving the visitors extend their sympathy to a refractory brother under discipline for murmuring at the food and speaking disrespectfully of that important official the cellarer,—his punishment for so doing requiring him, instead of sitting at table with the others during meal-time, to kneel between the rows of tables, and there receive only bread and water.

One of the most interesting passages in the history of the priory in the glen of Ploschardin, as the oldest charter spells it, is that which connects it with Dunfermline and the priory of Urchard. The good Margaret, Queen of Malcolm Canmore, largely influenced the actions of her husband. Through her

interposition, the church at Iona, which had been desolated by the Norsemen, was rebuilt, and it was doubtless at her desire that a monastery was founded at Dunfermline. When, in 1124, David I. gave to Dunfermline the dignity and equipment of an abbey, he also founded the priory of Urchard or Urquhart in Morayshire, as a cell of Margaret's favourite residence, the term "cell" being applied to the dependent establishment of a monastery planted on its more distant estates, and surviving in the "Kil" of Scottish topography. The monks of Urchard, as old Benedictines, wore a black gown and hood, while those of Pluscardyn wore the white habit of Cistercians. Between these two religious houses in Morayshire, a union was formed under a papal bull of Nicholas v., dated 1453. Mr. Macphail has been eminently successful in eliminating the causes that led up to this union, and in elucidating the manner in which it was carried out. Up to the time he took the matter in hand it was customary to represent the monks of Pluscardyn as chargeable with such gross immoralities as to lead to their expulsion from the monastery, but the Scotch chronicler of the priory has conclusively shown this to be inaccurate and unfair. The circumstances of the union were entirely of a worldly and diplomatic character, the house of Urchard being reduced at the date of incorporation to two monks, while that at Pluscardyn had seldom above six resident brothers. As to the manner in which the union was carried out, the proposal came from the black Benedictines, and involved a removal on their part to the more extensive buildings of the White Cistercians, and a uniting of their possessions and means to those of the Pluscardyn house, the mother-house of the former at Dunfermline assuming the charge of, and imposing its dress and rule upon, the newly combined fraternity. No little adroitness was displayed in thus changing white into black; and if there was any violation of morals in the matter, Mr. Macphail evidently inclines to lay it at the gate of the Urchard priory, and to hold responsible for some questionable scheming the prior of that house, at whose instigation and under whose management the union was carried out—the astute and wily John Benale, to whom, under the high-sounding name of "Done John Bonalda" he assigns an interesting chapter of the history. When the narrative comes as far down the stream of time as the days of Alexander

Dunbar, the last (and, let us hope, the worst) of the priors, the rule of the commendators, and the proprietorship of the lairds of Pluscarden, it is fairly outside the pale of ecclesiastical antiquities, so we do not feel called upon to take any special note of the loving labours bestowed upon these stages of the history by one who seems to have become completely enamoured with the sequestered sweetness of his favourite glen. The chapter devoted to the precincts and ruins of the priory, and the appendix containing papal bulls, transumps, charters, grants, cheirographs, writs, rentals, and suchlike documents, bear ample testimony to the erudite and painstaking way in which the Presbyterian minister has executed his self-imposed task, while they place it beyond question that he has enriched the ecclesiastical antiquities of his country with a standard work. In its youngest and ablest chronicler we meet with a zealous defender of "an order that for centuries of tradition has had no friendly voice to speak in its favour." And so long as he confines himself to the situation and the scenery, it is possible to write in glowing terms of "the general sense of sweetness and rest" which take possession of the traveller when his eye rests upon "the hoary ruin of the old priory," and he lingers amid the remains of "the resting-place for friends," enjoying "the pleasing mirage of having lived in other scenes and ages, and among men of another thought and ambition than he will find among those to whose company he is about to return." But when we make inquiries at our informant and guide as to any good work done at Pluscardyn, as to moral sweetness and spirit-rest reached out to through monkish help, there is a poor tale to tell. With all his desire to take the most favourable view of matters, historical impartiality compels Mr. Macphail, when closing his narrative, to admit that "this monastery did not contribute much impulse to moral and religious life in the district where it was planted," and that in general "the monastic life at its best, with all its voluntary moralities, observances, vigils, and charms, in the long-run is found to be but a poor defence against the powers without and within which beset the path of all of us." And, truth to tell, it would be difficult to come to any other conclusion, having in view the information which this volume furnishes. If there was not immorality in the wooded glen at the time of the Urchard

union, in the middle of the fifteenth century, there certainly was criminality in the days of the last of the priors, and Mr. Macphail freely admits that no stronger argument for the need of a reformation of morals and a revival of spiritual life could be desired than was furnished by the conduct of such men as Alexander Dunbar in the quiet glen, and Patrick Hepburn in the episcopal palace and cathedral of Moray. And even after Reformation times had come and gone, the amount of moral sweetness and spiritual light in the glen was scanty in the extreme. This comes out incidentally in what is recorded in a chapter of the work bearing the title, "Traditions of the Glen," concerning a character of wide and lasting reputation in these parts, Delty by name. The story about the local celebrity is one which we give in Mr. Macphail's own telling, thus furnishing our readers with a specimen of his literary style, which may bear out some remarks already made upon the form of the work :—

"Old Delty was beginning to feel that advancing years and their infirmities were telling rather severely on him. He had some faint conception that there was something immortal about him, and a somewhere in which his immortal somewhat had better spend its hereafter. Beyond this his ideas were very confused. Living at Whitetree, he had some considerable competence of worldly gear, and by means of this he hoped somehow to secure a something for eternity worth his effort. Accordingly, after much careful consideration and weighty balancing of probabilities and ways and means—for there was no wiser man in the glen whom he might consult—he one day picked out the best wedder at Whitetree, and made his way to the factor. Another version of the story says that he went to Burgie House. The factor looked somewhat concerned when he received this seer's portion, and inquired what old Delty required by way of aid or redress. Delty replied that it 'wisna that ava—that he had sheep enou' and gold enou', but he wis gettin' to be an suld man, and fan this life wis dun, he thoct there was lik tae be anither, but he did na' ken fat it was, nor fat tae dae to get it, an' as the factor had helpit him afore noo, maybe he could help him about this tae.' The reply of the factor was that he had the same difficulty himself, but was very sorry he could not help his aged friend. When the story takes the road to the Laird of Burgie, Delty is made ask for a certificate from the laird, for 'nae doot the good word o' sic a gentilman would gan far in the neist warld.' Such is the local record of the sad decay [?] of knowledge in the glen after Reformation times."

Of Mr. Macphail as a Scottish Presbyterian minister we have to speak in the past tense, for, after rendering effective service as a minister of the Free Church at Forfar, Elgin, and

Glasgow, he has transferred his labours across the Border to Liverpool. His removal from Scotland, however, has not deprived that country of clergymen animated with antiquarian enthusiasm, and capable of contributing to the archæological literature of their country. In proof, we need only pass from the history of the Morayshire Priory to

THE HISTORY OF PAISLEY ABBEY.¹

Very far from attractive must the aspect of the Abbey Church of Paisley have been when, in 1859, Dr. Lees was inducted as minister of the second charge. He thus describes the building and its surroundings :—

“The church was in a most disreputable state. The burial-ground outside the building covered up the whole basement of the church up to the windows. The interior was like a vault in a graveyard. Water ran down the walls, and an unwholesome smell pervaded every part of the church. Heavy galleries round the place cut the pillars in two. The clerestory windows were blocked up, and whitewash was freely used. The whole of the moulding at the base of the pillars was hidden out of sight in the soil. The transept windows were destitute of tracery, and the wall of that part not having been pointed for many years, had in many places fallen down. A few more years would have seen it all in ruin. The pulpit was placed against the centre pillar of the north aisle, and round the floor of the church was a wide circular passage, with huge iron stoves placed in it at intervals. The passage formed a favourite promenade for stragglers during the time of service, who perambulated from one stove to another, occasionally lighting their pipes at them before going out, which they did whenever they were tired of listening, a frequent enough occurrence. A more dreary place of worship could scarcely be conceived. The porch was in a deplorable condition. The stone seats were all broken down, and people who entered the church had to creep in through a narrow doorway. A street of disreputable pawnshops and public-houses abutted on the church, which was entirely hidden by the squalid buildings around it. People might pass within a few yards of it and not know it was there.”

Dr. Lees makes generous mention of those who, in this and the preceding century, rendered good service in preventing the abbey being pulled down, and in restoring and improving the structure and its surroundings; but, without any disparagement to the labours of Dr. Boog and the Rev. Mr. Wilson, we are safe in affirming that the most signal service

¹ *The Abbey of Paisley, from its Foundation till its Dissolution. With Notices of the Subsequent History of the Church, and an Appendix of Illustrative Documents.* By J. Cameron Lees, D.D., Minister of St. Giles's, Edinburgh. Paisley: Alexander Gardner.

rendered to Paisley Abbey since the days of Thomas de Terras, is that of him who for eighteen years ministered within its walls, and has traced its chequered history in the volume now under review. Architecturally viewed, the Abbey of Paisley does not possess what is fitted to elicit the admiration or even to engage the attention of the antiquarian. Like the House of Pluscardyn, it belongs to the first pointed or early English style which succeeded the Romanesque. This style prevailed from about 1180 to about 1286, and these dates mark the great age of ecclesiastical building north and south of the Tweed. In that era there were reared the cathedral piles of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Whithorn, Elgin, Brechin, Dunblane, and Dornoch; while specimens of the conventual churches of this age are to be found at Holyrood, Arbroath, Dryburgh, Kilwinning, Lindores, Pluscardyn, and Ardochattan. With few, if any, of the first pointed edifices or ruins, can the Abbey of Paisley compete in respect of beauty. The chief interest for lovers of old architecture attaches to the nave and the mortuary chapel, called St. Mirin's aisle, at the end of the south transept. The triforium or gallery of the nave is peculiar and not wanting in effectiveness, the large corbels between the triforium and the clerestory resting upon carvings of figures, human and animal, evidently far from comfortable under their burden. It rests upon the unimpeachable testimony of the quondam minister of the second charge that worshippers in the abbey relieved the tedium of long sermons by studying the details of these grotesque carvings; and it may reasonably be conjectured that on such occasions a figure, near the west gable, representing a man in "the garb of old Gaul," comes in for a large share of attention.

The Chapel of St. Mirin and St. Columba, founded so late as 1499, contains a series of sculptured panels running along the eastern wall, which series has severely taxed the ingenuity of antiquarians. Dr. Lees has happily availed himself of the aid furnished by the Breviary of Aberdeen in explaining the sculptures, and shows conclusively that they refer to the legends regarding St. Mirin recorded in that Service-book.

The estimate formed by Dr. Lees of the architectural interest and beauty of Paisley Abbey is, in our judgment, too high; but when we turn from architecture to history, we cordially

indorse his statement that it is "a building with many great associations."

Some of the most powerful families in Scotland bear in their very names evidence of the humble, not to say menial, character of the services originally rendered, and so of the political influence which these services conferred when the feudal system flourished,

"In the antique age of bow and spear,
And feudal rapine clothed with iron mail."

Thus the Durwards, once so powerful as hopefully to plot for sovereignty in Scotland, got their name from an hereditary office, in virtue of which they were the door-wards, door-keepers, or porters at the Court of Scotland. Then the Comyn family, which supplied a competitor for the Scottish Crown, whom Bruce only thrust aside by the free use of his own dagger, and that of his follower Kilpatrick, of "I mak sikar" notoriety, owe their name, "Cum in," to the office of chamberlain, discharged by the first of the family who came from Normandy to the Court of King William, who, "syn he was stark and stour," made him, according to Wyntoun's rhymed "Cronykil"—

"Keepare of hys chawmbyre dure ;
Na langage couth he spek clerly
Bot hys awyn langage of Normandy ;
Nevertheless zhit quhen he
Oppyny'd the dure til mak entrè,
Cum in, Cum in, he wald say,
As he herd othir about hym say."

But the most illustrious instance of humble, if not servile office in combination with high destiny exemplified in the career of Scottish families is that furnished by the great house of Stewart, which has supplied, not to Scotland only, but also to England, much of the tragedy which pervades the history of both kingdoms. The feudal office held by this family was originally that of steward ; it came to be in course of time that of the Lord High Steward of Scotland ; in the person of Robert II., the steward, or, as it came to be written, the Stewart family ascended the throne, and the Stewart dynasty was founded, through which the present Royal Family rightfully claim their inheritance of the British Empire. The name of this family, as distinguished from official title, was Alan or Allan, and the

home of the family was in Shropshire. In the first half of the twelfth century, a certain Walter Allan turned his face northward as a soldier of fortune, and ultimately acquired considerable property in Renfrewshire, his territory being known by the name of Strathgryff. It was this Walter Allan, whose armorial bearings contained a counting-board used in the steward's office, who founded the Abbey of Paisley. In or about 1163, in the reign of King Malcolm, the foundation-charter was drawn out and solemnly witnessed, according to the terms of which Walter, the son of Allan, for the souls of deceased kings, parents, and benefactors, for the health of the body and soul of the reigning sovereign, and to the honour of God, agreed to build an house of religion on his land of Passelay,¹ according to the order of the brotherhood of Wenlock in the founder's native county of Shropshire, the convent there being one of Cluniac Benedictines. The priory of Paisley, enriched with gifts of land, mills, and fishings, the chief of which came from the lordly house of the Stewarts, prospered exceedingly, and in due time developed into an abbey. When, in 1370, Robert, the High Steward, succeeded his cousin, David II., and was with all ceremony crowned and anointed at Scone as Robert II., the Abbey of Paisley could claim to be under royal patronage; and in 1406 Robert III. was buried before its high altar, after a profitless but harmless reign, which certainly did not warrant the severe estimate he formed of his life when he desired that for epitaph there should be written on his tomb, "Here lies the worst king and most miserable man in the universe." In after days, and up to the time of the dissolution of the monastery, Paisley Abbey was favoured with more than one royal visit. James IV., the hapless hero of Flodden, visited the abbey in 1489, the year of his accession; again in 1491, when, inflicting penance on himself for the share he had taken in the affair of Sauchie Burn, fatal to his father, having been on a pilgrimage to the shrine of St. Ninian at Whithorn, he came to Paisley to receive absolution from the abbot, empowered by a bull of the Pope to confer it; then in 1504, when dissipation alternated with devotions; and

¹ *Paalet, Passeleth, Passelay, Passetet, Paale, Paalewe, Paalay, Paisley*,—such are the more outstanding forms which the name assumes in earlier and later records. The most probable derivation is *pas*, a crossing or ferry, and *let*, a house, the name given to some house at a ferry on the river.

for the last time in 1507, only six years before he fell in the fatal ring on Brankstone Moor. The last King of Scotland who visited the abbey was James VI., who was there on the 24th July 1617, by which time the altars had been swept away, the abbey had become the Kirk of Paisley, and the monastery was known as "The Place."

But there are associations gathering round the place greater far than those connected with the doings of its founder, or the visits and the burial of Scottish Kings. In 1525 old Abbot Robert was promoted to the vacant see of Moray, and then the mitre of Paisley Abbey was placed on the head of a youthful monk in the Monastery of Kilwinning. The young abbot was an illegitimate son of the Earl of Arran—John Hamilton by name. By subsequent leaps of preferment Abbot John became Keeper of the Privy Seal, Lord High Treasurer for Scotland, Bishop of Dunkeld, and finally Archbishop of St. Andrews and Primate of Scotland. He is known to every tyro in Scottish history as the determined opponent of the Reformed faith and the persecutor of John Knox; strong suspicions attach to him as one implicated in the murder of Darnley; and he stands convicted upon his own confession of participation in the assassination of Regent Moray, the perpetrator of the deed being Hamilton of Bothwellhaugh, a nephew of the Archbishop. Hamilton was the last archbishop of the ante-Reformation Church of Scotland and the last abbot of Paisley. Considering the scandal which his appointment created in an age which cannot be charged with being oversqueamish, the open profligacy with which his life was stained, and the crimes of which he was guilty—and these are all freely admitted by the historian of the abbey,—the estimate formed of him by Dr. Lees seems, to say the least of it, a mild one when it finds expression in such qualified and guarded terms as these:—"He was a man of great ability, and, if [*sic*] he had faults, he was not worse than most men of his station and of his time." Although the monk of Kilwinning, Abbot of Paisley, Archbishop of St. Andrews and Primate of Scotland, was hanged at Stirling and the body quartered, Dr. Lees is of opinion that his mangled remains were buried in the church of his youthful abbacy. His reason for so thinking is that there is preserved at the west end of the north aisle of the

church a tablet which has sculptured upon it the ecclesiastic's coat of arms, his initials, J. H., and his motto, which contrasts strangely with his troubled life and tragic end—*Misericordia et Pax*.

It would be difficult to conceive a greater contrast in the matters of life and character than is presented in those of the fierce, ambitious, and unclean John Hamilton on the one hand, and those of the mild, humble, and holy Robert Leighton on the other. And yet Leighton as well as Hamilton has associations with Paisley Abbey. Only induced to accept the archbishopric of Glasgow in the hope that his translation to a sphere of such commanding influence would bring him nearer to the grand governing object of his life—a modified episcopacy for Scotland,—Leighton succeeded in bringing about a conference at Holyrood House, in Edinburgh, attended by representative men of both parties, in August 1670. Nothing practical resulted from this meeting, so another was arranged for in December of the same year. This second conference had Paisley Abbey for its place of meeting; and in the chapter of his work devoted to "The Curates," Dr. Lees gives an interesting account of the proceedings based upon the narratives of Wodrow and Burnet. That there was no intention on the part of the Presbyterians to concede anything that might be regarded as favouring the claims of Episcopal dignitaries was made manifest at the very outset, when, in answer to Leighton's inquiry, "Who shall begin our conference with prayer?" he was met with the counter question from the Rev. Matthew Ramsay, one of the "indulged" men, and minister of the First Charge, "Who should pray here, but the minister of Paisley?" he proceeding without further preliminary to open the meeting with an extemporaneous prayer.

The Paisley conference was as fruitless as the Edinburgh one, and his conciliation scheme continued to the close of the tolerant and charitable bishop's life a tantalising, fugitive dream. The dream might be nearer a realising to-day than we fear it is were there more wearers of lawn sleeves and silk aprons willing to emulate the example of Leighton, who visited a sick Presbyterian minister on a horse which he had borrowed from a Popish priest. Be that as it may, the air of Paisley Abbey should be all the sweeter from Leighton having been

within its walls, for to no one can the fine lines of Cowper be applied more fitly—

“When one that holds communion with the skies
Has filled his urn where those pure waters rise,
And once more mingles with us meaner things,
’Tis e’en as if an angel shook his wings ;
Immortal fragrance fills the circuit wide,
That tells us where his treasures are supplied.”

One more name it is permitted the historian to associate with Paisley Abbey—that of the far-renowned, much-loved, William Wallace. To make good a connection in this case, however, much must be done in the way of inferring and imagining. All there is to go upon is the fact that the father of Wallace was a knight and owner of the estate of Ellerslie, now called Elderslie, in Renfrewshire. That being the case, the house of Ellerslie would be within the parochial boundaries of the Parish Church of Paisley, the lands being only two and a half miles from the monastery. Young Wallace was well educated, and could make use of two languages, Latin and French, in addition to his vernacular. The likelihood is that he was indebted to the monks of Paisley for his education and accomplishments, as learning, even of the humblest kind, was at that period the exclusive possession of the cloister. It is, we fear, building too great a structure upon a somewhat slender foundation to picture the matter, as, in his *Early Days of Sir William Wallace*, the Marquess of Bute has done, when he imagines William, taken with his brothers by Malcolm Wallace and Margaret, his wife, “to listen for hours to the solemn rise and fall of the Gregorian chant,” and contracting his love for the Psalms, which lasted until he died, by hearing “the sublime compositions of the Hebrew poets alternately thundered and wailed through the Abbey Church of Paisley.” But who can blame the Presbyterian minister for reproducing and indorsing this devout imagining of the Romish nobleman when it enables him to connect his favourite structure with one whose name is so dear to all lovers of his country?

Even the slight investigation into historical matters which the foregoing sketch of some outstanding names associated with the religious house of Paisley has called for may show our readers what a wide field Dr. Lees has explored in con-

structing his chronicle of the seven hundred years over which his history extends. For the skill with which he carries them from stage to stage of his narrative, and interests them in what interests himself, the versatile minister of St. Giles deserves the warmest thanks of general readers, while professional archæologists will feel much indebted to him for the matter he has accumulated for their benefit in the valuable appendices of his work.

Only on one matter of importance do we crave liberty to dissent from the finding arrived at by Dr. Lees. When he comes to treat of Paisley Abbey after its overthrow in 1561, and when it passed from Popish into Presbyterian rule, he gives frequent and forcible expression to the conviction that the persecuting spirit of the ecclesiastical rulers continued unchanged, that toleration was a thing unknown in the creed and practice of either party, and that the will to persecute was just as strong in the Covenanters as in the Episcopalians after the accession of Charles II., the only difference being that the former had the will but not the power, whereas the latter, having "the arm of the secular power more under their control than their predecessors, were able to carry out their will in a more open and in a more repulsive form." In the chapters of his work devoted to "Discipline," "The Abercorns and the Kirk," "The Covenant," "The Curates," and "Witchcraft," these positions are given expression to and copiously illustrated. We think it would not be difficult to prove by a judicious use of material, taken from the writer's own pages, that he has overstated the case in so far as the Covenanters are concerned, and that he has actually, though unconsciously, raised a false issue. No one acquainted with their writings and their practices will contend that our covenanting forefathers had an intelligent hold of the principle of toleration and the right of private judgment; but if the forementioned chapters of Dr. Lee's work are studied it will appear, we predict, that there was a radical difference between the intolerance of Papists and Prelatists on the one hand and of Presbyterians on the other in respect of these two important matters—the offences dealt with, the punishments inflicted. By Papists and Prelatists the arm of the secular power was called in to aid the Church in dealing effectively with heretics, nonconformists, worshippers at conventicles, and

such as refused to take the abjuration oath and the test ; by the Presbyterians discipline was exercised for offences against morals, non-attendance upon ordinances, profanation of the Sabbath, and selling quack medicines. Then, by Papists and Prelatists the punishments inflicted for heresy or attending the ministrations of outed ministers were imprisonment, torture, banishment, the stake. Dr. Lees has no hesitation in admitting that it was with the sanction of John Hamilton—"whose bravery" the Doctor "cannot but admire"—that Adam Wallace was burned on the Castlehill of Edinburgh shortly after the abbot's elevation to the primacy, and that Walter Mill suffered the same fate at St. Andrews when eighty-two years of age ; and he tells, when chronicling what was done in the days of the curates, how, on the 3d of February 1685, two plain country men were brought before the Earl of Glencairn, Lord Ross, the Laird of Cobistown, and John Shaw at Paisley, and how, on refusing to take the oath of abjuration and the test, "they were immediately condemned to death, and at two o'clock the same afternoon were hanged at the Cross of Paisley, the soldiers being ordered to sound their trumpets and beat their drums to drown the psalm-singing of the victims."

Now, compare with these pains and penalties the discipline of the "Presbytere of Paslay holden within the Kirk of the same." Readers may smile when they are told that John Robesoune, upon confession of flagrant immorality, was ordered "to stand and abyde six Sabbaths barefooted and barelegged at the kirk door of Paisley between the second and third bell ringing and thereafter to goe to the place of public repentance during the said space of six sabbaths," and that William Steward "appeared in presence of the moderator and remanent brethren in hairclothe, barefooted and barelegged," and upon confession of uncleanness, was ordained "to stand six Sabbaths in the said hairclothe upon the place of publick repentance within the Kirk of Pasley ;" and they may think William Dougall hardly dealt with when, upon being convicted of "going superstitiouslie at Yuille in company with the pypars and dancers, and, in greater contempt to God and his Kirke, of coming through the Kirk-yard with a drawn quihinger in his hand, he was ordeint to remove the said sclander by making his repent-

ance in his lynin [linen] clothes two Sabbath-days," being the punishment inflicted upon him "for abusing himself in the superstitious tyme of Yuille, and for his blasphemous aiths and injurious language given to the session of Kilbarchan." But whatever judgment may be passed upon the Presbytery of Paisley for the severity and the unsuitableness of the discipline thus exercised for offences against morality and decency, can such an ordeal of chastening ever be mentioned in the same sentence with the torture and the cruel death inflicted by the Archbishop of St. Andrews upon venerable upholders of evangelical truth? And yet when Dr. Lees is concluding the chapter upon "Discipline," in which the above cases are given, he remarks :—"The people lived under an iron rule. If the Priests chastised them with whips, the Presbyters used scorpions." This is surely an inversion of the true order of things; the sting of the scorpion was experienced by such saintly men as Patrick Hamilton, George Wishart, Adam Wallace, Walter Mill, and others in the noble army of Scottish martyrs as recorded in "The Scots Worthies" of good John Howie, compared with whose sufferings the discipline of hair-cloth, linen clothes, bare feet, and bare legs inflicted upon such spotted characters and roving blades as Robesoune, Steward, and Dougall was only as the stroke of a whip. Dr. Lees devotes a lengthy chapter to "The Abercorns and the Kirk," and his last but one to "Witchcraft" as dealt with by presbytery when once more triumphant. In both chapters he seems to us to mete out but scant justice to the Presbyterians. As regards the Abercorns, Dame Marion Boyd—a "bold lady" and "potent dame" of great determination and energy, with her son the youthful Earl of Abercorn, had outwardly conformed to Protestantism, but the profession was notoriously false; the Master of Paisley, the Earl's brother, had used violence against Boyd of Trochrigg when settled as minister of the town, throwing out his books and locking the doors of the manse when the erudite divine was preaching; and Thomas Algeo, one of Lady Abercorn's household, was, there is reason to believe, a disguised priest. The presbytery dealings with these and other suspected members of the family extended from April 20, 1626, to November 22, 1628, owing mainly to the procrastinating, not to say prevaricating, of the persons dealt with, and they ended

in the excommunication of all the accused, with one exception. Dr. Lees endeavours to throw additional odium upon the clergy, holding them up as inquisitors, unable to excel themselves even had they been members of the holy office, by narrating the subsequent imprisonment in Edinburgh and death at Paisley, from *squalor carceris*, of the "poor countess;" but we fail to perceive how he connects the presbytery of Paisley with her closing sufferings and painful death, while some significant references to Jesuits and mention of Algeo, the priest in disguise, in the documents from which he quotes, suggest that the once potent dame had laid herself open to the charge of secret plotting, and thus explains, while it does not justify, the "odious ecclesiastical persecution" of which she is represented as being the victim. As to the witchcraft trials and burnings, which render the penultimate chapter painful reading, we find no fault with the writer for heartily denouncing the superstition and the cruelty which that chapter reveals; but we think he might have made it more apparent to general readers than it is likely to be that all the blame in this matter is not to be laid at the door of the Presbyterian ministers. For, in the first place, those who study this matter with any care will find that the earliest action in Scotland against witches was taken, not by an ecclesiastical body, but by Parliament in 1563, that the current beliefs upon the subject received royal sanction, James VI. being one of the sages of the science and author of *Demonologie* in three books, and that in the case to which Dr. Lees gives most prominence it was a commission of Privy Council that tried the suspected persons and condemned seven of them to the flames, the Paisley presbytery volunteering to assist the commission and arranging that certain members would spend some time with the condemned, so that each might "be dealt with by them and waited on to the fire." And then, secondly, we submit that in taking the active and unwarrantable, even although subordinate, part they did in this revolting matter, the ministers were acting not so much in their character as Presbyterians as in that of divines with a theology that was unscientific and an exegesis that was uncritical. It would have made no material difference had the two members of the presbytery of Paisley, who at successive stages of the year 1697, preached sermons from the text "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," been pre-

lates instead of presbyters, and used the Service Book in conducting the prayers of the service.

We have been thus specific in dealing with what appears to us the blot in this admirable monograph because we cherish the hope that it may ere long appear in the form of a second and improved edition. By the time it does so, and there is added the Index, the absence of which constitutes a serious defect in the book as we now have it, but which is stated to be "in preparation," perhaps the author will have revised his statements bearing upon his Presbyterian forefathers, and have ceased to apprehend evil from the setting up again of "a powerful and united Church," no longer regarding such as "almost in the nature of things antagonistic to civil liberty." Have the interests of Morality and Church Discipline not suffered more from a divided Presbyterianism in Scotland than those of civil liberty are ever likely to suffer from a powerful and united church set up again in Scotland?

Up till now our survey of recent contributions to the ecclesiastical antiquities of Scotland has been confined to those of individual archæologists, professional or amateur. It is well known, however, that both archæology and history have largely benefited alike in England, Ireland, and Scotland by the formation and publications of Societies or Clubs cultivating special fields of research. Confining ourselves to the country north of the Border, and leaving out of notice societies formed only for the publication of works bearing upon Scottish Church History—such as the "Wodrow Society," the love of archæology and history combined has prompted Scotchmen to the formation of "The Bannatyne Club," "The Abbotsford Club," and "The Maitland Club," all of which have rendered good service to the cause, and all the publications of which have been "printed at Edinburgh." Wider in its range, and much more recent than any of those now specified, if not the most recently formed of all, is

THE AYR AND WIGTOWN ARCHÆOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,¹

to the publications of which we now turn for additional proof

¹ *Archæological and Historical Collections relating to the Counties of Ayr and Wigtown.* Vols. i. ii. iii. iv. Edinburgh: Printed for the Ayr and Wigtown Archæological Association. 1878-1882.

of the thesis with which we started when combating the positions of Messrs. Robertson and Anderson. This Association was formed in October 1877. In the resolutions agreed to at the meeting for its formation, held in Ayr, under the presidency of the Earl of Stair, prominence was given to the preserving of the various prehistoric and mediæval remains of antiquity in the two counties, and to the printing of early charters, original mss., and other matters relating to the history and topography of the counties. These objects have been steadily kept in view, and nobly carried out in the four volumes of collections that have been printed—four quarto volumes, which, for beauty of typography, artistic excellency and sumptuousness of illustrations, and tastefulness in binding, will successfully compete with the publications of any association, whether north or south of the Tweed. In all the volumes a fair share of attention is bestowed upon the ecclesiastical antiquities of both counties. Thus in volume i. the existing buildings at Kilwinning Abbey are represented in nine plates, for which explanatory remarks are furnished, and a commencement is made of "Collections" toward a history of the Monastery. In volume ii. the Parish Church of Kilbirnie, remarkable on account of the carvings in oak with which the Crawford gallery and the pulpit are decorated, is the subject of an interesting and copiously illustrated paper. And in volume iii. the Holy Wells in Wigtownshire are enumerated and described by Daniel Conway, R.C.C., while Mr. Galloway, under the heading of "Early Christian Remains in Ayrshire," furnishes letterpress for three plates, in which are figured two stones found in the parish of Dailly, and one stone, with a large bowl-shaped cavity rising up with a distinct and independent necking, discovered in the lands of Preston [Priest's stone, or Priest's town?], in the parish of Colmonell. In 1881 the Association issued an extra volume,¹ the members being largely indebted for it "to the liberality of the Marquess of Bute, to the care taken by the Municipality of Ayr in preserving the ancient records and documents in their custody," and, it ought to be added, to the scholarly editing of their

¹ *Munimenta Fratrum Predicatorum de Ayr*. Charters of the Friars Preachers of Ayr. Edinburgh: Printed for the Ayr and Wigtown Archaeological Association. 1881.

accomplished honorary secretary for Ayrshire, R. W. Cochran-Patrick, M.P.

The interest of the documents contained in this Cartulary is for the most part local, as the muniments now given are fitted to throw some light upon the early history and topography of the town of Ayr. But forming as it does an important contribution to the history of the Order in Scotland, the Cartulary of the Predicant Friars of Ayr will be found of no small general interest. Dominic Gozman, a Spanish priest, moved by the widespread decay of religion in his day, instituted the Order of Preaching Brothers about 1215; and of this order of Black Frates or Friars Alexander II. founded no fewer than eight houses, viz., at Edinburgh, Berwick, Ayr, Perth, Aberdeen, Elgin, Stirling, and Inverness. Of these the honour of being the earliest foundation has been claimed for Ayr, and if the historian Spottiswood can be relied upon, the date of the foundation was 1230, the same as that of the Priory of Pluscardyn. It was certainly in the same reign that the Dominican Order obtained a footing in Ayr and the Benedictines in Morayshire, and the historian just mentioned says the Order of Preaching Friars was introduced into this country by William Malvoisin, Bishop of St. Andrews, the very ecclesiastic who, there is reason to believe, brought the rule of Val de Chou over from Burgundy.

Even should this not be the case, and should Clement, afterwards Bishop of Dunblane, be regarded as the first of the order in this country, there is enough in what has been stated above regarding date of foundation and reigning sovereign to warrant us in expecting that the records of Benedictines and Dominicans will mutually illustrate each other. In this expectation we are not disappointed, but diminishing space will not admit of our giving more than two instances in point. In the charters of Pluscardyn Priory mention is made now and again of "*multures*." Thus in the earliest extant charter, that from Bishop Andrew in 1233, enumeration is given of several gifts already received, and among these "the mill of Elgin, with the mills of Dunkinedur and of Molen *with multures pertaining thereto*;" then the papal bull of Urban IV., dated 1263, specifies the House and its surroundings, Durris mills and *multures*. Mr. Macphail contents himself with stating in

a foot-note:—"The farmers of Moray require no explanation of the term;" but, as it is reasonable to expect his work will be read by a considerably larger class than that composed of Moray farmers, it might have been well to state that *multure*¹ was the fee for grinding grain at the mill. Now, when we travel south from Morayshire as far as Ayrshire, we find the privilege of exemption from multures conferred upon the Friar Preachers. At page five of the Charters will be found one given in 1328 by Robert I. for the weal of his soul and of the souls of his ancestors and successors, kings of Scotland, in which he grants to the Friars Preachers of Ayr the right of grinding their grain, of whatever sort necessary for food, at his mills of Ayr free of multure—*sine multura*, and that they shall be nearer to the king in the mill than any other; and when Robert III. confirmed in 1390 what had been granted in the charter of 1328, the privilege of grinding *sine multura* is expressly mentioned and conserved. It was, we suspect, privileges of exemption such as this, combined with privileges of tithes, enabling the monks and friars not only to fill their own meal-sacks free of expense, but to get their hands into those of Elgin and Ayr burghers, that brought both Benedictines and Dominicans into general disrepute, and led to such quarrels and suits as are recorded in the works now under review. Another matter of antiquarian interest to which the historian of Pluscardyn has evidently given much attention is that of the seals of the priories of Beaulieu, Ardochattan, and Pluscardyn. In pursuing his research he has found that it was not an uncommon thing for a document to be confirmed by the adhibiting of a seal which was not the property of the person whose signature it ratified. This, he tells us, was done in the case of the seal of the famous John Benale, it being used in 1455 when a marriage settlement required confirmation, and "Elizabeth, Countess of Morra"—so runs the document—"in absence of her awin sele, has procurit the sele of a worshipful fader, Done John Bonalda, priour of Pluscardin." Now the charters of the Friars Preachers of Ayr furnish us with exactly parallel cases, and so bear out Mr. Macphail's supposition that it was "quite consistent with the ideas of the times to use another's seal, if

¹ Molo, to grind in a mill, molitor, a miller (post-class.). Multure is the old Scotch name for the tacksman of a mill.

its owner was mentioned in the body of the document." When, for example, Juliana of Ponte, daughter and heir of Adam of Ponte, burgess of Ayr, granted to "God and the blessed Katherine, the virgin," and to friar John of Torry, then prior, and to the convent, "twenty-one shillings of sterlings," "when it shall happen me to die, and when humanly there shall be an end of me," she "made bodily faith to the foresaid prior and convent by touching the sacred gospels." And then the charter has this for closing statement:—"In witness whereof, because I have not my own seal, I have procured the seal of Henry of Aberdalgy, burgess of Ayr, in my name and stead to be affixed to this present writing, together with the common seal of the burgh of Ayr, for the sake of greater evidence. So also the charter of Adam of Boure, in favour of the convent of the Friars Preachers of an annual rent of four shillings, is sealed with the seal of the granter, who for greater security procured with instance the seal of a noble man, John Blair of Adamton;"¹ and, not to multiply instances, a "tack by James of Cathcart of Macorbiston to Alan Quhit, has this for attesting clause:—"In witnes of the quhilkis thyngis, til this my present charter I hafe hungyn my sele at Sondrom the saxt day of the moneth of Maii, the yeir of our Lorde a thousand four hundre and acht thirty yere; and for the mair sekirnes the sele of Patrick Hair, alderman of Are, is procurit alsa to hyngye thairat, thir witness Johne Petit, bailye of Are . . . and mony othir." From these instances it can be gathered that to use the seal of another in subscribing important documents was by no means confined to the monks of Pluscardyn—the seal of a third party being employed, in Ayrshire as in Morayshire, in transactions between the clergy and the laity, when one of the contracting parties could not boast the possession of one, or when it was desired to invest the document with greater importance and render it of more binding obligation. This could be done, and was done in cases which Mr. Macphail does not seem to have contemplated, cases, namely, in which the owner of the seal was not mentioned in the body of the document.

In the valuable series of *The Historians of Scotland*, pub-

¹ "In cujus rei testimonium sigillum meum presentibus est appensum, et pro majore securitate sigillum nobilis viri Johannis Blare domini de Adamton cum instancia apponendum procuravi."

lished by Mr. Paterson of Edinburgh, a place is found for the *Critical Essay* of that "monkish, bookish person," as Wodrow calls him, Father Innes. Our survey of recent publications bearing upon Scottish ecclesiastical antiquities, would not have even a semblance of completeness did we not supplement such information as we have been able to give regarding the services of Presbyterian divines and Protestant laymen, by a reference, however brief, to the labours in the same field of a Roman Catholic nobleman, whereby English readers are put in possession of

THE ALTUS OF ST. COLUMBA.¹

In his preface—which might, with advantage to subject and readers, have been considerably amplified—the editor makes no doubt as to the authorship, accepting "an apparently unbroken tradition" which ascribes it to Columba. The evidence in favour of the Columban authorship of the hymn is not of a nature to warrant confident assertion, seeing that no writing in the form of book, letter, or poem, is a relic beyond suspicion of the founder of Iona. If the *Altus* is not the composition of Columba, whose is it? That seems all the length it is safe to go in the case of any one whose faith in "unbroken tradition" is not so strong as that of the Scottish nobleman. He may in this way reach a high measure of probability—very much after the manner of Carlyle when, judging of the Knox portraits, and giving his verdict in favour of the Somerville one, he affirmed that if it is not the Scottish hero and evangelist of the sixteenth century he could not conjecture who or what it is.

Turning to the hymn itself, we find it to be a curious specimen of the latinity of the Celtic Church. Like some of the books in the Jewish Scriptures, its name is taken from the first word in the composition, which opens with

"Altus Prosator, Vetustus
Dierum, et Ingenitus;"

like some of the Hebrew psalms it is alphabetical, each of the capitula into which it is broken up beginning with a letter of the alphabet in proper sequence. With the exception of A,

¹ *The Altus of St. Columba.* Edited, with a prose paraphrase and notes, by John, Marquess of Bute, K. T. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1882.

which has fourteen, each chapter consists of twelve lines rhyming, two and two. Setting out with praise of God, as He is in Himself, the author of the *Altus* proceeds to praise the Most High in connection with special classes of his works—the angelic world, the material cosmogony, and those things which shall be hereafter. The material of the hymn is largely drawn from the metaphors found in various passages of the Bible in the Vulgate rendering, coloured by the theological and physical conceptions of the mediæval Celtic Church. As the latinity of the rhyming lines is crabbed and clumsy, so the science is crude, and the theology confused. When the writer describes the Last Day his lines have a faint ring in them of the *Dies Iræ*, although we suspect few competent to form a judgment will indorse the sentiment of the editor that some of the capitula in the rugged *Altus* would not suffer by comparison with that splendid hymn.

The chapter upon Heaven is almost entirely taken from the passage in the second of Genesis describing the Paradise home of our first parents, supplemented by a passage from the twenty-eighth of Ezekiel. Purgatory is referred to as the dwelling of those whose knees oftentimes bendeth prayerfully at the name of the Lord Jesus, but who could not unroll the book written within and without, and sealed with seven seals,—a conception which the editor acknowledges is less defined and definite than the beliefs which have obtained in later days. The coincidence between the contents of the opening chapter and the Athanasian Creed, both in respect of teaching and of wording, is pointed out in the notes, and is certainly remarkable, bearing, as it does, striking testimony to the theology of the Celtic Church in the sixth century.

As supplying a good specimen of the hymn, and of the editor's skill in paraphrasing, while at the same time furnishing us with a good doxology, wherewith to bring our labours for the present to a close, we extract the following:—

“The Most High, the Father of all, the Antient of days, and Unbegotten, without origin, without beginning, and without limit, was, is, and will be for ever and ever; with whom is co-eternal in everlasting glory of Godhead the Only-Begotten Son, who also is the Christ and the Holy Spirit. We set not forth three Gods, but say that God is one, still holding ever the faith in three most glorious Persons.”

CHARLES G. M'CRIE.

ART. IV.—*Prospects of the Present Religious Reaction in the German Church.*

THE Lutheran Church in Germany, and to all appearance religion with it, came down at the close of last century before the pen of the critic, and, in the eye of public opinion, as fairly as the tree falls before the axe of the woodman. This signal victory has imparted to infidelity in that country a stamp of superiority and flush of assurance which distinguish it from the unbelief in other lands. The usual tone of the British infidel is a remonstrant grumble, like that of a subject tribe which has succumbed in the struggle with one more powerful, when the bitterness of defeat is mingled with a certain respect for those who have proved themselves stronger. German critics recognise this when they ascribe a certain honesty and sincerity to the British sceptic in contradistinction to the Frenchman. The former feels the necessity of giving credit to the strength of the argument against him. The French infidel never knew Christianity otherwise than as a league between the Most Christian King and Jesuit priests for sacrificing the lives and liberties of nations to their nefarious interests, according to which the great and noble were indulged in the most infamous vices while still the favourite sons and supporters of the Church ; hence he is animated with fiercest scorn, contempt, and hatred as against a flagitious superstition, and knows no aim so commendable as to seek its utter extirpation. He knows no good in it, and would fain stamp upon its neck as upon a poisonous reptile, against which there is no security as long as it breathes. Two things saved England : the onslaught of Deism was made at a time when there were men qualified to meet it, and when there was sufficient religious knowledge and discrimination in the people to appreciate on which side the victory lay. It was a stand-up fight in the end of the seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth between infidelity and truth ; but the infidel was put down by fair weapons, baffled, and driven off the field—a victory which has insured a quiet on this side of 150 years. Never was there more labour and ingenuity brought to bear against the

gospel than by Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Herbert, Woolston, Toland, Tindal, Chubb, and Priestley, not forgetting the arch-deist Hume; but in God's good providence there were champions at hand who were more than a match for them, and, mark this, which certainly was not of less consequence, the people had still so much interest and intelligence in the question as to ratify the decision in favour of the truth for generations. In Germany all was different. When infidelity made its assault there it wrought with the ease and celerity of a law of nature. The gospel disappeared before it like a thing of darkness that could not stand the free exercise of the intellect. Scarcely had the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments" appeared, than, as if the trumpet of Gideon had sounded, the tents of the establishment began to tremble. In all circles men began to whisper that the arguments against the resurrection of Christ (not a whit more acute than those which had been silenced in England) were unanswerable. The ministers of religion began to pass over to the side of the enemy, either preaching in hypocrisy a religion they privately ridiculed, or openly declaring their disbelief of the faith of which they were the salaried servants. There were no champions found equal to the occasion, and the adversary, from the heights of literary and intellectual vantage, flouted the weak defences of those who sincerely mourned over the desecrated temple. A number who had fancied themselves impregnable in orthodoxy felt their faith melt away under the trial, as Schleiermacher relates of his own uncle Stubenrauch, who had long been his monitor to recall him to the soundness of the Creed.

Thus the persuasion gradually pervaded the mass of the people, which has never again been dissipated, that Christianity is not what it professed to be, God's own plan of salvation, but that all it proposes, and more, can be attained by the due cultivation of the intellect. This has imparted to infidelity in Germany that tone of cool and haughty superiority which is more unfavourable to the gospel than the rabid ignorant fury of France. The gospel is treated as a weak and inferior thing, that is useful for controlling the masses who cannot rise to the level of philosophy. It is revolting to hear the pompous man of letters declare that he is far from discouraging devotion in the females of his household, as supplying for them what

they lack in mental culture. This has wrought an incurable confusion of ideas in regard to religion. It has spread the impression, which is all but universal, that the great men of science, of poetry, and of letters are, *ipso facto*, to be numbered as religious, whose sanctity it is a heresy to question. While the Scripture teaches that "if ye live after the flesh ye shall die," public opinion asserts that those who throughout life avowedly did nothing but the will of the flesh and the mind, nevertheless inherit eternal life.

Again, this same spirit gives birth to endeavours to keep out of sight, or treat as unessential, those truths of the gospel to which the pride of intellect is most apt to take exception. It is practically conceded that the disciples of science and art have a piety and morality of their own, and are not to be judged by the common standard. Who can but think of the "miry places" that were not healed even by the living waters that went forth from the sanctuary! When we put the question how such a result has been produced in the land of the Reformation, we find that certain radical faults were admitted into the constitution of the Lutheran Church, which, unless purged out (and they never have been), made such an issue inevitable.

For one thing, we see the rationalism appear in the fountain-head which at last burst forth with such pestilential rage. We call it rationalism when a favourite principle or position is maintained with a high hand, and the Word of God is browbeaten and twisted to conform to our opinion. When we say Luther was guilty of this, we are no more sinning against his saintship than we sin against Moses when we teach, after Scripture, that he was guilty of unbelief, and failed in a certain instance to sanctify God's name; or in blaming Gideon when he made an ephod which became a snare to him and his house. We take nothing from Luther, and are quite tolerant of the interpretation which finds in him the angel that was seen flying through the midst of heaven to preach the everlasting gospel to them that dwelt on the earth (Rev. xiv.). But, for all that, we find him guilty of smiting the rock, not once or twice, like the man of whom it is so often recorded he did as the Lord commanded him, when, instead of listening to the sense of the Word, he sought to force it to confirm the doctrine for which

he was a zealot: and his example became a snare to the Church which bears his name. It was in the interest of his peculiar doctrine of consubstantiation, and the ubiquity of Christ's human nature, that he perverted the passage, Acts iii. 21, where, instead of "whom the heavens must receive," he in defiance of all grammar sets "who must receive the heavens;" and where the pernicious influence of his example appears in that he leads in his wake not only the common herd of interpreters, but even Bengel. Here even his partial Lutheran follower Meyer forsakes him. In such an instance we trace the same want of reverence for the Divine Word in which rationalism has its root. We will not say much of the grossest and best known case under this head: we mean Luther's reckless sally against the canonicity of James, in his anxiety for the safety of the great truth of justification by faith alone. Yet this showed the man and his spirit: what opposed his views, even if it were Scripture itself, must give way. Although he soon perceived that this step was all too offensive and had to be retraced, yet his retraction was virtually a form, for he never accepted the truth which the Epistle of James was designed to teach, viz., that our faith is to be tested by the life, and that faith without works is to be reckoned as dead. The same zeal for faith as all in all carried him on to a series of wanton transgressions against the authority of the Divine Word. Thus his jealousy against the employment of the motives set before believers to enforce diligence in the work of holiness, led him to mistranslate Gal. vi. 9, where, in place of "in due time ye shall reap, if ye faint not," he sets, "ye shall reap without ceasing;" he could not endure the condition "*if* ye faint not," from his doctrine that faith must certainly and inevitably lead to the desired harvest. In the same way he mistranslates Psalm l. 23, "to him that ordereth his conversation aright will I show the salvation of God;" he did not like this condition of a good conversation, and omits the clause altogether. It may seem a small matter, and yet it is a proof of want of tender reverence for the Word, that in Romans iii. 28 he arbitrarily entered the word "alone" in the text, to give a more palpable support to his view, making it to say "a man is justified by faith alone"—a transgression of which the Roman Catholics have not failed to take advantage. Once more, having become disgusted

with the Jews, and persuaded himself that there are no further promises for Israel after the flesh, Luther allowed himself the unscrupulous act of expunging, we may say, the great promise in Romans xi. 15, where instead of the words "what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead?" he sets something that contains no sense at all, but certainly hides the truth revealed by the Holy Spirit that Israel is to be received again.

After these specimens from the master, shall we wonder at the prevalence of rationalism in that Church where the *ipse dixit* of the great Reformer was scarcely less weighty than in the school of Pythagoras himself? It became the habit of the Lutheran Church from its cradle to make the Word of God bend and bow to prop up those dogmas which were once for all regarded as the essentials of Divine revelation. Schneckenburger (vol. i. p. 39, preface) gives it as a characteristic of that Church, "in regard to Scripture to feel attracted in an exceptional way to that part of it which may be specially called *gospel*, making no scruple of giving it a preference to those parts of Scripture that are not so closely related to their favourite views." Hence also the habit of certain stereotyped lessons in the service of the Church, by which the rest of Scripture became a *terra incognita* to the people, ending in ignorance and neglect of the sacred volume. Perhaps the worst act of Luther in this way was the engrossing of the mutilated Roman Catholic version of the Ten Commandments in his Catechism, whereby the second commandment is wholly obliterated, the fourth (called third) is "Keep the festival," and the tenth is divided to make a ninth, the latter being "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," and the former, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife," etc. This Catechism of Luther's has been taught for 300 years over all Germany, and is still! Few in England will believe that Luther could be guilty of such a defiance of the word, "Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it." One thing more, Luther was guilty (we adhere to the word) of naturalising the Apocrypha in his Church, which is more read by far than the books of the Old Testament, and for the right of which in the Bible Lutherans contend as fiercely as if it concerned the inspiration of Scripture. With these precedents there needed but a generation to arise more indifferent to religion in general, and some daring spirit

inimical to the gospel and shaken loose from the awe of opinion, and the sluices of error were at once thrown open for the desolation of the Church. It is through a further advance in the same direction that Protestantism is now commonly defined as the revolt of the judgment and of subjective conviction against hierarchical authority, or, as otherwise expressed, "the living synthesis of the freest and acutest exercise of the intellect along with the purest and profoundest moral earnestness."—(Hundeshagen, p. 44.) But originally Protestantism was a protest for the Word from heaven, in opposition to the projects and devices of the carnal reason.

A second fundamental vice in the constitution of the Lutheran Church appears in the fatal separation of doctrinal truth from holiness of life. It is Luther's own theorem that the believer is not to be considered as *under the obligation* to produce good works.

"It is therefore as absurd and unsuitable that they say the righteous should do good works, as if they were to say God should do good, the sun should shine, the pear-tree should bring forth pears, three and seven should make ten, as all this ensues of necessity of the case from the nature of the thing. Or, to speak more plainly and distinctly, all this ensues without law and commandment in the course of nature, and freely, without constraint or compulsion. For whatever purpose anything is constituted for, it effects that without law and constraint; the sun shines naturally without command."—(Schneckenburger, vol. i. p. 117.)

This sounds very philosophical, but what if the inculcating of good works (Luke xvi. 1-9) be the cultivation by which the tree is disposed to yield its fruit? Justification by faith alone, where it exists, will produce good works, but we have no such assurance for the sole and exclusive preaching of justification by faith. It is not difficult to perceive what the results must be when this is made a normal principle in the teaching of the Church. Contrary as it is to the natural temper of the human heart to receive the righteousness from heaven with childlike faith, it is not less contrary to it to go forward in a consistent course of sin-mortification and cultivation of holiness. The extreme of self-righteousness is not more perilous, and has not proved itself more destructive, than the extreme of antinomianism. It was a philosophy, falsely so called, springing from jealousy for his precious

truth of justification by faith alone, that carried Luther to the parallogism expressed in the above quotation. It is logically true, but experimentally false, as if we should insist on applying to dynamics the formulæ of pure mathematics without allowance for friction.

The whole tenor of the Word, not less than the whole experience of the Church, teaches that the justified are not carried forward on the path of sanctification by any simple principle of righteousness, but by the rod of the Great Shepherd, who employs various means and appliances as each case requires. The dispensation which bestows free and unconditional righteousness and a gracious title to life does not exclude, but include, the relation of duty and obligation. This is the point of the awful parables of our Lord describing the doom of unfaithful servants. Warning and rebuke, self-examination and admonition, are essential throughout. Does not the same Paul, after establishing justification by faith without works, turn to the same justified persons with the warning, "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die"? If Luther answered that he designed this end of sanctification by gospel motives, by intensifying the believer's experience of the riches of free grace, we answer again, Logically right but scripturally wrong. The Holy Ghost in Scripture puts all theologians and logicians to shame by maintaining alongside of the doctrine of free grace a system of motives seemingly inconsistent with it, producing a composition of forces by which, and by which alone, the believer, wearing as he still does the body of death, moves forward in the mysterious but salutary line of sanctification. Even after Luther repented so far of his rashness as to acknowledge the place of James in the canon, he utterly repudiated his guidance, and expressly and systematically abhorred the submitting of faith to be tested by its fruits. Assurance was made to be the essence of faith; it came to be the one-sided tendency of the ministry to establish an unswerving faith; frequent communion was recommended as the means of maintaining a stable and unquestioning faith. The converse could not fail to find entrance, that wherever there was assurance there was also faith. When it is considered how prone men are, under favouring circumstances, to compensate by tenacious adherence to doctrine for laxity

and carnality of life, how tenacious this propensity is, and how hard to dislodge, even when the warnings and cautions against self-deceit are most faithfully administered, we must shudder at the sure consequences when it becomes heresy to take professing faith to task, and make it stand and give account of itself. We are not conjuring up a phantom in the shape of inferences and conclusions of our own minds. Luther was scarcely in his grave, and the first mighty impulse from the newly-discovered truths had scarcely subsided, when the consequences of this doctrine appear in all their malignity. Luther died in 1546, and Arndt, author of the famous book *Wahres Christenthum*, was born in 1555. When Arndt grew up, and entered on his office as a minister of the Word, he saw almost the whole Church given up to the delusion that it was enough to believe the doctrine of Christianity without paying attention to the life. The Lutheran Church was already come much into the condition of the Jews when John the Baptist arose, saying, "We have Abraham to our father." The Church said, "It is sufficient to believe as Luther taught;" and Arndt was constrained to address the admonition to his contemporaries, "Bring forth fruits meet for repentance." This state of things was no accident, but the genuine fruit of the Church's teaching. Though Arndt is scrupulously orthodox in the Lutheran sense, and professes on all occasions that he accepts every shibboleth by which his Church is distinguished from others, and although his book is the mildest possible plea for real godliness in heart and life by imitation of Christ, in opposition to a dead formality and external profession, he was assailed and decried on all sides as a confirmed heretic. It was only after an arduous struggle that a stray theologian here and there ventured to make a timid apology for him, till at last Gerhard (Johann) planted the ægis of his protection in front of him, and declared that he would not venture for aught in heaven and earth to condemn him (Tholuck, *passim*). Poor Arndt had to write three formal defences and nine apologetic letters for that work which has been ever since the chief pabulum of spiritual life in the cottages and homesteads of Germany, much as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* or Boston's *Fourfold State* among ourselves. In Arndt's defences he testifies that "there has been hitherto abundance of contending,

disputing, and striving for Christian doctrine, but little for Christian life." He compares the clergy of his day, in that first generation after Luther, to the builders of the tower of Babel, where each designed to build up to heaven, while the result was that their language was confounded so that no one understood the other; and as those foolish builders had to leave off, so the spiritual builders must in like manner give up their strivings in books and endless disputations, and turn over a new leaf, unless they mean to rob their hearers and themselves of salvation. This was in the close of the sixteenth century, but before the end of the seventeenth, when Spener arose, under the impulses which he had received from the Reformed Churches of Switzerland in favour of Christian life, the evil had engulfed the whole Church, so that Spener and Francke, in their protest for practical godliness alongside of and co-ordinate with faith, found themselves opposed by the whole learning and authority of the universities and pulpits.

It followed inflexibly from Luther's doctrine, that if only doctrinal integrity be secured, all the purposes of the Christian Church upon earth would be satisfied. It came in fact to be an axiom that the commission of the Lutheran Church on earth was to watch over purity of doctrine in general, and of the sacraments in particular. So far from this being considered a reproach, it is assumed by all modern writers as the admitted characteristic of the Lutheran Church. "No doubt our confession of faith teaches that the communion of believers is only to be found in a visible church, which has as marks purity of doctrine and of the sacraments."—(Kahnis, p. 273.) Life is not thought of as a mark of the true Church. Again, "If the present time withholds its testimony, yet a more just future will certainly not refuse it, to the fact that it (*viz* the ecclesiastical party in the Church) has embraced the faith as the result of upright inquiry, maintained it with genius and life in conflict with contrary tendencies, and imparted to it the impulsion of the science of every age" (p. 276).

In the same strain Schneckenburger (preface, 38) describes the Lutheran Church as occupying the position proper to one who has just passed through the process of conversion and never goes beyond it, and then proceeds, "Hence ensues the all-prevailing concern for sound doctrine, which is now to be perfectly re-

duced under the power of the mind that has become acquainted with it, and to be secured on all sides against all possible depravation ; hence the tenacious exclusiveness in the maintenance of sound doctrine, the extraordinary importance attached to the creeds, and hence the inevitable danger that at any time the understanding, urging forward unscrupulously in one direction, get the doctrine that has been regarded as pure in its power, and turn to treat it like a barren scholastic question as soon as the first tide of repentance and faith has subsided." This representation of the position of the Lutheran Church as that of the soul under the first dew of conversion may be very sentimental and poetical, but it is certainly, for a whole Church, a scripturally impossible one : and when it is set forth as a compensation for neglect of growth in sanctification, it is simply nonsense. The kingdom of heaven is compared to seed that is sown in the heart or in the world ; but if the seed, after coming up, stay in the blade, the end of the husbandman is frustrated. Just as untenable is the position that this Church should be content with being the church of sound doctrine and pure sacraments. If there be anything that the Scripture more decidedly loathes and repudiates, it is the Church where the scribes are indefatigable in doctrinal formality and minutiae, in questions and genealogies and definitions, and all kinds of subtleties, while the people are scattered abroad as sheep that have no shepherd. There can be nothing more deplorable than to read the self-satisfied comments of Kahnis and others, as they, in the review of the literature of theology, conclude that the Church has understood and fulfilled its calling, when the whole people, with exception of the merest fraction, is either ignorant of the claims of the gospel or contemns them.

It is saying nothing but what is generally known of that time, that there followed close upon the Reformation a period of spiritual surfeit, which inclined men to be satisfied with maintaining what they had acquired, and repelling every claim from whatever side to the coercion of that freedom of judgment which they had asserted for themselves. So Hundeshagen writes (p. 91), "It cannot be denied that Luther made the beginning here in the way he dealt with many elements around him." "But it appears from the works of Tholuck and

others that the Lutheran clergy were carried away by special influences to lose themselves in speculation, to the neglect of their peculiar duty as Christian pastors—to edify their flocks. Surrounded on all sides by Roman Catholics, and at least the phantoms of the Reformed and of Sacramentarians, almost every minister became a polemical writer, and, still worse, a polemical preacher, and was worked up to a bigoted conception of the anti-Christian character of all that deviated a hair's-breadth from Lutheran orthodoxy, as contained in the Augsburg Confession and Form of Concord. They entertained their flocks with numbering up hundreds of deadly errors that the Reformed and Romanists held in common with Turks and heathens, with the view of producing the greatest possible abhorrence against their doctrines. The whole vigour and ingenuity of hundreds of powerful intellects were mis-spent under this unhappy bias in proving that the Reformed (even more abhorred by the genuine Lutheran than the Roman Catholic!) believed in no one of the twelve articles of the Creed, nor in any one of the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, and that their doctrine was contrary to every one of the ten commandments, so that in effect they had no true religion at all." "Instead of seeking by the ministry of the Word, by a conscientious care of souls, and by an exemplary conversation, to evoke in each generation the same full and vigorous life as at the beginning, the clergy accustomed themselves to be satisfied with getting the articles of the creed accepted by the people in the form of a rigid law," etc. "They thought they did all that was necessary for the edification of the Church of God if they kept the *government* in a strict adherence to the orthodox creed. . . . Theologians placed their dependence on the government, and not on the spirit of life and piety in the people. . . . Worst of all, in this by no means temporary or occasional period of formalistic rigidity, the Church, in lack of real life, began to delude itself by a life that was a mere semblance. This semblance consisted in the learned occupation with the substance of religion and matters (*Stoffen*) which created an imposing literature, not only for the number of volumes it produced, and the learning displayed, but also for the genius that found exercise in it. . . . But in this termination of the great movement of the Reformation in 'corpora doctrinæ,

loci communes theologici, encheiridia theologicæ theticæ et syllabus controversiarum,' we cannot but behold a spurious development of the spirit of the Protestant Church, which could not fail in time to generate the most perilous consequences. . . . There is a certain interest in religion which men may have who have no personal concern about salvation, which is merely an attraction for that kind of scientific knowledge. . . . Yet these persons generally are entangled in the evil delusion that their acquaintance with the matter of religious truth, their zeal for religious and ecclesiastical objects, is the truest and most genuine religion, and that religion must stand or fall along with their conception of it. . . . There can be no doubt that our Protestant theology before and throughout the seventeenth century had fallen a prey to this scholastic tendency, which, wholly intent on theoretical contention, looked askance upon every great practical means for the welfare of the evangelical body, and put obstacles in its way. We need not be told that such a representation is not meant to hold good of all the chiefs among Protestant theologians, but *that this was the prevailing spirit of the majority in that period* no unprejudiced student of history can deny. . . . We must unreservedly agree in the main with those who assert, in respect of those times of purity and inflexibility of doctrine, and of universal agreement in theological creed, that the preaching was indeed more orthodox and with more entire uniformity than at any other period; but this also is true,—never was the people more deeply depraved; never the Protestant princes coarser and more regardless; never the clergy more arrogant and fanatical; never the theologians more self-willed, and the court clergy more full of intrigue; never was religion itself more a thing of heartless ceremony, the science of theology more fossilised, and Protestantism itself more paralysed and enfeebled in opposition to the Romish Church."—(Hundeshagen, pp. 95-103.)

It could not be otherwise: such a perverse heart in the great body of the ministry could have no other result but a widespread death and formality in the midst of the people. When the ministry had once surrendered themselves to the persuasion that they were doing the part of faithful shepherds when they got the people indoctrinated as to the odious char-

acter of every creed that differed from their own, it was not difficult to get the people to be of the same mind. The Scriptures, Old and New, make one sufficiently acquainted with this tendency of the heart to compensate the neglect of practical godliness by a Judaic adherence to certain easily accepted tenets, even when it is not directly cultivated from the pulpit. What must be the issue when it is made, though not consciously, the prime end of the whole ministry? Ministers and people were carried precipitously forward on a path of easy and empty self-righteousness, while the true substance and design of the gospel were evermore lost sight of. Even Tholuck, partial as he is to the Lutheran Church, is obliged to confess how few and unsatisfactory the manifestations of experimental religion are in the correspondence and actings of the theologians of that period when Lutheranism was in its zenith. It will not do to cast away such a picture with the general remark that there have been seasons of decay and coldness in all Churches. It may have a lesson for certain religionists of our own day, Plymouthists and their congeners, to contemplate such results in a Church where for a century and a half the people have been under a ministry that taught that conversion was the very essence of faith, that nothing but faith was necessary for salvation. The people of whom the German Annals (Schwegler's *Jahrbücher*) give the above picture, plainly showing that they could not have been in a worse religious and moral state, had been a century and a half assiduously taught that nothing more is necessary than justifying faith, that this of itself will bring all that is necessary to life and godliness; and above all they had been kept in an orthodox abhorrence of all reference to the law of God as the rule of Christian obedience. Such a case in history should teach that it is possible that even the doctrine of justification by faith may become a savour of death unto death, that though it be true that "*amisso articulo justificationis, simul amissu est tota doctrina Christiana,*" it is not true positively that "*stante articulo justificationis simul stat tota doctrina Christi.*" For the believer has not to look to his own assurance, possible and desirable as it is, but to Christ alone; and though faith alone justifies, yet not faith alone, but the whole Word of God, including the scriptural use

of the law, is essential for the work of salvation in the individual and in the Church. If we add to the above representation the facts that from the commencement of the Lutheran Church the people were taught in Luther's own Catechism that every individual is at baptism regenerated and partakes of the Holy Ghost—of which doctrine Principal Cunningham says in his strong way that the Church which teaches it has thereby “practically removed from men's minds, at least in countries where a profession of Christianity is established, . . . all sense and impression of their true condition, responsibility, and danger, as fallen creatures who have been subject to the curse of a broken law,”¹—and also that all who partake of the Communion, whether believers or not, receive the body and blood of Christ,—and further, that the absolution bestowed by the Lutheran clergyman before the consecration is to be received as if it were that of God Himself,—if we consider that all these soul-destroying doctrines have been propagated in the Lutheran Church, along with the partial teaching of justification by faith, to the exclusion of every care of trying faith by the life, we can no longer be surprised that the truth at the root of the Reformation proves so ineffectual in the land that gave it birth.

A third sad feature of German Protestantism has ever been its avowed and absolute Erastianism. Though this evil has been virtually as complete in the Anglican Establishment, yet the theologians of that Church have generally, at least of late, had so much discretion as to colour and cloak its naked deformity, whereas the Germans have theoretically embraced it, and boasted of it. It contributes to explain, if not to justify, this relation, if we remember that the German princes were originally the actual representatives of the Church. The compacts of the Empire were made with the princes and not with their subjects, and that with reference to a definite scheme of doctrine, so that any change in creed or ecclesiastical fashion was regarded as invalidating the compact. The Jesuits made the Form of Concord, which was introduced for composing dissensions in the Lutheran body, an excuse for beginning the Thirty Years' War. It is well known that when the prince changed his sentiments, from being Lutheran became Reformed, as in

¹ Vol. i. p. 560.

the Palatinate, or *vice versa*, or from being Protestant became Romanist, the whole people took on the same complexion, generally with the condition that recusants had to emigrate. For this authority of the secular ruler in religion, the theologians invented the fiction of the sovereign being "*summus episcopus*," under which title the King of Prussia still takes order in all ecclesiastical matters throughout his realm. So recently as 1824 this right of the sovereign in liturgical arrangements was elaborately maintained by Delbrück, Augusti, and Marheinecke, against Schleiermacher. At the Reformation it seemed the only possible way of securing standing-room for the Protestant faith in the Empire, to identify it with the person of the prince. But surely it was a grievous dereliction of Christian principle when men consented to accept security for themselves by a compact which surrendered the larger division of their country *in perpetuum* to the dominion of the superstition which they themselves were escaping. If this was sinful dependence on an arm of flesh or human policy, it has bitterly avenged itself. Luther, we must remember, had adopted the maxim that all other things are of comparative indifference, if only preaching of the gospel be preserved, *i.e.* the doctrine of justification by faith and his view of the sacraments. No scruple seems ever to have arisen about the point that the prince should exercise the same jurisdiction in the Church as in civil affairs, a persuasion which has been so inveterate in the Lutheran Church that it kept Gosner and the most spiritually-minded men from having any sympathy for the protest of the Scotch Church and the zeal of the Disruption, up to 1843. As long as the princes were themselves devout, and guided by their court theologians, the evil consequences of this arrangement were not directly apparent to the Church itself. On the contrary, it was and is quite the ideal of the Lutheran pastor, that the prince consults with them all measures for the benefit of religion, and is their ready coadjutor to suppress with a strong hand every heretical deviation. They could not but approve of the system whereby all in the land, without exception, were compelled to attend on ordinances; every child as soon as born was submitted to the water of baptism; and the youth when

approaching maturity—a boy at fourteen, a girl at seventeen years of age—were brought to confirmation and the communion-table, as the indispensable passport to enter on any path of life. The pastor felt himself thus clothed with the twofold importance of the minister of religion and of the official dignitary ; for every parishioner who incurred his censure drew on himself at the same time some mark of displeasure from the civil authority. It was a most short-sighted policy, but attended with such pleasing experiences that we cannot wonder men hoped it would continue. The minister felt no necessity for cultivating the favour of the people when he could, to some purpose, ally himself with those in authority.

Thus it happened that the ministers of religion in Germany committed the fatal mistake of identifying the cause of religion with the ruler rather than with the people, which mistake had various fatal results. In the first place it served to enhance the power of the prince, and caused the degradation and neglect of the people, for whom, as Israel's prophets so often tell us, both prince and prophet are designed by God ; and then in process of time it gave rise to an antagonism of interest between the people and that religion of which such men were the representatives. In this respect there was a seeming justification of the reproach raised by the Jesuits against Protestantism, that it had promoted absolute power ; for the ante-Reformation priests had ever made it their business, in the interests of the Papacy, not indeed to promote the liberties of the people, but to keep the balance against the power of the State. Now let us mark how the mischief was more and more developed in the course of events. The wars which under the name of religion desolated and distracted the heart of Europe in the seventeenth century, specially that known as the Thirty Years' War, from 1618-1648, issued in making every little prince absolute in his own territory—for the Peace of Westphalia took no account of the people at all,—a state of things which continued a century and a half up to the French Revolution. Germany had all this time thirty-four absolute princes, each of whom acted according to the counsel of his own will within his own borders (for any appeal to the Empire, though formally competent, was in fact a nullity). Throughout this period a thinking

civilised people groaned under almost all the evils of Oriental despotism : the little courts were ruled by mistresses and favourites ; each petty prince vied with the doings of Versailles, which was the cynosure of all voluptuaries ; and the evil went so far that the Landgrave of Hesse sold his subjects by thousands to England for her American wars, pocketing the money to waste in his dissolute pleasures, while fathers of families were compelled at the point of the bayonet to quit their homes and country, and go abroad to perish in a quarrel in which they had not even a nominal part. Under this crying iniquity there was not found a minister of religion who had the principle or the courage to lift a remonstrating voice. Erastianism had cut out the life and soul of the conscience in Protestant countries, and a theory of the absolute right of princes was bearing its nauseous fruits. But this was not all : that evil was of a kind that spreads like the leprosy, till, unless divinely healed, it causes the entire dissolution of the framework into which it has found entrance. Such doings caused men not quite embruted to meditate upon the constitution from which such consequences flowed. The German is by nature of a loyal, rational, and honest disposition beyond most peoples. We repeat it, that there is a natural loyalty resident in the German heart which is not easily exterminated. But this is fatal wherever loyalty to man takes precedence of loyalty to God, and this was the result which the ministers of religion had been all along, no doubt undesignedly yet sinfully, fostering by their perverse administration. This result appears in the popular proverb, which is in everybody's mouth, "*Herrndienst geht vor Gottesdienst*," i.e. "Duty to a master takes precedence of duty to God." The duty of passive obedience towards the prince had been inculcated without any sufficient caveat in favour of religion and equity ; the implicit subjection which had been yielded to the Papacy was at the Reformation transferred without qualification to the ruler of the country : as "*summus episcopus*," the prince acquired alongside of his material power the still more desirable attribute of a sacrosanct inviolability ; and in connection with the precious boon which the gospel of free grace conveyed, the deadly mischief which had crept in along with it was not immediately perceived, till it had become inveterate, and could no longer be separated from

the body. In process of time, the Protestant conscience, which had willingly consented to a prince of the same faith and with the same zeal for the glory of God, found itself trodden and abused by the caprice of wicked infidel princes who cared for nothing but their own pleasures. The subject found himself at last diametrically opposed, in the dictates of his understanding, in his interests, in his views of right and wrong, not only to the civil authority, which claimed him as a chattel entirely at its disposal, but also to the minister of religion who taught a doctrine that justified his evil condition. Casting his eyes abroad, the German Protestant beheld with envy how other nations were enjoying the blessings of rational freedom from which he was excluded, and, not unjustly, made the ministers of religion responsible for his unfortunate case. In short, political light and liberty, which are the natural fruits of gospel truth, and which are only duly developed and differenced from revolution under the fostering influence of the gospel,—those political benefits which the man should have inherited and acquired from the gospel were brought to the German by a merely human instrumentality, by the exercise of his natural human sense, in comparing the state of political nonage, in which he was retained, with the more fortunate condition of those nations to whom he felt himself in many respects superior—inducing the deplorable result that Christianity became associated in the national mind with irrational slavish subjection to the will of men. It became at last an axiom, which no one took pains to contradict, propagated sometimes in honest conviction, oftener still in determined hostility to the gospel, that faith and servility are inseparably conjoined, and that all who care for political freedom and man's social rights must stand opposed to a religion by which these life-blessings are systematically repudiated. It is a fact, which none among modern Germans has ever heard, or at least has never studied, that when God planted Israel in the land of promise under the shadow of Divine institutions, he constituted a republic. Protestantism began with calling into life the conscience of the nation, and teaching each to feel himself not a tool of the priest's, nor a vassal of the Church, but a responsible individual. Erastianism, after brooding over the land for ages, ended in working the conviction that if men are to be independent self-

determining agents, they must cast the whole scheme of religion to the winds as a compact between its ministers and the throne for maintaining a degrading yoke over the minds of men.

A fourth fatal defect of the Lutheran denomination is found in neglect of the scriptural constitution of the Church. The Lutherans never discovered any necessity for the scriptural autonomy (self-rule) of the Christian Church. They retained in its constitution the anti-scriptural leaven of a distinction of clergy and laity, and accorded to Christian people, Christ's clergy, no share in the management of Church affairs. Luther's maxim that the preaching of the main truths of the gospel would set and keep all straight in the Church, without any particular organisation, was too consistently carried out in practice, and is still maintained in all its integrity by strict Lutherans. When everywhere in Lutheran countries clergy were placed in the parishes, who were still called priests, heard confessions, gave absolution, and set forth the real body and blood of Christ in the Communion; when diets for divine service were appointed, catechisms and liturgies composed, and order taken for baptisms and burials, and for the observance of the festivals; the Church, as if completely furnished and equipped, was sent on its way through all the contingencies of the future, without inquiry whether there was a rule given by God's Spirit for its government. Luther retained consciously much of which he did not quite approve, in the belief that a more suitable time would soon arrive for separating the precious and the vile, and he took no account of the probability of that which actually ensued—that his Church would maintain, with superstitious veneration, every pin and nail of the tabernacle as he had created it for them. Thus it happened that the ministers of religion formed the Church, and the congregation became a flock to be guided in leading-strings, in all respects as in the Roman Catholic, in permanent nonage, without say or vote, or of course opinion or concern, in the interests of Christ's kingdom. The pastor was responsible only to the Government or the Court created by it, and, in a material way, dependent on the patron in his neighbourhood; towards the people he stood in the high attitude of the sole administrator of divine things. The Lutheran minister was, in his own communion, just the

counterpart of the Romish priest—a position to which his Church's view of the sacraments of itself tended, with the essential difference in favour of the Romanist, that the Lutheran pastor lacked his ecclesiastical backing. It lay in human nature that the clerical functionary thus isolated inclined to attach himself to the higher and educated classes, and treated their vices and prejudices with indulgence, while directing the severity of doctrine against the life and practices of the lower orders. There existed no wholesome reaction upon this clerical Church from the body of the congregation, and the impression gradually prevailed that the whole *onus* of the kingdom of Christ, and whole responsibility, rested upon the men that were ordained to rule. In the case of wise, faithful, and energetic Christians, as the first generation of Reformers in general were, this evil would not show in all its magnitude, but the natural gravitation of human character must at last manifest itself. It was a fearful mistake, in confidence of a human theory, to despise the provisions which had been made by Divine wisdom in furnishing the Church against the hierarchical and clerical bias that is indigenous to human nature when left to itself—the same provisions that appear originally in the commonwealth of Israel, when the prophets and elders were a counterpoise to the spirit of caste in the priesthood—and then not less distinctly in the ruling elders and deacons of the Christian congregation. As long as the Lutheran clergy enjoyed the sure and unlimited support of the Government, this defect, though operating in its full force, was not very apparent. But the times changed, and when the day arrived when every institution had to seek a popular basis as the condition of further efficiency, nay, of existence—when the Government was constrained to court the people in behalf of its own stability, and was swayed in its actings by political considerations, and tempted to cut itself loose from every institution that could not commend itself to the people—the Lutheran Church was found suspended in mid-air, without any hold or place on that platform of national sympathy or interests on which all claims must be disputed and maintained. The Lutheran Church did not appreciate the Divine organisation in the day when it had worthy sons in its bosom, who would have planted its authority insubvertibly in the affections and hearts of a Christian people;

and the consequence is, that it must submit to receive a secular organisation from the hands of those who are enemies to its faith, and careless of its wellbeing. It was a lack of faith and scriptural wisdom, and compliance with a false clerical bias, to overlook the dignity with which the Scripture clothes the Christian people, which consented to make the Church of Christ a parasite of the State, and then looked in vain to her members to deliver her out of the hand of her adversary in the day when the organs of Government were alien to her cause, and only concerned to reduce her to the status of a political machine. Jealously avoiding every semblance of conformity to the Reformed Church, and every link of contiguity, she refused to associate a popular element with her clergy, whom she gloried in regarding as strictly a priesthood; and now, in her degenerate days, she must stoop at command to choose church counsellors (*Kirchenräthe*) from classes that have nothing but worldly distinction to bring for propping up a fabric which they consider as still deserving political conservation. The Lutheran Church was wont to reproach the Reformed with its poverty and modest simplicity; but it has at last been proved that the Reformed Church, though poor in respect of festivals, robes, titles, altars, liturgies, and absolutions, is richer in the day of trial in all that constitutes the true efficiency of a Christian Church. Whence, to take only one example, have sprung all the great missionary, Bible, and tract societies in Reformed countries, of which only dwarfed paradigms appear under Lutheran régime, but from the sense and intelligence rooted in the hearts of the people, that every believer has as full a part and responsibility, not only in Christ personally, but in the whole machinery of His work and kingdom, as those who in the way of order and administration are set up to conduct it?

It is but the natural consequence of such a state of things, that the mass of the people are, *de facto*, without religion. As a common observer wrote on one occasion, in *Evangelical Christendom*, "The people of North Germany seem to retain no more of religion than the vague idea of a God." In such case the solemn warnings in the Epistles to the Seven Churches lead us to expect the most extreme spiritual calamity, unless prevented by repentance and a baptism of new zeal for the truth.

Is there any appearance of such reform in the German Church? That is the urgent question. There has doubtless been a very general and active movement going on within its bounds, and superficial observers speak of revival. A revival in the German Church! It would stir and gladden the heart of the world. But we must distinguish between a re-awakening of ecclesiastical zeal, such as the Roman Catholic Church can often boast of, and a revival of spiritual life, such as comes from the Holy Spirit working by the truth.

The present religious movement in Germany dates from the attempts on the life of the King, which forced even the most stupid and stagnant to consider the appalling ungodliness into which the masses had sunk. This set the pastors and clergy on the contemplation of measures for recovering the lapsed masses to the ranks of the Church. The spring of action here was not sympathy for lost men, lost for time and eternity (the latter few believe, for at the grave's mouth men are indiscriminately assured of salvation), but the perception of the danger from this state of things to society and the Church. This was the impelling motive, and it has wrought to some purpose to the end it had in view, launched and seconded, as their schemes have been, with all the resources of Government. By bold enactments, for the observance of which the whole police of the land is ever responsible, the Minister of Public Worship (Puttkammer), who is thoroughly in earnest in his work, has succeeded in getting the shops closed and public business stopped for three hours in the forenoon and two hours in the afternoon of Sunday (*i.e.* the Church's hours are observed, but not the Lord's day), and in getting the attendance on the church service increased. The mind of Government being decidedly expressed in this direction, all public functionaries, as well as all whom they draw in their wake, are more attentive to the externals of religion, and pastors and church courts vie with each other in zeal to have all within their bounds regularly baptized, confirmed, and married with church forms; as also in zeal for town missions and young men's associations. This a Minister can effect: placing orthodox professors in every vacant chair, and giving the patronage of the authorities to orthodox preachers, seeing to it that the festivals have all advantages, he can produce such appearances as might seduce

a casual observer to suppose that some mighty spiritual revolution is passing over the country. In the present instance, alas! it is not so. It is nothing resembling that Reformation that began in the cell and heart of the monk, and went forth in the power of the Divine Spirit to bless and subdue nations. The present is as yet the product of human counsels; there is might and power on its side, but nowhere apparent the Spirit of God. It is not the conversion of men's souls that is sought, but the re-establishment of the Church's lost authority. The town missionaries are not designed to deal with men for their soul's welfare (if they do this, it is incidental!), but to dole out benefactions to the poor, and induce them to attend church. It is not in this way that a spiritual work is initiated. We hear much of deliberations of church courts and the diligence of the police, but when is there a prayer-meeting to solicit the countenance of Him who says, "I will be entreated of them to do it for them"? We know of a case where a circular was sent abroad, inviting ministers and believers in Germany to unite with brethren in other countries in prayer for the rising generation, in reference to the special temptations of the age; and the answer from those reputed as the most spiritual men in Württemberg was to the effect that they of the Lutheran Church did not require such subsidiary means, as they had all in the original more complete constitution of their Church. Nowhere is there a trace, we will not say of a general concern in the mass of the people (for these are daily getting more hostile and more obdurate against the old faith to which their fathers adhered), but of a change of life and work of grace in those that adhere to the Church. Of course there are spots like the Wüpperthal, where religious life has ever been more real, and circles that are more closely connected with Great Britain, and are stirred up by what they have seen or heard of God's work in other countries; but our remarks apply to the German Church over its large extent.

Were we to regard mere zeal and its external outgoings we might as well talk of a revival in the Romish Church, the people of which never perhaps adhered with more bigotry to their priests, while displaying a fanatical hatred against God's Word and contrariety to its spirit. The revival in Germany is in favour of all the enormities above described of pure Luther-

anism, that at last brought the nation to such a pass (for what other issue can there be of a religion of sacraments?) that they were swept before the rationalistic flood without resistance. Who can rejoice in a revival of that spirit and system which formed the very primal cause of the calamity? We know from inspired sources wherein the essentials and circumstances of a revival consist, such as that under Samuel in Jericho—that the people remove their idols, confess the sin and error that had corrupted them, turn to seek God with contrition and endeavour after faithfulness in life. But the German Church, after the terrible repeated rebukes of God for a century back, turns to go forward in the career of its old errors as if all had been an accident. Ministers and synods boast of the numbers who are baptized and who come forward to the altar, but we nowhere hear of phenomena of the divine life and conversion to God. We cannot evade the conviction that conversion is a thing they are not seeking, as indeed can scarcely be the case when the sacraments are unduly exalted. The zeal of the pastors takes the shape of holding high the insignia of the Church above described. The colporteurs of the Bible Society testify that the mania in favour of the Apocrypha (which was quelled for a season) is becoming daily fiercer and more general, so that the pastors generally dissuade their people from buying Bibles without that pernicious appendage. This is a revival of a certain kind: “*ex uno disce omnes.*” After these writings have been so irrefragably proved to be spurious, what can we think of a Church reviving in zeal to make them an essential part of the Bible? Then the poisonous dogma of regeneration by baptism is ostentatiously proclaimed in all the churches, for in this the orthodox and the rationalist agree, in assuring the people that their state is good by virtue of external ordinances. Oh, it is sad to hear ministers that are sent to address the summons in Christ’s name, “Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead,” teaching their hearers that they have all received, and have in them, the germ of eternal life by sprinkling with water! People in Great Britain cherish the delusion that this doctrine has been dropped, or in some way divested of its noxious character, but they must have embraced this persuasion from a very limited induction. It is only sadder still to see the minister of religion come

forward over the coffin of him who has lived and died in open profaneness, and give the assurance that such man will yet meet his friends in glory, and had more faith than he himself was aware. Not only the pulpit but the grave is coerced into the service of lulling men asleep to eternal ruin. Would not a revived Church seek to clear itself of the iniquity of mutilating God's commandments, and of causing all the youth to be taught that as the Ten Commandments which is not so? Would not a revived Church show itself alive to the evil that the whole people from highest to lowest trespass on that sacred day which the Almighty has taken to himself from the seven? There is never a voice heard against the profanation of this day by those in high places in concerts and pageantries, and theatres and operas and ballets. If under such circumstances the preachers thunder against the vices, public-houses, and obscenities of the lower orders, while overlooking the other, it convicts them of partiality in the sight of God, and excites bitterness in the people. There can be no word of revival as long as the work of the ministry with men from the cradle to the grave is to comfort and reassure those who need to be roused out of death by the trumpet call to repent and be converted. Such duty the Lutheran Church has ever shown to be distasteful to her wherever attempted, in the days of Arndt, or Spener, or Zinzendorf, against whose endeavours the Lutheran clergy declared as against all that "tends to detract from the authority of the Church, and to make aught more than preaching and the sacraments necessary for maintaining the Christian life;" this means "no special urgency, no dealing with individual souls, no prayer-meetings nor conventicles even." Perhaps the one thing that everybody knows about Germany is that it tramples on the Lord's day; but in truth no German can possibly know aught of the sacredness of this day, as the whole youth of the country learn from the Catechism, not "Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy," but "Observe the festival;" and one thing more: all the passages in the New Testament which commend the *first day of the week* to the Church are mistranslated, so that the German finds nowhere in the New Testament mention of the first day of the week.

We say that a revived Church sitting quietly down with this mass of God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine is

unimaginable, but just as little surely can we fancy such a one hugging the yoke of Erastianism. Our time is disposed to make light of this grievous evil, which the Covenanters rated as so inconsistent with Christ's honour, that they were ready any day to lay down their lives rather than suffer its little finger to rest upon them, or cast one grain of incense on its altar. If the German Church could flourish, as many would persuade us, while professedly and undisguisedly clothing the secular arm with all Christ's royal prerogative over his blood-bought heritage and portion, confining the Lord Jesus to certain functions of his priestly and prophetic office which are limited by the pleasure of the State, we must conclude that Erastianism cannot be that "shade of deadly night" as which our stout forefathers denounced it. We adhere to the old representation as not more confirmed by history and fact than demanded by the tenor of Scripture. No instance serves better than that before us to prove that this was the fatal parasite that killed the plant which admitted its embrace. The manner of its operation can be sketched without great difficulty. The German Protestant Church was apparently cast from its cradle into the arms of the powers of this world. It was the electors and princes who were its chief patrons, and made wars and treaties, ventured land and life for it. Now came the evil consequence, that as it was born of policy it continued to be managed by policy, and the princes who had legislated for its introduction thought themselves entitled to legislate in its internal economy. This is often made an apology for the Continental Church, but unfairly, for the Scotch Church was in as much danger of the same issue from Morton and the Lords of the Congregation, and was saved by that clear perception which the Scotch Reformers had of the essential and inalienable right of the Lord Jesus Christ to exercise a spiritual rule in His own house, which was, at least as to the magnitude and infinite importance of the question, hidden from the others.

Yet for 150 years the arrangement had something very seductive for the German ecclesiastic. During that time the princes were in general ecclesiastically devout, even when, as in most cases, coarse and carnal in life, they made the churchmen their confidants in politics as in other things, so that in appearance it seemed as if the State were ruled by the Church,

when, in fact, the Erastian principle was carried into effect by churchmen. It was invaluable to the Church that this close alliance with the State put it in the position to quash every, even the slightest remonstrance against sound Lutheran doctrine. But very grave evils were latent under this condition of external comfort and dignity, and the clergy leant more towards the great, with whom they, and they only, had so many common bonds of sympathy; the breach between clergy and laity, which the spirit of Lutheranism tends to create, was ever widening, and, above all, the people, kept aloof from free inquiry, became like a bandaged cripple, that knows not how to play the man in the hour of trial. Taught to honour Christ, bow at his name, and live morally, but taught also that they received the main benefit of religion by a rite, having never passed through the throes of a true regeneration, in which the life that follows the power and authority of the Son of God are engraven on the heart beyond the power of infidel argument to shake them, the Lutheran people, kept in tutelage or bondage, civil and ecclesiastical, knew nothing of the call to conflict not merely with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers in heavenly places, nor of that freedom with which Christ makes his people free on all sides, and, as soon as the authority of the creed and the Church which they had implicitly trusted were made contemptible, they were scattered like sheep when their shepherd deserts them.

The sore day for Erastians is when the prince becomes an infidel or enemy of the Church, a day which is certain to come. After the Thirty Years' War, in which the French had been the allies of the Protestant states, French manners, vices, and ways of thinking flowed in upon Germany like an inundation, and then there was nowhere scriptural and spiritual training in the people to offer effectual resistance and turn the day. When the thirty-four sovereigns' courts in Germany became so many centres of infidelity, as well as of vile and dissolute manners, and each of these sovereigns was "*summus episcopus*" in his own territory, and when the Landgrave of Hesse sold his subjects by hundreds to England for her American wars, then indeed Church and people were put upon their trial. The State had kept the Church and people leaning on it till they were spiritually enervated, and then deserted them. For

a hundred years and more after the Reformation, when in England and Scotland men were braving the scaffold, pillory, and prison for conscience' sake, not a creature was found in that great land to meet the frowns of authority or to risk a hair of his head for an opinion differing from that in vogue around him. Thus it was that in the days of the mighty men of the Lutheran Church they were kept thundering against men of straw, caricatures of the Reformed, proving that these held ninety-nine errors in common with the Turks, and believed no article of the creed, and transgressed every one of the ten commandments; and when the real danger came in the shape of a people whose faith was shaken by infidel assaults, there was none found to stand in the breach. We are ready to think that if there had been a man at hand competent to deal with Lessing in the same way as Cudworth disposed of Hobbes, there might have been a happier result for the country. But the other, as necessary condition, was wanting in a people qualified from knowledge of Scripture truth to appreciate and improve such victory. It was an irreparable misfortune for Germany that Erastianism kept the people for centuries in civil and religious serfdom, till they at last obtained the moiety of political rights which they enjoy from the hand of infidelity, which we see in this very case renders nugatory the gift it boasts of conferring, failing to work out the problem of political freedom like the Puritans in a manly and consistent adherence to that gospel which has the promise of this life as of that which is to come. It is an evil of incalculable magnitude that the action of the Church in Germany has at last produced in all classes of the community, Jews and Christians, the ineffaceable impression that the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ is the ally of tyranny and absolute rule, and thus opposed to all the liberties of the race in the field of intellect as of political life.

This enormous evil is at this moment rampant as ever in the German Church, and all appearances to the contrary are but a blind. It has borrowed some things from the Reformed Church, and put on a patch of "liberal constitution here and there on its surface,—'*Kirchenrätbe*,' in imitation of our elders, and synods in which such questions are discussed as have previously been permitted by the higher powers; but the

Government has all the reins in its hand as surely as of old, appointing the members of consistory, nominating a large number of members of synods, besides all the superintendents, professors of theology, and others, who are naturally at its beck; and, worst of all, the people at large neither knows nor cares what the Church does. Less than ever before does the Church breathe a word of remonstrance against the offences of those in high places. Erastian Germany has come so far as to make a special heaven for the great of the earth, and Humboldt and Goethe, who would have nothing to do with Christ and his gospel while here (the latter expressly calls himself a heathen, and says the gospel does not suit him), are generally canonised, while no voice reminds the people that they are "laid in the grave like sheep, and the righteous shall have dominion over them in the morning."

It is a gulf not to be filled up which lies between the Reformed principle of accepting only that for which the inspired writings give authority, and the Lutheran of allowing all that these writings do not prohibit. By virtue of this principle altars were set up in the churches, upholding the idea of priest and sacrifice, candles lighted when the sun shines, crucifixes or figures of the Son of God on the cross erected, and thus advancing they allow what savours more of the spirit of the world than of the gospel, till the theatres, where Satan's spirit reigns, are treated as educational institutions, and are clothed with the epithet of holy (*die heilige Kunst*). No wonder that at last the boundary-line between church and world becomes hazy, and art and religion are confounded, and even the most devout cease to see the hideous incongruity of such oratorios as set forth in the luxury of enchanting sounds the agonies of the Son of God on the cross, oratorios which are annually performed in the principal churches for the entertainment of a mixed multitude, most of them Jews. No wonder that the Church has become a baptized heathenism, and art a kind of substitute for religion, and the great men of art compassed with a halo of sacredness.

We can believe in no revival¹ to any extent for the German

¹ The evangelist is more liable to delusion with a German assembly, since those who come under religious impressions so readily attain to peace. They know nothing of law-work in the heart, and do not meet the word

people until their ministers teach them to expect salvation from the word believed, and not from the external rite; until the Word of God is set in due honour, and the Apocryphal writings cast out from that co-ordinate place which they obtained in dark times; until the members of the Church are guided to observe the Lord's day; until the offences against the divine commandments are confessed and forsaken; until the Church ceases to lead up all the youth of the country of a certain age indiscriminately to the Lord's Table, even those who cannot examine themselves, and therefore eat and drink judgment to themselves; and last, not least, till they cease to give to Cæsar the things that are God's and Christ's, and cast the throne of the secular ruler out of the range of the Church which Christ has purchased to be his own, to lead and guide as a living shepherd by his Word and Spirit in the paths of peace and power.

But *cui bono*? Whom does this concern? What benefit is any one to have by raising this question? Surely it concerns the whole Church to have the atmosphere purified, and not to be left in ignorance whether a portion of the visible Church be ruled by the darkness of this world or by the principles of heavenly truth. But it concerns ourselves; for if we countenance a Church that deals thus unfaithfully with its people, it will infallibly react upon ourselves, and we shall become indifferent to and reconciled to practices which we believe to be at variance with spiritual life and prosperity. But it concerns us to determine our course of action towards brethren, as we cannot deny it to be a duty to sympathise with those who openly protest against what neutralises and spoils the principles of grace. There is a strange confusion of ideas in this field, and those who would abhor the idea of associating with a British Puseyite think themselves justified in owning and aiding the same type from Germany because he is a German, and in discountenancing those who are seeking to deliver men's souls from the power of that noxious error. It is surely time to let in daylight upon this very important question.

"Sell all" in the way of following Christ. There is a receiving of Christ without his cross which enables those who know nothing of duties to get a full peace. But if the Spirit do not first convince of sin, neither does he convince of righteousness, and the peace is not his, and will not abide.

But *cui bono*? What is the upshot of the whole, and whom is it to profit? In the *first* instance, the truth itself. It scatters the hallucination, so widely prevailing, that religious life should rise to its highest prosperity in such an atmosphere of errors and unfaithfulness. Does the world need to be told that there may be a certain luxuriance of theological science, when men of mind treat certain high themes with genial power and warmth, drawing and delighting crowds of students, and casting a nimbus of reputation around the seat of their teaching, whilst the truth that alone is sanctifying and saving is afar off, and the people perish? Thus it was with the scribes in the days of our Saviour on earth, thus with the great scholastic doctors, and thus it is with the great body of German professors. Even if a breathing of grace comes upon such a church as did visit Germany in 1817 after its neologian deluge, it fails of its end through the attempt men make to subordinate it to the revival of Lutheran errors. But, *secondly*, we say it is profitable in our own self-defence; for if our Churches coquet with those on the Continent, and, for the sake of great names and reminiscences, compliment and flatter those who make rites and festivals and sacraments the main religion, we are certain to be ourselves infected as those who go too freely about a house that has the plague. We shall find the evil we treat so indulgently at work undermining our principles at home. There has been already superabundant experience of this kind through the crowds of youth who have studied at German universities, and the young people who have been sent to be educated there, where so many have suffered such havoc in their souls as can never be compensated, and who at the same time introduce the leaven among ourselves. Once more, it is in the interest of our brethren of the true Church—we mean those brethren in Germany who are testifying and suffering for truth against error. There has been much injustice committed against Christ's people in this respect. Men suppose they have a mission to benefit fallen Churches, and think themselves entitled, with this high object, to court the good opinion of those at fault by turning their backs upon Christ's brethren who fill the place of his witnesses in sack-cloth in these dark lands! Shall this carnal policy have a blessing? It is as when the good kings of Judah went down to help Ahab (Ephraim was also an erring church!) and

turned their backs on the prophets who testified in God's Spirit against his abominations. The witnesses for truth on the Continent at this day are not less Christ's prophets, standing as they do on the ground of the Word, than Elijah and Elisha were in theirs. Shall such contempt of Christ's people bring a blessing? There has been too much of this in the Free Churches. Has it not recoiled on themselves?

DANIEL EDWARD.

ART. V.—*Personality and Law : The Duke of Argyll.*¹

IT is now sixteen years since the Duke of Argyll published *The Reign of Law*. In the preface to that work there was an intimation that the subject might be further pursued at some future time. That has now been done. In ten successive articles, or chapters, on "The Unity of Nature," published in the *Contemporary Review*, and soon to be gathered into a volume, we have a sequel to that work of great ability and value.

By these works the Duke has laid his contemporaries and those who shall come after under an obligation it would be difficult to estimate. *The Reign of Law* was published opportunely. Physical science had achieved great triumphs both as science and as subservient to the practical purposes of life. In view of this, not her special devotees alone, but all right-thinking men were exultant. In the deeper insight into Nature, and in the more efficient and wider control of her forces, they found new stimulus to inquiry and an added dignity to life. But in connection with this, and deriving prestige from it, there had come in a materialistic philosophy, shrouding in twilight, if not extinguishing, the hope of a future life, tending to lower the tone of morality, and changing the benignant aspect of law into the sternness and rigidity of fate. Every physical event was under law. Law was fixed, settled, uniform. It must be, to be law. There was, therefore, under the reign of law thus viewed, an order of events that was a barrier to prayer, and that no will could change. At this juncture it

¹ From the *Princeton Review*.

was an unspeakable relief to many to be shown that events are brought about, not by a single force or law, but by a combination and adjustment of forces not only admitting but requiring the interposition of purpose and will, and that this rigidity, this inflexibility and absolute uniformity of law, is the very feature of it that makes the whole system of laws capable of being adjusted by will and flexible to its purposes. This the Duke showed in *The Reign of Law* with great beauty and amplitude of illustration, and with a clearness that left no room for doubt. Scope was thus given to freedom, and a way was opened for an answer to prayer not only, but for an answer without a miracle.

Another concomitant and outgrowth of the materialistic combined with the scientific movement was a denial of purpose in Nature as reached by contrivance. The question here involved is fundamental; for if purpose reached by contrivance cannot be found in Nature, man has no data on which to base the belief of an Intelligence and a Will back of Nature.

In discussing this question the Duke showed that contrivance for the accomplishment of purpose is a necessity that arises out of the immutability of Natural Forces, and that the whole order of Nature is one vast system of contrivance by which the unchangeable demands of law are met and satisfied. As a part of this discussion we have an investigation of "the machinery of flight," than which there is nothing of the kind in the language more original and beautiful.

But ample as is the exposition of contrivance in Nature, and satisfactory as it must be to those who admit it to be contrivance, perhaps a word may be added to meet the sceptical attitude of those who deny that. That there should be such denial on the part of any who study Nature is surprising, since purpose and contrivance, or that which simulates them, are the only stimulus and guide in such study. We study Nature for the thought that is in it. If we deny to it thought as revealed in contrivance and purpose, it means nothing, and can no more be studied than a book that means nothing. That there are in Nature numberless instances of what would be contrivance if arranged by man no one can doubt. No definition of a contrivance can be framed that these will not satisfy. The question then is, and the only question, Have we a right to regard these

arrangements as caused by a Being having Intelligence and Will analogous to our own? This we naturally believe. If it be not so, language is falsely constructed, for, as the Duke has shown, those who deny it are constantly obliged to use language that implies it. If it be not so, if these marvellous appearances of purpose and contrivance are mere semblances, then Nature herself is constructed on the principle of falsehood. It would be interesting, if there were space, to trace this phase of scepticism to its source.

Passing to his papers on "The Unity of Nature," we find the Duke carrying over the universality of law as an element of that unity. In doing this he shows the extent of the unity, involving as it does the interaction of light and heat and gravitation, which seem to pervade all space, and the adjustment of these, together with that of the substances of Nature with their chemical laws, to the demands of organic and sensitive life. He shows, in opposition to the agnostics, that man has power to attain valid knowledge on these subjects, and still that he is no exception to the unity of Nature because of this, or because of his capacity, denied to the brutes, of improvement as a race. He does show, however, that man is an exception to that unity by his capacity of retrogression or development downwards, and by the fact of such development. "That," he says in his sixth paper, "which is rarely exceptional, and indeed absolutely singular in man, is the persistent tendency of his development to take a wrong direction." He shows, as Whately had shown before him, that man could not have been originally a savage; and in treating of the history of religion he makes it clear that "the famous generalisation by Comte of the four necessary stages in the history of religion" is baseless. Instead of the order fetishism, polytheism, monotheism, and then Comtism, he shows that monotheism was first.

Round each of the points above mentioned, as well as others treated of, strong interest gathers at the present time. In the discussion of these we are struck with the clearness of the statements made, and with the ample equipment of knowledge in natural history, in physics, in historical research, and in mental and moral science that reveals itself as it is needed. We admire also the uniform candour manifested towards those of opposing views, and the modesty which led the Duke to say,

in the preface to his papers on the Unity of Nature which he proposes to publish in a volume, "The publication of it as a series of articles in this *Review*, before its final appearance as a volume, will afford me, I hope, the advantage of hearing and of seeing what may be said and written of its errors or of its deficiencies."

In accordance with the above suggestion, and recognising fully the great service done by these works, we venture to inquire whether the relation of Personality to Law, constantly involved in the discussion, is rightly given—whether the theory of the reign of natural law and of the unity of Nature is not so carried out as to trench, not avowedly, but logically and really, on the sphere and prerogatives of personality.

In doing this we first notice the chapter on "The Supernatural," and the conception of that that runs through both works. Of the relation of man to Nature there are two distinct conceptions. These are clearly seen and distinctly stated by the Duke. In his first paper on the Unity of Nature he says: "And of this unity we who see it, and think of it, and speak of it—we are a part. In body and in mind we belong to it, and are included in it." That is one view. Of this he says, "It is more easy to admit this as a general proposition than really to see it as a truth and to accept all the consequences it involves. The habitual attitude of our thoughts is certainly not in accordance with it." We have here an admission which involves a strong presumption against his proposition. But he goes on to say, and this gives the other view, "We look on 'Nature' as something outside of us—something on which we can look down, or to which we can look up, according to our mood; but in any case as something in which we are exceptions, and which we can and ought to regard from an external point of view." That it is natural for us thus to regard nature as "something outside of us" he admits still more distinctly in his fifth paper. He says—

"We are all quite accustomed to think of man as not belonging to Nature at all—as the one thing or being which is contradistinguished from Nature. This is implied in the commonest use of language, as when we contrast the works of man with the works of Nature. The same idea is almost unconsciously involved in language which is intended to be strictly

philosophical, and in the most careful utterances of our most distinguished scientific men."

This he says. He also says that there is no other objection to the definition of the Supernatural given by Dr. Bushnell, which includes man, "than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms 'Nature' and 'natural' which is very much at variance with the sense in which they are commonly understood." The following is the definition by Dr. Bushnell as quoted in *The Reign of Law*: "That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in Nature from without the chain." Here the distinction between the natural and supernatural is clearly drawn. According to this Nature is to be regarded as a system of uniformities within which there is no self-determination, no original causation, and no freedom. This, we venture to say, is the conception of Nature in the minds of most men, and any definition of it that would include a power of self-determination, or of original causation, or of acting from without upon its ongoing as a chain of cause and effect, would be more at variance with what is commonly understood by the word Nature than one which would exclude man so far as he is free and is an original cause. Indeed, the conception of freedom, and that of subjection to natural law so as to be within the chain of cause and effect, are incompatible. The one thing which gives Nature its value as a basis of experience is its uniformity. No matter what the cause of this may be, it is independent of the human will, and the movement assumes to us the aspect of necessity. The conditions being given, the element of a uniformity that is independent of the human will is that which is essential to our conception of a Nature. Back of that there may be what is called necessity, or fate, or the Divine Will, but let there be an absolutely uniform ongoing, having, or seeming to have, its cause within itself, and we have what constitutes our conception of a Nature. We have what we need as a basis for experience, and for the responsible action of a free being.

What the Duke would include within Nature we do not precisely know. Failing to draw at the point of self-determination and freedom the only line that can be drawn between Nature

and the supernatural, we sometimes find him, as near the close of his fourth paper, assigning to man a power over Nature which we should call supernatural. He says, "Nor can there be any doubt as to what are the supreme faculties of the human mind. The power of initiating changes in the order of Nature and of shaping them to the noblest ends—this, in general terms, may be said to include or involve the whole of them." Again, in *The Reign of Law*, p. 279, we find him virtually denying, as it seems to us, the possibility of freedom. He says—

"If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us if in passing from the material world to the world of Mind, we see that Law, in the same sense, prevails in the phenomena of both."

Once more we find him, as in his third paper, using language in regard to Nature which would not only include within it intelligences superior to man, but would seem to include God himself, and so be pantheistic. He says—

"We have been created, or—if any one likes the phrase better—we have been 'evolved;' not, however, out of nothing, nor out of confusion, nor out of lies, but out of 'Nature,' which is but a word for the sum of all existence—the source of all order, and the very ground of all truth—the fountain in which all fulness dwells."

It was not meant so, but if this be not an identification of God with Nature, what would be? But finally, and naturally enough, we find him so troubled with the word 'supernatural' that he wishes it banished from the language, and gives his reasons. He says, "It would be well if this word were altogether banished from our vocabulary." This is a perilous assertion for one to make respecting a word so domiciled in the language, who says a little further on of human speech that it is "that sure record of the deepest metaphysical truths." His reasons, however, are, that "it assumes that we know all that 'Nature' contains, and that we can pronounce with certainty on what can and what cannot be found there. Or else it assumes that nature is limited to purely physical agencies, and that our own mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these." Certainly it does assume that we can know, not all that can be found in nature, but what can *not* be found there. And that we do know. We know that self-determination and

freedom, and moral character, cannot be found in what is commonly called "Nature," and no confusion could be greater than would come from an attempt to blend the two. Nor does it assume that Nature is limited to purely physical agencies, or that the mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these. As has been said, the essential idea of "Nature" is uniformity from a cause independent of the human will. Hence "Nature" may, and does, come up into mind and find a sphere there as well as in matter, since we have in that, uniformities or laws, as those of Association. Universally, so far as these are uniformities in mind not dependent on its own choice, it has a nature, and is subject to laws analogous to physical laws. That man, as a whole, has more often been regarded as a part of Nature is true. This has been from his complex nature, and because he is so to so great an extent. All that is below him is within Nature. He is a partaker of that. If we make, as in "The Outline Study of Man," the upward movement of Nature to be by successive platforms where all that is below is constantly carried up, while at each platform, and for its formation, something new is added so that the column constantly diminishes in extent and increases in comprehension, all difficulty at this point will vanish. So far as man is material and animal, he will be included within Nature; but so far as he is self-determined and free and moral, so far indeed as he is in the image of God, he is above Nature. He must be, or, so far as we can see, God himself is not supernatural.

In this view of it, instead of the confused notion of Nature when no line is drawn, we have a system of uniformities, in itself meaningless and useless, but grand and wonderful as a basis and condition of a free and spiritual system that is as far above it as the heavens are above the earth.

In connection with the Supernatural the Duke treats of miracles; and here also we find the same tendency to extend the domain of Natural Law so as to trench on the prerogatives of personality. "The common idea of a miracle," he says, "is that it is a suspension or violation of the laws of Nature." His own idea of miracle is that "there is nothing in religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the in-

strumentality of means—that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a divine purpose.” A miracle, he says, “does not involve the idea of an exercise of will apart from the use of means.” “It does not involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult of conception.” Again he says, “Nevertheless, so deeply ingrained in the popular theology is the idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must be performed by some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature, that the opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means is regarded with jealousy and suspicion.”

In these passages it is implied that for anything to be done without the use of means would be a violation or suspension of the laws of Nature; and is therefore difficult of belief. Is this true? It may well be if what he says on p. 315 of *The Reign of Law* be correct. He there says that “all facts which we can bring about must be so brought about by the use of means. This is true universally.” He says further in the same connection that “all actions must have a cause, or, in other words, must be brought about by the use of means,” thus identifying the use of means with the power of causation. What then do we mean when we say that a thing is done without the use of means? Not certainly that it is done without a cause, but that the will itself, or the personal power of the man, with nothing intervening, is the cause. This we must mean if we mean anything, and meaning this we inquire whether we do not, in all cases of personal and free agency, do something without the use of means. We walk. In doing this we use muscles as means of moving the bones, and nerves as means of moving the muscles, and the brain, if you please, as a means of giving impulse through the nerves; but go back as we may, if we are to have free causation we must reach a point where something is done directly and without the use of means. In using means a first cause must act directly without the use of means. But again, did Christ use means when he called Lazarus from the tomb? Did he when he healed the servant of the centurion in response to a faith which was commended from the very fact that it implied an expectation of its being done without the use of means? “But say the word,” said the centurion, “and my servant shall be healed.”

It is difficult to see what we gain in such a case by interposing a law of which we know nothing, and which would still require the direct agency of a personal will to make use of it.

But if we suppose the cure done by a power residing in the person and put forth by a direct act of will, as when Christ said to the leper, "I will; be thou clean," would that involve any "violation or suspension" of a law of Nature? And here perhaps it should be said that a law of Nature can be violated only as it is suspended, if indeed that would be a violation, and that we can never have evidence that such a law is suspended. It is sometimes said that a law of Nature, the law of gravitation, is violated when a man throws himself from a precipice. A law of the man's nature is violated, but the law of gravitation is perfectly obeyed. If the force implied in the law were suspended, the law might be said, in a sense, to be broken, but not when that force is counteracted or overcome by a greater force, for that is constantly done. We do it every time we lift a hand or a foot. When, then, Christ walked upon the water, or said to the winds and waves, "Peace, be still," and they obeyed, we neither have nor can have evidence that any natural law or force was suspended in its action, but only that the forces previously in action were overcome by a mightier force. That a personal Will has control over matter at some points and to some extent must be admitted, or we deny its agency and the possibility of a miracle altogether. Why not, then, suppose such a power to come in as a superior force, not to violate or suspend any law, but to counteract and transcend it, just as the law of gravitation is counteracted and transcended by the law of cohesion, or of chemical affinity, or by the force connected with vegetable life? This would place Personality in a relation to natural laws wholly different from that which necessitates their use. It makes them the servants of God in the sense in which the centurion said that those under him were his servants. It not only makes them flexible to his will, but gives him the prerogative, when the exigencies of his moral government require it, of acting directly by his will and without their intervention. This view mere science cannot receive. It is not strange that scientific men should be averse to it, but it is strange that one should be averse to it who

believes that all the forces of Nature may have originated in Will. This the Duke of Argyll believes. He quotes with approbation Sir John Herschel as saying that "it is but reasonable to regard the Force of Gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a will existing somewhere," and says himself that it is in the highest degree unphilosophical "to speak or to think as if the Forces of Nature were either independent of, or separate from, the Creator's Power."

While therefore, we would not deny, but believe in, the constant intervention of God through the adjustment of laws; and believe also that such intervention may be so conspicuous and in such conjunctures as to have the effect of a miracle, we yet think that the above view is more in accordance with the prerogatives of a Personal God, and brings him nearer to us as a Father and a hearer of prayer. We also think that the above is the natural view, and hence that the credulity of the many, if we must choose between them, is more philosophical than the scepticism of the few. If we give to personality its true place and prerogatives, there is no such antecedent improbability of a miracle in the sense above explained as should prevent an examination of the evidence for it as for any other event, and nothing can be more opposed to the spirit of a true philosophy than the ground taken on this subject by positivists and some scientific men.

In following in their order the chapters in *The Reign of Law*, we next reach that on "Law—Its Definitions;" and here we find the same tendency to exaggerate the natural side and to trench on the domain of Personality.

In defining Law it may be questioned whether the Duke has entirely escaped the danger against which he was so evidently on his guard, of using a word in two senses without perceiving it. Seeing clearly the distinction between Law in its primary and secondary senses, he says, "In its primary signification 'a law' is the authoritative expression of human will enforced by power." This definition makes no distinction between a law and a command, nor does it admit that an authoritative expression of the Divine Will enters into the primary signification of "a law;" but the objection to it in point here is in the use of the word "power" as that by which law in its primary sense can be enforced. For, having defined "law in its primary sense"

as above, he goes on to say that "the instincts of mankind, finding utterance in the use of language, have not failed to see that the phenomena of Nature are only really conceivable to us as, in like manner, the expression of a Will enforcing itself with Power." It is here said, and so far as there is any recognition of Law in its primary sense, or of Moral law, throughout the work, it is implied that a law in its primary sense, and a law of Nature, are, *in like manner*, enforced with *Power*. The truth, however, is, that law in its primary sense never is or can be enforced by power at all, and that in its secondary or figurative sense it never is or can be enforced by anything else. It is not by "Power" but by punishment that obedience to commands is enforced. Power to inflict punishment is implied, but the enforcement lies wholly in the punishment, and that, too, in the punishment as threatened and when as yet no power has been put forth. A command requires choice and voluntary obedience, and to suppose that these can be produced by power is to break down the distinction between physical law, or a law of Nature, on the one hand, and Civil and Moral Law on the other. In the one case we have an enforcement wholly by punishment; for if there were power without punishment there would be no enforcement, no law even; while in the other case we have enforcement wholly by power, and punishment is impossible.

With the tendency above indicated to identify the two kinds of law, we find the Duke extending its reign into the realm of mind. This he does in a chapter of which the tendency, and we think the logical result, would be an encroachment upon freedom. He says, in the first place, that the Will of man is free in the same sense, and in the same sense only, as the will of an animal, and that it is subject to Law in the same sense, and in that only. Now we say, in the first place, that there is an essential difference between the freedom of man and of animals, in that man has, through his moral nature, presented to him an alternative in *kind*, as the animals have not, and so has moral freedom; and we say, in the second place, that so far as man is free he is not subject at all to Law, in any one of its secondary senses. The Duke identifies being subject to Law, and to the influence of motives, but by what right it is difficult to see. We are not subject to motives in any such sense that they are a law to us. He says, "It is true that our Wills can never be free

from motives, and in this sense can never be free from Law"—which is just no sense at all. Motives are the condition, and the only condition, on which the Will can be free from Law in any one of its secondary senses as he has given them. He says, "It is from compulsion that our wills are free, and from nothing else." Yes, they are free from *Law* as enforced by *power*, and are free under Law as enforced by punishment.

Of this whole chapter the tendency is indicated by the following sentence :—

"If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as regards that in which Force itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us if, in passing from the material world to the world of mind, we see that Law in the same sense prevails in both."

This it is the object of the chapter to show, at the same time that it asserts that the Will is free. But the two are incompatible. Where Law prevails *in the same sense* as in the material world there can be no freedom. That it does so prevail in mind up to a certain point, and in reference to certain processes, we agree, but that it prevails at all when we reach the region of choice we deny. Here we hold to the doctrine of a self-originating power, which the Duke denies. "Nor," he says, "does the doctrine of our Free Will assign to the human mind any self-originating power." Certainly it assigns to it no power of originating itself; but if it has not the power within itself of originating a free choice it has no freedom, and if it has not the power of originating action in accordance with that choice it has no efficiency. The antecedent and cause of the choice is a being capable of making it, two objects or courses of action being presupposed between which the choice is to be made. These objects or courses of action are commonly called *motives*, but the moving power is wholly within.

To the chapter on "Creation by Law" there is no objection if we understand by creation the formation of new structures out of materials already existing. It is in this sense that the Duke uses the term, and he makes no reference to any other. In doing this he assumes that personality has not the power supposed by many to belong to it, of originating the material itself. The material being supposed to exist, we have reason to believe that God proceeded according to a regular order, or, if you

please, "Law," to build up the world and the organised structures upon it, but whence the material? Did he originate that? That it is impossible for us to conceive the mode of such origination is conceded, but then we cannot conceive the mode of doing anything unless we have in some measure the power of doing the same *kind* of thing. Shall we then deny to God the power to do anything different in kind from what we can do? It does not seem reasonable unless we know enough of him and his resources to know that it would involve a contradiction. Whatever would not involve a contradiction God can do. To originate actual substance may seem to some to involve a contradiction, but the more we investigate matter the less we know about it, and if we suppose with Boscovich that it consists of centres of attraction and repulsion, or with many philosophers and physicists now, that it is a permanent form of force, there would seem to be no more difficulty about its origin than about the origin of the force of gravity. We may therefore safely say that to originate and uphold such a form of being as matter is, seemingly so solid, and yet, as we investigate it, so elusive, may not involve a contradiction.

This meaning of "creation," involving as it does personal prerogative, cannot be ignored, for if matter was not originated in time it must have been as eternal as God himself. Would the Duke say that? But if eternal, then, so far as we can see, it must have been independent, if not unchangeable, and its marvellous adaptability must have been wholly accidental. That adaptability is so found both in the constitution of the elements of matter and in the relative quantity of what seem to be its various kinds, that it was said by Faraday to have every appearance of being a manufactured article. Take oxygen, for example. See how it unites with hydrogen to form water, and with the various metallic bases to form the rocks and the earths, and think how precise the original quantity must have been to enable it to take up all the material for these, and then have just enough left to be diluted by nitrogen and form our atmosphere. A larger or a smaller quantity left over would have unfitted the atmosphere for the use of animals and vegetables as now constituted. Then, too, as combined in the atmosphere, how great the variety of uses to which that is put! See it the breath of life to all that lives, and the destroying agent of all

that is dead ; see it brightening the flame of the artisan, distilling the waters of the ocean, lifting them in vapour, floating them in clouds, bearing up birds, wafting ships, and so refracting and diffusing light as to make the day universal. Oxygen is a gas, but in carbon, a solid body, we also find an adaptability and proportioning no less wonderful. Now we see it in its purity, the most precious known ornament ; now, stored in huge black masses, as fuel for the nations ; now spouting up as a constituent of the oil that gives us light ; now floating in the atmosphere and diffused in the earth, so as to be absorbed by vegetables and form their main constituent, thus giving us trees for fruit, leaves for shade, wood for fuel, and timber for houses and ships.

If now we reflect that what is here said of these two substances is applicable in a measure, if not equally, to all others, we shall see that not only in the adjustment of law to law and of force to force have we evidence of a contriving mind that lay back of them, but also that we have evidence of precisely the same kind for an originating mind that lay back of the material which those laws control.

Of the admirable papers on "The Unity of Nature," the most noticeable are those on the moral character of man regarded as an exception to that unity. And here again there may be a question whether the true relation of personality in Nature is reached. It may be that if it were, the apparent exception would be merged in a higher unity.

A unity differs from a unit. That can have no unity. A unity is the result of parts so related that they conspire to form a whole. This whole may be a part of a still greater whole and go to form its unity. Thus the eye is a unity in itself, at the same time that it goes in as a part to form the unity of the body. There may, therefore, be as many unities in the body as there are separate organs. Each muscle is a separate unity, so is a leaf, so is a tree, so is the earth as composed of different strata, so is the planetary system, so are the starry heavens, so is the universe. But while a whole of some kind is thus implied in a unity, the whole in one case may be of a different kind from that in another. It may be a whole of mere aggregation, as in a rock ; or of contrivance, as in a machine ; or of movement, as among the planets ; or of effect,

as in a combination of colours or of sounds ; and anything so connected with such whole as to be out of harmony with its constitutive idea would be an exception to its unity.

Now it will be seen that the whole had in view by the Duke when he speaks of the moral character of man and his consequent development downwards as an exception to the unity of Nature is not the whole of Nature, but the whole of organised Nature. He has in view the action of each organ and tendency within separate organisms, and of individuals as going to make up distinct species.

"All this," he says, "is in conformity with an absolute and universal law in virtue of which there is established a perfect unity between these three things : first, the physical powers and structure of all living creatures ; secondly, those dispositions and instinctive appetites which are seated in that structure to impel and guide its powers ; and thirdly, the external conditions in which the creature's life is passed, and in which its faculties find an appropriate field of exercise."

He goes on to say that "if man has any place in the unities of Nature, this law must prevail with him ;" and then to show that in regard to his moral nature or instinct it does not prevail,

"There is," he says, "no difficulty in seeing the place which this instinct holds in the unity of Nature. It belongs to that class of gifts, universal in the world, which enable all living things to fulfil their part in the order of Nature, and to discharge the functions which belong to it. It is when we pass from a review of those instincts and powers with which man has been endowed to a review of their actual working and results that we, for the first time, encounter facts which are wholly exceptional, and which it is, accordingly, most difficult to reconcile with the unities of Nature."

Among these facts he mentions the cruel treatment of women, to which there is nothing analogous among beasts, and which necessarily tends to the degradation of the race. He mentions also polyandry, infanticide, cannibalism, deliberate cruelty, systematic slaughter connected with warlike passions or with religious customs. He then says, in his sixth paper—

"It is indeed impossible to look abroad either upon the past history or upon the existing condition of mankind, whether savage or civilised, without seeing that it presents phenomena which are strange and monstrous—in-capable of being reduced within the harmony of things or reconciled with the unity of Nature. The contrasts which it presents to the general laws

and course of Nature cannot be stated too broadly. There is nothing like it in the world. It is an element of confusion amidst universal order."

He says again of these habits and practices, that "they stand before us as unquestionable exceptions to the unity of Nature, and as conspicuous violations of the general harmony of creation."

If, now, we regard organised Nature as the whole of Nature, and look only at the action of each tendency and organ within particular organisms, and as a general thing, at the relation of individuals within each species, we shall find what is said of the moral character of man, and of the practices growing out of its perversion as an exception to the unity of Nature, to be not only true and able, but also of special interest in its bearing on subjects now warmly discussed. He insists, for example, on the fact of a development downwards. This is a great fact, and its possibility is implied in the possession of powers that render possible a development upward. That such development has taken place, not only, as is patent, in individuals, but in communities and races, is conclusively shown. It may, indeed, be questioned whether history will justify us in affirming any law of progress for the race as a whole that will carry it, in its present moral state, up to a point of civilisation at all equal to its unperverted capabilities, or that can be permanently maintained. And not only is it shown that there is development downwards, but also that the savage state has been reached by such development. Those who hold that man was developed from below also hold that primeval man was a savage, and that as we recede towards the point of his origin his savage characteristics become more pronounced. But since the anomalous and destructive practices mentioned above are most prevalent among savages, and not at all among the animals from which man is supposed to have been developed, it will follow that the more nearly he should approach them the more free he would be from such practices. Since then man is by these practices degraded below the brutes, it will follow, even on the supposition of his animal origin, that he could not have been originally a savage.

The above views in regard to primeval man, and man as a savage, are of much interest. They rest on their own basis, and can be affected by nothing that may be said in connection

with a wider view of Nature. Such wider view there is. Organic nature is not the whole of Nature, and if we take Nature as a whole we cannot assent to the assertion of the Duke that there is in it "universal order," or any "general harmony of creation" that has not its discords. On the other hand we say (1) that there are in Nature appearances of disorder as great as those in man himself, and (2) that the appearances of disorder in Nature correspond with those in man in a remarkable degree.

"The earth, our habitation," says Bishop Butler, "has the appearances of being a ruin." No one can look upon its surface without seeing that its present state must have been the result of forces that have not acted harmoniously, but with violence and convulsion. We look upon a sea of mountains. Was it that the earth was once fluid, and was tossed, as the ocean with a tempest, and suddenly congealed? Was it that the surface was once even and these masses were upheaved from the centre? In either case who can conceive of the violence and struggle of those agencies by which such effects were produced? Here we see the sides of the cleft mountain, and find the strata not only upheaved, but contorted and deflexed. On the very tops of the mountains the rocks testify of the force of ocean currents and of the grinding power of the iceberg. Nor does it appear that these forces have yet reached a point of stable equilibrium. There are volcanoes, and earthquakes, and typhoons, and on the land the desolated path of the whirlwind. Is it said that the original convulsions worked towards the fitting up of a habitation for man? Yes, but what a habitation? Certainly not such a one as would have been the product of love and skill careful for the wants of those towards whom no displeasure ever had been, or would be, manifested. We would not be ungrateful, but it must be said that large portions of the earth yield their products reluctantly, scantily, and only to the hand of toil, so that for the many life is so far a struggle for mere existence as to dwarf them both physically and intellectually. Climates are extreme. There are noxious and pestilential elements. There are serpents that hiss, and wild beasts that devour. There are locusts, and caterpillars, and mildew, and blight, and frost by which Nature destroys in a night millions of fruit-buds which she had been months in forming. Is there unity in that?

That the race generally have believed that there is in Nature

disorder and a want of unity is testified by their mythologies. Hence the Ahriman of Persia ; hence the Typhon of Egypt, " who tears his mother's side at the moment she is giving him birth, and is afterwards united to Nephthys, that is, perfection, or consummate beauty, thus producing the mixture of good and evil which is, as it were, the essence of this world." Hence the essential evil connected with matter in the system of Plato, and the Demiurgus of the Gnostics. Hence, too, the giants and dwarfs in the mythology of the Scandinavians. Nor is the difficulty removed by any explanations or discoveries of modern philosophy. If they show, as they do, that in the conflicts of the elements evil is removed, it is yet involved that there was evil to be removed. Does the storm purify the atmosphere ? Then the atmosphere needed to be purified. Such explanations only show that God has confined evil within such limits that it shall not be destructive of the system, and also discover the wisdom of those means which he has taken thus to limit it. If, in the human system, an attack of the gout prevents a fever that would be fatal, that does not show that the gout is not an evil. No, the truth is that in connection with the order and beneficence of the system there is also disorder and misery, and these are so inwrought and intermingled that both optimism and pessimism are possible.

And not only is there disorder in Nature, and an apparent want of unity and of harmony, but, as has been said, these correspond remarkably to the same things in man. The extent and minuteness of this correspondence between Nature and the human mind, whether on the side of order or of disorder, may be seen if we observe how that part of language originates which is employed to express the affections of the mind. It is a received doctrine among men learned in this department that all such words had first a meaning purely physical, and that this meaning was afterwards transferred to express some affection of the mind analogous to the physical condition or act. Whether this be strictly and universally true or not, it certainly is true that the great mass of words of this description are thus formed ; and if so, then it will follow that for every mental state, act, or affection which we can express in words there must be some analogous state, act, or affection in the

physical world or in the animal creation ; for if we look at the different species of animals we find no unity unless from that relation by which one preys upon another. Thus, referring to Nature, Shakespeare says in *Richard III.*, "O, then began the tempest of my soul." Again in *Richard II.*, "This lowering tempest of your home-bred hate." In *Hamlet* we have three words in one line to express a single mental affection : "In the very torrent, tempest, and as I may say whirlwind of passion." So, to refer to animals, he says, in *King Lear*, "Hog in sloth, fox in stealth, wolf in greediness, dog in madness, lion in prey." Quotations of this kind might be multiplied indefinitely. But this could not be if there were not in Nature disorder and want of unity corresponding to those in man.

Is there then no unity in Nature as a whole ? So far as human sagacity, unaided by Revelation, has been able to discover, we say no. Taken as a whole it neither realises nor tends towards any one result to such a degree that we can find its unity in relation to that. Certainly it is not as well adapted as it might be to produce happiness ; much less is it as well adapted as it might be to produce misery. There is in it a strange blending of elements and tendencies and results that has always caused it to be a mystery and enigma unsolvable by man.

But if we turn to Revelation we find that the end of Nature is not within itself, and therefore that its unity must be from its relation to something out of, beyond, or above itself. Viewed in the light of Revelation, this marvellous system of materials which we call matter, and of uniformities which we call laws, originated we know not when, upheld we know not how, is but a temporary scaffolding erected with reference to a permanent building that is now going up. "They shall all," says the Scripture, "wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed." Viewing Nature thus as a scaffolding, we shall see that there is in it a perfect adaptation to the end in view, and that it is by its very want of unity within itself that it is fitted to become a part of a higher unity. It is the uniformities which constitute it a Nature, and the necessity and perfection of these, not only for the education of such a being as man, but as a condition

for his responsibility, will not be questioned. Each of these uniformities has unity within itself, but in order to become a part of a higher unity it was necessary that there should be in the whole a perfect correspondence between it and the moral state of man. Such a correspondence there is, and this it is that causes it to be what the Scriptures reveal it to be, a fit place for the temporary residence of such a being as man in a state of probation under a remedial system. The unity of Nature will then be found, not in any harmony within the system itself, but in its fitness to speak to man of both "the goodness and the severity of God"—to be an emblem of the stability of Moral Law, and of the certainty of retribution, whether for good or for evil, under its administration. Vast as the system of Nature is, we find its chief significance and value in its relation to a higher and vaster system in which we find Personality and Moral Law.

While, therefore, we have a very high estimate of both the ability and value of *The Reign of Law*, and of each of the papers on the "Unity of Nature," we yet feel that in their total effect they do not present truly the relation of personality to Natural Law. By the term Law two things wholly distinct are signified. In the one case it signifies a uniformity, or a set of uniformities, and implies a force by which the uniformity is produced. The rule in accordance with which the force acts may or may not be known, but in either case there is no freedom of choice in the subject of the law. There is, under given conditions, a uniform, necessitated movement, and that is all. Disobedience to the law by the subject of it is impossible, and, of course, there is no responsibility, or reward, or punishment. These uniformities, uniformities of succession and of structure, are the basis of natural science. They constitute its domain. Their certainty is the ground, and the whole ground, of its certainty. In the other sense of the word Law, and especially if it be Moral Law, it signifies a command addressed to intelligent and free beings that can be obeyed or disobeyed, and that has connected with it rewards and punishments. Between these the analogy is so slight that it seems unfortunate they should both be called by the same name. We here come into the region of personality, and our ground of certainty in regard to anything future is wholly different. It is not science, but con-

fidence in character. We come into the region of Moral Law. This it is that addresses itself to man as man. With the system of uniformities which we call Nature, man, as a moral being, has not, necessarily, anything to do. His great interests lie outside of and beyond it. Moral Law is paramount, and may require him, as in martyrdom, to renounce whatever good it is capable of conferring, or to defy whatever evil it can inflict. This law is among those things in this universe that "cannot be shaken," and must remain. Surely, then, we might have expected that in a work entitled *The Reign of Law* Moral Law would at least be mentioned. But no; it is not even among the definitions, and then, though evidently not so intended, the whole trend of the discussions is towards the undue extension of natural law. We feel that Nature is not made as subordinate as it should be, and that personality and freedom do not have their proper place. Let Natural Law have its own domain, and, during its appointed time, bring round its cycles, but, except as subordinate and temporary, this system that we call Nature, this necessitated system, this round of ongoing that returns into itself, cannot justify itself, and ought not to be permanent. It can justify itself and find its unity as a part of the great whole only, and so far, as it is a condition for an end beyond itself that is worthy of such preparation. Such an end the Scriptures reveal. In its more general form this end is the glory of God, that is to say, the manifestation of his attributes. Towards this we may well believe that the whole of Nature, its disorder not less than its order, is fitted to contribute. In its more specific form the end revealed in the Scriptures is the "new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."

MARK HOPKINS.

ART. VI.—*The Legend of the Buddha, and the Life of the Christ.*¹

THE legend of the Buddha runs substantially as follows:²

It is said that, at a time variously fixed at dates varying between the fifth and twenty-fifth century B.C.,³ the Buddha, who had already existed in a great diversity of forms, in not less than five hundred and fifty previous births, and was at that time living under the name of Santusita in the Tusita heaven,—at the request of the gods of that celestial world, and out of love to man,—determined the next time to be born on earth, and there attain to that supernatural knowledge whereby he should become a Buddha, *i.e.* an enlightened one, and so be able to show to all men the way of deliverance from their sorrows.

Accordingly, having carefully considered all the various conditions under which the would-be Buddha must be born, he decided to be conceived in the womb of Maya, the queen of Suddhodana, the king of the Sakyas, in the village of Kapilavastu, about a hundred miles north-west of Benares. This queen Maya had been a long time married, but thus far had been blessed with no child.⁴ On this occasion she had a dream. In her dream she saw the guardian devas of the four quarters take up the couch upon which she lay, and convey it to the great forest of Himala, where they placed it upon a rock under the shade of a sal tree one hundred miles high. After this the four queens of these devas bathed, anointed and clothed her; and then the four devas took her to a rock of silver, upon which was a palace of gold; and having made a divine couch, they placed her upon it. . . . While she was

¹ From *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

² I have drawn the account of the Legend for the most part from a translation of the Pujawaliya, in the Rev. Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*; some particulars are added from other authorities, which will be indicated in their place. Mr. Hardy was for more than a quarter of a century Wesleyan Missionary to the Buddhists of Ceylon, and is justly regarded as a very high authority on all that pertains to Buddhism.

³ See *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. p. 214; also Hardy's *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, pp. 78, 79.

⁴ *Buddhism*, Rhys Davids, p. 26.

there reposing the Bodhisat¹ appeared to her, like a cloud in the moonlight, coming from the north, and in his hand holding a lotus. After ascending the rock, he thrice circumambulated the queen's couch. At this moment Santusita, who saw the progress of the dream, passed away from the world of the gods, and was conceived in the world of men;² and Maya discovered, after the circumambulations were concluded, that Bodhisat was lying in her body. This wonderful conception of the Buddha was accompanied by a multitude of the most astounding prodigies, which our space will not allow us to enumerate. As the time that the queen should be delivered drew nigh the queen informed her husband that she wished to visit her parents, and accordingly started on her journey. On the way, however, it came to pass that, in a grove called Lumbini, the child was born. The wonderful circumstances which attended his birth are many of them scarcely of a character to be here detailed. Suffice it here to say that upon his birth thousands and ten thousands of devas came to adore him, bringing him gifts; two cleansing silver streams of water, sent by the devas, came down upon him and his mother;³ at once the child began to walk, and to exclaim, "I am chief in the world! I am the most excellent in the world! Hereafter there is to me no other birth."

As compared with this account, as given in the Pujawaliya, the Fo-pen-hing, or Chinese version of the Abhinishkramana sutra, translated by Professor Beal, is much more detailed, and tells us that "at the time of the birth of Bodhisatwa in Lumbini . . . the rishis and the devas, who dwelt on earth, exclaimed with great joy, 'This day Buddha is born, for the good of men, to dispel the darkness of their ignorance,' etc. Then the four heavenly kings took up the strain, and said, 'Now because Bodhisatwa is born to give joy and bring peace to the world, therefore is there this brightness.' Then the gods of the thirty-three heavens took up the burden of the strain, and the Yama devas, and the Tusita devas; and so forth

¹ Bodhisat or Bodhisatwa, means "the future Buddha."

² Many authorities add that he came and entered, or seemed to enter, her side in the shape of a young white elephant. See, e.g. Bigandet's *Legend of Gaudama*, vol. i. p. 29; also Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 63.

³ Herein some have discovered an analogy with the baptism of Christ; see Eitel's *Buddhism*, p. 8.

through all the heavens of the Kama, Rupa, and Arupa worlds, even up to the Akanishta heavens, all the devas joined in this song, and said, 'To-day Bodhisatwa is born on earth to give joy and peace to men and devas, to shed light in the dark places, and to give sight to the blind.'"¹

Then we read how, shortly after the birth of the child, a venerable sage, named Asita, came from afar to see the king, the father of the future Buddha, saying, "I have come from very far to see the child just born to your majesty." When the old sage came in, the mother of the child endeavoured to make the child bow his head in reverence to the venerable man. This, however, the child would not do, but turned around, and insisted upon presenting his feet to the sage. The old man then took the child in his arms, and, returning to his seat, rested on his knees. And when the king urged that Asita should allow the child to worship him, he answered: "Say not so, O queen; for, on the contrary, both I and devas and men should rather worship him." Then the sage proceeded to examine the child, to see whether the three hundred and twenty-eight marks of a supreme Buddha were on his person. Having found them, he then looked to ascertain whether he would be permitted to live until the Buddhahood of the child should be attained. When he saw that he would not, and that even a hundred thousand Buddhas should be born before he could receive any benefit from them, he began to weep like a broken water-vessel, and cried:

"By grief and regret I am completely overpowered!
Not to meet him when he shall have attained supreme wisdom!

Alas, I am old, and stricken in years;
My time of departure is close at hand.

What happiness from the birth of this child shall ensue!
The misery, the wretchedness of men shall disappear;
And at his bidding peace and joy shall everywhere flourish."²

As the Bodhisat grew up he was kept in the harem; and the king, his father, fearing because of the predictions concerning him, that he would leave his home to become an ascetic, surrounded him with every allurement of sensual pleasure. He

¹ Beal, *Romantic Legend*, pp. 55, 56.

² *Romantic Legend*, p. 60.

had three wives and no less than six myriads of concubines. And again and again is the statement repeated, that the prince before he began his work as a Buddha, "indulged himself in all carnal pleasures," "remained in the indulgence of his animal passions," etc.¹

To the same effect is the briefer narrative of the Pujawaliya and the Nidana Katha. It was at this time,—not during his infancy,—the Chinese version of the story tells us, that a certain king Bimbisara, who ruled in that region of country, was fearing lest some king might arise who should destroy his kingdom. Assembling his ministers, he bade them despatch messengers and make diligent inquiry and search throughout the kingdom, and see if there were any one capable of overcoming him. In the course of time the two messengers who were sent returned, having heard of the Buddha, and "exhorted Bimbisara at once to raise an army and destroy the child, lest he should overturn the empire of the king." This, however, we are told the king refused to do.

"For," said he, "if this youth is to become a holy chakravarti raja, and to wield a righteous sceptre, then it becomes us to reverence and obey him. . . . If he becomes a Buddha, his love and compassion leading him to deliver and to save all flesh, then we ought to listen to him and become his disciples. So it is quite unnecessary to excite in myself any desire to destroy such a being."²

When the prince had passed many years in the delights of the harem, and was now twenty-nine years old, we are told that, despite the precautions which his father had taken to have every glimpse of the sorrow and the misery of the great world kept from him, it happened that he saw, on successive occasions, a sick man, an old man, a corpse, and an ascetic who had renounced the world. All this brought home to his mind the utter vanity of all the pleasures of the world which held always such possibilities of misery, and at the last must end in death. And when he heard that these woes were absolutely universal, and that no possible rank or riches or wisdom known to man could enable any one to escape them, he formed the resolution to

¹ Beal, *Romantic Legend*, pp. 101, 102, 111, 115 *et passim*. And Mr. Edwin Arnold, in the Preface to his *Light of Asia*, comparing the Buddha with Christ, tells us that "the Buddhistical books agree in the one point of recording nothing—no single act or word—which mars the perfect purity . . . of this Indian teacher" (!).

² Beal, pp. 103, 104.

leave the palace and all its joys, take up the life of an ascetic, and not to rest until, if it were possible, he had solved this awful problem of human misery, and discovered for the world some way of deliverance from it. As by night he was leaving the palace to put his resolution into effect, we are told that Mara, the mighty prince of evil, appeared in the air, and cried, "Depart not, O my Lord! In seven days from now the wheel of empire will appear, and will make you sovereign over the four continents and the two thousand adjacent isles. Stop, O my Lord!"¹ To this temptation to give up his resolve the Buddha yielded not. But from that time on the tempter never left him, till at last he attained the secret of the great deliverance.

For six years the Bodhisat sought the way in vain, studying all the various systems of the greatest of India's holy men, fasting and denying himself even almost unto death, till at last the final great conflict came under the bo-tree near Gaya. Thither came the prince of evil that he might make a last attempt to shake the Bodhisat from his resolution to become the saviour of the world. The story is told in the various Buddhist authorities with the greatest fulness of detail, magnifying to the utmost the horrors and the terrors with which the arch-fiend sought to seduce the Bodhisat from his purpose. To be brief, Mara came, it is said, riding on an elephant one hundred and fifty yojanas (two thousand four hundred miles) high, appearing as a monster with five hundred heads, one thousand red eyes, and five hundred flaming tongues; he had also one thousand arms, in each of which was a weapon, no two of these weapons alike. With him came also an army of hideous demons of every conceivable frightful form, so large that it extended on every side one hundred and sixty-four miles, and nine miles upward, and its weight was sufficient to overpoise the earth. First he sent against the Bodhisat a terrific wind, which tore up the largest mountains; then a rain-storm, every drop the size of a palm-tree; then a shower of burning rocks and mountains; then a shower of swords and spears, and all manner of sharp weapons; then a shower of burning charcoal; then another of burning ashes; and then another of burning sand, and another of burning filth; and then a fourfold darkness. But the wind moved him not; the rain refreshed him;

¹ Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 84.

the burning mountains became garlands of flowers; the weapons a shower of blossoms; the burning coals, rubies; the fiery ashes, fragrant sandal-powder; the burning sand, a shower of pearls; and the darkness a resplendent light. Then came the whole army of Mara, with the arch-fiend at their head; but their combined assault did not move him. Then Mara himself, clothed in a form of frightful terror, cried with an awful voice, "Begone from my throne!" but the Bodhisat trembled not. "For," said he, "to gain this throne have I practised the ten virtues through more than four grand cycles of ages. How canst thou possess it, who hast never accomplished a single virtue?" Then he recounted the alms that he had given even in a single birth, and called upon the earth to bear him witness; and the earth cried with an awful roar, "I am witness to thee of that!" And her voice was so terrible that Mara and his army fled away discomfited.

Then the three daughters of Mara came to their father, and, to comfort him, told him that in another way they could overcome the prince. And they transformed themselves into several maidens, and going to the tree where the Bodhisat still remained sitting, sought in every way to seduce him from his virtue and so break his resolution; but they were as unsuccessful as the demon army. The conflict was over. And then in that night he attained the mystery of existence and discovered the way of deliverance. He acquired in the first watch of the night the knowledge of the past; in the middle watch the knowledge of the present; and in the third watch, the knowledge of the chain of causation which leads to the origin of evil. And then he sung the hymn of triumph:

"Long have I wandered! long!
Bound by the chain of life,
Through many births:
Seeking thus long in vain,
Whence comes this life in man, this consciousness of pain?
And hard to bear is birth,
When pain and birth but lead to birth again.
Found! It is found!
O cause of individuality!"¹

¹ Not God, whose existence Buddhism denies, but *karma*, "action," as the cause of repeated births. See a note by Prof. Max Müller on this hymn in *Buddhaghosha's Parables*, p. ciii.; also, his *Science of Religion*, p. 178.

No longer shalt thou make a house for me !
 Broken are all thy beams,
 The ridge-pole shattered !
 Into Nirvāna now my mind has passed,
 The end of cravings has been reached at last !"¹

He was now thirty-five years old ; and from this time on began to preach his doctrine, and continued so to do, till at last he died a natural death at the age of eighty.

His preaching, the authorities assure us, was accompanied by the most astounding miracles, of which we may have more to say in the sequel. His disciples multiplied ; and before his death the new religion numbered a great multitude of followers, his own royal father and his wife and child among them. When he died, in due time his body was laid upon the funeral pyre. For seven days they endeavoured to set the pyre on fire, but it refused to burn. At last, to the great amazement of all who beheld it, a flame issued from the Buddha's breast and the pile ignited of itself. And when the body, all but a few of the bones, was consumed, the fire was extinguished by a great shower of rain.

Such in outline is the legend of the Buddha in its most striking features. The Rev. Dr. Eitel adds two other circumstances which may be mentioned for the sake of completeness.

"Toward the end of his life," says Dr. Eitel, "he is said to have been glorified, or, as the Buddhist tradition literally calls it, 'baptized' with fire. He was on a mountain in Ceylon, discoursing on religious subjects, when suddenly a flame of light descended upon him and encircled the crown of his head with a halo of light."²

Again, Dr. Eitel tells us of a tradition of his resurrection :—

"After his remains had been put in a golden coffin, which then grew so heavy that no one could move it, . . . suddenly his long-deceased mother, Maya, appeared from above, bewailing her son, when the coffin lifted itself up, the lid sprang open, and Sakyamuni appeared with folded hands, saluting his mother."³

Others add that he both ascended into heaven and descended

¹ As rendered by Mr. Rhys Davids, in Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. 103, 104, where Mr. Hardy's literal translation of the hymn is also given.

² Eitel, *Buddhism*, p. 12. This legend will be found (in its earliest form, according to Mr. Rhys Davids), in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sūtra*, as translated by Mr. Davids in the *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi. pp. 81, 82.

³ Eitel's *Buddhism*, p. 13.

into hell to publish the doctrine of his religion ; but this is said to have been during his lifetime and not after death.

We may thus sum up the legend of the Buddha, combining the features derived from various sources, in the language of Dr. Eitel, as follows :—

“Sakyamuni Buddha, we are told, came from heaven, was born of a virgin, welcomed by angels, received by an old saint who was endowed with prophetic vision, presented in a temple, baptized with water and afterwards baptized with fire. He astonished the most learned doctors by his understanding and his answers. He was led by the spirit into the wilderness, and having been tempted by the devil, he went about preaching and doing wonders. The friend of publicans and sinners, he is transfigured on a mount, descends to hell, ascends up to heaven. In short, with the single exception of Christ's crucifixion, almost every characteristic incident in Christ's life is also to be found narrated in the Buddhistic traditions of the life of Sakyamuni, Gautama Buddha.”¹

Every candid person will feel that these coincidences between the story of the Buddha and the story of the Christ are quite too numerous and striking to be ignored. And the question which unbelief presses upon us in this matter is certainly fair and reasonable. How are we, on the basis of the received faith of the Church as to the historical trustworthiness of the Gospel narrative, to explain the remarkable fact that so much that is most characteristic of the life of Jesus of Nazareth is also recorded of Sakyamuni, who lived some five hundred years or more before him? One might, indeed, cut the knot by declaring that all the agreements of the two narratives are merely accidental ; but this will scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of the difficulty.

There are some who offer as a solution of the question a theory such as follows. It is supposed that there were certain myths, solar or other, floating about the East centuries before Christ ; that these in the first instance were attached by the disciples of Sakyamuni to the person of their master ; and that at last, somehow, through the Essenes, as Mr. De Bunsen thinks,² these stories concerning the Buddha found their way to Palestine, and were there by the disciples of Jesus transferred to him, and came to be regarded, in the form in which

¹ Eitel, *Buddhism*, p. 14.

² In *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*. London, 1880.

we have them in the Gospels, as veritable history. Historical basis, on this hypothesis, there was none in either case. This theory, when set forth, as *e.g.* in *The Angel-Messiah* of Mr. De Bunsen, with a great parade of Oriental learning, may be made, no doubt, to appear to many minds very plausible ; but, as any one can see, this is but to resuscitate the old mythical interpretation of the gospel in a Buddhist dress. The theory granted, the Gospels then are not reliable history ; and since they are the only authorities of any account, it follows that no one either knows or can know much of anything about the life of that Jesus who has transformed half the world. It is of so great consequence for unbelief to be able to make out this point, that we find many grasping eagerly at this legend of the Buddha, and in a spirit of somewhat premature triumph holding forth these various agreements with the Gospel history as evidence conclusive that in its essential features the story of the Christ was afloat in the East before ever Christ appeared, and is therefore of no historical value. Hence it is that the legend of the Buddha comes to have a special claim just now upon the consideration of the Christian apologist. What are we who believe in the Gospels to do with this strangely coincident narrative ?

In dealing with this question, we have to observe that, quite antecedent to any minute consideration of the facts of the case, an overwhelming presumption rests against this imagined derivation of any part of the narrative in the Gospels from a pre-existing legend of the Buddha. This presumption is so strong as to throw the whole burden of proof upon those who make the suggestion. It cannot be set aside or neutralised by any demonstration of any number of mere abstract possibilities. The case is such that we may justly demand from such objectors to the credibility of the Gospels proof the most full and explicit. And this presumption against the truth of this theory is twofold. In the first place, there is not the slightest evidence yet brought in from any quarter that in the age when Christ appeared, or immediately thereafter, this legend of the Buddha as we have it now was so much as known in Palestine. It is not even possible to prove that there had been opportunity for this geographical transfer of the story.

This line of argument has been very ably and conclusively

set forth by Professor J. Estlin Carpenter,¹ and we need only here indicate his conclusions, for which he gives abundant and satisfactory evidence. In the first place, there is no evidence that the influence of Buddhism extended beyond India at all till after the time of Alexander the Great, when in the reign of Asoka, about 250 B.C., the missionary work of the Buddhists began. Yet not until the first century of our era had Buddhism extended so far as China in the East; while not even the Buddhist historians ever claim that any of their missionaries so much as attempted the conquest of the far West, or reached the lands on the Mediterranean. Nor is there any evidence that the story could probably have reached Palestine by way of commerce and travel. There is no evidence that the dispersion of the Jews had by the Christian era yet reached India. There exists, he tells us, a very early list of the synagogues for foreign Jews in Jerusalem;² but there is in it no intimation of the existence of Indian Jews. Some, like Mr. de Bunsen, have endeavoured to made out a connection between Essenism and Buddhism; but his frequent inaccuracy, and failure to furnish undoubted facts where they are most needed for his demonstration, have caused his argument to be condemned as a failure by both Christian and Jewish critics.

History seems to indicate that from the time when the Greek Megasthenes, as the ambassador of Seleucus Nicator, lived at the Buddhist capital of Pataliputra, until the Christian era, intercourse of any kind between India and the West was but very irregularly maintained; and there is little evidence that the peoples of the West knew much of Buddhism. In particular, there is no trace of any knowledge of Buddhism among the Palestinian Jews in the literature of the centuries immediately preceding that in which the Gospels were written. All this, it is true, is merely negative proof, and is not offered as demonstration. It is still, we will admit, conceivable, notwithstanding this silence of all literature, that the legend of the Buddha may have been known in Palestine at the time when the Gospels were written; but assuredly the entire absence of any proof of such acquaintance with Buddhistic ideas

¹ In the *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1880; Art. "Buddhism and the New Testament."

² See Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, iii. 282.

raises a very strong presumption that up to the time in question the legend of the Buddha was not known to the Jews of Palestine, and therefore could not have formed the original of any part of the narrative of the Gospels.

And this presumption against any such connection between the two stories is greatly strengthened by another, yet more conclusive, to the same effect. For if there has not yet been any thorough critical examination of the scriptures of the Buddhists, we must bear in mind that there has been such an examination of the testimony which we have recorded in the four Gospels. In this examination, as every one knows, rationalistic and unbelieving, no less than believing, critics have taken part. And the latest and most reliable results of this criticism of the New Testament, we affirm, are such as to give of themselves abundant warrant for dismissing this theory of an admixture of Buddhist legend in the story of the Gospels as utterly irreconcilable with well-ascertained facts. And it will be easy to show this. For if we assume that the legend of the Buddha, as we now have it, had gradually grown up in the East in the centuries between Buddha and Christ, and, having in some way unknown found its way into Palestine, was then transferred to the life of Jesus of Nazareth, it is plain that this must have required considerable time. Not until the figure and history of Jesus had begun to lose somewhat of its distinctness in the haze of the past could men by any possibility have been brought to believe that these old Buddhist legends referred to him.

It is therefore safe to say that the supposed commingling of Buddhist stories with the story of the life of Christ could in no case have taken place till, at the soonest, two or three generations after the time of Christ. But nothing in literature is now better established than that the synoptical Gospels, in which the alleged coincidences with the legend of the Buddha chiefly occur, were published to the world in substantially their present form before the generation contemporary with Christ had passed off the earth. Unbelief may be said to be near giving up in despair the attempt to demonstrate a later origin. Hitzig, Schenkel, and Volkmar, Weiss and Meyer, all agree in assigning the composition of the Gospel of Mark to a period within forty years of the crucifixion. Matthew's Gospel is by

a few extreme critics assigned to a rather later date; but even Schenkel and Keim suppose it to have been written not far from A.D. 70. Luke, according to Godet, was written between A.D. 64 and 80, and according to Weiss between A.D. 70 and 80; while even such critics as Hilgenfeld, Keim, and Volkmar do not give it a later date than A.D. 100.¹ Here, then, were the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke existing, according to the practically unanimous consensus of the ablest critics of every school of thought, in essentially the form in which we have them now, before the end of the first century. This imagined transference of parts of the old legend of the Buddha to the story of the Christ could therefore by no possibility have taken place in a period later than the first century.

Thus the well-settled results of the latest scientific criticism of the New Testament compel us to believe that if the hypothesis before us be true, then the old tales about the Buddha were written into these pretended histories of the life of Jesus, and successfully passed off for veritable history upon a contemporary generation. The apostles themselves were not all dead when this was done,—if done at all,—and yet there is not a word of doubt or protest which has come down from any of them against this imposition. No more have any of the early opponents of the gospel betrayed any knowledge of this fraud. Even supposing that any motive had existed for the fraud,—of which no one adduces the slightest evidence,—yet how utterly incredible that the immediate disciples of Christ should have been persuaded to accept those old Buddhist myths as truly relating to the life of one with whom not a few of them had been personally acquainted, when, in point of fact, they must every one of them have known better. And the case is even stronger than this. For we have not assumed anything thus far as to the authorship of the Gospels. But when men like Renan, who can be suspected of no leaning to orthodox beliefs,—to say nothing of other no less able critics,—tell us that the evidence is such that we are compelled to

¹ For a brief and clear exhibit of the general consensus of the critics on this subject, with full references to original authorities, see, among others, an admirable little book by Rev. Prof. Curtiss, of Chicago Theological Seminary, *The Date of our Gospels*, especially pp. 43-45; see also Fisher's *Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, Essays iii. and iv., and Supplementary Notes to the same.

believe that the synoptic Gospels were "substantially" written by the men whose names they bear,¹ the rest of us can justly affirm with confidence that not only the date, but also the authorship, of these three Gospels, must now be regarded as a settled question. Those Gospels, then, were not only written in the apostolic age, but came out of the very midst of the apostolic circle. Even if it were conceivable that some unknown men, personally unacquainted both with Christ and his immediate disciples, should have ignorantly mixed up the story of the Buddha with the life and works of Jesus, and succeeded in imposing this incongruous mixture of fact and fable upon the whole Church of that age for trustworthy history, how more than absurd it is to suppose that the apostles or their immediate associates should have done this. Who can believe, for example, that Matthew, after three years of constant association with Jesus, should have confused the story of Christ with a number of old Buddhist fables, or, worse still, deliberately discredited his whole testimony by indiscriminately mingling with various matters of fact, scraps of old Indian myths, which, by the hypothesis, must have been floating about Palestine on the lips of the people for some time before Jesus appeared?

We may then affirm, without fear of successful contradiction by any one who is acquainted with the facts, that the conclusions of the latest and most impartial criticism as regards the date and the authorship of the Gospels are such as to make the theory that many of the incidents recorded in the Gospels were originally derived from a previously existing legend of the Buddha in the last degree improbable, if not absurd. The evidence upon which these conclusions are based is of such a character that it is not, and cannot be, affected in the slightest degree by any number of such alleged coincidences, however clear and striking. We may not, indeed, be yet in a position to be able to say with confidence what the true

¹ Renan says (in the translation of the *Vie de Jesus*, p. 21, published by Trübner, London, 1864), "On the whole I admit as authentic the four canonical Gospels. All, in my opinion, date from the first century, and the authors are, generally speaking, those to whom they are attributed." His depreciation of their historical value on account of the miraculous element they contain does not affect the value of the above testimony for the present purpose. See Fisher's *Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, p. 435.

explanation of each and every asserted coincidence between the two stories really is, but the historical criticism of the New Testament has at least placed us in a position to say what that explanation cannot be. So firmly established are those results by the application of every critical test, and so universally accepted by the general consensus of competent critics of the most divergent schools, that to insist in the name of scientific candour that we shall ignore those results in dealing with this legend of the Buddha is much as if one should insist that, in order to deal in a scientific and unprejudiced spirit with some unexplained celestial phenomenon, we should begin by ignoring the principle of gravitation.

Nevertheless, it is, no doubt, a question of interest how we are to account for the many agreements which are pointed out in the two stories of the Buddha and the Christ. And to this question we reply, first, that to give a full and satisfactory solution of the problem is not yet within the power of any one. For in order to this, it is plainly necessary that we shall have before us all the Buddhist authorities, and that these shall then be submitted to the same rigid criticism, as regards date, authorship, etc., which has been so successfully applied to the Gospel histories. But a large part of these voluminous records is as yet unknown and inaccessible to European scholars, being locked up in Pali, Chinese, Thibetan, and other Oriental manuscripts, which have yet to be opened up to the world at large by competent scholarship. Nor have the critical questions which arise been satisfactorily settled, even as regards the various authorities already accessible.

The very first question which arises when one is confronted with these coincidences, is that of the date and origin of each one of these various legends. Can this legend of the Buddha, in any one of the various forms in which we have it now, as embodying the alleged coincidences with the story of Christ, be proven to have been in existence antecedent to the Christian era? It is no disparagement to any one to say that no man living is able to prove this. We have not yet the data which are absolutely necessary to prove that vital point. Even Professor Beal, who seems to lean distinctly toward the opinion of a pre-Christian origin for the legend, frankly admits that "in our present state of knowledge there is no complete explana-

tion to offer. We must wait until dates are certainly and finally fixed.”¹ Nor need it give any Christian man the slightest uneasiness that he is obliged to make this admission. For it is evident at sight that the same lack of the requisite data which makes it impossible to furnish an absolute demonstration of any view of the legend which shall be in full accord with the faith of the Church in the Gospels, no less authoritatively forbids any and every dogmatic assertion of any inference from that legend, either contradictory to, or even disparaging to, the historical accuracy of the narrative in the Gospels. And meantime the presumptions to the contrary, as above set forth, remain in all their force. But while all this is true, we yet believe that we are in a position to be able to give, if not a demonstration, yet a highly probable explanation of the chief agreements which are by one and another alleged as between the legend of the Buddha and the story of Christ. Let it be observed, to begin with, that we are by no means to assume that all such agreements in the two stories are to be of necessity explained in the same way. The contrary is not only possible, but highly probable, as we shall be able to show. The full and complete explanation even of a single case of asserted agreement may very possibly be found in a combination of several facts. Premising this, let it be noted, first, that many of the alleged coincidences between the two narratives are only superficial and apparent. It is a fact that the resemblance between the story, as also the doctrines, of Buddha and of Christ, to those who are quite unfamiliar with the Oriental languages and peoples, is often made to appear much closer than it really is, though by the rendition of Buddhist ideas by Christian terms. These, whatever literal equivalence they may have to the words of the original, in the great majority of cases convey ideas entirely different from, and often contradictory to, those which the original terms suggest to a Buddhist. To a certain degree, no doubt, such translations are unavoidable. The writer has had too much personal experience in endeavouring, as a missionary, to teach the Christian religion in a language steeped in pantheism, not to appreciate fully the great difficulties which in this case beset the translator. But, making all allowance for this, we

¹ *Romantic Legend*, Preface, p. ix.

are constrained to place on record our protest against the unnecessary and persistent misrepresentation of a certain class of writers, who, whether through ignorance or through their scarcely concealed eagerness to break down the high and exclusive claims of Christianity by a glorification of heathenism, habitually, and often quite needlessly, clothe heathen ideas in Christian terms, without the slightest intimation to their readers that such terms are to be understood in a sense entirely different from that which they have in our ordinary language. Illustrations might be multiplied. Let two or three, however, suffice as examples, which may put the ordinary reader on his guard against the mischievous plausibilities of such blind guides.

The author of the *Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*, renders the title *tathàgata*, commonly applied to the Buddha, as literally "he that should come;"¹ thereby, of course, meaning to suggest an identity of this title with the Jewish phrase denoting the Messiah as *ὁ ἐρχόμενος*.² As a matter of fact, however, the word *tathàgata* does not have this meaning, nor is it easy to see how possibly any such meaning could ever be got out of it, or put into it. The word is a compound, of which the first element is the Sanskrit *tathà*, *thus, so*; and the second either *gata*, past part. from the root *gam*, *to go*, or *àgata*, compound past part. from *à* and *gam*, meaning *come*. Whichever it be, the idea of futurity, the essential thing to make out the asserted coincidence, is excluded. Authorities give the meaning of the title as follows: Dr. Edkins renders it "thus come," and says, "It is explained, 'bringing human nature as it truly is, with perfect knowledge and high intelligence, he comes and manifests himself.'"³ Mr. Rhys Davids says, "*tathàgata*, *gone or come in like manner*, subject to the fate of men, is an adjective applied originally to all mortals, but afterwards used as a favourite epithet of Gotama."⁴ Bishop Bigandet, missionary to Burmah, says, "It means 'he who has come like all his predecessors.' The Buddhas who appear . . . have all the same mission to accomplish; they are gifted with the same perfect science,

¹ See the work cited, p. 18.

² So also Prof. Beal, *Romantic Legend*, p. 4, note 1.

³ Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 6, note 2.

⁴ In Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 71, note 2.

and are filled with similar feelings of compassion for and benevolence toward all beings. Hence the denomination which is fitly given to Gotama, the last of them."¹ We have thus abundant authority² for affirming that the coincidence with the title of our Lord which some have supposed that they had discovered here has no existence except in the imagination of those who assert the agreement.

Again, we read constantly of the Buddha, as *e.g.* in *The Light of Asia*, as a Saviour or a Deliverer; words which as applied to Christ have a very precise and definite sense, but one as far as possible removed from that which they have as applied to the Buddha. For it is of the very essence of the doctrine of Buddhism that man cannot, in any Christian sense of the words, be saved by another, but must save himself. Buddha is only in such a sense supposed to be a saviour as that he has pointed out the way whereby men may save themselves. Thus the Dhammapada says explicitly, "You yourself must make an effort; the Tathāgatas [*i.e.* the Buddhas] are only preachers."³ Here, again, an agreement appears to the superficial reader, where, as soon as the word is understood, it is plain that there is really no coincidence at all.

Coming to the legend itself, we may note again its teaching as to the pre-existence of the Buddha, which is referred to by Professor Beal as one of the remarkable coincidences of the legend with the story of Christ.⁴ Christ, we are told in the Gospel, existed in heaven before he was born of the Virgin Mary, and so did the Buddha before he was born of Maya. Here, again, the analogy seems plausible, but will not stand the least examination. For, in point of fact, the pre-existence

¹ *The Legend of Gaudama*, p. xv.

² If necessary, we could add much more testimony of the highest authority to the same effect. Thus, Burnouf, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, pp. 75, 76, gives the following as the definition of M. Csoma, the Thibetan scholar: "Tathāgata signifie 'celui qui a parcouru sa carrière religieuse de la même manière que ses devanciers.'" Burnouf expresses himself as inclined to regard this version of the term "comme la première et la plus authentique." He gives other definitions as follows: "'parti ainsi,' c'est à dire parti de telle manière qu'il ne reparaitra plus dans le monde." . . . "Suivant les Bouddhistes du Sud, Tathāgata (Tathā āgata) signifie 'celui qui est venu comme de la même façon que les autres Buddhas ses prédécesseurs;' ou encore Tathāgata revient à Tathā gata, 'celui qui a marché ou qui est parti comme eux.'" . . .

³ Dhammapada, 276, translated from the Pali, by Prof. Max Müller, as given in Buddhaghosha's *Parables*, p. cxxxvi.

⁴ *Romantic Legend*, Preface, p. viii.

of Buddha is represented after a fashion so entirely different from that which the Scriptures attribute to Christ that it is simply impossible that there should be any historical connection between them. The Scriptures teach, according to the faith of the universal Church, that the Christ, the self-same spiritual being which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin, existed from eternal ages in the glory of God the Father; and that in this pre-existence he was alone and peculiar among all that are born of women. As regards the pre-existence of the Buddha, however, it is not represented as anything peculiar to him, but the contrary. It is the uniform teaching of the Buddhist authorities, that every human and superhuman being, as also every animal, has had an existence previous to this present, whether in heaven, earth, or hell. Here, then, is a radical difference at once. Christ, in that he pre-existed, is distinguished from all men; the Buddha, in that he pre-existed, only shared the common lot of all men.

But even this is by no means the whole or the chief contrast between the two doctrines. For when the Buddhist writings speak of the pre-existence of the Buddha and of other men, they do not mean to teach their pre-existence, in our sense of the term, at all. For when we speak of a previous or a future existence of any one, we mean, of course, the previous or future existence of the animating soul. But nothing can be clearer than that Buddhism, according to its own authorities, denies *in toto* that there is such an essence as the soul. That, therefore, which pre-existed in the case of the Buddha, as of any other man, was not, according to the Buddhist conception, the very soul of Buddha at all. Not to go into the intricacies of Buddhist metaphysics, let it suffice to say that, according to the Buddhist conception, that of me which persists after I die, and also existed before I was born, is not my soul,—for I have none,—but my *karma*, or actions; that is, it is the fact of a previously accumulated succession of moral actions in successive moral beings which necessitates the existence of every individual man before he is born; and it is that, and that alone, which survives death, and in like manner necessitates the production of another being in the same line to reap the fruit of such actions. The unity and identity, therefore, of the successive beings in a given line is not found in their posses-

sion of one and the same individual soul, but in their representing the effect of one continuous line of moral activity. Thus when the orthodox Buddhist asserts the pre-existence of the Buddha, he refers to a pre-existence in this sense only.¹ It is plain at sight, whether we are able to understand precisely what is intended by this Buddhist mystery or not, that the orthodox doctrine of the pre-existence of the Buddha has absolutely nothing in common with the Scripture doctrine of the pre-existence of the Christ. There is no coincidence here at all.

But even if we concede that in Buddhist countries many of the common people do believe in the existence of the soul, and consequently the pre-existence of the soul of Buddha, still there is no coincidence with the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ. For whereas the pre-existence of Christ is represented as a state of unchanging glory with God, the Buddha is represented in the popular birth stories as having been born no less than five hundred and fifty times,² sometimes as a god, sometimes as a man, sometimes as a beast. According to Mr. Hardy,³ the Buddha is declared to have pre-existed in every form from that of the god Sakka down to that of a thief, a devil-dancer, and a pig. No argument is needed. The coincidence asserted here, again, has no existence except in the imaginations of those who make the assertion. The two doctrines of the pre-existence of the Christ and the pre-existence of the Buddha are so utterly diverse that by no possibility can the one have arisen from the other.

In like manner, the analogy which is alleged between the Buddhist legend of the incarnation and miraculous conception and the story of the miraculous birth of Christ, if not also wholly superficial and apparent, is at least often greatly exaggerated. In the case of Christ, the teaching of the gospel is that the Son of God, being sent by the love of the Father for the salvation of men, freely gave himself in like love to that

¹ There can be, it would seem, no doubt that this is the real teaching of the Buddhist authorities. For a full argument to this effect, see Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 93-99. See also his remarks in Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. lxxv, lxxvi, and also Bigandet on "The Seven Ways to Neibban," in *The Legend of Gaudama*, vol. ii. p. 213, and Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 410, 454, sec. 12, p. 457, sec. 17 *et passim*.

² *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. l, lxxxi.

³ *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 102.

work, was born of a virgin, lived and died for the sins of men. The legend of the Buddha tells us that ages ago the Bodhisat, when born as a hermit, and having it in his power then and there, obtaining Nirvána, to cease from the weary round of births and deaths, out of pity for man determined to postpone that final deliverance, in order that slowly progressing upwards through successive births, and at last attaining to omniscience, he might become a Buddha, and show to suffering men the way of deliverance from births and deaths.¹ Is it easy to believe that the Scripture doctrine of the sending of the Son by the Father for our redemption is a copy of this Buddhist legend?

But many insist much on the legend of his miraculous conception, and think that we have here a clear and most remarkable analogy. Mr. De Bunsen even ventures to head the section of his book which treats of this part of the legend, "Conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the virgin Maya."² But how much is there in this coincidence? What are the facts of the case? According to Bishop Bigandet, "The conception of Phralaong (Buddha) in his mother's womb is wrapped up in a mysterious obscurity. The Cochin Chinese in their religious legends pretend that Buddha was conceived and born from Maya in a wonderful manner, not at all resembling what takes place in the order of nature."³ On the other hand, Mr. Hardy quotes the Thibetan scholar Csoma Korösi as saying that he "does not find any mention in the Thibetan books" of that virginity of Maya "upon which the Mongolian accounts lay so much stress."⁴ Mr. Rhys Davids, however, alluding to this statement of Csoma Korösi, says, "His reference to a belief of the later Mongolian Buddhists that Maya was a virgin has not been confirmed."⁵ The facts of the case are, as regards the authorities before us, that while something supernatural is suggested in connection with the birth of the Buddha, they distinctly exclude the idea of Maya's virginity. The mother of Buddha is not represented, like the Virgin Mary in the Gospel, as having never known man, and never

¹ See Fausböll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, "Nidána Kathà," pp. 10-14, for a full version of this legend.

² *The Angel-Messiah*, p. 33. Some have even fancied they could discern a connection between the Páli name *Mâyà*, and the Greek name of the mother of our Lord, *Mapia*! Eitel, *Three Lectures on Buddhism*, p. 7.

³ *Legend of Gaudama*, vol. i. p. 27, note 17.

⁴ *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 145, note.

⁵ *Buddhism*, p. 183, note 1.

having lived with her husband; but, on the contrary, as having lived with her husband childless to the age of forty-five years.¹ It is, moreover, distinctly taught, in terms we need not here cite, that up to that time she had lived with him after the ordinary manner.² In the Chinese account, among the thirty-two signs which must mark the mother of a Buddha the virginal birth is not mentioned, but only that "she must never have borne a child before." In fact, the idea that she should be, like the Virgin Mary, an unmarried woman is excluded by the thirty-first mark, that "she must be a woman obedient to her husband."³ To the same effect reads the legend in the Nidāna Kathā, the Pūjāwaliya, and the Mallālingāra Wouttou. Whether or not in any Buddhist documents not yet before us, the doctrine of the miraculous virginal conception be taught, we will not affirm, but it is certainly true that the authorities accessible do not so represent the case. Jerome (Cont. Jovian, Lib. i.) speaks of it as an oral *tradition* of the gymnosophists of India.

As for the statement that the legend represents the Buddha as having been conceived by the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the virgin Maya, we find no warrant for this statement except in the assertion of Mr. De Bunsen,—for which he gives no authority,—that the Chinese Buddhistic writings say "it was the Holy Ghost, or Shing-shin, which descended upon the virgin Maya."⁴ With regard to this, we can only say that in none of the authorities before us—Chinese, as well as others—is there any suggestion of this kind. Not only this, but the very idea of the Holy Ghost is utterly alien to Buddhism. The very existence of spirit is again and again denied. If, however, it should nevertheless appear that the conception of the Buddha is so represented in any Chinese authorities, it is certain that the coincidence cannot be explained by a derivation of the gospel conception from the Buddhistic, but rather by the reverse. For, since the religion of the Buddha was only introduced into China in the first century after Christ, a derivation of the idea from Christian preaching is therefore quite possible, the contrary is quite impossible.

In fine, then, the only demonstrated analogy between the

¹ *Buddhism*, p. 26.

² *Romantic Legend*, p. 32.

³ See *Romantic Legend*, pp. 36, 37, 41.

⁴ *Angel-Messiah*, p. 33.

legend of the birth of the Buddha and that of the Christ is found in the suggestion of a miraculous element in both cases. But the idea of a supernatural birth, it need not be said, is by no means peculiar to Buddhism. In various forms it occurs in the mythologies of many nations. What may be the relation of this fact to the Scripture doctrine of the miraculous conception of our Lord we cannot now stop to inquire; but it certainly diminishes, if it does not remove, the special significance of the occurrence of this idea in the narrative of the Buddha.

Professor Beal calls attention to "another of the singular coincidences of the narrative of the Buddha with the gospel history" in the chapter of the *Fo-pen-hing*, entitled "The Fear of Bimbasara."¹ That chapter tells us that when the Buddha was a young man, the king Bimbasara was filled with fear lest there might somewhere be some enemy able to overthrow his kingdom. He accordingly sent two messengers to seek throughout all the regions round about to see whether any such there were. In their search they heard of the Buddha, then a young man between twenty and thirty years of age, and, impressed with his power, returning, exhorted the king to destroy him. The king, however, utterly refused to entertain this suggestion. The "singular coincidence" with the history of the gospel which the learned professor here discovers we suppose must have reference to the story of Herod, who "sought the young child to destroy him," though this is not explicitly stated. The coincidence is, indeed, very "singular;" for we read that so far from wishing to destroy the Buddha, the king utterly refuses to entertain the suggestion. The only coincident feature in the two cases is found in the fact that both Bimbasara and Herod appear to have been anxious lest they should lose their kingdom. But we surely need to add no further illustration of coincidences which are simply apparent and imaginary.

2. Another element which must be allowed some place in any explanation of the coincidences is undoubtedly that of accident. While we would not press this unduly, yet we think that there can be no doubt that there is no need of going beyond this for the explanation of not a few points which

¹ *Romantic Legend*, pp. 103, 104.

are urged. Thus, for example, Mr. Arnold, in his poem, tells us how

"From afar came merchantmen
Bringing, on tidings of his birth, rich gifts."¹

To suppose that the mention of this incident can only be accounted for on the supposition of a direct connection of some sort between the gospel story and that of the Buddha is, as it seems to us, absurd. There is no more common custom in India, and the East generally, than the presentation of gifts on the birth of a son, especially to a person of rank. That men should have come bringing gifts both in the case of the birth of the Buddha and of the Christ is only what was to be expected.

Little, if any, more significance can we see in the blessing of the infant Buddha by Asita, in which many have thought that they could see the story of the blessing of the infant Jesus in the temple. In the case of Christ, he is taken to the temple, and Simeon there receives him, and through the Holy Ghost predicts his future glory as the Christ of God, in the words which begin, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, . . . for mine eyes have seen thy salvation." In the case of the Buddha and Asita, almost every detail of the story is different. Asita is said to have descended from heaven, where he had gone by his magic power to rest during the heat of the day. He goes to the king to see the new-born son, of whom in heaven he had heard; proceeds to look for the marks on the body of the child which should indicate the future Buddha. Having found them, he congratulates the king, but mingles his congratulations with mourning and weeping, saying,—

"What loss, what damage is mine !
Alas, I am old and stricken in years !
My time of departure is close at hand."²

The only coincidence is in the circumstance of something like a blessing by an old man in the case of the Buddha as well as of Christ. Surely this is not so rare and unusual a circumstance but that it may easily be a merely accidental agreement. As for the rest, the two stories are marked by contrast in

¹ *Light of Asia*, Book i.

² *Romantic Legend*, pp. 56-60.

almost every particular. Mr. Arnold, however, puts in the lips of Asita the additional words,

"A sword must pierce
Thy bowels for this boy."¹

The phrase evidently suggests—whether so intended by Mr. Arnold or not—a verbal coincidence with the story of Simeon in the Gospel, which would deserve attention were such coincidence really to be found in the original authorities. To what authorities Mr. Arnold may have had access we know not; but it is certain that no such phraseology occurs either in the Ceylonese Pūjāwaliya or the Nidāna Kathā, the Burmese Mallālingāra Wouttou, nor the Chinese version of the Abhinishkramana Sūtra. We venture to raise the question, whether the above phraseology can be justified from any original authority whatever. This is not the only instance in the poem of Mr. Arnold, as also in the work of Mr. De Bunsen,² wherein the phraseology of the Gospels is used in the narrative in a manner for which we can find no warrant in any of the authorities before us. Except such warrant can be clearly shown, we must protest, in the name of common honesty, against this mischievous practice, as practically involving, however unintentionally, gross misrepresentation, and occasioning of necessity very serious misapprehension of facts. It suggests a verisimilitude between the two stories of the Buddha and of Christ, frequently extending even to the words of the two accounts, whereas such verbal agreements, if we are not greatly mistaken, cannot, with a few possible exceptions, be shown to exist.

Mr. Arnold, in the preface to his poem, refers reverentially to "the miracles which consecrate the record."³ And here, again, many see another significant parallel to the story of the life of Christ. But all will agree that in the mere fact that miracles are attributed to the Buddha as well as to Christ there is no such coincidence as of necessity suggests some kind of historical connection between the two narratives. Every one knows that miraculous deeds have been attributed to almost every one to whom men have ever rendered religious reverence or worship. The fact that miracles are attributed to both the

¹ *Light of Asia*, Book i.

² *The Angel-Messiah*, pp. 33, 34, etc.

³ *Light of Asia*, Preface.

Buddha and Christ may therefore be rightly regarded as a merely accidental circumstance. Only in case that the miracles attributed to the Buddha should be found closely similar in character to those of Christ would we be justly warranted in a different opinion. As a matter of fact, the two classes of miracles are marked not by similarity, but by contrast the most complete and suggestive. We are, indeed, told that at the moment of the conception of the Buddha, as also on his attaining the Buddhahood, many prodigies occurred, some of which remind one of what our Lord is said to have done. We read that at the time of the conception¹ "in the ten thousand world-systems an immeasurable light appeared; the blind received their sight; the deaf heard the noise; the dumb spake one with another; the crooked became straight; the lame walked; all prisoners were freed from their bonds and chains; in each hell the fire was extinguished; the hungry ghosts received food and drink," etc. But these are not represented as the acts of the Buddha. As for his miracles, we are rather reminded of the prodigies that are related of Christ in some of the apocryphal Gospels than of anything in the New Testament.² We are told, for example, that, when born, he immediately began to walk, while under every step a lotus sprang up. At the same time he spoke also, crying, "I am the chief of the world." He is said to have sat unsupported in the air, to have thrown an elephant a distance of sixteen miles, and so on indefinitely. In these miracles which "consecrate (!) the record," we see no coincidence which requires an explanation. As for the fact, then, that miracles are attributed to both the Buddha and Christ, most readers will, we believe, agree that there is nothing in this which is not abundantly accounted for as a mere accidental circumstance. And very possibly it will be found in the end that yet other features in the legend resembling more or less certain features in the gospel story may be sufficiently explained in like manner.

3. Another element which should probably have a place in the complete explanation of the relation of the two stories to each other, the believer in the Word of God may not unreason-

¹ Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 64.

² See, e.g. instances noted by Prof. Beal, in the *Romantic Legend*, pp. 390, 391.

ably find in the influence of an indistinct lingering memory among our race of a promise of a deliverer who should struggle with the tempter, and, struggling, overcome him. If that promise were made, as we Christians believe, then it were natural that the remembrance of such a momentous fact should outlive most early memories of the race. And this being so, it is also easy to see how men should readily come to believe with regard to any one whom from time to time they might mistakenly suppose to be the expected deliverer, that he had had the struggle and the victory predicted. Until the memory of the ancient promise had entirely faded away, something like this would even seem to be a condition of faith in any one claiming to be a deliverer of men from the curse. And, as a matter of fact, it would appear that this has been even so. Every one knows how, among almost all the great nations of antiquity, we find a story or a prophecy of a conflict of one or another great deliverer with a personal power of evil, the enemy of man.

The story of the conflict of the Buddha with Mara the prince of evil is thus not an exceptional fact, without any parallel except that of the temptation of Christ. The coincidence of such a spiritual trial in each case is real and undeniable; but it is not of such a sort as only to be explained by the theory of a common mythical origin of the two stories, or a derivation of one from the other. Presumably we are to look for an explanation of the agreement, which shall be broad enough to include the other numerous phenomena of a similar nature. Such an explanation, we believe, is found in that redemptive tradition of the first promise which, if we allow any kind of historical character to the records of the Scriptures, must have existed. It accounts both for the story of the temptation of the Buddha and for other similar stories among other peoples. It accounts, also, no less for the actual temptation of the Christ than for the fancied conflicts of these others. For if that promise was ever made at all, it follows of necessity that the true Deliverer, when indeed He should come, must have that experience in fact which had been attributed to others in fancy. Nor would the fact of the previous mistakes of men invalidate in the least whatever testimony there might be as to the reality of the conflict in this case. The

primal redemptive promise, then, may be fairly urged as the ultimate explanation of the fact that both to Buddha and Christ is attributed a struggle with the Evil One.

Still, it may be reasonably asked whether there are not coincidences of detail between the two stories such as to compel us to infer in this case a much closer connection between them? To which we answer, that this particular case will be found, we believe, to illustrate a previous remark that the explanation of some of the asserted agreements between the two stories will prove to be more or less complex. While the fact of the story of the conflict we are inclined to explain by reference to the primeval promise, we can easily grant that some of the details of the story—as at least it is given to us by some—require a further explanation than this. In some particulars we believe it can be shown, as above, that the alleged agreements are only imaginary. It is the experience of the writer that as one compares the two stories—that of the temptation of the Christ with that of the Buddha, not as transmuted by the poetic wand of Mr. Arnold, but as it stands in the original authorities,—the contrasts do so overwhelmingly outweigh any casual coincidences here and there, as to make it very easy to believe in the original independence of the two stories. Granting that very possibly single features or phrases may have been added under the influence of Christian teaching at a late day,¹ yet it is almost impossible, laying the two stories side by side, to believe that either one has been derived from the other, or both from a common source.

The whole case, as it seems to us, is often very much exaggerated, both by the friends and enemies of the gospel. Especially will those be grievously misled who depend on the *Light of Asia* for their knowledge. We are free to affirm that, however unintentionally, the poet has so constructed, *e.g.* the story of the temptation of Buddha as to convey to the mind of the reader an impression exceedingly different from what he will receive from any of the original authorities we have above mentioned. Space will not allow us to show this in detail; but let any one who is curious read, *e.g.* the story of the temptation of the Buddha as given in the trans-

¹ See *infra*, pp. 761, 762.

lation of the Abhinishkramana Sùtra in the *Romantic Legend* of Professor Beal.¹ Any one who will do this will readily see how, by throwing that which contrasts with the story of Christ quite into the background, and omitting entirely the gross and even indecent features of the legend, an impression is given of verisimilitude between the two stories which the actual facts are very far from justifying. The erroneous impression is the more deepened that through an apparent misapprehension of the meaning of certain Pali terms employed the poet has given to the conflict a moral character different from, and vastly higher than, that which it really has. Of this we may give two notable illustrations.

According to Mr. Arnold, the first temptation of Mara was to the sin called Attavàd, which he thus explains :

“The sin of self, who in the universe
As in a mirror sees her fond face shown,
And, crying ‘I,’ would have the world say ‘I,’
And all things perish so if she endure.
‘If thou be’st Buddh,’² she said, ‘let others grope
Lightless ; it is enough that thou art thou
Changelessly. Rise, and take the bliss of gods,
Who change not, heed not, strive not.’”³

In this passage the nature of the sin called Attavàd seems to be entirely misunderstood, and the misunderstanding gives the temptation an inner moral similarity to that of Christ which really does not exist. Attavàd is here made to mean selfishness ; but, in fact, it does not mean selfishness, nor anything like it. The word is literally *self-saying*, and in Buddhistic phraseology has the precise and definite meaning, “the affirmation of the existence of soul or self.” That this is the true meaning of the word is conclusively shown by such Buddhist scholars as Davids, Hardy, and other most competent authorities, from the writings of the Buddhists themselves.⁴ The first temptation of the Buddha, then, by

¹ *Romantic Legend*, pp. 199-225.

² We note here another verbal agreement with the story of Christ, for which we have been able to find no warrant in any original authority. In fact, it is inconceivable, from a Buddhist point of view, that Gautama should have been represented as so addressed at that time, inasmuch as he did not claim yet to be Buddha, nor was Buddha (lit. *enlightened*) until *after* this conflict with Mara.

³ *Light of Asia*, Book vi.

⁴ See, e.g. Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 95, 109.

Mara, according to this form of the legend, was not to selfishness, but to the belief that he had a soul distinct from the body. And so any imagined analogy with the spirit of the temptation of Christ vanishes so soon as the word is defined. In fact, so far from being tempted herein to a sin, it had been much better for the world had Mara succeeded in persuading the Buddha to *attavād*.

No less misleading is the account which is given of the temptation to the sin called *arūparāga*, which is rendered, "lust of fame;" a meaning, again, which the word in nowise has. For as the sin previously mentioned, called *rūparāga*, and rendered "lust of days," means in Buddhist phraseology desire of life in the *rūpaloka*, the present or some like world of form, so *arūparāga* means desire of life in the *arūpaloka*, "the formless world." Mr. Davids thus very properly gives as the equivalent of the former of these two terms, "desire of life on earth," and for *arūparāga*, "desire of life in heaven." And this was another of the temptations of the Buddha. Again a correct definition suffices to dispel any shadow of a fancied analogy with the temptation of Christ.

But while the suggestions thus far made will, we believe, either singly or together, furnish the true explanation of many points of agreement in the story of the temptation and other parts of the two stories of the Buddha and of Christ, we are quite willing to admit that there may still remain here and there such agreements in detail as may not unreasonably suggest a derivation of some elements in the two stories either from a common source or from one story to the other. But as for any theory which supposes a pre-Christian origin of such features as they exist in the Gospel histories, we believe that the argument already given for the historical credibility of the gospel narrative rules out any such theory as untenable.

4. The question only remains of the possible derivation of individual features in the legend of the Buddha from Christian sources. And this is, we believe, another and the last element in the full explanation of the legend of the Buddha. That such a derivation can as yet be demonstrated we do not claim; that it is not only possible, but highly probable, can, we believe, be clearly shown. The chief facts which point toward this conclusion are as follows: It is admitted on all hands

that the Buddhist scriptures were committed to writing a century or more before Christ. But, admitting also that a legend of the Buddha was contained in those early documents, yet no competent scholar professes to be able to prove that the legend as at that time therein contained had a single feature of detail coincident with the later gospel story. Buddhist scholars appear to agree with Dr. Eitel, who says, "No reliable information exists as to the extent and character of the Buddhist scriptures said to have been finally revised by that council of Kanishka, between A.D. 15 and 45. The very earliest compilation of the Buddhist canon that history can point out is that of Ceylon, . . . which was first compiled and fixed in writing between the years 412 and 432 of our present Christian era."¹ Mr. Hardy, in his *Manual of Buddhism*, says that the legend is translated by him chiefly from the Pùjā-waliya, which was written between A.D. 1267 and 1301.² None of the twelve works from which he has drawn appear to be of earlier date than this. The Chinese version of the Abhinishkramana Sūtra, translated into English by Professor Beal, is dated by Mr. Rhys Davids in the sixth century after Christ. He adds that the date of the Sanskrit original is unknown.³ Bishop Bigandet of Burmah has translated a Burmese life of Buddha, called Mallālinkāra Wouttōu. But according to the bishop, this was composed as late as A.D. 1773. The author's name is not given.⁴ Not to be tedious, according to Mr. Rhys Davids, the oldest of all the authorities which we have for the life of Buddha is to be dated not later than the fourth century B.C. But this oldest authority, the Mahā-parinibbāna Sūtra, only rehearses the incidents which are said to have occurred in connection with the death of Buddha, and thus does not contain the most striking coincidences of the legend with the life of Christ.⁵ The oldest authority containing the legend of the birth, etc.,—the commentary on the

¹ *Buddhism*, p. 17 ; and see also p. 25, where he shows that the Chinese Buddhist canon was not completed until A.D. 1410.

² *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 143, note §, and Appendix, p. 538, etc. See also Hardy, *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. xxvi.

³ Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 12. No Chinese version of the Legend can be earlier than A.D. 66, when Buddhism was introduced into China ; and none is proven to be as old as that.

⁴ *Legend of Gaudama*, Third Edition, vol. ii. p. 149. See also *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi. ; *Buddhist Sutras*, p. xxxii.

⁵ Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 12.

Jātaka,—is assigned to the middle of the fifth century of our era.¹ So much for the date of the chief original authorities for this legend of the Buddha. There is not one of them which can be traced with any certainty to an earlier date than the fifth or sixth century after Christ, except the Mahāparinibbāna and Mahāsudassana Sūtras,² and these present no difficulty as regards the present argument. And even this does not state the whole case; for it also remains to be shown that the earliest authorities containing the legend have come down without any material corruption or addition. Of this, again, there is no proof, nor are we likely to be able to obtain any.

The contrast, in this respect, with the writings of the New Testament, is most striking and suggestive. As every scholar knows, we possess manuscripts of the New Testament which reach back to the fourth century, and these are found to give the story of the life of Christ, in every essential particular, just as we have it in the most modern authorities. And this testimony is further corroborated by still earlier translations of the New Testament books, and by a multitude of quotations and references by numerous writers of the first three centuries of our era. We can therefore affirm, with the utmost assurance, that we have the story of the Gospels in essentially the very same form in which it was originally written. As regards the authorities for this legend of the Buddha, the case is the exact reverse. Dr. Eitel asserts, and he is contradicted, we believe, by no one, that "not a single ancient manuscript of the Buddhist scriptures has withstood the ravages of time."³ Nor have we any ancient collateral testimony that can give us any assurance that the authorities originally contained all that we find in them now. Clemens Alexandrinus, in the third century, barely states that some of the Indians "worshipped Boutta as a God;" and Jerome, in the fourth century, alludes to the belief of some of the Indians that the Buddha was born of a virgin. From this we may infer that at this date something of the modern version of the story of the Buddha was known in the West. But it is not conceivable that, if it had existed in its present fully developed form, such opponents of Christianity as Celsus and

¹ Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 13.

² Translated in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. ix.

³ Eitel, *Buddhism*, p. 25.

Porphyry would have been any less ready than their modern followers to make use of it in their argument against the gospel of Christ. At least, if it had existed and they did not so use it, this is hardly to be explained, except on the supposition that they knew that it was of so late origin as to be unavailable as an argument.

The conclusion from all this seems to be almost self-evident. If the legend of the Buddha in its full modern form does not occur in any literature earlier than several hundred years after Christ, the natural explanation of this fact is, that in the form in which we have it now it did not exist until at least a considerable time after the Christian era. And this is the conclusion reached by so competent a scholar as Dr. Eitel.¹ It should be remarked, however, that Professor Beal is plainly disinclined to this conclusion. His argument against it is substantially as follows:²—He admits that the Chinese version of the Abhinishkramana Sûtra, of which his *Romantic Legend* is a translation, was rendered into Chinese not earlier than the sixth century of our era. But he refers to the statement of a Chinese writer that the above Sanskrit work was translated also into Chinese as early as A.D. 69 or 70. Whence the origin of the story must be put back at least some little time previous to that date. Even this date, however, would not exclude the possibility of a Christian origin for many things in the legend. Waiving that, however, what proof is there that the legend as translated, A.D. 70, agreed with the legend as translated five hundred years later, and that the most striking coincidences may not have been later additions? Of this no proof is given. On the contrary, Professor Beal himself argues that “it would seem that originally the story of the Abhiniskramana was simply that of Buddha’s flight from his palace to become an ascetic.” “Afterwards,” he suggests, “the same title was applied to the complete legend, which includes his previous and subsequent history.” This argument may therefore be dismissed, as proving nothing against the late origin of the coincidences in the legend with the story of Christ.

He argues further, however, that the Chinese translator of the sixth century tells us that the story is also called Ta-chwang-yen, “great magnificence,” which points it out as the San-

¹ Eitel, *Buddhism*, p. 31.

² See *Romantic Legend*, pp. 5-9, for the argument as here reviewed.

skrit work known as the *Lalita Vistāra*. But, he says, according to M. Foucaux, the translator of the Thibetan version of this work, the *Lalita Vistāra* was put in its present form in the reign of Kanishka, four hundred years after Buddha. He himself, however, does not venture formally to indorse this opinion; while Mr. Davids broadly affirms that M. Foucaux assigns the Sanskrit to Kanishka's Council "without any evidence whatever."¹ Certainly, there is nothing in all this to raise a presumption for the pre-Christian origin of the legend.

The only other argument given for the early date Professor Beal derives from certain sculptures upon the Buddhist topes at Sanchi and Bharhut. He simply says—

"Many of the stories related in the following pages are found sculptured at Sanchi, and some, I believe, at Bharhut. . . . If the date of these topes is to be placed between Asoka, about 300 B.C., and the first century of the Christian era, it will be seen that the records of the books and of the stone sculptures are in agreement."

But as regards the precise question before us, all this amounts to very little. First, there is the question of the date of the topes containing these sculptures. Can it be positively proven that they are earlier than the first century of the Christian era? If not, then they do not prove the legend of necessity pre-Christian. But Mr. Beal, it will be observed, only says that "many" of the stories in the Chinese version of the legend are found on those sculptures. But many is not all. And the question is not whether much of the legend may not have been in existence at the early date named, but whether those sculptures show us that those parts of the legend which exhibit the close agreement with the story of Christ were certainly in existence at a date earlier than the Christian era. Of this we find nowhere any proof. Professor Beal, in the notes to the *Romantic Legend*, calls attention in all to twenty-four instances in which he thinks that incidents in the story of the Buddha are to be identified on various sculptures in India. Of all these there are only two incidents—the incarnation scene and the old sage Asita holding the infant Buddha in his arms—which have even any apparent similarity with anything in the Gospel narrative. But the representation of an old man holding a child in his arms can hardly be held as

¹ *Buddhism*, p. 11, note.

proof conclusive that the artist must have known the story of the blessing of Simeon as it appears in our Gospel of Luke. And as for the incarnation scene, wherein, as Professor Beal tells us, the Buddha is "generally represented as descending in the form of a white elephant,"¹—surely there is nothing in this to remind one of the Gospel story of the incarnation of our Lord, and show that it had a pre-Christian origin. And that the monuments do really bring no proof to this effect, we may safely conclude from the fact that even so eminent a scholar as this same Professor Beal, after all this argument, is compelled to admit that "in our present state of knowledge there is no complete explanation of the coincidences to offer."²

In view then of the total absence of proof that the legend of the Buddha in its pre-Christian form contained details coincident with the story of the life of Christ; regarding also the weighty testimony of the most direct and positive sort to the actual occurrence of the incidents in question in the case of Christ; and finally, in view of the positive proof that all the authorities which contain the legend in the full modern form, must be dated, at the earliest, several centuries after Christ, we may justly infer that such details of the legend as are really coincident with the facts of Christ's life were derived from the Gospel story at a period considerably subsequent to the Christian era. And the case is even stronger than this. For it can be shown conclusively that within the limits of time and place required by the facts, such opportunity for the transfer of incidents from the gospel to the legend of the Buddha did beyond doubt occur.

In the first place, it is a familiar fact that a body of Christians in fellowship with the Syrian church has existed on the south-west coast of India from a very remote antiquity. They themselves have an uncontradicted tradition that their Church was originally founded by the apostle Thomas. But, whether we accept this tradition, or, with some modern critics, suppose this ancient Indian church to have been established by a Syrian Thomas in the third century, it matters not for our present argument. In any case, we have positive and independent testimony to the existence of Christian churches on

¹ *Romantic Legend*, p. 36, note 2.

² *Ibid.* p. 9.

the Malabar coast by the middle of the fourth century,¹ a date earlier than that of any of the existing authorities for the now existing legend of the Buddha. It is also matter of undisputed history that among the Nestorian Christians there was a great quickening of missionary zeal in the sixth and seventh centuries, and that they had already before A.D. 500 sent forth "multitudes of missionaries" into Eastern, and perhaps also Southern, Asia.² We have, in particular, testimony of a Syriac inscription in China,—accepted by scholars like Huc, Abel Remusat, and others,—that the gospel was preached in China in A.D. 636 by a Nestorian Christian Olopen.³ In the century following, we read of the appointment by the Nestorian patriarch Salibazach of metropolitans of Samarkand and of China,—a fact which shows that there must have been at that time a considerable number of churches in the regions indicated.⁴

Not to enlarge further, it is the significant fact that nearly all of the existing original authorities for the legend of the Buddha were written about the time of that great missionary activity of the Nestorian church in Southern and Eastern Asia, and none whatever antedate the known existence of Christian churches in India. Here, then, was the opportunity required for a transfer of details from the story of the Christ to a pre-existing legend of the Buddha. Of the existence of any real agreements between the two stories before the establishment of Christian churches in India we have no evidence at all. Only subsequent to that were all the works written in which the alleged coincidences appear. We maintain, then, that whatever may be the residuum of agreement between the story of the Buddha and of Christ, more or less, which cannot be fairly accounted for by considerations we have previously mentioned, it may be with the highest reason ascribed to the influence of Christian teaching in China and in India between the first and the seventh centuries of our era.⁵

In conclusion, we may sum up our argument as follows:

¹ Kurtz, *Kirchengeschichte*, s. 190.

² Mosheim, *Ecclesiastical History*, p. 421; Smith, *Medieval Missions*, pp. 203, 204; Kurtz, *Kirchengeschichte*, ss. 190, 191.

³ Mosheim, *Ecclesiastical History*, p. 421, note (1); Smith, *Medieval Missions*, pp. 205-209.

⁴ *Medieval Missions*, p. 210.

⁵ With this conclusion Dr. Kital agrees, but is even more definite as to the precise date of the transfer of the Christian elements to the legend of Buddha.—*Buddhism*, pp. 31, 32. See also J. Talboys Wheeler's *History of India*, vol. iii. p. 146, note 48.

Against the theory that the features in the legend of the Buddha which are said to be coincident with similar details in the recorded life of our Lord are to be explained either by a common origin of such parts of the two stories, or else a derivation of such details in the story of Christ from the story of the Buddha, lies the most weighty presumption, for the reasons following, namely:—

1. Negatively, we have no evidence that the legend of the Buddha was known in Palestine at so early a date as is required by the hypothesis.

2. Positively, we have such proof of the apostolic origin of the Gospel histories as utterly forbids us to believe that there was opportunity for any such confusion of the facts of the life of Christ with pre-existing myths of the Buddha.

3. Negatively, again, it is impossible to prove that the legend of the Buddha, in the form under discussion, was in existence until some centuries after Christ.

4. The full and complete explanation of the facts concerned, whenever such explanation shall be possible, will in all probability be complex, and will include at least the following particulars:—Some of the coincident features are, either in part or wholly, superficial and apparent; others, merely accidental. Others, again, may be reasonably ascribed to the influence of a tradition of the promise of a Redeemer; and a remainder, more or less numerous, may be with good reason attributed to an actual transference to the original legend of the Buddha of certain elements in the story of Christ, as preached through the East in the early centuries of our era. In what precise proportion, indeed, these various elements should enter into the solution of the problem, no man yet knows enough to be able to say with confidence. We have, however, for all this, a sufficiency of ascertained facts before us to vindicate the Gospel record fully from all suspicions which have been of late so freely cast upon it from this quarter.¹

S. H. KELLOGG.

¹ Since the above was written, we have received vol. ix. of the *Sacred Books of the East*, containing the Buddhist Suttas, as translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, in which we find that the learned author expresses himself fully and decisively against the theory that the New Testament has borrowed anything from Buddhist sources. As regards the alleged similarities of the two literatures, he says (p. 164), "There does not seem to me to be the slightest evidence of any historical connection between them."

ART. VII.—*Progress in Psychology.*¹

THE statement is frequently made, that the science of mind makes no progress. Psychology, it is often said, is no nearer a solution of its problems than it was in Plato's time; its professors still dispute among themselves, with no approach to an agreement, and no hope of any; the progress of physical science has left mental science far back in the dark ages, whence it will never emerge.

This opinion is erroneous and superficial. The science of mind has made as great progress in modern times, considering its peculiar difficulties, as the sciences of matter have done. Mind cannot be measured, weighed, or analysed, and hence its study is more difficult, to most people, than the study of matter. Mind is self, and hence its study is more exposed to prejudice and mistake than the study of the not-self. To study the laws of matter, again, is fashionable. Thousands of able men, throughout the civilised world, constantly stimulate one another in physical research, make known the smallest new results through their learned societies, gain fame and sometimes fortune from a happy guess. In psychology a few scores or hundreds of patient thinkers build with one hand and fight with the other, constructing their science and defending its very existence at the same time, having little of the enthusiasm which springs from combination, and less of the eagerness which is derived from profit. Again, these objectors forget that in the sciences of matter vast regions are still unexplored, new theories are to be tested, and ultimate facts are still matter of speculative inference. Mechanical ingenuity is not science, and it is a great though common fallacy to cite progress in machinery as a proof of the vast progress of the science of matter, no less unfair than to charge upon psychology all the absurdities and vagaries of abstract thought, all the wild or weak speculations concerning the great problems of existence which the ages have produced.

We shall undertake to make it clear that the progress of psychology in modern times has been great, and in the following

¹ From the *New Englander*.

particulars. I. In positive additions to our knowledge of the operations of the human mind, and this in two ways: (1.) the true theory of vision, with its consequences, and (2.) the increased knowledge of the brain and nervous system. II. In the remarkable approach to one another, whether explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, of contending parties on some important points of psychology.

I. (1.) The true theory of vision, a doctrine most fruitful of consequences in many departments of thought, was first proved by Berkeley in 1709, though others had dimly seen or hinted at it before. We quote a part of Professor Bowen's statement of the theory: "Berkeley proved that there is no resemblance whatever between the *visible* and the tangible qualities of material things; that colours are the only objects of sight, while the distances, figures, and magnitudes of external objects are not seen, but only inferred or estimated from qualities which are really visible, that is, from variations of colour, and from the gradation of tints, and of light and shade." The sensations of sight alone give us, directly, a very limited amount of information, but a vast structure of knowledge is built upon them by association, by inference, and by the aid of the other senses.

No doctrine of science has ever been more revolutionary in its effects, nor has any ever compelled more completely the reluctant assent of the thinking world. Like the theory of gravitation, or the undulatory theory of light, or the theory of the exact combinations of atoms, or that of the correlation of forces, it is accepted as embodying the most certain truth, even though it makes the subject in some respects still more mysterious and difficult than before.

In the first place, this doctrine establishes beyond dispute the truth that the mind is active in perception. It was believed in former times that the outer world had a power of its own to make itself known to the mind. But in modern times the new theory of vision has led to a similar analysis of the operations of the other senses, and they have been shown to be, in varying degrees, subject to similar laws. It is now generally held that the whole mind is active in perception, sensation receiving impressions from the outside world, association supplying the information which would be afforded by the other senses, judgment distinguishing the object or its properties from others,

memory giving the aid of former similar perceptions, imagination constructing the landscape, the complete object in its relations, feeling experiencing pleasure or pain, the will selecting one or another part of the object for special attention.

In the second place, the modern theory of vision has been the starting-point of school after school of metaphysics. Berkeley was led by it, quite unnecessarily as we believe, to deny the existence of the material world, "idealising matter and realising ideas." Hume pushed this idealism a step further, denying the existence both of matter and of mind; and from Hume has sprung nearly all modern metaphysics. The idealistic pantheism of Germany, with its two-faced subject-object, which is both matter and mind at once, is but a hot-house growth of the seeds sown by Hume, while opposition to him was the spring of all the best, most original, and most permanent parts of the philosophy of Kant. And it is a singular fact, that the latest materialism, while it denies the existence of spirit, and makes that denial one of its postulates, is yet led by this stream of tendency which is derived from the theory of vision, to deny matter also, although it thus wheels into line as one of the systems of idealistic pantheism. Professor Huxley, for example, in his life of Hume, follows each of these tendencies to its last results. He denies the existence of the material world, except as an experience of mind; but the mind, according to him, is only the series of our sensations and feelings, a mere function of the brain, which is itself matter; and thus, if we understand the word matter in its usual sense, it is nothing but a product of nothing, which nothing itself begets. But it is obvious that Huxley's idea of matter must be, whether he so declares it or not, the pantheist's idea of Substance, the double-faced Being, whose two sets of attributes make up the universe. Professor Tyndall, indeed, shows this very clearly in his celebrated utterance describing matter as "containing the potency of life," for mind, with him, is only a function of life.

(2.) Another modern improvement in psychology is the better knowledge of the action of the brain and nervous system in thought, feeling, and perception. Not only has a vast mass of knowledge been accumulated through anatomy, vivisection, and the use of electricity, but the phenomena of somnambulism, sleep, nervous disease, idiocy, etc., have been studied with great

assiduity and considerable success. And if it should be said that all this is not psychology, that we do not know any more about the mind because the body has been dissected more carefully, two replies are possible. First, it may be said that psychology has for its field the whole apparatus of thought, as a unit, and is just as much concerned with the physical as the immaterial part of the machinery. Secondly, it may be said that from these researches psychology has received its grandest justification. For when an impression on the nerves of sensation has been traced along its course to the brain, and the vibrations of the atoms of the brain have been all traced and described, we then stand more than ever face to face with mystery; the chasm in our knowledge is not only as great as ever, but is more apparent than ever. And even those who assert that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, and that man is only an automaton, even Tyndall and Taine themselves admit that if we could explain all the changes in the substance of the brain, we should be no nearer to explaining how such molecular changes give rise to an image, a consciousness, a thought.

We think it is clear, then, that psychology has not been unprogressive in the modern era of progress, but has established some new theories of great importance and pursued new investigations of great interest. It remains to show that there is a certain convergence, on some important points, in the teachings of the leading thinkers.

II. The problem of knowledge has always been the battleground of philosophy. Is the human mind capable of certain knowledge? what are the limitations of its knowing? how does it acquire knowledge? Such are the questions which have been disputed by all thinking minds, and which have divided the philosophical world into schools and sects. The question of the origin of knowledge is the most important and living of psychological issues at the present time. Are all the thoughts of the human mind derived from experience, or does it have other sources of knowledge, innate ideas, *a priori* concepts? This is the question which makes the deepest line of division between opposing parties, and here we believe they have made great, if unconscious, concessions to one another, so great as to make a genuine step of progress in the science of mind.

The greatest argument ever constructed for innate ideas was made by Kant. This immortal work, in spite of its abstruseness and difficulty, and its strange terminology, has had and still has an immense influence. Kant did not, like most of his predecessors and some writers of the present day, mass together a number of incongruous principles, and say that the ideas of identity, of space, of time, of cause and effect, of the beautiful, of the true, of right, etc., are all innate ideas. Beginning with sensations, he shows that the *a priori* concepts of space and time are the necessary forms of all our perceptions. We cannot perceive the external world at all except under the conditions of time and space. We cannot imagine events occurring or objects existing out of time, nor can we imagine bodies existing out of space. Now it is true that Kant went on to make space and time mere forms of thought, and nothing else, true empirically, but without objective existence; thus converting this plain, practical philosophy into the most thorough-going system of scepticism. But this does not destroy the value and suggestiveness of this treatment of space and time, because, in the words of Professor Bowen, "we can admit the positive portion of Kant's theory, without accepting the sceptical doctrine which he has needlessly and unreasonably appended to it, the doctrine, that is, that space and time in themselves are unreal and illusive." Sir W. Hamilton, for example, teaches that space is a form or fundamental law of thought, and yet, at the same time, an existing reality of which we have knowledge through experience.

And here, curiously enough, most of the experience-philosophers fall into the same pit with Kant, though reaching it by an opposite road. For they prove, most elaborately, that we have a knowledge of space through experience, and yet teach that space is only a relation of our sensations to one another, and has no real existence outside of our perceptions. Like Kant, they deny in the sequel the validity of the very faculties which, at the outset, they declare to be the only source of knowledge.

We are not concerned at present, however, to refute the errors of either party, but we believe that we can show that the experience-philosophy is not so far from the position of Hamilton on this point as it usually declares and supposes

itself to be, while the intuition-philosophy has made very important concessions in its turn.

The most elaborately constructed, perhaps the ablest, of all systems of experience-philosophy, is that of Professor Bain. There are two distinct ways, if we mistake not, in which Professor Bain generates the idea of space, first, the direct feeling or perception of distance, and second, the muscular feeling of motion. When one places both points of a pair of compasses on his hand, not too near together, he has an immediate knowledge that the two sensations are not one and the same sensation, but different. Now, in what do they differ? Evidently in space, distance, extension. If they were closer together they would not be recognised as two, they would unite in one. They may be alike in all other respects, different only in place. Space is what separates them, space is what we instantly and irresistibly recognise as separating them. At this point the intuitionist affirms that we could not perceive the two points as occupying different parts of space, if we did not know beforehand what space is; that we could not tell that the two sensations differed unless we knew that in which they differ; just as we could not tell a tall man from a short one unless we knew something about what tallness and shortness are. We are not arguing on either side, but we think the intuitionist is entitled to say that, even though all our knowledge of space be derived from these double sensations, yet space is by this method of induction proved to be an actual existence, if anything is proved about it at all, and, if it be a real existence, then it must be a condition of the being of all material things, and hence a law of all thought concerning them.

Again, let one place his hands together, and then move them apart till separated widely; the successive muscular sensations consequent upon the constantly changing position of the arm give, says Professor Bain, the idea of distance or extension, which is the same as space. Closely allied with this experiment is that in which one rubs the hand or finger slowly over a rough surface, such as a file. In this case it is the succession of tactual sensations which gives occasion to the idea of space. Now, the intuitionist will reply that successive muscular or tactual sensations can have no tendency whatever to give rise to the idea of space, unless there

be a consciousness of motion between the successive sensations; and he will add that such a consciousness of motion amounts to but little if anything less than an *a priori* concept of space, rising into consciousness on the occasion of the movements of the body.

We do not desire, at present, to decide between the two views; but we affirm that if the mind has the power of constructing such a concept as that of space, so that this concept irresistibly arises, upon such a basis as the perception of two points near together, or the almost imperceptible muscular sensations which occur in moving the arm, or the quick succession of delicate abrasions from a rough surface,—then the mind has a power not very distant after all from that which the intuitionists claim for it, especially if we bear in mind the concessions which have been made by the more recent writers of that school. For intuition is no longer considered as a complete, perfect, philosophical knowledge of *a priori* concepts; it is admitted that these concepts do not exist in the mind consciously and completely, without reflection, and that they come into operation only on the occasion of sensations, while the training and study of a philosopher are necessary to segregate them and make them clear and recognisable in consciousness. For example, President Porter says, *Human Intellect*, p. 501:—

“In calling them first truths or primitive judgments, it is not intended that these truths or judgments are acquired first in the order of time, or that the mind's assent to them is prior to its other acts of knowledge. The majority of men never think of them, much less do they accept them. . . . To reach them, long courses of training are required, to bring the intellect into a capacity for analysis and generalisation, which may enable it to understand and assent to them.”

And again, p. 504:—

“We are, in some sense, indebted to experience for their acquisition. It is equally clear that experience does not give them authority. Both these truths are expressed in the often repeated proposition that our knowledge of these truths is occasioned by, but it is not derived from, experience.”

We may approach this point from another direction. What are the smallest component parts, or elements, of our knowledge? Bain's analysis of the powers of the mind is simple and striking. He says: “The primary attributes of Intellect are, consciousness of difference, consciousness of agreement,

and retentiveness." The original products of these primary powers, would be then, of course, the first elements of knowledge. For our present purpose we need consider only the first. It is evident that this feeling of difference is nothing but the correlative of the feeling of identity, that either one, taken by itself, is only the denial of the other. This is, then, only a slightly different expression of the relativity of knowledge, and is so explained by Bain himself. The mind can know nothing except as different from something else; black is not white, up is not down, long is not short, all knowledge is relative. On this point all parties are agreed. But at this point the intuitionist asks: "How can the mind know two things as different, and not the same, unless it previously knows what identity-difference is? Does not Bain, then, really reduce knowledge to three intuitive principles or concepts, identity-difference, agreement, and continuance?" We do not stop to answer this question. Be that as it may, we affirm that a philosopher who builds up the concept of space, for instance, out of the consciousness of identity-difference, which he admits to be a part of the original furniture of the mind, does not differ by such a world-wide distance, after all, from those who hold that the concept of space itself is in itself *a priori*, but is awakened into action and brought forward into consciousness by, in, and through the experience derived from the senses. Here, we say, is an important concession on the part of the experience-philosophy. We shall come to one which seems to us still more fundamental.

The modern experience-philosophy asserts that there is no occasion for assuming an *a priori* origin for the primary concepts, such as space, and causation, because they can easily be derived from our experience, by induction. The question then at once arises, What is the basis of this induction, or can it hang in the air, without any basis? Is inductive reasoning a kind of reasoning without a major premise? Suppose the mind has a feeling of space, or extension, or distance, when two points are pressed upon the skin at a moderate distance apart; suppose the experience repeated a thousand times. How do we know that the same fact will cause the same feeling the next time? How can we generalise such experiences into any universal truths concerning space, distance, extension?

Nearly all reasoners upon these subjects admit the necessity of some principle here, upon which to found our reasoning, when we generalise from nature or experience. Professor Bain, in particular, admits, in his *Logic*, the principle of the uniformity of nature, the conviction that the future will resemble the past, as an irresistible persuasion of the mind, and the basis of all inductive reasoning. In his *Mental Science*, he states it in this way: "There is, in the active tendency of the mind, a strong disposition to extend to all places and times whatever is true in the present. So powerful, indeed, is this impulse, that it constantly leads us too far, and needs to be checked and reduced within limits." Again, among the emotions he classes Belief, and says that the mental foundations of belief are in our activity, in association, and in the feelings; but he also says, under this head: "Our belief in the physical laws is our primitive spontaneity *contracted* to the bounds of experience." "We begin with unbounded credulity, and are gradually educated into a more limited reliance." The intuitionist will say that this "strong disposition," this "primitive spontaneity," looks immensely like an intuitive idea. And surely, even to an impartial observer, the extreme ingenuity with which Professor Bain introduces a new principle as a basis for induction, serves to prove the deep necessity for such a principle, felt by all logical minds. At any rate, it is evident that to derive primary truths from induction, and then rest induction on spontaneity, or irresistible belief, is to pursue a process somewhat more complicated than that of the more recent intuition-philosophy, but not otherwise at the opposite pole from it.

The primary notion, or intuition of causation, is one very much in dispute at the present day; it also belongs to a totally different order from that of space, to which we have appended our previous remarks; we therefore desire to present a few further remarks under this head. According to Kant, as we have seen, space and time are the forms under which alone we can know the material world. But when we begin to reflect upon our perceptions—to join them together, our reasoning must be under certain categories of the understanding—a *priori* forms of thinking, as necessary and as pure as the forms of sensation. Unfortunately, to quote Professor Bowen again, "Kant with his

usual fanaticism for system," insisted on twelve categories, because that number could be derived from the forms of logic. Some of them, consequently, are repetitions, and some are needless. Among them, however, we find those of reality or existence, limitation, substance and attribute, and cause and effect, which are accepted by almost all who believe in any intuitions at all. When we reflect upon any event, or any change, any phenomenon whatever beginning to exist, we are compelled, according to Kant, by the very nature of the mind, to think of it as caused. It is impossible for the mind to conceive of any event occurring without a cause. It is obvious that this notion of cause implies actual efficiency or power in the cause to produce the effect, and it is so understood and accepted by intuitionist philosophers in general. They say that the idea of causation in this sense is native to the mind—is called into exercise when we first reflect upon an event, and is irresistible in its regulative office over our thoughts. The experience-philosophers, on the other hand, affirm that the idea of cause is a mere result of experience, an induction from the innumerable sequences which we observe occurring in the world. But it must be carefully noted that they nearly all, from Hume down, deny that causation implies efficiency or power to produce an event or effect. When a ball is shot from a gun, they say, there is some connection, no doubt, between the explosion of the powder and the expulsion of the ball, but we are unable to say that it is anything more than an invariable sequence; we have no right to infer an efficiency, a power on the part of the exploding powder to expel the ball. It is obvious that the parties to this controversy do not use the word cause in the same sense. The intuitionists charge the experience-philosophers with leaving out the essential element of causation, because it forms a difficulty insoluble by their methods; and admit that a causation which is nothing but mere sequence can be easily enough proved by induction from experience, and does not need to be a necessary category of the understanding. The experience-philosophers, on the other hand, accuse the intuitionists of assuming an entirely unnecessary and irrational principle, and then assuming a special faculty to account for it. On this last point the experience-philosophers have undoubtedly the general opinion and con-

sciousness of mankind against them. That the explosion of powder has not actual efficiency to drive out a ball will always appear a philosophical subtlety, repugnant to practical common sense. It may be replied that it is no more contrary to common sense than the theory of vision, which is now universally accepted. Still we think it must be regarded as a very important unconscious concession on the part of most of the experience-philosophers, that they discharge the idea of causation of all its original meaning before they proceed to construct it out of the gatherings of experience. To win the day and expel causation from the list of *a priori* principles, they must show either that the idea of cause, in the full sense of efficiency, can be generalised from experience, or else that cause is not, in either sense, a category of the understanding, a regulative form of our thought concerning the phenomena of the material world. And this concession, unlike those previously mentioned, proceeds from the extreme wing of the modern experience-philosophy; those who erect a building in the air, with no foundation, denying the validity of consciousness or any of the powers of the mind, denying that induction needs any basis, denying that knowledge corresponds to reality—those who, like M. Taine, find in the mind nothing but a series of hallucinations, with no check and no test but their mutual interferences and rectifications; those who, like John Stuart Mill, are compelled to admit that, on their principles, two and two may possibly, in some circumstances, be five. It lies at the very basis of their system to deny the reality of causation. This is felt to be a test-case between the two parties, one which the new philosophy must win at any cost.

The old philosophy has made no corresponding concessions with regard to this point. Sir W. Hamilton, it is curious to notice here, attempted such a concession, and made the attempt to explain the idea of causation by analysing it, according to his favourite method of the antinomies of human reason, into nescience, or imbecility—the imbecility of the mind to conceive an absolute beginning. But we are not aware that he has been followed in this by any subsequent thinkers.

We think we have succeeded in showing that the most recent parties in psychology are approaching each other on some points more nearly than they are altogether willing to

admit ; that mutual concessions have removed a part of the *casus belli* ; that even the party of philosophical scepticism or nihilism is no longer content simply to "deny everything and call for proof," but takes pains to undermine the citadel before attacking it, to prove that cause is only sequence, before attempting to prove that it is not a category of the understanding. These things, we believe, constitute a genuine step of progress in psychology.

There are many in these days of materialism who deride all philosophy and ask, with a sneer, of what use any of these inquiries or controversies can be. Various replies may be made. We may say, in the words of Sir W. Hamilton, "It is as the best gymnastic of the mind that I would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application is the mind thus reflected on itself, and its faculties aroused to such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy ; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved." We may say, in the words of Professor Bowen, "Why seek to estimate the loss or gain from an undertaking which at any rate is inevitable ? Men have been engaged in the pursuit of speculative truth ever since they began to think, though voices have never been wanting to admonish them that the end was unattainable. But the warning was unheeded, for it is self-contradictory. Aristotle long ago remarked that we are compelled to philosophise in order to prove that philosophy itself is illusory and vain." Every thinking man has some system of philosophy ; it is a duty then for any honest thinker to seek the best attainable philosophy, to have a system well founded and well reasoned—not caught up at haphazard, nor heaped together incongruously.

Or, finally, we may reply that error of every kind is usually entrenched in metaphysics, and we must conquer it there if at all. In theology, and in every science, all speculative questions have their origin or end in philosophy. "Even our physicists," says Professor Bowen, "find themselves studying and teaching metaphysics unawares." So far as the views of our modern speculative scientific men are false and dangerous, they can only be exposed and refuted by men well trained in philosophy, accustomed to detect and handle philosophical error.

When we become convinced, after careful study, that the extreme form of modern Evolutionism is only Pantheism "writ large," we have gone far toward freeing ourselves from its fascination. And when we have satisfied ourselves that the empirical philosophy as taught by its ablest advocates, is equally with the other founded on metaphysical assumptions; and that, to say the least, it finds certain problems as insoluble as does the intuitional philosophy,—we have certainly reached a result of vast practical importance for our moral and intellectual life.

E. JAMES.

ART. VIII.—*Man's Sympathy with Man, and the Means of Grace.*¹

ALL the ordinances of God referred to by the general expression, "the means of grace," are as well suited to the end of winning men to embrace heavenly wisdom as if they were designed to be the efficient causes in the great work of gospel persuasion. Suppose an educated gentleman, say twenty-one years old, has never before seen a Bible, and that the sacred volume is now before his eyes, and he is perusing its divine pages for the first time. He knows that the Church receives the book as the very Word of God, and he cannot help forming some general idea of its style and structure and contents. How signally must most of such a reader's expectations be disappointed! The historical form, the progressive, time-consuming development, the minute, human, often revolting details of the inspired production; the local, definite, narrow direction of many of its composing units; the Jewishness of its psalms and prophecies, and of much of its narratives and laws, would broadly contradict his pre-formed impressions. Not only so; he would find the whole mode of the Bible to be the opposite of what he has looked for in a Divine revelation. He would wonder to find it a book of principles rather than of statutes; a book which relies on reason more than on authority; a book not addressed to church officers, with the exception of one or two small parts, but to individuals in their private

¹ From the *Southern Presbyterian Review*.

capacity ; a book constantly requiring the exercise of judgment and discrimination on our part, in order to be useful to us ; a book not only encouraging but demanding investigation, and the full and free exercise of all the powers of the soul in reference to its claims, its doctrines, its duties, and its application ; a book which on the side of its authorship is *thoroughly human*, while it claims to be absolutely divine. Yet however perplexed our supposed student may at first be by these strange discoveries, he may soon come to see in them all only a most beautiful, humbling, and worship-inspiring display of divine prudence and wisdom.

Among all the contradictions of an *a priori* judgment in reference to the character of a revelation from God, not the least striking is the prominence of the human element on the side of its authorship. The Psalms of David are far more truly the utterances of the sweet singer of Israel than are Moore's melodies the utterances of Erin's most musical bard. The songs of the poet may or may not vent his own convictions and sentiments. Not so the hymns of the prophet. He really saw the visions he records ; he had the convictions and the feelings he inculcates ; he experienced the sorrows he recounts, and basked in the hopes he communicates. In David's Psalms we have David's unique personality brought to bear upon our spirits as truly as we have the word of God. So, too, the Epistles of Paul have more of the Apostle of the Gentiles in them than the *Letters to His Son* of Philip Dormer Stanhope have of their titled author. In them Paul himself, in his own marked individuality, lives, and breathes, and thinks, and feels, and worships, and persuades. They are Paul's spirit, and temper, and faith, and hope, and love, and zeal, placed before us alive and palpitating and mightily working. In nearly all the sacred books their human writers appear not merely as the accredited penmen of the Spirit, but as veritable authors. With perfect freedom and boldness they come before us in their own personality, and reason and reprove and exhort with all freedom of mind and emotion. And what is further very remarkable is, that the most pious student of the Holy Scriptures is, other things being equal, the most likely to excel in his admiration of the lofty, poetic genius, the fervid overpowering energy, intellectual and logical, the

deep and mighty pathos of the men chosen by God, not only to write, but also to be, his revelation ; and who, because thus chosen, give, so far as they give any, a true indication of their experience and characters. How different, for instance, the relation of the *Night Thoughts*, and the scorn of worldly ambition they profess, to the real life of the servile courtier who penned them, predominated as it was by an appetite for earthly preferment too greedy to be nice in reference to the way of its gratification ! How different this relation from that of the Book of Ecclesiastes to the life and biography of its royal scribe ! How little does the one let us into the experience of its author ; how greatly the other ! How different the relation of the writings of Lord Bacon to Macaulay's view of this philosopher's real character, from that of the writings of Paul to Luke's presentation of the apostle's experience and real predominating aspiration ! Indeed, it is not too much to say, if only it be said reverently, that so far as the infinite disparity between the two personalities, that of Jesus Christ and that of Paul, will allow, the latter is as largely revealed in the Scriptures as the former. But let us imagine that our supposed novice reads the first verse of the twelfth chapter of Romans, "I beseech you therefore, brethren," etc. Would he not be apt to say, Why, this is the word of Paul himself ! The amanuensis has the audacity to obtrude himself, and to use his own influence. Not content to be the mere instrument by which the Holy Ghost reveals the bearing of the mercies of God on human duty, this apostle in his own person beseeches me. Is this a manner befitting even the private secretary of a human monarch, and how much less one expected to write under the dictation of Almighty God, and who is the instrument of revealing the will of the King of kings, the Sovereign of the universe ?

The explanation of this wonderful paradox is the law underlying all saving ordinances, *that God uses the sinner's sympathy with the human as a means of lifting the sinner up into sympathy with the divine*. By the fall the life of holiness was expelled from man's heart, and enmity to God introduced into its place. But man was not by the fall thus alienated from his fellow-man. Social morality, and what we distinctively call the natural affections, survived the dire catastrophe of Eden. The

fallen man is not dead to the convictions of a soul formed like his own, considered merely as the convictions of his fellow-mortal, or dead to the sufferings or pathos of a being having a body and soul like his. He still believes in humanity and friendship and patriotism and philanthropy. The parental, the filial, the social, the humane elements of his life remain, and retain great liveliness and susceptibility. Hence, in God's first approach to the sinner, he uses as his agent, not simply a man, but humanity—the mind and heart of a man in full exercise and demonstration and display. By this agency he appeals to the sinner's sympathy with the human, and thus moves him towards sympathy with the divine. "Ye became," says Paul, "followers of us and of the Lord." First of us, and then, by means of us, of the Lord. First sympathy with us, your fellow-creatures, in our intellectual and emotional experience, and in our painful desire for your welfare, and then from this you moved onward under the gentle, unfelt, and, save by after reflection, unnoticed impulse of the Spirit, to full, direct sympathy with God. This is an explanation of the human element in the Scriptures on the side of their authorship, so far as the work of conversion is concerned. As to the regenerate, it may be remarked that they, alas! often become torpid on the divine side, practically dead to the direct appeals of God, and even worse, under the power of an evil conscience, averse to hearing the divine voice; and that when they are in such a condition they need the love and zeal and painful pleadings of humanity, as what they can best be aroused and attracted by, to the exercise of holy consideration and faith. Hence the Lord sent Nathan unto David, instead of arresting the prayerless, guilty, torpid-souled king by a direct voice from the throne of heaven. But the *progress*, and even the *perfection*, of Christian character do not annul the law which regulates the influence of spirit upon spirit. On the contrary, in what the Scriptures reveal to us of the worship of heaven, we have reason to believe that the law of sympathy has in the world of perfect holiness its largest influence. One who has taste to appreciate external beauty standing alone gazing upon a lovely landscape, and drinking in its loveliness, is delighted. But let him go again to admire some equally lovely scene, but not alone; let him have with him one whose taste he knows to be of the most

refined, cultivated, and poetic order ; let both look and admire and exchange feelings and thoughts by eyes and lips. Does he not see and feel now what he never could have perceived and felt were he alone ? So it is that "the things which are above" are better appreciated when contemplated in fellowship with those who are most exquisitely affected by them, and who are objects of our reverence, confidence, and love. We better comply with the exhortation, "Be followers of God, as dear children," for having been imitators of or sympathisers with his holy apostles and prophets. And thus it is that the Epistles of Paul, for instance, are much more valuable to the most advanced Christian for having Paul himself living in them.

But not alone in the structure of revelation do we find a provision made for engaging the sinner's sympathy with the human to aid in the great work of converting and sanctifying the sinner. The manifestation of our Saviour's humanity, as made in Palestine, and as recorded by the Evangelists, is evidently designed to appeal to man's sympathy with humanity, and is so applied in apostolic sermons and epistles. The humanity of our Lord was indeed necessary to a far higher end ; but much in the history of its manifestation was not necessary to the atonement, so far as we can see, but was written, doubtless, for the purpose of touching and awakening man's sympathy with the human, and of thus leading the sinner on to sympathy with the divine. Here, too, we first become followers of the man, and then are, in an inscrutable way, enabled to perceive the infinite preciousness of the divine Saviour. The practice of praying to the departed saints is unnecessary, unwarranted, and dangerous. Yet it obtains ; and its existence proves, that such are the inferences which the sinful heart is apt to draw from the purity of Jesus and his separation from sinners, and such in man, the sinner, the antipathy to perfect holiness, and such the fear inspired by one so evidently and fully in communion with the Supreme Lawgiver as Jesus appears to be, that it is manifestly wise in God, as well as a merciful condescension to our weakness, to make his first approach to the sinner through one who has been involved in a common ruin with himself, and who is as really a sinner as himself. The human writers of the Scriptures are

indeed no longer sinful, but it is as sinners, as men not perfectly sanctified, that they address us in the Sacred Scriptures. Moreover, whatever in the way of a powerful appeal to man's sympathy with the human in behalf of religion the world has been deprived of by the death of inspired men, is fully made up to us by the organisation, and ordinances, and officers, and endowments, and prescribed life of the Church, and very especially, by *her living ministry*. The saying of Christ, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfil," is as applicable to the great law of social influence as it is to the moral and positive laws of revelation. It has been said that "the flutterings of an insect's wing send its vibrations to the remotest orb in the great field of space." Be this as it may, that man influences man is a law whose operation is co-extensive with our race. No one is either above or beneath the modifying touch of this subtle, all-penetrating, and ever-flowing element of power. By it man multiplies his moral self—gives immortality and universality to the ideas that spring from his intellect and the principles that shape his life. The words that drop from his lips fall as pebbles into the centre of a placid lake, creating a series of undulating and ever-widening circles over the whole expanse. Thus the spirit of past generations throbs in us, and down through posterity it shall flow and be the moral life-blood of the men that are to be. Whether conscious or unconscious, designed or unintended, man's influence on man is constantly operating. Through the channels of physical relationship and of universal interdependence; through the love and authority of the parent and the affection and duty of the child; through the diversity of intellectual powers, mental attainments, secular positions, and of the ages and general capabilities of men; by the voluntary language of the tongue and the pen, and the involuntary expression of the lip, the brow, the eye, the tone of voice; by all that is contradistinguished as the natural language of the sentiments, does the character of the individual pour itself out upon the world, and through the ear, the eye, the understanding, the sensibilities, the instinct of imitation, the desire of approbation, and through all that in one man corresponds to the feelings and impulses of another, and makes them contagious, does the world receive from its intelligent constituents, according to the measure of each, that

powerful, assimilating, though intangible fluid, of sympathetic influence, to send it forth again in constant circulation. This great law of sympathy Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil—that is, to make its operation a blessing instead of a curse to the race of man. ' Accordingly, the end for which he established his Church almost wholly resolves itself into the utilisation and direction, unto the promotion of God's glory through the gospel, of man's sympathy with the human, or man's influence upon man. Who can fail to see that a recognition of this great law underlies the statement and command of the Redeemer when he says to his disciples, the representatives of his Church, "Ye are the salt of the earth; ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your Father which is in heaven." The Saviour assumes that men have a tendency to notice and feel all striking manifestations of human thought and emotion; and from this premise he infers that when the members of the visible Church zealously reveal and illustrate the character of their Father in heaven, their works can no more escape the notice and attention of men before whom they are done than could a city set on a hill remain unseen; and that there is a powerful tendency in such an earnest Christian life to bring men to glorify the God of the Church, and hence that it is such a means of saving sinners as the Spirit of wisdom and grace will accept and bless.

What has now been said must suffice to direct attention to the human element in all the means of grace, as beautifully manifesting Divine condescension and prudence, and as being of very great importance in God's method of converting and sanctifying sinners. But while this has been the immediate, it has not been the principal end aimed at in our discussion. The result we have reached has all the time been pursued as containing an answer to the most important practical questions that can be asked relative to the work of the Church as a propagandist of truth and a co-labourer with the Holy Ghost in seeking the salvation of men.

It is from the value attached by God himself to man's sympathy with the human as a means of begetting in him sympathy with the divine, of bringing him to the knowledge of the truth, that architecture and music and posture in prayer and elo-

quence, derive their importance in relation to the mission of Christians; and their adaptation to this end is the standard of their perfection. Our doctrine tells us that art has a place, and defines the place it has in the operations of Christianity. When either by excess or imperfection, it fails to prepare for the reception of the truth, it fails of its legitimate end; and when it hinders the perception of truth, it is a positive evil. It should, on the one hand, be suited to awaken man's sympathy with man, and, on the other, to awaken it so that it shall be a preparation for and an advance towards sympathy with the divine. The Church's appeals to sinners should have in them art enough to gain their natural emotions; but it should be such art as will gain these emotions, not as an end, but as a means—as the means best adapted to lead souls to the perception of the truth and the experience of spiritual emotions. The Church should use art as a means of saying to men, "I beseech you, be reconciled to God; and, moved by the mercies of God through Jesus Christ, present your bodies living sacrifices, holy and acceptable to God, a reasonable service."

The great means of saving sinners is the preaching of the gospel. There are in preaching, as in all the means of grace, two elements—the divine and the human. If you take either away, what you have left is not the divine ordinance of preaching at all. But granting that the truth of the gospel is essential to preaching as a means of salvation, the inquiry is very important, What must the preacher himself supply in order that his deliverances may be what God demands? To this inquiry attention to the human element of the Bible and on the side of its authorship gives answer that the preacher should contribute to the sermonic deliverance not only the results of a mind skilful in inward composition and the display of a refined and nice invention, and the product of a rhetorical pen and well-adapted action; that not all the elements of the dramatic grace of authors and actors combined, which constitute the perfection of theatrical mimicry of the real, would suffice to make one true sermon, even although they may produce a discourse full of God's truth, and containing no error; our doctrine teaches that the preacher must, in a proper way, put into his sermon his whole humanity—all in him that is suited to awaken the affections of his

auditors ; that the direct, immediate end of preaching is to bring men to feel with the preacher in reference to his intellectual and spiritual experience of divine things. It is for the sake of the sinner's sympathy with the human that God calls and ordains men to preach. Were that sympathy of little importance in the sight of God, we can see no reason why instead of preachers he should not have given us a great commentary on the Scriptures, to be read for themselves by all who can read, and to be read to all others by persons appointed to that comparatively very simple and easy duty. Besides, it is only when we regard the ministry as a provision immediately directed to the enlisting of the sinner's sympathy with the human in behalf of religion that we see any compensation for the evils necessarily proceeding from the appointment of sinful men to preach the gospel. How many grievous scandals, how many cruel persecutions, how much bitter controversy, would have been kept out of the history of the Church, had God sent the inhabitants of the other world, who are free from infirmity and sin, to be our instructors in the knowledge of salvation ! If, then, it is to man's sympathy with man that preaching is to be immediately addressed, it is easy to see that perfection in the art of preaching requires that the preacher bring his whole humanity to bear on his hearers in favour of divine truth. It is plain from this that in order to be a preacher at all, the man's humanity must be engrossed, occupied, pervaded, dominated by gospel realities, personages, and glories. This leads us to submit that, so far as the human element in preaching is concerned, its perfection lies in its thorough, sanctified individuality. The preacher himself must operate on his audience—*himself*, not as wrought by the force of mere fancy into a sentimental frame of pulpit fervour and piety, but himself as actually confronting eternal realities, and moved by a perception of their nature and grandeur, as different from any exercise of the fancy as seeing with our bodily eyes and hearing with our bodily ears are different from the illusions of a dream. "Eloquence is the emission through speech of all the soul's virtues, energies, of thought, of sensibility, and especially of will." Can a human soul be thus active, moved upon, engrossed in one pursuit, tax its every nerve to the uttermost, and not display marked individual

traits? Not if it is true that diversity in unity is a law of creation, and that God has never made two souls any more than he has made two faces that are not distinguishable.

Let the next question be, What is the Christian's best preparation for winning souls to Christ, whether he be a preacher or a private member of the Church? Our doctrine of sympathy plainly answers: a desire for the glory of God and the good of our fellow-men, so strong that it must express itself—yea, compel its subject to oppose his whole weight against the downward movements of the sinner, and apply his whole force to move him heavenwards. When men see that you are yourself deeply impressed by the claims of God and the preciousness of Jesus Christ, and that you sincerely long that others should be thus impressed also, the principle of sympathy will mightily tend to incline them, and under the grace of the Holy Ghost, will actually incline them, to take your views of religion, and to feel and obey as you do. Men will judge by our lives whether our words are sincere, and truly express our feelings. Paul's entreaty was sustained by his constant conduct. Men knew that his words unveiled his heart; hence their power. Ah, it is a sad thing when a Christian's life is such that he dare not say to his brother, "I beseech thee, serve God." If the earnest desire of a Christian heart may be the effectual means of another's salvation, how important is it that we should keep our religious emotions and interest always in a lively condition!

"I've known the pregnant thinkers of this time,
And stood by, breathless, hanging on their lips,
When some chromatic sequence of fine thought,
In learned modulation, framed itself
To an un conjectured harmony of truth;
And yet I've been more moved, more raised, I say,
By a simple word—a broken, easy thing
A three-years' infant might say after you—
A look, a sigh, a touch upon the palm,
Which means less than I love you . . . than by all
The full-voiced rhetoric of those master mouths."

But, finally, our doctrine contains the answer to the tremendous question, What is the most pressing need of the perishing world in which we live? We see, in the light of Paul's entreaty, and of the human element in the Scriptures, and in all

the means of grace, that what is most needed by perishing men is to have the most powerful appeal to their sympathy with the human made to them in favour of Christianity. How then is this appeal to be made? The structure of the Bible, the records of God manifested in the flesh, and the very design of the Church as taught in the Scriptures, in answer point to an embodiment, an incarnation, a living manifestation of the truth by the Church of Jesus Christ. Suppose the Church and the truth to be one, somewhat as the humanity of Jesus and the Divine Logos were one; that she manifested the truth as Jesus did the divine nature; or, if this too far transcends the power of our poor aspirations, suppose the Church to be under the influence of divine truth as Paul the apostle was, to realise her mission as he did his; suppose Zion to travail with an agony proportioned to her profession, her promises and work, what results might we not expect to behold! See what happens in a particular congregation when the members of the church feel and manifest a deep and operative interest in the salvation of souls. Every revival of religion proves the inestimable value of hearty, earnest, and vigorous appeals made by the church to the sinner's sympathy with the human in favour of religion. The sinner's sense of the reality and importance of religion is very apt to be graded according to the church's earnestness in promoting the divine glory. That old, hoary, oft-quoted aphorism, "Great is the truth, and it will prevail," should find some iconoclastic Carlyle to test its merits and show how far it should be permitted to shape our hopes. Moral truth can prevail over moral error only by meeting it in its own form. When error clothes itself only in abstract theories and fine speeches, then truth may put it down by abstract arguments and eloquent harangues. But when error concretes not alone with the brain, the tongue, and the folio, but with the very life of men, is ensouled and embodied in them, then, if truth is ever to prevail, it, too, must become flesh, and dwell amongst men; it must dominate all the capacities and powers of the Church. To overcome paganism, irreligion, and wrong religion and sin, truth must operate in and through the Church, as these operate in and through the world. Let the Church's mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of truth, and then its light will

so shine before men that they will see her good works, and glorify our Father in heaven.

But, even as things are, how tremendous is the human appeal made to each one of us, urging us to receive and enjoy the mercies of God! There is the appeal of prophets, and apostles, and evangelists, addressing us under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost; there is the appeal of the man, Christ Jesus, speaking on earth, and from heaven—an appeal of blood and agony, and of victory and glory; there is the appeal of many martyrs of the Primitive Church and the Reformed Church; there is the appeal of what the Bible has wrought in reference to man's temporal interests; there is the appeal of home, of Sabbath-school, and Church; there is the appeal from the glorious Humanity, which is this day enthroned above angels and archangels, and vested with unbounded dominion. Can we remain unmoved, while thus entreated to be reconciled to God, and to present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, a reasonable service!

FRANCIS P. MULLALY.

ART. IX.—*Current Literature.*

EVEN the most casual observer must have noticed that, so far as science and literature are concerned, the demand of the present day is not in favour of the bulky volumes of the past. The only large volumes which have a chance of sale to-day are those which are encyclopædic. The contemporaneous existence of these with the small thin volumes is no exception to the rule, but an additional proof of it. When we remember the ponderous volumes of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, and compare them with the productions of this century, in its first half even, we at once see the increasing tendency to diminution in size. But when we take up one of the shilling manuals of the last year or two, and go with it to the shelves, on which, alas! repose the huge giants of our forefathers' libraries, covered with dust far too often,

through our want of loving remembrance and veneration for the mighty dead, we find ourselves under the influence of strangely mingled feelings and thoughts. We can hardly at first say whether we should yield to tears or laughter, and perhaps we turn away, and, having seated ourselves in the old study chair, are ready to fall into a reverie from which we may rouse ourselves by many thoughts of this busy, hurried, and utilitarian age. Thus catching up the spirit of the time, or rather being caught up by that prevailing *Zeit-Geist*, we feel proudly vain and generous—generous in our estimate alike of their learning and perseverance, and vain of our own advantages derived from their indefatigable toils, and from the noble and strong impulse which they gave to learning—an impulse whose force is not yet spent, but which, the further it advances, gathers in power in proportion to its loss in bulk—and at last, as now, survives in the pithy, stimulating essences and delightful elixirs with which the youth of the present day are, shall we say pampered, favoured, or satiated—which?

Theologians and exegetes have not been behind their literary and scientific fellows in manifesting the spirit, and following the book-making fashion of the day. Handbooks for Bible classes have appeared with marvellous rapidity both in Scotland and in England. Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh have already been recognised as the Scotch publishers who have kept pace with the *Zeit-Geist* above referred to. Through their enterprising energy we have been favoured with translations, as all the world knows, of many of the best German and French theological, exegetical, and philosophical works. They are now publishing a series of Handbooks—the work for the most part of ministers of the Free Church of Scotland—under the general editorship of Rev. Marcus Dods, D.D., and Rev. Alex. Whyte, D.D. Already eleven of the series are published, and no less than twenty-one are announced as in preparation. These valuable manuals give evidence of varied and substantial scholarship, and we question whether, taking them all in all, any Church in the kingdom can produce better work, or give a better account of its high talent and freshness of spirit and vigour. We need only refer to such books of this series as *The Sacraments*, by Professor Candlish; *A Life of Christ*, by Rev. James Stalker, M.A.; *The Confession of Faith*,

by Rev. John Macpherson, M.A.; and now to *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, by Professor Davidson (1).

It would not be easy anywhere to find a more competent author to deal with this Epistle. As a scholar, teacher, and exegete, Dr. Davidson stands in the first rank,—a worthy successor to Rabbi Duncan, who taught with such genius and spiritual and truly philosophical insight. In the volume before us, the present occupant of the Hebrew Chair in the New College seems to have done his best to carry out the intention and desire of the editors, and the result is a very fresh, readable, rich, and business-like work. In an introduction of twenty-six pages, Dr. Davidson elucidates such questions as respect the readers of the Epistle,—their circumstances—their locality: the Epistle itself, its occasion, its substance, and, lastly, the Author. These several questions are examined with both minuteness and brevity—a pleasing combination, which delights the student. In his answers we have abundant evidence of our author's recognised caution while, in a truly philosophic and religious spirit, handling freely, but ever reverently, questions which have not yet been satisfactorily solved. For instance, as to the locality of the Hebrews to whom the Epistle is addressed, after having examined the arguments in favour of (1) Jerusalem, (2) Rome, (3) Alexandria, he sums up thus: "Upon the whole, while nothing approaching to certainty can be reached, some community of the Dispersion in the East,—not, however, Jerusalem, nor any church in its immediate neighbourhood,—with a Hellenistic type of Judaism, best suits the circumstances of the case." Again, giving a rapid glance at the history of opinion and conjecture with regard to the author of the Epistle, Dr. Davidson sets forth the prevailing modern view with his wonted and characteristic caution. He will not commit himself, in the absence of decisive evidence, to any of the parties who positively affirm that Barnabas or Apollos wrote the Epistle, though from his use of the expressions "felicitous conjecture" (p. 26), and "happy suggestion" (p. 34), of Luther, that Apollos of Alexandria might be the author, we might fancy that he in-

(1) *The Epistle to the Hebrews*. With Introduction and Notes by A. B. Davidson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, etc., in the New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1882.

clined to this opinion. But however strong the inclination may be, he suspends his judgment upon the words, "It is strange, however, if Apollos be the author, that it never occurred to antiquity to connect his name with the Epistle." And, once more, in regard to the great mass of literature that has concerned itself with this question in recent times, he says, "The exhaustive investigations of modern times have set the question in all possible lights, and though they are far from having resulted in unanimity of sentiment, they may fairly be described as on the whole converging towards the negative conclusion that the writer of the Epistle was not the apostle Paul." Besides the exegetical and expository remarks on each verse, as occasion demands, this little handbook has extended notes on "the Son," "the Rest of God," "the Word of God," "the Priesthood of Christ," "the Two Covenants," "Purge, sanctify, make perfect." The method of the book is excellently adapted to give an eager student an intelligent interest in the Epistle, and to facilitate his mastery of its argument as well as contents. Such a serviceable manual it will not be easy to match.

To his paper read at the Pan-Presbyterian Council held at Philadelphia in 1880, Mr. Bannerman of Perth has added a chapter on "Methods of Admission to the Lord's Table for the first time," thus making a neat volume (2). Besides the chapter just referred to, there are two, dealing with the questions, Who should be received to the Lord's Table? and, Whose children should be baptized? This little work deserves to be well and widely known. It gives evidence on every page of much research and very full knowledge of the history of opinion with reference to the questions raised. Indeed we may say that one of the main features of the work is its historical character, and notwithstanding the author's apology for its "academic and ecclesiastical cast," we believe that this very form adds much value to the treatise. One other remark of a general nature we wish to make with regard to the statements of the various prevailing opinions in this and in other

(2) *Grounds and Methods of Admission to Sealing Ordinances.* By Rev. D. D. Bannerman, M.A., Free St. Leonard's Church, Perth. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot. 1882.

countries at different times. Whether these are favourable or unfavourable, they are here set forth with fairness, and in no respect have we found reason to dissent from the conclusions arrived at and the opinions held by Mr. Bannerman. In carefully reading the book it always seemed as if the judgments formed, while not always the traditional, were in accord alike with Scripture and common sense. We may give a single illustration. After an excellent piece of reasoning against the doctrine of "pure communion," in which our author has tenderly yet firmly dealt with the Plymouthistic theory, he proceeds to answer the questions, What, according to Scripture, will fully justify *the church or its office-bearers* in admitting a man? and, What, according to Scripture, will justify the *man himself* in the sight of God in asking admission? His answers are admirable—

"As to the *first*, I believe that what Scripture requires is a serious and intelligent profession of faith in Christ, and obedience to Him, with a corresponding conduct; as to the *second*, the *real existence* in the man of what he professes—a true faith and sincere obedience. The church is responsible only for what concerns the first-named qualification; the man himself, and he only, for what concerns the second. That is to say, the gates of the kingdom of Christ on earth should be open to every one coming with a credible profession of what is needful for entrance into the kingdom of Christ in heaven."

The third chapter contains a most interesting and elaborate review of the—so-called by Rome and misnamed—sacrament of Confirmation. Mr. Bannerman shows conclusively that, as Dr. Hodge puts it, those things, "which in other churches constitute confirmation, in ours constitute what we are accustomed to call admission to sealing ordinances. . . It is a great mistake, therefore, to represent confirmation as a prelatical service." We value this little and inexpensive work so highly that we could wish it were placed in the hands of every office-bearer of the Presbyterian Churches. From its clear and sound exposition of the scriptural passages bearing on the subject, not only is wise direction afforded, but many tender consciences would find relief in the discovery that their duty is not to judge as to conversion, but as to facts which support the profession by the applicant for admission to the Lord's Table. We hope to hear of the extensive circulation of this helpful book.

Ever since the days of the æsthetic and persistent Dr. Robert Lee, of Greyfriars, who is looked upon by some as the pioneer and martyr of reform in the worship of the Presbyterian Church, and by others as the advocate and introducer of a revival of prelatial forms, the Scottish religious world has been more or less agitated by movements and discussions having for their object a change—for the better some say—for the worse say others—in the methods, forms, and postures of worship. The greatest anxiety has been manifested in the Church Established in Scotland; but neither the Free Church of Scotland nor the United Presbyterian—nor, we may add, the sister Church—the Presbyterian Church of England, has been free from care and perplexity in this matter. It is certainly well that we should worship God with the best materials and in the best manner. No one will dispute this; but danger lies in the tendency of the mind to judge for itself as to what is best alike in substance, quality, and mode,—thus overlooking the scriptural principles which ought ever to guide those whose religion is founded upon the sacred writings; and placing the refinements of a mere human culture, or the delights of a sentimental nature, above and before the actual expressions of a real worship in keeping with the “simplicity that is in Christ.” In fact, the best form of worship is the natural attitude and utterance of a true heart; and when we begin to give great attention to the study of the form we are in great danger of attaining only to play-acting. Hence the cultivation of the Cathedral tones for prayer, which are becoming so fashionable, are apt by some sharp, shrewd, business men to be associated with a peculiar morning draught that we do not care to mention. We confess we have been led into this vein by the perusal of a very excellent work on the *Worship and Offices of the Church of Scotland*, by the minister of North Berwick (3). Here we find a series of very interesting lectures—not dull and flat and lifeless—but full of energy, exhibiting a good deal of research into and knowledge of the subject in

(3) *The Worship and Offices of the Church of Scotland, or the Celebration of Public Worship, the Administration of the Sacraments, and other Divine Offices, according to the Order of the Church of Scotland*; being Lectures delivered at the Universities of Aberdeen, Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Edinburgh. By George W. Sprott, D.D., Minister of North Berwick. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. 1882.

hand, with a dash of humour in an anecdote or illustration which must have made the lectures as delivered, and which make them as read, very popular. The style is flowing, and the structure is rather sketchy; but thus a most readable book is produced. Before passing on, we cannot help, in justification of ourselves for the state of mind confessed above, alluding to the fact that Dr. Sprott's humour is richest in his treatment of customs at Burial. There is no question as to a prevailing want of hearty devotion on the part of many members of all Protestant churches in this land. The remedy, however, is not to be found in outward forms and ceremonies, which we believe will be found utterly distasteful to the sturdy sons of Albion. Let the life of Christianity, the love of Christ, dwell in the heart, and then devotion will be real, and will be visible. The teaching of the middle portion of the first chapter of Isaiah should put us right in our views of devotion in God's House, and in his presence everywhere. No amount of churchiness, no reverence for stone and lime, though magnificently built by man, should be allowed to occupy the heart, and narrow its worship to times and places. Hence we question whether it is advisable to have churches open during the week, that men and women may have a place to which to repair for devotion. Is not healthier doctrine taught by our Lord to the woman of Samaria? And how much better would it not be for our preachers to teach the people to lift up their hearts to God, their Father, any time and everywhere? This would be to carry religion into common life; this would cause men and women to live heavenly lives even here. Doing their work in the spirit of a trustful love to God, both formalism and morbid sentimentality would disappear, and true and simple piety stand forth in beauty of holiness. The poor Roman Catholic, whom it is the fashion with some weak religionists greatly to respect for his devotion, as exhibited in the grand Cathedrals and Churches of France and Belgium, provides the type for our sentimental Presbyterian. But let any one who knows answer the question, Is your devout Roman Catholic a *pious* man? Thus another tendency in all these efforts after outward forms and rubrics, as helps to the cultivation of devotional feeling, is to separate devotion and piety—devotion being emasculated yet cherished, and piety

being completely overlooked. The idea many self-constituted reformers of worship in the Scottish churches cherish is based upon the apostolic word, "Let everything be done decent and in order," and forthwith, being possessed by their own idea of these words, they set themselves to talk grandly, march grandly, bow grandly, and, in fact, carry themselves most stiffly, and assume an air of freezing coldness in their ecclesiastical walk and conversation. To make the distance great between God and man seems to be great part of the aim of this revival of forms and ceremonies. It would be interesting to listen to a sermon by one of these revivalists on the text "But now in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far off, made nigh by the blood of Christ" (Eph. ii. 13). To train a child in state and ceremony is to restrain the outflowing of its love—to destroy the feeling at length through constant repression. And so, to teach the worshipper that we serve God best when we render an æsthetic service, is to be guilty of deluding the soul into the belief that attitude and expression are more than truth in the inward parts. Now it must be supposed that we are fairly set against all attempts at reformation in the matter of worship. On the contrary, we confess the need and the desirability as much as any one, but we are inclined to differ with our friends who write in favour of the externals, as to their judgments. We humbly think that the better and more excellent way is to begin at the centre, and work outwards, rather than at the circumference, and work inwards. It seems to us that striving to educate the Lord's people, those who seek to produce a stately worship are really, and at the best, only doing evangelistic work. They are desirous of making worship attractive, and they are doing so in good faith. But all that is done is to make an impression on our sense of reverence, rather than to give expression to the homage and love of a contrite and devoted heart. We go to the temple to pray, and we are satisfied with an act or an hour of worship, forgetting that the exhortation is, "Pray without ceasing," and that what God demands is a life of worship.

We have no doubt this book on the *Worship and Office of the Church of Scotland* will be a valuable contribution to the work of the Church Service Society, and will be pri-

by all who seek to know something of the history of the devotional practices and offices of the Church. But we cannot avoid the previous question, Whether even the Church Service Society itself, as Dr. Begg once said, is not subversive of the very principles of Presbyterianism. We are aware that that Society passes by the English Prayer-Book, and goes back to the Greek and Latin Fathers and elsewhere; but if any Society produces a prayer-book for public use in congregations, and introduces organs and responses, the almost only difference left between Prelacy and Presbyterianism will be the "Bishop" and his "Orders."

Dr. Sprott's ignorance of the feeling of the North Highlands is well brought out in a remark in his last paragraph of the chapter on *Admission of Catechumens*, p. 97, where he speaks of "that most unchristian state of things which exists in some parts of the Highlands, where none but a few old people are communicants, and where those who have not accepted their own baptism act as sponsors for children." It certainly savours of uncharitableness when one Christian brands the actions of another as *unchristian*. And this whole quotation, as well as the unpleasant adjective, leads one to suspect that Dr. Sprott has no very clear idea either of the nature of baptism or of the grounds of its administration. From his own point of view, however, and considering that the Established Church is an almost *terra incognita* in the Highlands, we are not much surprised at this slip, and we have no doubt it will be overlooked by his friends of the Church Service Society, who, with others, requested the publication of these lectures. Notwithstanding all that has been said, we must repeat our conviction that the reading of these lectures will be accompanied with pleasure by most people, but, while saying this, we would not homologate the teaching implied, and sometimes inculcated.

Another series of lectures delivered at the Universities of Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Glasgow is before us. The subject is, *The Pastor as Preacher* (4). We may say at once that we

(4) *The Pastor as Preacher; or, Preaching in connection with Work in the Parish and in the Study.* By Henry Wallis Smith, Minister of Kirknewton and East Calder. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. 1882.

value highly this excellent work. It is a purpose-like production from beginning to end. Mr. Smith has spared no pains by consulting the best works, as is evident from the rich treatment of the various subjects of study. One might almost say that in a work like this, more than in almost any other sort of work not directly experimental, a man gives out the history and experience of his own life. To young pastors, and old pastors also, this book will be very helpful. If the young students of divinity who heard these lectures delivered would each study them thoroughly in print, it would be a happy omen for the future ministry of the Church of Scotland. But we hope the students and ministers of other denominations likewise will have wisdom enough to read this very capital and helpful work.

We welcome with much pleasure a volume containing selected lectures (5) of the late Dr. Morley Punshon, introduced by Rev. Wm. Arthur, and we are certain we will not be alone in our welcome. Every one who has had the pleasure of even once hearing and seeing the eloquent and powerful preacher and lecturer who has lately gone to his rest, will recall through this book the nervous, forceful manner, and the picturesque style, and the dramatic—now simple, now involved, and again abrupt—composition, by means of which he captivated the imagination, the emotions, the reason, and the will of vast and intelligent audiences in all the great cities and towns of the United Kingdom and of America. We have often in our own mind made comparison between two famous lecturers—Dean Stanley and Dr. Punshon, and we confess that for truth and beauty and real force impelling to right and duty in the business of life we have yielded the palm to the Wesleyan rather than the Churchman. For while the Dean was perhaps unrivalled in exhibiting the exterior of a man—his public, ecclesiastical, social, external character and bearing, together with the circumstances of his time, and the scenery amidst which he grew and acted, and which to some extent unconsciously moulded his character; the nonconforming divine, on the other hand, while not far behind in making men's pictures

(5) *Lectures.* By the Rev. W. Morley Punshon, LL.D. London: J. Woolmer. 1882.

stand forth by a few bold dashes of his pen, had far more power, as we conceive, in setting before readers and audiences the motives, principles, and purposes of men's lives, and thus attained a power of moulding character at its centre, whereas the Dean's power lay for the most part in polishing, and in inducing a man, by his own cultivated style and manner, to plant his foot firmly down and walk leisurely under the self-satisfying thoughts of his native nobility, and the kindly, brotherly service of Jesus in giving Himself in the Gospels as a study. Dr. Punshon, however, preferred the life-struggle of the city at one time and the free air of the mountain at another to the calmness and the shade of the classic grove of Academus. These healthful lectures are the result. Young men and all who are of a healthy spirit will delight in them. We may add as an additional inducement to the reading of this book that the contents are—The Prophet of Horeb—Bunyan—Macaulay—Wilberforce—The Huguenots—Wesley—Daniel—Florence and some notable Florentines—The connection between science, literature, and religion—The men of the Mayflower."

The third volume of the *Popular Commentary on the New Testament* (6), edited by Dr. Schaff, contains a clear and complete exposition of the Pauline Epistles. The most noteworthy treatises are "Galatians," by the editor; "Corinthians," by Principal Brown, of Aberdeen, and "Titus," by Dr. Oswald Dykes. Dr. Brown exhibits the same exegetic sagacity and epigrammatic statement which have made his notes on the Epistle to the Romans so valuable; while Dr. Dykes, in the very limited scope assigned him, and within the compass of a very few pages, proves himself possessed of singular power as a scholarly interpreter of Scripture. The three volumes of this Commentary already issued are admirably adapted for popular instruction. The contributors are judiciously conservative, and at the same time abreast of modern thought and research. Within its own sphere this commentary ranks second to none.

In its quarterly issue, the *Homiletic Magazine* won golden

(6) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

opinions. The new volume (7), containing six monthly parts (January to June 1882), is now before us. Its contents are characterised by thoughtfulness, vigour, and freshness. We are particularly pleased with the "Expository Section," especially with the homiletical commentaries on "Jonah," "Daniel," "Philippians," and the "Parabolic Teaching of Christ." Of the last, from the pen of Professor Bruce, we cannot speak too highly. To a profound insight into the purpose of each individual parable, there is added a remarkably wide acquaintance with the whole literature of the subject, recent and remote. We know of no discussion of the Parables approaching this in completeness and excellence.

From an Edinburgh publishing house we have received the first instalment, in two volumes, of a worthy edition of Wordsworth's *Poetical Works* (8). The editor, Professor Knight, of St. Andrews, has evidently entered upon his task *con amore*. He proposes to reprint all the poems, as far as possible, in chronological order—not of publication, but of production. He accepts Wordsworth's own final text of 1849-50, enriching or illustrating it, as the case may be, with various readings from other editions, and also from manuscript notes to which he has had access. "Several poems and fragments of poems hitherto unpublished" are also in these volumes to see the light for the first time. The two volumes before us are certainly very attractive, and they give promise, full and fair, of a series in which the growth of the poet's mind shall be clearly traced, while the fruits of his genius are fitly enshrined.

An anonymous book on man's place in nature (9) deserves notice. The author has collated and examined the various arguments adduced in proof of man's antiquity and primitive savagery, subjecting them to a destructive criticism with no little skill and success. To any who are disposed to attach much weight to hasty inferences, too often based upon uncer-

(7) London: James Nisbet and Co.

(8) *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*. Edited by William Knight, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews. Edinburgh: William Paterson.

(9) *The Remote Antiquity of Man not proven: Primeval Man not a Savage*. London: Elliot Stock.

tain facts, this little volume may be confidently recommended. It ought, at least, to compel them to examine anew both the facts and the inferences. The truth is, in the present state of our knowledge we are totally unable to fix dates in prehistoric time.

A Welsh preacher has printed twelve sermons preached in London (10). They are earnest, sensible, and orthodox. They claim and deserve attention not for any daring fancifulness of interpretation, but for genuine sympathy with the contents of the Bible, and an evident desire to unfold and enforce its lessons.

There is before us a dainty facsimile reprint of the first edition of *The Temple* (11), by George Herbert, with a characteristic introductory essay by J. Henry Shorthouse. Readers of *John Inglesant*, who remember the references in the first volume to Herbert's poems, will naturally turn to the introduction with much interest. We need not write a word in commendation of the poems. We would only say that in the form in which they lie before us they seem somehow to possess a force and significance not so apparent in the modern garb in which they are usually presented.

Why does Dr. Fraser disfigure his excellent little treatise (12) by giving it a title to which reasonable exception is sure to be taken? Luke's second treatise is not styled, The Acts of the *Holy* Apostles, and it would be more seemly to follow Biblical usage. To some prejudices we are not unwilling to yield, but when certain terms convey an unscriptural and dangerous meaning, our sense of truth should be shown in a careful avoidance of them. To speak of certain individuals as "saints" and "holy" *par excellence* is certainly not warranted by Scripture, and to intelligent theologians the danger of doing so need not be pointed out. We hope that from the second

(10) *Sermons preached in London*, by Rev. W. A. Griffiths. London : Elliot Stock.

(11) *The Temple*, etc. By George Herbert. Facsimile reprint of First Edition, 1633. London : T. Fisher Unwin.

(12) *The Speeches of the Holy Apostles*. By Donald Fraser, D.D. Edinburgh : Macniven and Wallace.

edition this blot will disappear. For the nothing but praise. It is original, and a ception and execution.

The new volume of the *Expositor* (1 terest. Mr. Beet, who has taken a good of commentators by his careful examina the Romans, contributes a valuable and certain difficult and important passages sion." Dr. Abbot makes a fierce onsl Epistle of Peter, which is met with son Farrar. Dr. George Matheson supplies s and Amos. The editor writes with his on the second, third, and fourth Psalm volume is one which a wise reader can pe tage. But we have noticed that, in the a and sometimes reckless criticism, there to dulness. The only remedy for this lie a constructive and edifying spirit among

To many within and without the V Memorial Volume of Dr. Gervase Smith come. It contains an historical sketch recollections by Mr. Gregory, an addres connection with the funeral sermon, and lectures, speeches, and sermons of Dr. Sn able and interesting, the sermons are eva fresh.

For some years the Cæsarean Literary has been issuing a new *corpus* (15) of Latin and they have already published the Severus, Minucius Felix, Cyprian, Arnobi We now have the works of Eunodius, of

(13) *The Expositor*, vol. iii. Second Series Stoughton.

(14) *The Rev. Gervase Smith, D.D.* A Memoir by S. Woolmer.

(15) *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Lat impensis Acad. Litt. Cæs. Vindobonensis*: vol. vi. 1 Omnia. Vienna: Carl Gerold's Sohn.

controversy. This volume, like that on Cyprian, is edited by Hartel. The usual plan is pursued. A text with various readings is given, and valuable prolegomena. To the latter special attention should be called. In this case there are brilliant contributions to the textual criticism of Eunodius, in which the several manuscripts and editions of any separate value are, upon purely textual grounds, referred to two originals. As a matter of typography this edition is much superior to the edition of Usigne, whilst its textual accuracy and careful revision makes it of higher value than the editions of 1611.

The plan of Bowman's *Hebrew Course* (16), the second part of which has just appeared, is sufficiently described by its title. It aims at giving an introduction to Hebrew, at once "easy and complete." To this end a Hebrew Grammar is undertaken, split up into fairly brief lessons, each of which blends grammatical remarks with exercises. Short vocabularies of useful and frequent words are also appended at the end of the volume. The resulting course thus more nearly resembles Kalisch's Grammar than Davidson's, although very large use has apparently been made of Böttcher's *Auführlicher Lehrbuch*. Alas! this second volume is a posthumous work, and has been completed by the Rev. T. Bowman's son, the Rev. A. H. Bowman, Junior and Senior Hebrew Prizeman at the University of Durham. Only long practice with classes would give a right to expressing our opinion upon such a work as this. At first sight, however, it seems too loaded with exceptions for a beginner, and too empirical for an advanced student.

In the latest volume of the *Pulpit Commentary* (17) the "Exposition" is from the pen of Dr. W. Lindsay Alexander, the "Homiletics" are contributed by Dr. Clemance, and, as usual, there are additional "Homilies" by various authors. The introduction contains a valuable, carefully constructed *résumé* of

(16) *A New, Easy, and Complete Hebrew Course, containing a Hebrew Grammar, with copious Hebrew and English Exercises, strictly graduated; also a Hebrew-English and English-Hebrew Lexicon.* By the late Rev. T. Bowman, M.A., Clifton, Bristol. Part II. *Irregular Verbs*, etc. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

(17) *The Pulpit Commentary: Deuteronomy.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.

modern opinions and discussions concerning the authority and authorship of Deuteronomy. It is eminently judicial. While fairly stating the objections with which we have been of late years made so familiar, it meets them temperately enough, yet with singular effectiveness. Indeed, we do not know where to find, within such reasonable compass, an equally complete and satisfactory statement of the whole case. The expository portion of the volume is also solid and serviceable. The homilies vary in value, but on the whole they are sound, sensible, and suggestive.

We are anxious to call attention to a volume of papers on Christian life and experience (18) which we have read with very great interest and pleasure. It is by a Wesleyan minister, but it contains very little to which any intelligent Calvinist would object, and it contains a great deal which it would be well for all Calvinists to know. The author opens up new fields in his choice of subjects. Among these we may mention "Compensations," "Possibilities of Life," "Narrow Escapes," "Unaccomplished Aims," and "The Open Secret of Character," as specially worthy of perusal, both on account of their novelty and a certain singular *verve* by which they are distinguished.

The relations between German Culture and Christianity have been sufficiently complex and changeful during the last century. Mr. Joseph Gostwick, who has already made himself known by his *Outlines of German Literature*, presents us with a large and acceptable volume (19), in which we have the results of much thoughtful and painstaking study of their controversy in the period between 1770 and 1880. In an orderly, interesting, and intelligible narrative, he traces philosophies, or forms of philosophic thought, which have assumed a hostile attitude towards Christian truth, from their origin through the various phases of development on to the present day. As a handbook of modern German philosophy this volume has considerable merit, and it evidences throughout a

(18) *Mistaken Signs: and other Papers on Christian Life and Experience.* By Rev. W. L. Walkinson. London: T. Woolmer.

(19) *German Culture and Christianity: their Controversy in the time 1770-1880.* London: Frederic Norgate.

clear and correct appreciation of the issues involved. In speaking of the antagonism now existing, he tells us that Ed. von Hartmann promises that he will soon produce and evolve "a principle that will in future serve better than Christianity to inspire and direct ethically the whole body of the human race." Mr. Gostwick quietly adds: "The intention is large; but we fear that sufficient time will hardly be allowed for such a performance as is here promised. In Berlin changes of theory must now-a-days be 'sensational.' Idealism has been slain, and is buried by pessimism; and now appears the latest novelty in the shape of that very old enemy—materialism. Our human 'consciousness,' of which so much has been said by idealists and pessimists, is itself—we are told now—nothing more than a delusion. All those actions of our brain that once were ascribed to divine influence are simply the results of changes taking place in molecules. Matter is all. Everything is material. Man is a bundle of sensations. He works like an automaton and cannot sin; for matter never sins.

"This is the result. Here is the substitute for the faith destroyed. It is not mere declamation, but sober truth, when it is asserted, that every word that can be said against Christianity has been said and repeated *usque ad nauseam* in Berlin; but that now the social principles there most dreaded, are so dreaded *specially because they are irreligious.*"



